JONATHAN WAYNE GOFORTH V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2006-SC-000456-MR
JONATHAN WAYNE GOFORTH
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APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
NO . 99-CR-00146-002
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Jonathan Wayne Goforth appeals from the Fayette Circuit Court's partial
denial of his RCr 11 .42 motion seeking to set aside his conviction for murder,
robbery, burglary, arson, and tampering with physical evidence . In the motion,
Goforth raised nineteen claims, fifteen of which contained allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Fayette Circuit Court denied eighteen of
the claims without an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing was
conducted on the single remaining claim of juror misconduct and was ultimately denied. Goforth appeals from ten of the claims which were rejected
without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm the Fayette Circuit
Court.
Goforth was tried jointly with Virginia Caudill for the murder of Lonetta
White. White, age seventy-three, was bludgeoned to death in her home during
the early hours of March 15, 1998 . Her body was later found in the trunk of
K aju- D .C .
her burning vehicle in a field several miles away. Her home had been
ransacked and numerous items of valuable personal property stolen. While
both Goforth and Caudill admitted that they were present during the
commission of these acts, each blamed the other for the actual murder of
White .
In a joint trial, Goforth and Caudill were convicted of murder, robbery in
the first degree, burglary in the first degree, arson in the second degree, and
tampering with physical evidence . Each was sentenced to death for the murder
conviction and to the maximum authorized penalty for the remaining
convictions . Their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to this Court.
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S .W .3d 635 (Ky. 2003) . The following year,
Goforth filed a motion to vacate and set aside the conviction pursuant to RCr
11 .42, from which he now appeals.'
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Standard ofReview
In an RCr 11 .42 proceeding, the movant bears the burden of establishing
that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel . "In order to be
ineffective, performance of counsel must be below the objective standard of
reasonableness and so prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial and a
reasonable result." Haight v. Commonwealth , 41 S .W.3d 436, 441 (Ky. 2001) .
"Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must
1 After filing the present appeal, Goforth moved this Court to withhold ruling on his appeal
until opinions are rendered in Leonard v. Commonwealth , - S.W.3d - (Ky . 2009) and Foley v.
Commonwealth , - S.W.3d - (Ky. 2009). The motion was granted and Goforth's appeal has
been considered in light of our holdings in both Leonard and Foley.
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance[ .]" Strickland v . Washington , 466
U.S . 668, 689 (1984) . "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome ." Id. at 694 . In considering
an RCr 11 .42 motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the trial
court must evaluate counsel's performance in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the trial as a whole. In essence, the supposed deficiency
must demonstrate a complete breakdown of the adversarial process.
When a movant has raised an allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the trial court need not always conduct an evidentiary hearing . "An
evidentiary hearing is not required to consider issues already refuted by the
record in the trial court." Hai ht, id . at 442 . "Con clusionary allegations which
are not supported by specific facts do not justify an evidentiary hearing
because RCr 11 .42 does not require a hearing to serve the function of a
discovery deposition ." Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S .W.2d 905, 909 (Ky.
1998) .
Cross-Examination of Caudill
The trial court rejected Goforth's claim that his defense counsel were
ineffective for failing to zealously cross-examine his co-defendant, Virginia
Caudill, with respect to prior inconsistent statements. Prior to trial, the police
videotaped a "walk-through" of the crime scene which Caudill narrated. In the
video, Caudill points out where the attack on White occurred and claims that
3
Goforth bludgeoned White to death while she sat, hysterical, in a bedroom .
Caudill is visibly distraught in the police video, appearing tearful and
uncomfortable . Goforth's counsel objected to the admission of the tape, and
ultimately, the Commonwealth agreed to exclude the tape .
Caudill's statements on the videotape differ at times from her testimony
at trial . She states on the videotape that she saw Goforth hitting White from
around a corner, but at trial she testifies that she never actually saw Goforth
hit White. On videotape, Caudill claims she had no idea White's body was
found in a car, but at trial she admits helping Goforth put White's body in the
trunk of the car. At trial, Caudill claimed that she became hysterical when
Goforth started attacking White, and that he forced her into a bedroom,
slapping her and binding her hands in an attempt to calm her down. She
omitted this information during the video walk-through . Finally, on the
videotape, Caudill states that Goforth left White's home to get gasoline from a
nearby store. However, at trial she testified that she did not know where the
gas was obtained .
The decision by defense counsel to avoid cross-examination questions
concerning the videotape was arguably sound trial strategy . Caudill appears
very upset in the video, which could reasonably be interpreted as remorse by
the jury and, thus, engender sympathy for her. Defense counsel effectively
attacked Caudill's credibility through impeachment by presenting other prior
inconsistent statements she had given to investigators, friends, and former
cellmates . Further, even taking into account the aforementioned
discrepancies, Caudill's trial testimony differed little from her videotaped
4
account: in both, she insisted that she was a forced and unwilling bystander to
White's murder . Finally, the cross-examination of Caudill was effective and
thorough . Goforth's defense counsel succeeded in highlighting the
implausibility of Caudill's story and her independent motive to commit the
crime.
The decision to exclude Caudill's videotaped walk-through was sound
trial strategy made in a reasoned attempt to avoid possible juror sympathy for
Caudill. Further, the benefit to be gained by cross-examination was minimal in
light of this possible prejudice, as Caudill never materially veered from her
claim that she did not participate in the actual murder. The record reveals a
thorough and effective cross-examination of Caudill . For this reason, the trial
court did not err in rejecting this claim without an evidentiary hearing, as a
review of the trial record reveals that the decision by defense counsel to avoid
introduction of the video was reasonable. Tactical decisions "will not be second
guessed in an RCr 11 .42 proceeding." Hodge v. Commonwealth , 116 S .W.3d
463, 473 (Ky. 2003) .
Reverse KRE 404(b) Evidence Regarding Caudill
Goforth alleges defense counsel were ineffective for allowing Caudill to
present herself at trial as a submissive lemming who was unwittingly dragged
into the criminal scheme without a more vigorous contest. Goforth claims that
defense counsel should have attempted to admit evidence that Caudill had
victimized and robbed an elderly woman in New Orleans prior to her arrest.
Goforth also cites evidence that Caudill had manipulated and conned her
former attorney and paramour, with whom she had a turbulent and
5
inappropriate relationship. Goforth claims this information would have refuted
any assertion that Caudill was a submissive woman and a victim of Goforth's
domineering personality.
First, the record entirely refutes the claim that the jury did not hear
damaging evidence concerning Caudill's character . It was revealed that Caudill
was a drug addict and prostitute ; that she sought revenge on her ex-boyfriend,
the victim's son; that she conceived the idea to burglarize White and urged
Goforth's participation ; and that she later laughed about White's pleas for
mercy. While Caudill attempted to present herself as a victim of domineering
male personalities in her life, both the Commonwealth and Goforth's defense
counsel effectively cross-examined her on this point . For example, though
Caudill testified that Goforth forced her to flee Kentucky with him, both the
Commonwealth and Goforth's counsel successfully highlighted the numerous
opportunities she had to leave. The jury obviously rejected Caudill's attempts
to exonerate herself or to paint herself as an innocent victim of persuasion,
finding her as equally culpable as Goforth .
Further, it is highly questionable that the information cited by Goforth
would have been admissible at trial, as neither the prior conviction in New
Orleans or Caudill's dealings with her former attorney bore any meaningful
similarity to the crimes upon White. KRE 404(b) . Finally, even had this
information of Caudill's character been elicited at trial, in addition to the
significant bad character evidence already admitted, we perceive no way in
which it would operate to lessen Goforth's culpability. While this evidence may
have bolstered Goforth's argument that Caudill engineered the crimes, it
6
offered little explanation for the primary gap in Goforth's credibility: that is,
why he continued to participate in the removal of White's body and property,
and why he fled with Caudill despite his claims of complete innocence . For this
reason, even had the performance of defense counsel in this respect been
deficient, we discern little possibility that it would have affected the verdict
against Goforth. The absence of this evidence does not undermine our
confidence in the outcome of the trial . Strickland , 466 U .S . at 694 . The claim
was properly rejected based on the trial record alone .
Commonwealth's Penalty Phase Closing Argument
Goforth cites as ineffective assistance the failure of defense counsel to
object to certain statements made during the Commonwealth's penalty phase
closing arguments. According to Goforth, the Commonwealth's Attorney made
inflammatory comments to the jury, attacked the concept of mitigation, asked
the jury to send a message to the community by imposing the death penalty,
and injected his personal opinion about the proper sentence and the credibility
of mitigating evidence. These comments occurred during one portion of the
Commonwealth's lengthy closing argument, during which the Commonwealth's
Attorney quoted a U .S . Supreme Court case in which Justice Stewart theorizes
that society's inability to impose proper punishments ultimately leads to
anarchy .
On direct appeal from his conviction, Goforth alleged prosecutorial
misconduct in the Commonwealth's closing argument, citing this same portion
of the argument. Analyzing the unpreserved allegation of error, we held that
the Commonwealth's comments were not prejudicial. "[W]e perceive no
7
fundamental unfairness from this particular dramatic flourish ." Caudill, 120
S .W.3d at 677 . The trial court rejected this claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, first citing Hodge v. Commonwealth , 116 S.W .3d 463 (Ky. 2003), for
the proposition that a claim of error raised and rejected on direct appeal cannot
be resurrected as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in an RCr 11 .42
motion.
Since the Fayette Circuit Court's consideration of Goforth's motion, the
procedural bar cited in Hod e has been removed. Recently, in Leonard v.
Commonwealth, - S .W .3d - (Ky. 2009), we reaffirmed the principle set forth
in Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2006) . Martin established that
a petitioner may present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in an RCr
11 .42 motion, even though the underlying claim of palpable error had been
denied on direct appeal . Our reasoning in both Leonard and Martin rests on
the recognition that a palpable error claim involves a more stringent standard
of review than a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and for that reason
"a failure to prevail on a palpable error claim does not obviate a proper
ineffective assistance claim ." Martin , id . at 5 .
Here, though the Fayette Circuit Court first noted that Goforth could
not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because prosecutorial
misconduct had already been presented and rejected as palpable error on
direct appeal, it nonetheless continued by finding that the "Commonwealth's
closing argument was not improper" and that Goforth's argument was "without
merit." We therefore conduct our independent review based on these
conclusions and disregard the trial court's mention of Hodge. See Brown v.
8
Commonwealth , 253 S.W .3d 490, 500 (Ky . 2008) (While we defer to any
findings of facts and credibility made by the trial court, the appellate court
"looks de novo at counsel's performance and any potential deficiency caused by
counsel's performance .") .
We have reviewed the Commonwealth's closing argument in its entirety
and believe that the trial court's determination that there was nothing
improper about the argument is based on substantial evidence . CR 52 .01 .
The closing argument was limited to fair interpretations of the evidence and of
the defendants' testimony and did not contain improper commentary on the
concept of mitigation evidence . There was no misconduct . As such, defense
counsel cannot be ineffective for declining to object to a legitimate closing
argument .
Failure to Introduce Evidence Negating Statutory Aggravators
Goforth argues that defense counsel were ineffective when, during the
guilt phase of his trial, they conceded that he had committed the aggravators
necessary to impose the death penalty. Goforth also claims that defense
counsel were ineffective for failing to introduce evidence in mitigation of the
aggravating circumstances . The Commonwealth advanced the aggravating
circumstance that the murder was committed while Goforth was engaged in the
commission of robbery and burglary in the first degree . KRS 532 .025(2)(a)(2) .
This claim is without merit in light of Goforth's testimony at trial.
Goforth admitted to being present at White's home when the murder occurred .
Though he claimed he did not know Caudill's intentions and was surprised
when she began attacking White, he nonetheless remained in the home while
9
the murder occurred, even assisting in the removal of White's body. He also
admitted taking possession of guns belonging to White and later disposing of
them in the Kentucky River. Given these admissions, it was reasonable trial
strategy to admit the burglary and robbery in an attempt to focus the jury's
attention on Goforth's claim of innocence with respect to the murder charge.
Furthermore, the record refutes the allegation that defense counsel did
not introduce evidence in mitigation of the aggravating circumstances . Given
the compelling circumstantial evidence that the pair went to White's home to
rob her, and Goforth's aforementioned admissions, there was little available
evidence that would mitigate these aggravating circumstances . Nonetheless, it
was continually argued that Caudill was the mastermind of the crime, and that
Goforth reluctantly participated only when he feared that Caudill would
inculpate him . Evidence of his intoxication, his character, and his lack of any
real motive to commit the crime was presented in an effort to minimize his
culpability.
Considering Goforth's admitted participation in the burglary and
robbery, it was reasonable for defense counsel to make certain concessions in
an effort to gain the jury's support prior to the death penalty deliberations.
The strong presumption that defense counsel performed within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance has not been overcome . Strickland , 466
U .S. at 689 . This allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel was properly
rejected by the trial court based on the trial record alone and no evidentiary
hearing was necessary .
10
Polygraph Results
Goforth argues that counsel were ineffective when they failed to obtain
and present polygraph evidence . Though a polygraph was not conducted prior
to trial, one was performed in 2004 at the request of Goforth's post-conviction
attorneys. He passed the test with respect to his participation in the actual
murder of White. In his RCr 11 .42 motion, Goforth argued that polygraph
testing should have been obtained and used in both the guilt and sentencing
phases of his trial. During the guilt phase, Goforth claims the polygraph would
have been evidence of his innocence . He also speculates that the
Commonwealth might have offered him a plea agreement, or sought a lesser
sentence, had the polygraph been taken before trial. During the penalty phase,
Goforth argues that polygraph results could have been used as mitigation
evidence demonstrating his lesser culpability.
The results of polygraph testing are considered unreliable and are,
therefore, inadmissible in Kentucky . "We have not only excluded the evidence
of polygraph examiners, but excluded mention of the taking of a polygraph, the
purpose of which is to bolster the claim of credibility or lack of credibility of a
particular witness or defendant." Ice v. Commonwealth , 667 S .W.2d 671, 675
(Ky. 1984) . Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failure to obtain evidence
that would not have been admissible . Further, because inadmissible, there is
no possibility that the results of a polygraph test would have altered the results
of either the guilt or penalty phases of the proceeding. The trial court properly
rejected this claim on its face.
Goforth's claim that had favorable polygraph results been obtained prior
to trial, the Commonwealth would have sought a lesser sentence or offered a
plea agreement is purely speculative . Such speculation cannot form the basis
of a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . Moore v .
Commonwealth , 983 S.W.2d 479, 486-87 (Ky. 1998) .
Failure to Rebut Caudill's Mitigation Evidence
Goforth advances several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
during the penalty phase of the trial . He claims that counsel should have
presented evidence to rebut Caudill's claim that she was submissive to males
and easily manipulated . He claims this could have been done by the
introduction of prior bad acts evidence . He also argues that counsel were
deficient in failing to introduce evidence that Goforth was raised in a stable and
loving home and, therefore, would not have willingly committed the violence
involved in these crimes .
In consideration of this claim, we must first point out that Caudill did
not advance the theory that Goforth had induced her to commit the crime . Her
version of the murder is that Goforth acted unexpectedly and unilaterally .
Still, Caudill claimed that Goforth forced her to flee Kentucky with him. On
this evidence, the jury was instructed on the statutory mitigating circumstance
that she "acted under duress or under the domination of another person." KRS
532 .025(2)(b)(6) . To support the mitigator, Caudill relied on the testimony of
Dr. Peter Schilling. Dr. Schilling testified that Caudill's history signaled
possible brain damage, and that results of personality testing reflected a
submissive personality, particularly with respect to men . The Commonwealth
12
effectively rebutted Dr. Schilling's testimony through the testimony of Dr.
Andrew Cooley, who disagreed with nearly every finding.
This issue was raised on direct appeal in the context of severance of the
penalty phase proceedings . There, Goforth argued that the trial court should
have severed the penalty phase because Caudill introduced evidence of her
submissive personality that was prejudicial to Goforth. We found no error:
Goforth's attorney did not request a severance of the penalty phase
either before or after Dr. Schilling's testimony. He did not crossexamine either Dr. Schilling or Dr . Cooley . Nor did he request a
recess in order to prepare a possible cross-examination . The
enduring impression of this entire issue is that Goforth's attorney
did not believe Dr. Schilling's testimony was sufficiently prejudicial
to his client to warrant a severance or even cross-examination . We
agree and hold that the trial judge did not err in failing to grant an
unrequested severance.
Caudill , 120 S .W .3d at 671 (emphasis added) .
Our consideration of Dr . Schilling's testimony in Goforth's direct appeal
is not dispositive of the issue raised herein, as it was raised in the context of a
motion to sever. Nonetheless, we must again express the belief that the
testimony was not particularly damaging to Goforth's defense. Dr. Cooley's
testimony significantly rebutted that of Dr. Schilling, which explains why
Goforth's defense counsel would elect not to cross-examine Dr. Schilling.
Furthermore, we note that the jury apparently rejected Caudill's claim
regarding the statutory mitigating circumstance given the penalty imposed.
Therefore, there can be little, if any, prejudice to Goforth.
Goforth's allegation that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his defense attorneys failed to introduce evidence from his childhood
is without merit. Goforth's mother testified at the penalty phase that Goforth
13
was a nice and loving child, and she even brought pictures of Goforth's
childhood which were published to the jury. Danny Hogue, Goforth's former
supervisor, also testified on his behalf, describing his past community service
work and his positive attitude. Defense counsel indicated it was a tactical
decision not to call Goforth's sisters as mitigation witnesses. We note that the
proposed testimony of Goforth's sisters is cumulative of his mother's testimony
and included similar descriptions of Goforth's background and childhood .
We find no failure on the part of defense counsel that would rise to the
level of constitutionally ineffective assistance . The central mitigation issue in
Goforth's case was the minimization of his role as an accomplice, which
defense counsel accomplished by highlighting Caudill's knowledge of White and
her belongings, the blood spatter on Caudill's shoes, and her motive to
mastermind the crime. Defense counsel clearly delved into Goforth's childhood
and background as a possible source of mitigating evidence and determined
that such evidence was secondary. We find no deficiency in the tactical
decision by defense counsel to focus the jury's attention more on Goforth's level
of culpability, rather than on his family background and childhood . Cf.
Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510, 534-35 (2003) (finding constitutional
deprivation where counsel failed to conduct any investigation into defendant's
background) . Further, Goforth has left us unconvinced that the result of the
penalty phase would have been different had his sisters testified in addition to
his mother and former supervisor . This allegation is easily rejected based on
the trial record alone, and the trial court did not err in refusing to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the issue.
14
Severance
Goforth alleges defense counsel were ineffective for failing to seek a
separate trial . Caudill's defense counsel did move for separate trials, which
was denied by the trial court and affirmed by this Court. Caudill , 120 S .W.3d
at 651 ("The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Caudill's motion
for a separate trial.") . As such, Goforth cannot now claim prejudice, as a
second motion would have been of no consequence after Caudill's motion had
already been validly denied . See McQueen v. Commonwealth , 721 S .W .2d 694,
699 (Ky. 1986) . Moreover, we have already determined that joinder was proper
in this case . Caudill, id . Finally, upon review of the record, we believe that
defense counsel made a tactical decision in declining to seek separate trials .
As Goforth's primary defense was to paint Caudill as the sole mastermind of
the crimes, it was likely deemed more effective to allow the jury to hear the
Commonwealth's case against Caudill, rather than attempt to place blame on
an absent co-defendant . Based on the trial record, the trial court correctly
determined that counsel was not deficient in this regard .
Alleged Conflict ofInterest
In a final claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Goforth argues that
he was effectively denied counsel due to an apparent conflict of interest. First,
he alleges that an impermissible conflict existed where his attorneys were
contracted for by Fayette County Legal Aid, the entity which also provided
Caudill's attorney. He also claims that the fee arrangement deprived him of
effective assistance of counsel . While Goforth characterizes private counsels'
fee arrangement as a flat rate, it was actually a fee cap. The two attorneys
15
were paid an hourly fee up to a pre-arranged limit and were required to submit
time sheets to the court.
Turning first to Goforth's claim that a conflict existed because his
attorneys were paid by the same entity that provided Caudill's counsel, we find
this claim to be purely speculative. In fact, a hearing was held shortly after
Goforth's arraignment for the express purpose of arranging counsel that would
not create a conflict of interest for the two indigent co-defendants. Further, in
his RCr 11 .42 motion, Goforth provided no evidence to the trial court of
deprivation of effective counsel beyond the mere assertion that his attorneys
operated under a conflict of interest . Nor was the trial court presented
evidence that Caudill's counsel consulted with or prepared for trial in concert
with Goforth's counsel. See Burger v. Kemp , 483 U .S. 776, 783 (1987) ("[T]he
risk of prejudice is increased when the two lawyers cooperate with one another
in the planning or conduct of trial strategy . . . ... ) . Even where co-defendants
are represented by separate counsel from the same legal aid or public defender
agency, relief is not warranted unless an actual, not potential, conflict of
interest exists . Kirkland v. Commonwealth, 53 S .W.3d 71, 74 (Ky. 2001), ci'tin
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U .S . 335 (1980) . Goforth failed to provide any evidence
of an actual conflict of interest and failed to identify any resulting prejudice .
As such, the trial court properly denied the RCr 11 .42 motion without an
evidentiary hearing on this issue .
We likewise find no merit in the allegation that the fee arrangement of
defense counsel created an inherent conflict of interest because it was subject
to a cap or limitation . This type of fee arrangement is not prohibited by SCR
16
3 .130-1 .5 . Nor do we believe that the representation of Goforth was "materially
limited" by the supposed responsibility of defense counsel to Fayette County
Legal Aid, as there is no indication whatsoever that any such responsibility was
created by the mere fact that they were paid by that entity. SCR 3 .130 - 1 .7(b) .
Cf. American Insurance Assn v . KBA, 917 S .W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996) (finding that
set fee arrangements between insurer and defense counsel for insured
interfered with the attorney's exercise of independent professional judgment) .
Finally, we reject Goforth's bald assertion that a conflict was created simply by
the fact that defense counsels' representation was subject to a fee cap . If this
were so, any public defender would be operating under this handicap, as all are
paid an annual salary for the representation of indigent clients that does not
increase or decrease depending on the actual number of hours spent preparing
for the case . In the absence of any demonstration of actual prejudice, Goforth's
claim must fail .
Other Grounds for Post-Conviction Relief
Withholding of Exculpatory Information
Goforth alleges that the Commonwealth withheld the fact that Lexington
police officers had interviewed Raymond Kirk, Caudill's former boyfriend, and
that he had characterized Caudill as a violent woman driven by greed . In his
RCr 11 .42 motion, Goforth theorizes that Caudill was a police informant and
was given "easy" treatment by officers investigating White's murder, a fact that
should have been disclosed pursuant to Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83
(1963) .' This theory, however, is derived from Kirk's affidavit in which he
simply speculates that Caudill was an informant because she had prostituted
17
herself to various Lexington police officers . The claim is entirely
unsubstantiated by any independent proof, and Kirk's affidavit offers nothing
other than this bare assertion .
Even if accepted at face value, none of this information exonerates
Goforth in any manner . Further, as explained above, the jury heard
substantial evidence of Caudill's character, particularly from former cellmates
who testified about her callous attitude towards White's vicious murder. The
jury's verdict reflects its rejection of attempts by defense counsel to portray
Caudill as an innocent victim of manipulation . For this reason, there could be
no prejudice to Goforth from the exclusion of this evidence.
"To prevail on an RCr 11 .42 motion, a movant must convincingly
establish that he was deprived of a substantial right justifying the
extraordinary relief afforded by post conviction proceedings ." Halvorsen v .
Commonwealth , 258 S .W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2007) . Goforth has failed to satisfy this
burden and has not raised a material question of fact that would entitle him to
an evidentiary hearing. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W .2d 742, 743 (Ky.
1993) . The trial court did not err.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is
affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
David Michael Barron
Amy Robinson Staples
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 301
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Matthew Robert Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
Raymond M. Larson
Commonwealth Attorney
116 North Upper Street, Suite 300
Lexington, KY 40507
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