HARVEY EDWARD SKAGGS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2007-SC-000007-MR
HARVEY EDWARD SKAGGS
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
NO . 05-CR-00140
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This is a direct appeal from a judgment in which Appellant was convicted
of murder and first-degree robbery. Appellant claims as error: the failure to
give a "missing evidence" instruction regarding a van driven by Appellant on
the night of the murder ; allowing the jury to view the van, which was in a
materially altered condition; the failure of the Commonwealth's Attorney to be
disqualified from the case; and the failure to give an instruction on
circumstantial evidence . We reject all four claims of error and, thus, affirm .
In the summer of 2004, Julie Boyd met Appellant, Harvey Skaggs, at a
divorce recovery group meeting at her church, the Severns Valley Baptist
Church in Elizabethtown . At some point during their ensuing acquaintance,
Boyd and Skaggs began to talk about Skaggs repossessing a truck from Boyd's
estranged husband . At the time Skaggs worked as a repairman for Allen's
Heating and Air Conditioning, but occasionally did work on the side for his
cousin, Marvin Skaggs, a private investigator .
On Wednesday, December 29, 2004, Skaggs and Boyd met at the church
to discuss Skaggs' repossession of the truck sometime that week. At Skaggs'
request, Boyd brought a copy of the truck's title and a note granting Skaggs
permission to drive the truck. The two then planned to meet the following
evening.
On December 30, 2004, Skaggs met Boyd at the Jeri-Mart convenience
store in Rineyville at 8 :00 p .m. Skaggs was driving his work van and Boyd was
driving her Ford Mustang that she had just, picked up at her parents' house .
The Commonwealth and Skaggs have different theories of what transpired after
this point.
According to Skaggs, Boyd left her Mustang at the Jeri-Mart and got into
the van with him. They drove around for two hours discussing the details of
the repossession and then Skaggs brought her back to her car at the Jeri-Mart.
According to Skaggs' January 1.5, 2005, statement to police, when Boyd exited
the van, a man grabbed her from behind and pushed her back into the
passenger's seat of Skaggs' van . This man and a second smaller man then got
into the van through the cargo doors . Skaggs told police that the larger man
entered the van with a gun, although he did not see the gun again that night.
The men told Skaggs to drive, and for the next two hours he drove around
Hardin County.
Skaggs told police that the two men were wearing masks with an open
area around the eyes and spoke "very proper with Yankee accents." The men
called Boyd by her first name, speaking to her in a mocking tone . They asked
Boyd if she had enough money to save Skaggs' life and asked Skaggs if he had
enough money to save Boyd's life . The men then asked Boyd if she had the
money or if her husband had the money . Boyd told the men that she didn't
know what they were talking about.
According to Skaggs' version of events, at some point the larger man
began to hit Boyd in the mouth with his fist, almost every time with his right
hand. The men continued to demand money from Boyd, and when they got an
answer they did not like, they continued to strike her. Skaggs then heard a
thud and looked over and saw that Boyd was bleeding . Skaggs looked down
and saw a hammer lying on the floor by the passenger's seat. When Skaggs
told the men, "That's not necessary" or "That's uncalled for," one of the men hit
him in the back of the head. Sometime later the men hit Boyd in the head with
the hammer a second time . Skaggs told police that Boyd never tried to block
the blows from the men's fists or the hammer because she never saw the blows
coming.
The men directed Skaggs to drive to Boyd's apartment in Rineyville.
However, once they stopped there, the men told Skaggs to get out of the van
and check on Boyd. Skaggs got out and went in the van through the cargo
doors and checked on Boyd in the passenger seat. He stated that she was still
conscious . The men then told Skaggs to get back in the driver's seat and drive.
After driving around more, the men directed Skaggs to go back to the
Jeri-Mart. Upon stopping, Skaggs claimed that one of the men put something
like a shoestring around his neck and pulled him from the driver's seat into the
cargo area of the van. Skaggs stated that he lost consciousness and when he
woke up, he was lying next to Boyd in the van . Boyd had electrical tape
around her neck and was making a gurgling sound . Skaggs said he removed
the electrical tape and turned her head to the side to clear her airway.
Skaggs then (drove the van from the Jeri-Mart to the Hardin Memorial
Hospital. Skaggs arrived at the hospital at around 2 :15 a.m . and parked the
van in the parking garage instead of going to the ER entrance . Skaggs carried
Boyd from the garage to the ER entrance where he collapsed. Hospital
personnel immediately came to Skaggs'and Boyd's aid .
Upon arrival at the emergency room, Boyd had no cardiac or respiratory
activity and she was pronounced dead at 2 :26 a.m. The cause of death was
determined to be multiple blunt force head injuries and ligature strangulation .
Emergency room nurse Jennifer King observed a small scratch on the
back of Skaggs'head and dried blood on his hand and face . Otherwise, he had
no visible injuries. A small mark on Skaggs'neck was visible in pictures taken
at the hospital that night. However, Nurse King testified that she saw no
marks on Skaggs'neck before he was placed in a C-Collar to stabilize his neck
and spine. Dr. Donna Hunsaker, a pathologist from the Louisville Medical
Examiner's Office, testified that she had seen cervical collars make marks
similar to the one seen on Skaggs' neck in the photograph .
Skaggs was interviewed by Kentucky State Police ("KSP") detectives at the
hospital on December 31, 2004 . Skaggs gave another statement to police on
January 15, 2005, and was arrested for Boyd's murder immediately thereafter.
On March 29, 2005, Skaggs was indicted for murder, first-degree robbery, and
tampering with physical evidence . The tampering charge was later dismissed.
The case was tried before a jury from October 4, 2006, through October
24, 2006 . The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that Skaggs fabricated
the story about being abducted by the two men, and that Skaggs had robbed
and killed Boyd because he was having financial problems . The
Commonwealth's case was primarily based on: blood pattern evidence in and
on the van ; evidence that the engagement ring Skaggs gave his fiancé after the
murder was the same ring that had been taken off Boyd's finger on the night of
the murder ; inconsistent stories Skaggs told police and other witnesses about
the murder; and evidence that Skaggs was having financial problems at the
time of the murder.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Skaggs guilty of murder and
first-degree robbery and recommended a sentence of life without the possibility
of parole for twenty-five (25) years for murder and twenty (20) years for first
degree robbery. The trial court sentenced Skaggs according to the jury's
recommendation, except that it ran the term of imprisonment for first-degree
robbery concurrent with the life sentence for murder, as required by law. This
direct appeal by Skaggs followed .
'
MISSING EVIDENCE
After interviewing Skaggs at the hospital, the police obtained and
executed a search warrant on the van Skaggs was driving the night of the
murder. The van, which was owned by Allen's Heating and Air Conditioning,
was parked in the hospital's parking garage. There was a significant amount of
blood on both the inside and outside of the van. After collecting some evidence
and photographing the van, the police decided that a forensic team from
Frankfort should be called to examine the van . The van was then covered with
a tarp and taken to the Elizabethtown Police Department where it was secured.
Four days later, on January 4, 2005, a team of four KSP lab analysts and
two KSP photographers arrived to examine and document the van. The team
took blood swabs for DNA analysis, dusted for fingerprints, and collected trace
evidence from the van, along with taking numerous photographs . The evidence
collection and examination of the van by the KSP took 10-12 hours .
.
After securing the van at the Elizabethtown Police Department, the KSP
contacted Allen's Heating and Air Conditioning . The company told KSP that
they needed the van back as soon as possible to use for the business. KSP
returned the van to the company on January 5, 2005.
Prior to trial, Skaggs moved to exclude the evidence regarding the van
because the evidence had been essentially destroyed (by giving the van back to
the company) before the defense had an opportunity to conduct their own
independent examination of the van. In the alternative, Skaggs requested that
a "missing evidence" instruction be given which would allow the jury to infer
that the evidence, if available, would be adverse to the Commonwealth and
favorable to the Defendant. See Sanborn v . Commonwealth, 754 S .W .2d 534,
540 (Ky . 1988), overruled on other grounds bv Hudson v. Commonwealth , 202
S .W.3d 17 (Ky. 2006) . An evidentiary hearing was held on the motion, after
which the court entered an order denying Skaggs' motion to exclude the
evidence or for a "missing evidence" instruction. The court specifically found
there was no bad faith on the part of the police in giving the van back to the
company.
On appeal, Skaggs argues that he was substantially prejudiced and
denied due process by the trial court's failure to exclude the evidence or give a
"missing evidence" instruction regarding the van. It has been held that the
intentional destruction of exculpatory evidence by the Commonwealth is a Due
Process violation requiring (1) dismissal, (2) exclusion of the Commonwealth's
evidence, or (3) a "missing evidence" instruction. Sanborn , 754 S.W.2d at 53940 . In Estep v . Commonwealth , 64 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Ky. 2002), this Court
clarified what constitutes a Due Process violation and when a "missing
evidence" instruction is warranted:
First, the purpose of a "missing evidence" instruction
is to cure any Due Process violation attributable to the
loss or destruction of exculpatory evidence by a less
onerous remedy than dismissal or the suppression of
relevant evidence. . . . Second, the Due Process Clause
is implicated only when the failure to preserve or
collect the missing evidence was intentional and the
potentially exculpatory nature of the evidence was
apparent at the time it was lost or destroyed. None of
the above precludes a defendant from exploring,
commenting on, or arguing inferences from the
Commonwealth's failure to collect or preserve any
evidence . It just means that absent some degree of
"bad faith," the defendant is not entitled to an
instruction that the jury may draw an adverse
inference from that failure.
At the hearing in the present case, Detective David Norris of the KSP
testified that under KSP procedure, property is returned to its owner on a case
by case basis . Detective Norris stated that he returned the van to Allen's
Heating and Air Conditioning when the KSP had finished with the van so as not
to create a hardship for the company, which needed the vehicle for its business
operations.
"When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we utilize
a clear error standard of review for factual findings and a de novo standard of
review for conclusions of law." Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 S .W.3d 300,
305 (Ky. 2006) (citing Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W .3d 407, 409 (Ky.
2004)) . Further, alleged errors regarding jury instructions are questions of law
and must be examined using a de novo standard of review . Hamilton v. CSX
Transportation, Inc . , 208 S .W .3d 272, 275 (Ky.App . 2006) .
The trial court in the instant case found there was no bad faith because
"[t]here was no evidence of any intention on the part of the police to deprive the
Defendant of the opportunity to examine the van ." As this finding was
supported by substantial evidence, Skaggs was not entitled, as a matter of law,
to exclusion of the evidence or a "missing evidence" instruction. See also
Coulthard v. Commonwealth, 230 S .W.3d 572, 580-81 (Ky. 2007) (holding that
return of victim's car after police testing was not bad faith, thus, "missing
evidence" instruction was not warranted) .
JURY VIEWING OF VAN
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine requesting that
the jury be allowed to view, among other things, the van Skaggs was driving on
the night of the murder . The Commonwealth argued that the pictures of the
van would not be an adequate substitute for actually seeing the van in person.
The court's initial order allowed the viewing of actual sites involved in the case
(hospital parking garage, hospital ER entrance, and Jeri-Mart parking lot), but
reserved ruling on the viewing of the van.
During the trial, the Commonwealth renewed its motion for the jury to
view the van . The Commonwealth argued that given the defense theory of the
case that the two men killed Boyd within the confines of the van with a
hammer, it was necessary for the jury to see the inside of the van in person to
appreciate its dimensions in determining whether Boyd could have been killed
in the manner alleged by Skaggs. The defense countered that because the van
had been cleaned up and used by Allen's Heating and Air Conditioning since
being returned, it was too materially altered from its condition on the night of
the murder to be viewed as evidence at trial . The court ruled that so long as
everything was removed from the van, except built-in features, it would allow
the jury to view the van for the purpose of seeing its dimensions only. The
court also admonished the jury as follows : "The van is not in the same
condition as it has been described in this case ." The court noted that because
it was requiring that everything be taken out of the van, there necessarily
would be more room in the van than on the night of the murder . Thus, any
prejudice from the jury's viewing would be to the Commonwealth .
KRS 29A .310(3) provides :
When necessary the judge may authorize the jury to
view the real property which is the subject of the
litigation, or the place in which any material fact
occurred, or the place in which the offense is charged
to have been committed .
The decision of whether to allow the jury to view the place where the
crime occurred is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Debruler v.
Commonwealth , 231 S .W.3d 752, 761 (Ky . 2007) ; Tungate v. Commonwealth ,
901 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Ky. 1995) . "The test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.
1999) . "A change that is material to the probativeness of the evidence is fatal."
Ropers v. Commonwealth , 992 S .W .2d 183, 187 (Ky. 1999) (quoting Robert G.
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 11 .00 (3rd ed. 1993)) .
Skaggs argues that at the time of trial the van was in such a materially
altered condition that it lacked probative value to be viewed by the jury. We do
not agree. While the van had been cleaned and been in use by the owner, its
basic dimensions remained the same, and that was the purpose for which it
was to be viewed by the jury.
Edward Taylor, a forensic specialist for the KSP, testified to the blood
spatter patterns on and in the van . One of Taylor's conclusions, which was
critical to the Commonwealth's theory that Boyd was not killed inside the van,
was that, given the configuration and dimensions of the interior of the van, the
blood patterns were not consistent with a person being beaten to death inside
the van. Taylor testified that if a person had been struck with a weapon inside
the van, there would have been cast-off blood spatter patterns on various areas
inside the van, which were not present .
From our viewing of the photographs of the van introduced at trial, it was
difficult to ascertain the dimensions and layout of the inside of the van. Given
Taylor's testimony, the inadequacy of the photographs, and the defense theory
that two men beat Boyd to death within the confines of the cargo area of the
van, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
jury to view the van . As for the altered condition of the van, we believe that the
trial court's admonishment was sufficient to apprise the jury that the van was
not in the same condition as the night of the murder.
DISQUALIFICATION OF COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY
On March 2, 2006, a year after Skaggs' indictment, Skaggs filed a motion
to "recuse" Christopher Shaw, the Hardin County Commonwealth's Attorney,
from prosecuting the case. The motion was based on the fact that Shaw's wife,
Deborah Shaw, represented Skaggs' ex-wife, Jessica Skaggs, in seeking to have
custody of their daughter modified from joint custody to sole custody after
Skaggs was charged with murder . A hearing was held on the motion the day
the motion was filed.
At the hearing it was learned Deborah Shaw had visited Skaggs at the
Hardin County Justice Center while he was in jail awaiting trial to have him
sign an agreed order regarding custody and visitation of his daughter . Harvey
Skaggs testified that when Shaw approached him, he was expecting someone
else and "told her some things" regarding his case . However, just when Skaggs
had starting talking, Shaw stopped him, identified herself, and told him why
she was there . At that point, Deborah Shaw presented Skaggs with the agreed
order to sign. Skaggs conceded that the discussion of his case with Shaw was
minimal.
As authority for his position that Deborah Shaw's representation of
Jessica Skaggs and contact with Harvey Skaggs constituted a conflict requiring
Christopher Shaw to disqualify himself and his office from the case, Skaggs'
counsel cited SCR 3 .130-1 .8(i) which provides as follows :
A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child,
sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a
representation directly adverse to a person who the
lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer except
upon consent by the client after consultation regarding
the relationship.
After hearing Skaggs' testimony and the arguments of counsel, the trial
court denied the motion for Christopher Shaw to disqualify himself and his
office from prosecuting the case . The court noted there was no evidence of
prejudice to Skaggs in his criminal case .
On appeal, Skaggs argues that Christopher Shaw and his office should
have been disqualified from prosecuting the case pursuant to KRS 15 .733(2)(c)
which provides:
Any prosecuting attorney shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which he or his spouse, or a
member of his immediate family either individually or
as a fiduciary:
(c) Is known by the prosecuting attorney to have an
interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding[.]
Contrary to the Commonwealth's assertion, we do not view the issue as
unpreserved because Skaggs has cited a different statute than argued below to
support his claim of a conflict of interest. Skaggs' basic argument is the same
on appeal, and SCR 3.130-1 .8(i) and KRS 15.733 are similar in their import,
with the latter applying specifically to prosecuting attorneys.
In reading KRS 15 .733(2) as it applies to the facts at hand, we believe it
is significant that at the time the Commonwealth's Attorney began prosecuting
the case, there would not have been any conflict because presumably Deborah
Shaw would not have been representing Jessica Skaggs in the custody
modification matter since the custody change was a subsequent consequence
of the murder charge. Although Jessica Skaggs was called by the
Commonwealth as a witness in the case, the representation of Jessica Skaggs
in the custody matter was only remotely related to the criminal case in that the
change in custody was necessitated by the murder charge.
We also recognize, as did the trial court, that there was no showing of
prejudice to Skaggs in his criminal case as a result of Deborah Shaw's
representation of Jessica Skaggs in the custody matter or his limited contact
with Deborah Shaw in jail.
See Barnett v. Commonwealth , 979 S .W.2d 98,
102 (Ky. 1998) (holding disqualification of prosecutor who was limited guardian
for victim was not required where prosecutor's interest could not have been
substantially affected by trial's outcome and there was no showing of actual
prejudice) and Clayton v. Commonwealth , 786 S.W .2d 866 (Ky. 1990) (actual
prejudice required to warrant disqualification of prosecutor) . But cf. Whitaker
v. Commonwealth , 895 S.W.2d 953, 955-56 (Ky. 1995) (wherein this Court did
not require a showing of actual prejudice in the case of defendant's former
counsel joining the Commonwealth's Attorney's office ; rather, the test was
whether the former counsel had substantial and personal participation in
client's defense) . Skaggs did not specify what information he conveyed to
Deborah Shaw at the jail, but he testified that his remarks were brief because
she immediately stopped him.
Finally, Christopher Shaw did not personally prosecute the case against
Skaggs . It was tried by one of his assistants, and the only record of Shaw's
participation in the case after the hearing to disqualify him was in brief
appearances at pretrial hearings regarding procedural matters . See Summit v.
Mudd, 679 S .W.2d 225, 225-26 (Ky. 1984) (mere appearance of impropriety is
not sufficient to disqualify the entire staff of the Commonwealth's Attorney's
office), overruled in part y Whitaker , 895 S.W .2d at 955-56 (in the case of
defendant's former counsel joining the Commonwealth's Attorney's office,
inquiry was required to determine if entire office of Commonwealth's Attorney
should be disqualified) . Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to
order the disqualification of Christopher Shaw or his office from prosecuting
the case .
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INSTRUCTION
Skaggs' final argument is that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury
on circumstantial evidence denied him due process of law. At the close of
evidence, Skaggs requested the following instruction : "No defendant may be
convicted on circumstantial evidence if the circumstantial evidence is as
consistent with innocence as it is with guilt ." The Commonwealth objected on
grounds that such an instruction infringes on the reasonable doubt standard.
The trial court ruled that absent some authority allowing for such an
instruction in Kentucky, the proposed instruction would be inappropriate . The
court also noted that Kentucky law favors bare bones instructions. See
McGuire v . Commonwealth, 885 S.W .2d 931, 936 (Ky. 1994) .
An instruction nearly identical to the one sought in the instant case was
requested in Armstrong v. Commonwealth , 517 S.W .2d 233, 236 (Ky. 1974) .
Our predecessor Court rejected the instruction, stating:
Such an instruction would violate the fundamental
principle that the court should never give an
instruction as to any class of evidence or as to the
weight to be accorded the evidence relating to any
particular matter.
Id. at 236 (quotations and citations omitted) . This Court is not inclined to
depart from that view of such an instruction.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is
affirmed .
All sitting . All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Shelly R . Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Deapartment of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601-1133
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
David Bryan Abner
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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