DAVID MORROW V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2007-SC-000505-DG
ED
DAVID MORROW
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2005-CA-001645-MR
MCCREARY CIRCUIT COURT NO . 03-CR-00066-002
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE SCOTT
REVERSING
The present appeal comes to this Court by way of discretionary review
from a decision of the Court of Appeals, wherein it was determined that a
criminal defendant may not deny commission of a criminal offense and
alternatively seek the affirmative defense of entrapment, breaking with the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Mathews v. United States, 485 U .S. 58
(1988) .
Appellant, David Morrow, appeals from the Court of Appeals' decision
affirming the judgment of the McCreary Circuit Court convicting him of
complicity to commit first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance whereby
Appellant was sentenced to six (6) years imprisonment . Appellant claims that
the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury on entrapment . Having
been sufficiently persuaded that Mathews should be followed in Kentucky, we
thus reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals and remand the matter back to
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion .
I.
Appellant was
BACKGROUND
a former special deputy sheriff in McCreary County and
was employed as a part-time deputy jailer at the Whitley County jail during the
time he was arrested for complicity to commit first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance with his brother, Ernie Morrow . Appellant claims that it
was the events leading up to his arrest which predicate his innocence .
Appellant claimed to know Henry Tapley only peripherally, through an
introduction at a local garage of a mechanic they both used. Tapley became
associated with Kentucky State Police around February 2002 when officers
raided his residence upon suspicion of involvement in the drug trade and
discovered Oxycontin and other prescription medications present therein .
Tapley was known by the police to be well-connected with other individuals in
the drug community. Shortly thereafter, to avoid prosecution, Tapley agreed to
cooperate with police and became a confidential informant. Subsequently, a
surveillance camera was installed at Tapley's residence in his garage to capture
staged drug transactions .
During the course of their involvement with Tapley, police received
information that Appellant was connected with selling drugs . It was suggested
by Detective Billy Correll that Tapley pursue Appellant as a possible target.
Appellant claimed that he had no other dealings with Tapley prior to the
events which led to his arrest . Testimony introduced at trial indicated that
Tapley sought Appellant out at his residence under the auspices of discussing
an antique car which Tapley had brought to his home to restore. During the
course of the conversation, Tapley, who was limping and using a cane,
complained that he was in pain and asked Appellant if he or his brother, Ernie,
had anything that could help him with the pain. Ernie was battling cancer and
had been prescribed pain medications for four or five years.
Over the course of the next several days, Tapley vigorously pursued
Appellant and his brother, calling repeatedly and stopping by Appellant's house
on more than one occasion. The end result was the facilitation of a drug
transaction between Tapley and Ernie .
Apparently, Ernie was unfamiliar with where Tapley lived, but Appellant
knew the location, allegedly having been there once before . Thus, on March
28, 2003, Appellant and Ernie arrived at Tapley's residence . I A portion of the
transaction which followed was captured by the surveillance equipment in
Tapley's garage. Appellant claimed that he was aware that Tapley wanted
drugs, but that he was unaware that Ernie had drugs in his possession .
The videotape of the transaction showed Ernie removing money from his
wallet and entering the garage while Appellant remained outside. Tapley
claimed that he saw Ernie hand money to Appellant prior to this . Tapley had
'It is disputed whether the brothers arrived together in the same automobile or
drove separately.
been supplied with $600 in marked "buy money" by detectives for purposes of
acquiring Oxycontin. In the garage, Ernie indicated that he would sell the
prescription medication to Tapley at a price of $35 per pill . Appellant was
called into the garage to do some calculations on a piece of paper and arrived
at a figure of seventeen (17) pills for a price of $595 . Appellant then left the
room after performing the calculation and prior to the transaction. Video
showed Tapley removing the money from his pocket and exchanging it with
Ernie as he counted out the pills . As Ernie left, a photograph of his car was
captured by a detective who was in hiding at the scene .
Appellant was subsequently arrested some months later in July 2003 for
complicity to commit trafficking, and Ernie was indicted for first-degree
trafficking. Appellant and his brother were tried together, although Ernie
accepted a plea agreement during the latter stages of the trial .
At the onset of the trial, Appellant moved to dismiss on the basis that he
was entrapped; the motion, however, was overruled . During trial, Appellant
presented evidence relating to the entrapment and the persistent nature with
which Tapley pursued the transaction . Appellant also presented a defense
which centered on his involvement in an independent undercover drug
investigation scheme, his contact with several figures regarding the
investigation and his attempts to set up Tapley.
Appellant alleged that he could not get cooperation from the McCreary
County police on his investigation because the police were strongly biased
against his family. Appellant's wife had been employed as a 011 operator prior
to her termination in July 2002. Appellant claimed that when his wife
subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination his family was harassed by the
sheriffs department and they refused to assist him .
At the close of evidence, Appellant requested the trial court tender an
instruction to the jury on entrapment. The Commonwealth argued that he
should not be able to receive the instruction because of his alternate defense
regarding his independent undercover drug investigation . The trial court
denied Appellant's request for the instruction, claiming that it did not appear
that Appellant was entrapped . Appellant was ultimately convicted of complicity
to commit first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and was sentenced
to six (6) years imprisonment . We granted discretionary review of the matter to
examine whether criminal defendants may alternately and inconsistently plead
entrapment as a defense.
II.
ANALYSIS
The sole question before this Court is whether the trial court should have
instructed the jury on the entrapment defense . Appellant alleges that sufficient
evidence was presented at trial to warrant an instruction on entrapment and,
as such, he was denied due process when the trial court refused to so instruct
the jury. Because this matter turns on the trial court's determination as to
whether to tender a jury instruction, we will engage in a de novo review.
Hamilton v. CSX Transp., Inc . , 208 S .W.3d 272, 275 (Ky. App. 2006) .
The law surrounding entrapment is well-defined in Kentucky, having
been amply set forth by both statutory and case law. Entrapment is a defense
to a crime available to a defendant if "`[the defendant] was induced or
encouraged to engage in [the criminal] conduct by a public servant seeking to
obtain evidence against him for the purpose of criminal prosecution,' and the
defendant "was not otherwise disposed to engage in such conduct" at the time
of the inducement . Wyatt v. Commonwealth , 219 S.W.3d 751, 756 (Ky. 2007)
(quoting KRS 505 .010) .2 Entitlement to the defense requires satisfaction of
both prongs of the test, inducement and absence of predisposition . Mathews,
485 U .S . at 63.
2 KRS 505 .010 states in full:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense arising out of proscribed conduct
when:
(a) He was induced or encouraged to engage in that conduct by a public
servant or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant
seeking to obtain evidence against him for the purpose of criminal
prosecution; and
(b) At the time of the inducement or encouragement, he was not
otherwise disposed to engage in such conduct .
(2) The relief afforded by subsection (1) is unavailable when:
(a) The public servant or the person acting in cooperation with a public
servant merely affords the defendant an opportunity to commit an
offense ; or
(b) The offense charged has physical injury or the threat of physical
injury as one (1) of its elements and the prosecution is based on
conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment .
(3) The relief provided a defendant by subsection (1) is a defense.
Here, the first prong, inducement, is conceded by the Commonwealth . It
is uncontroverted that Tapley was a confidential informant working in
conjunction with the state police under the direction of Detective Correll . The
facts indicate that Tapley was engaged in a scheme whereby a video camera
was set up in his garage to record drug transactions . Tapley was paid one
hundred dollars ($100) for each drug transaction he facilitated. The
Commonwealth admits that it was Tapley who first broached the issue of
whether Appellant could supply him with Oxycontin and that all subsequent
conversations between the Morrow brothers and Tapley were initiated by
Tapley.
There was ample testimony introduced at trial that Tapley was quite
persistent in his efforts . Although the exact numbers are contested, it appears
that Tapley went to Appellant's home at least twice and made numerous phone
calls to Appellant's residence, calling as many as two to three times a day and
speaking with Appellant, his mother, his brother, his wife, and his children at
various times . Testimony indicated that Tapley's number appeared on
Appellant's caller identification record twenty (20) times . Appellant's brother,
Ernie, testified that Tapley called him on five (5) consecutive days asking for
Oxycontin. Testimony indicated that Ernie told Appellant Tapley was "driving
him crazy." The Commonwealth concedes that although Appellant acquiesced
to the sale, he was not the "prime mover" in the transaction. Wyatt, 219
S .W.3d at 757.
If the first prong of the entrapment defense is satisfied, the burden then
shifts to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was predisposed to engage in the criminal act prior to inducement
by the government or its agent. Id. ; Commonwealth v. Day, 983 S .W.2d 505
(Ky. 1999); KRS 500 .070(3) . "Predisposition, `the principal element in the
defense of entrapment,' focuses upon whether the defendant was an `unwary
innocent' or, instead, an `unwary criminal' who readily availed himself of the
opportunity to perpetrate the crime ." Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63 (
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U .S . 435 (1932)) (internal citations omitted) ;
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S . 369, 376-377 (1958) . This Court has
found that predisposition may be demonstrated by "evidence that . . . the
accused has engaged in a course of similar crimes, where the defendant was
merely afforded an opportunity to commit a preconceived plan, or where
willingness to commit the crime is apparent by ready compliance." Wyatt, 219
S .W.3d at 757 .
Here, evidence presented at trial produced conflicting accounts as to
whether Appellant had previously engaged in a course of similar criminal
behavior or was in fact willing to commit the crime in this instance . Appellant
had formerly been employed by the county sheriff's department and was
employed as a part-time deputy jailer at the time of his arrest. Testimony
indicated that Appellant had never been in any trouble prior to his arrest.
When Tapley first approached Appellant about acquiring Qxycontin, Appellant
indicated that he did not sell drugs and was not involved in drugs. During
subsequent contacts by Tapley, Appellant repeated to him that he did not sell
drugs. When Tapley became an informant for the sheriff's department, he
submitted a list of names of people who he knew had involvement in the drug
trade in the community . Appellant's name was not on this list .
Alternatively, Detective Correll testified at trial that he received
information from other sources linking Appellant with the drug trade . Correll
testified that Tapley indicated he had purchased drugs from Appellant once
before, prior to 2002 . Likewise, Tapley testified that Appellant once came to his
house looking for an individual who allegedly owed him money from a soured
drug deal. Moreover, Appellant's brother, Ernie, initially implicated Appellant
in drug trafficking, though Ernie later refuted this testimony at trial, claiming
that he was suffering from mild dementia during the time the statement was
made as a result of treatments he was undergoing for cancer.
However, the "x-factor" in this analysis centers on Appellant's defense at
trial, a rather intricate account whereby he claims that he was engaged in an
independent drug investigation under the auspices of garnering future
employment . Appellant had worked on the election campaign of Sheriff
Clarence Perry. According to Appellant, he expected to be hired as a deputy
sheriff after Perry's election and had begun gathering evidence on Tapley
during this time. Appellant indicated he had driven an individual to Tapley's
residence on two occasions to observe drug transactions in an effort to gather
evidence against him. Appellant claimed that he wanted Tapley to believe that
he was involved in the drug culture so that he could make a false buy from him
in the future . Testimony indicated that Appellant had informed former fellow
deputy jailer Bob Robinson that he intended to contact undercover police
detective David Lassiter for purposes of setting up Tapley. Appellant also
claimed that he had been in contact with Constable Milford Creekmore, who
had informed him that he would bring charges on any individual on whom
Appellant could produce evidence. However, at trial, Sheriff Perry testified that
he did not recall speaking with Appellant about the investigation and that he
had initially considered hiring Appellant but declined to do so, on the basis of
rumors that he was on medication.
Thus, the crux of the present matter is this: did Appellant's assertion
that he was engaged in the transaction for purposes of an independent
criminal investigation preclude him from alternatively asserting that he was
entrapped? We think not.
The United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of
alternative inconsistent defenses in the entrapment setting, i .e. denial of the
offense and reliance upon entrapment, in a case substantially on point. See
Mathews , 485 U .S . at 64 . In Mathews , the United States government argued
that a criminal defendant should not be allowed to both deny an offense and
alternatively rely on an entrapment defense "[b]ecause entrapment
presupposes commission of a crime ." Id . at 63 (citin United States v. Russell ,
411 U .S . 423, 435 (1973)) . Rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court
recognized "[a]s a general proposition a defendant is entitled to an instruction
as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a
reasonable jury to find in his favor." Id . (emphasis added) . Extrapolating that
logic, the Court noted that both federal and state courts permit alternative
inconsistent affirmative defenses in various settings and that inconsistent
pleading is explicitly allowed under the federal rules of civil procedure and
impliedly allowed under the federal criminal rules . Accordingly, the Court held
that, in the case of entrapment, a defendant could deny the acts and elements
constituting the underlying crime, yet still maintain an entrapment defense.
Id . at 65 (citin United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975)) .
The Court of Appeals, in its opinion below, found that Appellant, was not
entitled to the entrapment defense - rejecting the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Mathews, and adopting instead, a position consistent with the view espoused
by Justice White's dissent, in which he reasoned, "'[p]ermitting a defendant to
argue two defenses that cannot both be true is equivalent to sanctioning
perjury by the defendant .' Mathews , 485 U .S . at 72 (White, J ., dissenting)
(quoting Note, Entrapment and Denial of the Crime: A Defense of the
Inconsistency Rule , 1986 Duke L.J. 866, 883-884.) .
As Justice White aptly noted, "a criminal trial is not a game or a sport."
Mathews, 485 U .S. at 72 (White, J. dissenting) . Indeed, it is not. However,
3 The Court of Appeals is correct insofar as it asserts that Mathews concerns a
federal prosecution and does not posit constitutional matters. Thus, Kentuc
not obligated to follow it.
neither should the investigatory techniques of public officers and their agents
be considered a game of cat and mouse, where otherwise innocent persons are
intentionally provoked into criminal acts. Although,
[a]rtifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in
criminal enterprises . The appropriate object of this permitted
activity, frequently essential to the enforcement of the law, is to
reveal the criminal design ; to expose the illicit traffic . . . and thus
to disclose the would-be violators of the law. A different question is
presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of
the government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
commission in order that they may prosecute .
Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 at 442 (internal citations omitted) . The entrapment
defense allows a jury to sift out the truly innocent from the process of
prosecution and is therefore important to our freedoms .
The Court of Appeals opined that when presented with inconsistent
alternative defenses, "[a] jury could not logically conclude that a defendant
failed to commit the crime and yet had been entrapped." Morrow v.
Commonwealth , No. 2005-CA-001645-MR, slip op. at 5 (Ky. June 29, 2007) .
While as a tactical reality this may be correct, this supposition, however,
ignores the fact that the law, in many arenas, indulges in the legal fiction of
inconsistent pleadings and defenses. See, e.g. , Demma , 523 F.2d at 985 ("The
rule in favor of inconsistent defenses reflects the belief of modern criminal
jurisprudence that a criminal defendant should be accorded every reasonable
protection in defending himself against governmental prosecution .") ; see also
Love v. State , 441 So .2d 1353, 1356 (Miss. 1983) ("Litigants in all cases are
entitled to assert alternative theories, even inconsistent alternative theories .") .
The obvious danger implicated in not allowing a criminal defendant to
alternatively claim innocence and entrapment as a defense is that it forces the
defendant to admit to the criminal acts in question in order to have the defense
available.
Thus, we do not share in the Court of Appeals' and Justice White's fear
of the entrapment defense, and do not think claiming alternative inconsistent
defenses "will encourage perjury, lead to jury confusion, [or] subvert the truth
finding function of the trial. These same concerns are [ ] present in the civil
context, yet inconsistency is expressly allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. We do not think that allowing inconsistency necessarily sanctions
perjury." Mathews, 485 U.S . at 65 . Mathews unequivocally held that "when
the defendant denied one or more elements of the offense, the defendant is still
entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever sufficient evidence exists from
which a reasonable jury could find entrapment." United States v. Walther, 867
F.2d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 1989) (considering the retroactive applicability of
Mathews for purposes of permitting alternate defenses) . We think this is a
sound position under the law and, accordingly, find the Court of Appeals
holding untenable .4
4 The aforementioned analysis notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals based its
holding, in part, on its determination that Appellant was denying the underlying
offense and thus could not claim entrapment as it necessitates, as a prerequisite,
that the offense was committed. However, we believe that the Court of Appeals
misconstrued Appellant's defense . Here, Appellant was not asserting that he did
not engage in the transaction, rather that he was not complicit in trafficking, as he
was not criminally culpable because he was gathering evidence against Tapley, or,
13
Thus, we hold that a criminal defendant may properly deny one or more
elements of a criminal offense and alternatively claim the affirmative defense of
entrapment if sufficient evidence is introduced at trial to warrant instructing
the jury as to the defense . Here, the Commonwealth conceded that Appellant
was induced to participate in the transaction . Therefore, the burden was on
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was
predisposed to participate . Wyatt, 219 S .W.3d at 757 . Although the trial
testimony was conflicting, we believe that there was sufficient evidence
introduced such that a reasonable juror could have believed that Appellant was
entrapped .
Accordingly, because "[t]he question of entrapment is generally one for
the jury, rather than for the court," Mathews, 485 U.S . at 63, and because
Kentucky courts are bound to instruct juries on the whole law of the case,
Ward v. Commonwealth , 695 S .W.2d 404, 406 (Ky. 1985), including alternative
instructions when supported by the evidence, Hayes v. Commonwealth , 625
S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 1981), the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
on entrapment .
III.
CONCLUSION
For the aforesaid reasons, we hereby reverse the ruling of the Court of
Appeals and remand the matter to the McCreary Circuit Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion .
All sitting. All concur.
alternatively, that he was entrapped.
14
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Paul J. Neel, Jr .
1012 South Fourth Street
Louisville, KY 40203
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Michael Louis Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Divsion
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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