COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. THOMAS ELZA, JR.
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RENDERED : MAY 21, 2009
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2007-SC-000538-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
04101_
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2006-CA-001339-MR
LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT NO. 03-CR-00251
V.
THOMAS ELZA, JR.
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM
REVERSING
Appellee, Thomas Elza, Jr., moved the Laurel Circuit Court for postconviction relief pursuant to RCr 11 .42, alleging that his plea of guilty to the
charges of murder and burglary in the first degree was involuntary. Elza
admitted that he broke into the home of Pauline Rey, the mother of his exgirlfriend, and choked her to death in front of her two young grandchildren.
Crystal Rey, Elza's ex-girlfriend, was also present while the murder occurred,
simultaneously trying to stop Elza while protecting her two children . After
killing Pauline, Elza kidnapped Crystal by dragging her from the home as she
pleaded for her children . He took her to a nearby wooded area, tied her to a
tree, and left.
The trial court denied the motion for post-conviction relief without
conducting an evidentiary hearing. Elza appealed, and the Court of Appeals
remanded the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. Upon the
Commonwealth's motion, this Court granted discretionary review .
In his RCr 11 .42 motion, Elza claimed that his plea of guilty was not
voluntary and intelligent, and that it was the product of ineffective assistance
of counsel . Elza's motion is based on the claim that he was so intoxicated at
the time of the murder that he could not have formed the requisite intent to
commit either murder or burglary in the first degree . He asserts that his
counsel failed to inform him that his intoxication could possibly provide a
defense to the charges or result in conviction of a lesser degree of homicide .
In support of the motion, Elza submitted reports of mental evaluations
conducted prior to his plea. The first evaluation was ordered by the circuit
court upon petition of a Laurel County deputy jailer who noted that Elza,
before being apprehended for Rey's murder, had attempted to kill himself. In
the report, Elza is deemed competent to stand trial, but the evaluating
psychologist would not give an opinion on Elza's criminal responsibility
because Elza reported, "my lawyer told me not to talk about [the crimes] ."
Elza underwent a second evaluation by a defense expert psychologist .
This report recounts Elza's long-time use of methamphetamines and notes his
lack of any memory of the crimes. The evaluating psychologist concluded that
Elza was in a drug-altered state at the time of the crimes and was unable to
differentiate between right and wrong and was unable to conform his conduct
to the law.
Elza claims that the reports of these evaluations clearly support an
intoxication defense to the murder and burglary charges. Had he known the
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existence and strength of his intoxication defense, Elza asserts he would have
insisted on going to trial. Further, Elza stated in his motion that counsel
coerced him into accepting the plea agreement through "emotional
manipulation ." He did not file an affidavit in support of this claim . Rather, he
simply states in his pro se motion that defense counsel "made [him] feel like
[he] was getting a special deal" and that a jury would "most assuredly" give him
the death penalty.
The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred in denying
Elza an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing should be conducted when
a "material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record"
has been raised . RCr 11 .42(5) . "A hearing is required if there is a material
issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i .e ., conclusively proved or
disproved, by an examination of the record ." Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59
S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001) .
In his motion for post-conviction relief, Elza argued that his guilty plea
was constitutionally defective because it was the product of his attorney's
coercion and failure to pursue an intoxication defense. In order to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel where a guilty plea has been entered, the
movant must establish:
(1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance
fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance ;
and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously affected the
outcome of the plea process that, but for- the errors of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have
pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.
Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001) (considering claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel brought pursuant to RCr 8 .10 motion to
withdraw a guilty plea) . "[T]he trial court must evaluate whether errors by trial
counsel significantly influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty in a
manner which gives the trial court reason to doubt the voluntariness and
validity of the plea." Id. at 487.
Elza insists that the evidence supporting an intoxication defense was
very strong, and that his attorney was ineffective for recommending a plea
agreement in light of that sustainable defense . Our analysis, however, must
begin with the voluntariness of his guilty plea. This is because the effect of a
valid plea of guilty is to waive all defenses other than that the indictment
charges no offense. Quarles v. Commonwealth , 456 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Ky.
1970) . We determine the voluntariness of the plea from the "totality of the
circumstances ." Rodriguez v. Commonwealth , 87 S.W.3d 8, 10-11 (Ky. 2002) .
In doing so, we "juxtapose the presumption of voluntariness inherent in a
proper plea colloquy with a Strickland v. Washington inquiry into the
performance of counsel." Bronk, 58 S .W.3d at 486 .
The trial court initially determined the voluntariness of Elza's guilty plea
during the thorough colloquy conducted pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969) . Elza described, in his own words, what happened when he
killed Pauline Rey. He explained that he entered Rey's residence with the
purpose of "getting into an altercation with her" ; that he hit Rey; and that he
strangled Rey to death . Not only are such admissions made in open court
afforded much credence, but Elza's description completely refutes the current
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claim that he has no memory of the crimes . See Edmonds v. Commonwealth,
189 S .W .3d 558, 569 (Ky. 2006) ("Solemn declarations in open court carry a
strong presumption of verity.")
Elza stated that he was satisfied with his attorney, and that counsel had
fully explained the defenses available to him. He denied that he had been
coerced or induced to accept the plea agreement. He stated that he was not
under the influence of any mind-altering substance or medication that would
inhibit his ability to understand the guilty plea proceedings. He stated that he
had never been diagnosed with a mental disease that would affect his ability to
reason or understand the proceedings against him. He appeared coherent,
engaged, and involved during the colloquy . Elza signed the motion to enter a
guilty plea (AOC form 491) and indicated that he read and understood its
contents .
Having found no indication from the plea colloquy to negate the
presumption that Elza's plea was voluntary, we turn to counsel's performance .
The Commonwealth notified Elza prior to the guilty plea of its intention to
proceed with capital punishment, citing the first-degree burglary aggravator
enumerated at KRS 532 .025(2)(a)(2) as a basis. Thus, Elza faced a maximum
punishment of death and a minimum punishment of imprisonment for twenty
years . See KRS 532 .030(l) . Defense counsel engaged in extensive motion
practice in an effort to remove the death penalty as a possible sentence . The
Commonwealth vigorously opposed each motion, illustrating its intent to seek
capital punishment . In light of these circumstances, the plea accepted by Elza
was reasonable. By pleading guilty, Elza avoided the death penalty . In
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addition, two remaining felony counts (kidnapping and retaliation against a
participant in the legal process) and two remaining misdemeanor counts
(wanton endangerment in the second degree) were dismissed . See
Commonwealth v. Campbell , 415 S .W.2d 614 (Ky. 1967) (no ineffective
assistance of counsel where defendant was advised to accept a reasonable plea
agreement) .
"[W]here the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant
of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the
`prejudice' inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely
would have succeeded at trial ." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) . Here,
the record offers little indication that a defense of intoxication would have
succeeded . The evidence of Elza's guilt was overwhelming and included the
damning testimony of his ex-girlfriend who witnessed the entire crime. There
was little hope of juror sympathy, as two young children watched Elza brutally
murder their grandmother and then violently drag their mother from the home .
Thus, we find no likelihood that the intoxication defense, had it been presented
to a jury, would have succeeded in exonerating Elza .
"In order to be valid, a guilty plea in a criminal case must represent a
meaningful choice between the probable outcome at trial and the more certain
outcome offered by the plea agreement." Vaughn , 258 S .W.3d 435, 439 (Ky.
App . 2008) . See also North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S . 25 (1970) . In light of
the uncertainties Elza potentially faced at trial, including the death penalty, it
appears a meaningful choice was made.
The record before the trial court conclusively refutes the assertion that
Elza's guilty plea was involuntary. His statements and demeanor at the plea
colloquy belie any contention that he was coerced into pleading guilty .
Further, Elza has failed to make even a threshold showing that defense
counsel's performance was deficient in any manner. His claim that defense
counsel told him he would "assuredly" receive the death penalty does not
amount to coercion. Rather, the record establishes that defense counsel's
advice was reasonable, as the Commonwealth repeatedly and successfully
defended any attempt to remove the case from capital punishment eligibility.
For these reasons, an evidentiary hearing was not required in this case .
We have recognized that an evidentiary hearing is often necessary in cases
where a defendant claims his plea was involuntary due to counsel's ineffective
assistance in order to determine "what transpired between attorney and
client[ .]" Rodriguez, 87 S .W .3d at 10 . However, here, Elza filed no affidavits in
support of his claim of coercion and did not identify any particular instance of
the alleged manipulation other than defense counsel's truthful warning that
the death penalty was a very real possibility. Furthermore, as detailed above,
the record clearly establishes that Elza's guilty plea was voluntary, and that the
plea agreement was reasonable in light of the circumstances . "The subsequent
presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to
summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly
incredible ." Edmonds, 189 S .W.3d at 569, quoting Blackledge v. Allison , 431
U.S. 63, 74 (1977) . The trial court properly rejected Elza's motion without
conducting an evidentiary hearing.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the
Laurel Circuit Court is hereby reinstated .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas Elza, Jr. #187923
Marion Adjustment Center
95 Raywick Road
St. Mary, KY 40063
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