NICHOLAS L. DEPP V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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AS MODIFIED : MARCH 10, 2009
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2009
TO BE PUBLISHED
2007-SC-000575-MR
NICHOLAS L. DEPP
ON APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP R. PATTON, JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-00177
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NOBLE
AFFIRMING
Nicholas Depp, Appellant, was convicted of first-degree rape and firstdegree sodomy, and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment on each
count, to run consecutively for a total of thirty years . He filed this appeal as a
matter of right pursuant to Ky. Const. Section 110 (2) (b) .
A detailed recitation of the facts underlying Appellant's convictions is not
necessary for analysis of the issues he raises in this appeal . Suffice it to say
that Appellant and the alleged victim differed about whether their sexual
encounters were consensual . The jury obviously believed the victim's version
of events . The underlying facts of the offense, however, are not relevant to the
issues in this case .
Appellant raises four issues on appeal : (1) the trial court failed to follow
proper procedure under Faretta v. California, 422 U .S . 806 (1975) ; (2) the trial
court failed to inform Appellant he could control standby counsel and failed to
appoint standby counsel; (3) the trial court mislead him regarding service of
subpoenas and refused to grant a continuance ; and, (4) the trial court erred by
not inviting Appellant to the bench during individual voir dire of potential
jurors . Finding no error, this Court affirms .
I. Appellant's Self-Representation
Before the Appellant was even indicted, he wrote a letter to the trial court
expressing his wish to represent himself, but recognizing the need for
assistance : "[W]ith the hopes in receiving legal rep ., for my up and coming jury
trial, Judge Patton, I truly intended on representing myself, however I am
unable to because of the many motions that need to be filed . . . ." He had
strong opinions about the kind of attorney he needed, because, as he wrote, "1
wouldn't want to get in the middle of this trial, and be forced to let my attorney
go, because he or she slacks off because they don't wish to embarrass these
two women . . . ."-clearly demonstrating that he knew he was in control of his
defense and what his attorney might do.
When Appellant appeared for his arraignment, he reminded the trial
court of his letter, and the court offered to appoint a public defender. By that
time, Appellant had decided to "just go it alone." The trial court emphasized
that the public defender had a high success rate at trial, but Appellant
resisted. At that point, the trial court suggested that it appoint standby
counsel, with whom Appellant could consult . The only person Appellant
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wanted was a jail inmate, but the trial court explained that the inmate could
not represent him . Since Appellant continued to want to represent himself, the
trial court told him a hearing under Faretta v. California, 422 U .S. 806 (1975),
was required, set a date for the hearing, informed the Appellant of the charges
against him, gave him a copy of the indictment and entered a plea of not guilty .
Subsequently, at the Faretta hearing, Appellant indicated that he now
wanted a lawyer, but wanted to pick his own attorney, and again asked for the
jail inmate . Again, the trial court praised the public defender's office, and
explained that the inmate was not an attorney and thus could not represent
the Appellant. Instead, the court was going to appoint the public defender .
Appellant refused, saying he would rather cross-examine the victim witness
himself. The trial court told Appellant that the attorney would ask the
questions, but that Appellant could confer with the attorney, and had begun to
explain further what the Appellant could say, when he interrupted, "Well, okay,
I don't want no attorney. I'm just going to not have an attorney."
At that point, the Commonwealth Attorney inserted the position that if
Appellant represented himself, he would not have a constitutional right to
cross-examine the victim witness pursuant to Partin v . Commonwealth, 168
S .W.3d 23 (Ky. 2005) . The trial court stated that would be dealt with "when
the time comes," and proceeded with the Faretta hearing, ascertaining that
Appellant understood he would have to abide by the rules of court and the
rulings made by the trial court, and that he was competent and not coerced
into representing himself. The trial court required Appellant to put his request
to represent himself in writing and sign it in open court, and concluded, "Okay,
I'm going to make a finding that you can represent yourself."
Appellant has a right under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution to reject counsel and represent himself during a criminal
proceeding. Faretta, 422 U .S. at 807 . However, the relinquishment of the right
to counsel must be made "knowingly and intelligently ." Id. at 835. Faretta did
not require any specific form or magic words for there to be a knowing and
voluntary choice to proceed pro se. It only required that the concerns it notes
be addressed.
Followi ng Faretta, this Court adopted a formulaic approach in
determining whether a defendant waived counsel "knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily." Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S .W.3d 221, 226 (Ky. 2004) .
However, shortly after Hill, the United States Supreme Court stated the
following:
We have not, however, prescribed any formula or script to be read
to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without
counsel. The information a defendant must possess in order to
make an intelligent election, our decisions indicate, will depend on
a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant's
education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature
of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding.
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S . 77, 88 (2004) .
In Tovar, the defendant, who was charged with drunken driving, told the
trial court he wanted to represent himself and to plead guilty. The court then
conducted the guilty-plea colloquy explaining the rights the defendant would
have if he pleaded not guilty, and what would happen in regard to his rights if
he instead pleaded guilty. The court explained the penalty ranges and the
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elements of the offense, and then accepted the guilty plea . Tovar was later
sentenced to two days' incarceration . However, he had two subsequent DUI
convictions, with representation of counsel . On the third occasion, he was
charged with a felony, using the two prior convictions as enhancement. He
resisted the felony charge by arguing that his first conviction must be excluded
because his waiver of counsel was invalid . The trial court denied his motion,
and sentenced him to the felony. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, but the
Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment without
considering the first conviction . The United States Supreme Court took review
to clarify the requirements the Sixth Amendment imposes on waiver of counsel,
as the federal courts were divided on the issue.
While Tovar involves waiver of counsel to enter a guilty plea, the U .S .
Supreme Court pointed out that the analysis regarding whether waiver of
counsel is adequate at any stage requires a pragmatic approach to right-tocounsel waivers, one that asks, "what purposes a lawyer can serve at the
particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance [counsel]
could provide to an accused at that stage' . . . ." Id . at 89 (quoting Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U.S . 285, 298 (1988)) . While what is required at different stages of
the trial may vary, the Court clarified as to the Sixth Amendment that the
constitutional minimum for determining whether a waiver was "knowing and
intelligent" is that the accused be made sufficiently aware of his right to have
counsel present and of the possible consequences of a decision to forgo the aid
of counsel. Since Faretta dealt with the defendant's right to represent himself
at trial , and the concomitant right to not have counsel forced upon him, the
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U.S . Supreme Court held that the record must establish that he "knowingly
and intelligently" chose to forgo the benefits of an attorney . The U.S . Supreme
Court, looking at the record , determined that Tovar did voluntarily exercise his
informed free will because of his personal characteristics and because the trial
court had warned him that it was a mistake not to accept assistance of counsel
and that he would be required to follow the rules of trial procedure . No "magic
words" or formulaic approach were required.
This Court, in Hill , reiterated the Faretta holding that an accused was
entitled to self-representation, or in that instance, co-representation . More
specifically, however, the Court commented that this right was accompanied by
the right to be informed by the trial court of the dangers inherent in doing so .
The Court determined that the trial court must hold a hearing at which the
defendant must testify that his choice is voluntary, knowing and intelligent ; the
trial court must warn the defendant of the dangers of relinquishing the benefits
of an attorney; and the trial court must make a finding on the record that the
waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.
Clearly, this is a bright-line approach . But there are so few bright lines
in law because most things are just not that simple . This case is a good
illustration of why imposing rigid requirements in every instance is not
necessary because it is clear the defendant indeed knew what he was doing,
and why doing so would undermine judicial economy
In this case, Appellant asked to represent himself. At his arraignment,
the possibility of standby counsel was discussed and Appellant rejected this
because he could not be represented by his jailhouse "lawyer." Appellant was
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offered assistance from DPA at both appearances before the trial court, and
rejected this because he could not choose his attorney and because he wanted
to cross-examine the witnesses himself. At the Faretta hearing, Appellant was
warned of the dangers of self-representation . He was informed he would have
to follow the rules of the court. Appellant put his waiver in writing and the trial
court made an oral finding that he could represent himself. In making that
finding, the court had the benefit of knowing all the discussions it had with the
Appellant, and it was aware that the Appellant knew and understood .
Appellant now claims that because the trial court did not use the magic
words that it found the waiver of counsel to be done "knowingly and
voluntarily," reversible error has been committed . However, the notion that a
specific script or "magic words" is required was clearly rejected in Tovar, and
while this Court could certainly impose more requirements than the federal
courts, if we do so, it should be meaningful. To reverse simply because the
trial court did not specifically state that the waiver was "voluntary, knowing
and intelligent" does nothing to ensure that the defendant had the opportunity
to make such a waiver. Only the record can do that .
In fact, even if the trial court had used those magic words, an appellate
court would still have to review the record to determine whether that finding
was correct.
The legal analysis in Hill is correct, and the result is just under the facts
of that case, so to overrule it is not required . However, to the extent Hill
purports to require a rigid, formulaic review of waiver of counsel, it is modified
to comport with common sense . If this case had been tried in federal court,
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under Faretta and Tovar the judgment would stand. Prior to Hill, Kentucky
law's only departure in this area was the allowance of a partial waiver of the
right to counsel under the Kentucky Constitution . The waiver requirements
were the same. Therefore, the claim after Tovar that Hill's overly rigid
requirements are still sound law and that the waiver requirements in Kentucky
are more expansive, is unsustainable . Hill itself purports to follow Faretta.
The requirements under Faretta as to waiver of counsel are all that should be
applied in this case .
The trial court implicitly found the waiver to be done knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily when, based on the sufficiently developed record,
he said he was going to "find" that Appellant could represent himself. While it
is always preferable to have express findings by the trial court on record, as it
usually clarifies issues on appeal, to require that trial courts adhere to a script
or be found in error is to elevate form over substance .
Appellant's argument that the trial court failed to explore the parameters
for standby counsel, failed to inform Appellant he could control standby
counsel and failed to appoint standby counsel is not supported by the record .
Appellant did not ask for standby counsel, although now he argues that he
ultimately decided to represent himself based on the trial court erroneously
informing him that if he had an attorney, he would not be able to crossexamine the witnesses personally and that he would have been able to retain
this right. In fact, the trial court was attempting to explain that if it appointed
an attorney, the attorney would be conducting the questioning of the victim
witness, but that Appellant would have input. This was a decision well within
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the trial court's discretion under Partin, and does not require a separate
hearing any more than most discretionary decisions do . In fact, Partin itself
approved a trial court's decision not to allow the defendant to personally crossexamine the victim without first conducting a hearing because it "was not an
abuse of discretion and did not violate Appellant's right of self-representation ."
Partin , 168 S .W. 3d at 29 .
A defendant "confronts" an alleged victim by his presence during
questioning, and has no constitutional right to intimidate a victim witness by
personally questioning him or her. His interest is sufficiently protected when
the judge asks questions that he has provided. It is within the judge's sound
discretion whether to allow the defendant to question a victim witness, and it
would be difficult to imagine a scenario where that discretion had been abused
when the judge did not allow an alleged perpetrator to question an alleged
victim of a sexual assault directly . See id. at 28-29 .
Under the procedural history of this case, and the legal aspects of what
the Appellant wanted to do, the trial court did not belabor the point about
standby counsel because it was obvious further discussion would make no
difference, since the issue for Appellant concerned what he himself might be
able to do, not counsel.
In this case, it is clear from the record that the trial court discussed selfrepresentation issues with the Appellant on two separate occasions, made an
adequate record for this Court to review for content, and adequately complied
with any duties it had with regard to Appellant's representation . To require
more here would create an injustice to the victim and the trial court. There
was no error.
II. Appellant's Witnesses
Appellant also argues that he was unable to secure two witnesses due to
the trial court misadvising him about the service of subpoenas and that he
should have been granted a continuance . However, Appellant announced that
he was ready to proceed to trial, knowing the witnesses had not been located .
He did not request a continuance or other specific relief before the trial began .
Because this alleged error was not preserved for appellate review, the
Court will reverse only if it constitutes palpable error under RCr 10.26 . A
palpable error is one that "affects the substantial rights of a party" and will
result in "manifest injustice" if not considered by the court . Schoenbachler v.
Commonwealth , 95 S .W.3d 830 (Ky. 2003) (citing RCr 10 .26) . Recently this
Court clarified that the key emphasis in defining such a palpable error under
RCr 10 .26 is the concept of "manifest injustice ." Martin v. Commonwealth,
207 S .W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006) . "[T]he required showing is probability of a different
result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due
process of law ." Id. Having reviewed Appellant's arguments, his willingness to
proceed without objection leads the Court to conclude that there was no
manifest injustice. The alleged error was not " shocking or jurisprudentially
intolerable." Id. at 4 . Therefore, it cannot be considered palpable and is not
grounds for reversal.
III. Jury Selection
During voir dire, the trial court asked the jurors to approach individually
to answer questions regarding their exposure to media coverage of Appellant's
case. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing to invite him to the
bench during this questioning. The trial court informed Appellant before the
trial began that he was going to ask the jurors about the newspaper articles at
the bench and that either party could ask the jurors questions. Neither the
prosecutor nor Appellant approached the bench during this portion of voir dire .
However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that he was precluded from
approaching and he did not ask to approach .
As the U .S . Supreme Court has stated, "whatever else may or may not be
open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot
thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of
`effective assistance of counsel."' Faretta, 422 U .S. at 834 n .46. There was no
error.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment and sentence of the Barren
Circuit Court is affirmed .
Cunningham, Scott and Venters, JJ., concur. Abramson, J ., concurs in
result only. Minton, C.J., dissents by separate opinion in which Schroder, J .,
loins.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Susan Jackson Balliet
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
James C . Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Attorney General's Office
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2009
TO BE PUBLISHED
,$ixyrPutr Cnaurf of ~rttfu-&V
2007-SC-000575-MR
NICHOLAS L. DEPP
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP R. PATTON, JUDGE
NO . 06-CR-00177
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON
Respectfully, I dissent because I cannot agree with the majority's
conclusion that this record supports the trial court's implicit finding that
Depp's waiver of his constitutional right to counsel was "knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary ."
On the heels of Depp's withdrawal of his request to represent himself, the
Commonwealth stated : "Your honor, just so we're clear, if he's getting an
attorney-one of the things that I was going to file if he was representing
Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 226 (Ky. 2004) (holding that a trial court
has three clear duties to perform in situations in which a defendant seeks to waive
his or her constitutional right to counsel : (1) the trial court must hold a hearing
during which it questions the defendant on the issue of whether the waiver of
counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (2) "during the hearing, the trial
court must warn the defendant of the hazards arising from and the benefits
relinquished by waiving counsel[ ;]" (3) the trial court "must make a finding on the
record that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.") .
himself is a motion to prevent him from cross-examining the victims, and
there's some case law on that- ." The Commonwealth and the trial court
discussed the motion and other matters in the case, and then there was a
moment of silence . Upon reflection of the Commonwealth's statement
pertaining to cross-examination, Depp broke the silence by stating : "By the
way, your honor, if I can't cross-examine the people that's brought me here,
then I don't think I would take an attorney, but if I can, then-." The following
dialogue ensued :
COURT:
Well, okay-
DEPP:
I want to be the one asking the questions.
These people that's brought me here-
COMMONWEALTH : Okay, which, we'll go ahead and file a motion
on that asking you to prohibit himDEPP:
Prohibit me?
COURT:
Okay, let me make sure that I understand
what you're asking me, Mr. Depp.
DEPP:
These people that's brought these allegations
against me--
COURT:
Okay.
DEPP:
Well, I should have the right to come in front
of you, with all due respect, in front of the
jury, with all due respect, and ask these
people these questions, the things that they
say that I have done to them, times, places-
COURT:
Okay, let me make sure that I, I had thought
that you had decided you wanted me to
appoint you a lawyer .
DEPP:
Yes, I do.
COURT:
If I appoint you a lawyer, then your attorney
asks those questions . You don't. Now, you
can confer with your attorney. You can say-
DEPP:
Well, okay, I don't want no attorney. I'm just
going to not have an attorney.
COMMONWEALTH : Which, your honor, that would be part of our
motion because there is case lawCOURT:
Okay, well deal with that when the time
comes.
COMMONWEALTH : So, if he's deciding not to have an attorney
now, are we going to have a hearing?
DEPP:
I just don't know. Let's just have a hearing .
COURT :
Okay. Let's proceed then with this, what I
have to do to let you represent yourself. All
right. I've got to make a determination
whether you are competent to represent
yourself. Now, that doesn't mean that you
graduated from law school . It just means
that you are familiar enough with the
procedure that you can represent yourself.
So let me ask this, have you ever been
determined, Mr. Depp, to be incompetent by
any court?
DEPP:
No, sir.
COURT:
Have you ever been treated for any mental
disease or defect?
DEPP:
No, sir.
COURT:
Have you-are you addicted to any controlled
substances?
DEPP:
No, sir.
COURT:
Are you under the influence of any drugs or
alcohol today?
DEPP:
Absolutely not.
COURT:
Now, I want to-I've got to warn you that in
court, we have rules of procedure, you know,
like who goes first and, who asks the
questions, then when it's your time to ask
questions, when it's their time to ask
questions. Do you understand that you will
be expected to follow those same rules?
DEPP:
Yes, but I can object-
COURT:
You can object-
DEPP:
At any time?
COURT:
Right, but if I make a ruling on an objection,
and I overrule your objection, then it has to
go the way I say. Do you understand that?
DEPP:
Yes, you the man. Yes sir, I understand that.
COURT :
Now, I need-the disadvantage of you
representing yourself is, even though you
have some experience in court, you didn't go
to law school-
DEPP:
No, sir.
COURT:
But you understand that I'm going to make
you follow the rules even though you didn't.
DEPP:
I understand .
COURT:
So that's a hazard of representing yourself.
DEPP:
I understand .
COURT:
Now, do you want then to represent yourself?
DEPP:
Yes, I do.
COURT:
Okay, I need for you to put that request in
writing.
At this point, the trial court provided Depp with paper; and Depp wrote
and signed the following request :
Sir, I would like to represent myself in both these cases
because [I] am afraid that all the facts will not come out at trial if
[I] use [a] public defender [and] want badly to question my
accuser[s] [and] witnesses[.]
The trial court then continued with the questioning:
COURT:
Now just a couple of more questions I want to
ask you, Mr . Depp . Did anyone make any
threats against you to cause you to make this
decision to represent yourself?
DEPP:
No, sir .
COURT:
Did anyone make any promises to you to
cause you to want to represent yourself?
DEPP:
No, sir.
COURT:
Has any member of the court, law
enforcement, corrections, anyone else, tried
to convince you that you should represent
yourself?
DEPP:
No, sir .
COURT:
So are you acting of your own free will?
DEPP:
Yes, sir.
COURT:
Okay I'm going to make a finding that you
can represent yourself.
And the trial court made the following written entry in the record:
"Pursuant to written request and after a hearing per Faretta v. Calif. [21 the
Defendant may represent himself."
Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 (1975) .
I commend the trial court for its patience in addressing Depp's indecision
about what he truly wanted, but I believe that the hearing was insufficient to
ensure that Depp's decision to forego counsel was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. More specifically, the trial court erred by informing Depp that if he
appointed counsel, the attorney-not Depp-would conduct the examination of
any witnesses . In Kentucky, "an accused may make a limited waiver of
counsel, specifying the extent of services he desires, and he then is entitled to
counsel whose duty will be confined to rendering the specified kind of services
(within, of course, the normal scope of counsel services) ."3 Here, the trial court
prophylacticly foreclosed Depp's right to make a limited waiver of counsel by
telling Depp that if it appointed counsel for him, Depp would not be able to
cross-examine the Commonwealth's witnesses . It is apparent, based both on
Depp's statements in the hearing and his written request, that the desire
personally to question the Commonwealth's witnesses was the heart of his
desire to waive counsel. Of course, a defendant is not necessarily entitled
personally to cross-examine each witness, especially the victim.4 But a
defendant proceeding with standby counsel should be able at least to
participate in cross-examination by preparing questions he desires his standby
3
Wake v. Barker , 514 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Ky. 1974) (recognizing hybrid representation
and expressing conclusion "that this is embraced within the right-to-counsel and
equal-protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions.").
Partin v. Commonwealth , 168 S.W.3d 23, 27 (Ky. 2005) (holding that a trial court
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit defendant who was acting as his
own co-counsel from personally cross-examining alleged victims who defendant
had allegedly threatened and intimidated) .
counsel to ask his accusers. Or, presumably, a defendant proceeding with
standby counsel may personally be allowed to cross-examine some of the
Commonwealth's witnesses (for example, investigating police officers who
would not generally be as emotionally involved or subject to intimidation as
would an alleged victim) . Likewise, a self-represented defendant may
presumably personally cross-examine at least some of the Commonwealth's
witnesses while also, if necessary, at least being able to write questions for the
trial judge to ask of other witnesses (i.e., the victim) . 6 Moreover, a trial court
should hold an evidentiary hearing before declining to permit a self-represented
litigant to cross-examine witnesses.?
In the case at hand, however, the trial court seemingly foreclosed,
without explanation or evidentiary hearing, any possibility that Depp would be
able personally to cross-examine any of the Commonwealth's witnesses or to
take any other meaningful role, such as assisting his counsel in the
preparation of questions. In other words, the trial court erred, in my view, by
presenting the questioning of witnesses as an all-or-nothing proposition .
Moreover, the colloquy between the trial court and Depp did not contain
a thorough warning by the trial court of the benefits Depp would relinquish if
he persisted in his desire to proceed without an attorney. Instead, the trial
court merely told Depp that even though Depp had not gone to law school, he
Id. at 28-29 .
Id. at 28.
Id.
would be expected to follow the procedural rules of court. This cursory
exchange was insufficient fully to "warn the defendant of the hazards arising
from and the benefits relinquished by waiving counsel .» 8 Of course, although I
do not believe it wise or necessary to set forth definitively what a trial court
must discuss with a defendant who seeks to proceed without an attorney, I
note that many of the typical facets of a proper colloquy between the trial judge
and the defendant have been set forth in a learned treatise and cases from
other jurisdictions . 9
Hill, 125 S.W .3d at 226 .
See CJS Criminal Law § 377 (2008) ("The court should generally hold a discussion
with the accused . In accordance with the rules concerning what the accused must
know in order to make a valid waiver, the court generally should expressly advise
the accused of the disadvantages or dangers of self-representation, the fact that the
accused must follow technical rules and rules of criminal procedure and evidence,
the nature of the charges and possible penalties, defenses or mitigating factors, the
right to counsel, and the right to self-representation .
The court should advise the accused of the technical problems the accused may
encounter in acting as his or her own counsel and risks he or she takes if the
defense is unsuccessful, that the lack of knowledge of the law may impair the
accused's ability to defend himself or herself, and that his or her dual role as
attorney and accused might hamper effectiveness of his or her defense, and of the
difficulties in acting as his or her own counsel . The defendant should be advised
that, in addition to defenses, the defendant has rights that, if not timely asserted,
may be lost permanently, and that if errors occur and are not timely objected to,
objection to these errors may be lost permanently. When a defendant seeks to
represent himself, the district court should inquire of the defendant about the
complexity of the case to ensure that the defendant understands his or her
decision and, in particular, the difficulties he or she will face proceeding in proper
person . Accordingly, if a defendant willingly waives counsel and chooses selfrepresentation with an understanding of its dangers, including the difficulties
presented by a complex case, he or she has the right to do so . In addition, before
allowing the criminal defendant to waive right to counsel, the court should
specifically advise the defendant that it would be unwise not to accept assistance of
counsel .") (footnotes omitted) . See also United States v. McDowell, 814 F .2d 245,
251-52 (6th Cir. 1987) (setting forth in an appendix a guideline for federal trial
judges to follow in situations where a defendant expresses a desire for selfrepresentation) .
Additionally, I note that the trial court did not make any oral or written
findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding Depp's desire to proceed
without counsel or to have standby counsel, except to note that Depp had been
granted the opportunity to represent himself. A trial court is required to make
findings on the record as to whether the defendant's waiver of the right to
counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily . t o
Of course, we should not require trial courts to recite any specific litany
while conducting Faretta-type hearings . But I believe a trial court is required
to provide an adequate, meaningful, and accurate explanation of the basic
constitutional rights that a defendant seeks to waive in order to ensure that the
defendant makes a decision "with eyes open."' 1 That fundamental requirement
was not met in this case .
Finally, I would conclude that the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Iowa v. Tovar, 12 which the Commonwealth argues has superseded
Hill, is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand because Tovar did not
involve a request to proceed with self-representation at trial . Rather, as the
Supreme Court itself held, Tovar involved "the extent to which a trial judge,
before accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate
on the right to representation."13 Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court held that
to Hill , 125 S.W.3d at 226 (holding that the trial court "must make a finding on the
record that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. ") .
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann , 317 U.S .
269, 279 (1942)) .
12 541 U .S. 77 (2004) .
13 Id. at 81 .
no magic words were required for a defendant validly to waive the right to
counsel . 14 With that unremarkable proposition, I do not quarrel . But I find
Hill to be a more appropriate statement of Kentucky's more expansive law
regarding a defendant's right to self-representation because we have previously
noted that a defendant possesses somewhat more expansive rights in the selfrepresentation area under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution than under
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution . 1 5 And Tovar itself
recognized that a state was free to adopt a different approach . 16 So I disagree
with the Commonwealth's assertion that Hill is no longer valid and binding.
There is more that causes me concern about the substance of this
hearing. In the hearing, the trial court did not inform Depp of the nature of the
charges against him and the range of punishments . I am not looking for magic
words, incantations, or a scripted monologue by the trial court. I am simply
looking for an adequate, meaningful, and accurate explanation of the basic
constitutional right that Depp was relinquishing to ensure that he made his
decision "with eyes open" as required by Faretta . In my opinion, that did not
happen here . Having reviewed the record, I would conclude that the trial court
did not provide sufficient guidance and warnings to Depp so as to allow Depp
to waive his vital constitutional right to an attorney with fully open eyes . Our
14
15
16
Id. at 88.
See, e.g., Deno v . Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Ky . 2005) ("The wording of
Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution, unlike that of the similar provision which
appears in the United States Constitution, guarantees a criminal defendant the
right: (1) to represent himself pro se; (2) to be represented by counsel; or (3) to
have hybrid representation .") (footnote omitted) .
541 U.S . at 94.
10
precedent clearly holds that these types of errors are structural and cannot be
harmless . 17 So I would reverse and remand for a new trial .
Schroder, J ., joins this dissenting opinion .
17 Hill , 125 S .W. 3d at 228-29 .
,*UyrrMr (~Vurf
of ~irufurhv
2007-SC-000575-MR
NICHOLAS L. DEPP
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP R. PATTON, JUDGE
NO . 06-CR-00177
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER
On the Court's own motion, the Opinion of the Court by Justice Noble
rendered February 19, 2009 shall be modified on page 3, line 18, by changing
the citation in Partin . Pages 1 and 3 shall be substituted, as attached hereto, in
lieu of pages 1 and 3 of the Opinion as originally rendered . Said modification
does not affect the holding.
Entered: March 10, 2009 .
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