DWAYNE EARL BISHOP V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2005-SC-000361-MR
2005-SC-000373-MR
DWAYNE EARL BISHOP
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APPELLANT/ CROSS-APPELLEE
ON APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
NO . 00-CR-00061
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING ON DIRECT APPEAL AND AFFIRMING ON
CROSS-APPEAL
This is a direct appeal and a cross-appeal from a judgment in which
Dwayne Earl Bishop was convicted of the murder of his estranged wife and
sentenced to life imprisonment . Because Bishop moved to act as co-counsel in
the case and was denied this right without a Faretta hearing, we must reverse
and remand for a new trial . As no arguments were presented by the
Commonwealth on their cross-appeal, we affirm as to the cross-appeal .
On August 31, 2000, Carolyn Ann Tackett Bishop, the estranged wife of
Appellant, was brutally murdered . Appellant was indicted for the murder on
October 26, 2000. Subsequently, Vicki Ridgway and Harolyn Howard were
appointed to represent Bishop . On December 13, 2000, Bishop filed a pro se
motion to disqualify Harolyn Howard from the case because she was expected
.. ._~0 . c;.
to be called as a material witness . Before the court's ruling on the motion to
disqualify counsel, Bishop also filed a pro se motion "to proceed as co-counsel"
on January 31, 2001 . The motion requested that he be allowed to proceed as
co-counsel "with limited counsel as necessary to conduct the services needed."
The motion cited a conflict with his court-appointed attorney, that his courtappointed attorney would be called as a witness in the case, and that the
court-appointed attorney would not file motions that Bishop felt should be filed
as reasons that the court should grant his request . The pro se motion also
specifically cited Wake v. Barker , 514 S .W.2d 692 (Ky. 1974), and Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), as support for the motion .
On February 9, 2001, a hearing was held on the motion to proceed as cocounsel . At the hearing, the trial judge asked court-appointed counsel and the
Commonwealth their positions on the motion and then denied the motion,
stating:
Now, I think I can take judicial notice that Mr. Bishop
is not a practicing attorney, he has - does not have a
legal license in this Commonwealth, and I - My
understanding of the law is, that there is no provision
for that . So, the motion to be appointed as co-counsel
is OVERRULED because the law just doesn't provide
for that.
The court informed Bishop that he could proceed pro se and represent
himself or he could proceed with an attorney, but he could not act as cocounsel in the case. An ex parte hearing was then held on the motion to
disqualify counsel, after which said motion was denied.
At the jury trial held January 17-24, 2005, Bishop was represented by
Harolyn Howard and Robert Ganstine . Bishop was ultimately found guilty of
murder and sentenced to life in prison . This appeal by Bishop followed .
RIGHT TO HYBRID COUNSEL
Bishop argues that it was reversible error for the trial court to deny him
his right to act as co-counsel in the case. We agree.
In Wake v. Barker, 514 S .W.2d at 696, our predecessor Court he ld that a
defendant is constitutionally entitled to "make a limited waiver of counsel,
specifying the extent of services he desires, and he then is entitled to counsel
whose duty will be confined to rendering the specified kind of services . . . ."
Wake has since been reaffirmed by this Court in Hill v. Commonwealth, 12 5
S.W .3d 221, 225 (Ky. 2004) and, most recently, in Stone v . Commonwealth,
217 S .W.3d 233, 236 (Ky. 2007) .
Bishop clearly asserted his right to make a limited waiver of counsel in
the present case . He was denied this right without anything approximating a
Faretta hearing, as required by Hill, 125 S.W.3d at 227 . At the February 9,
2001 hearing, the trial court made no inquiry into whether Bishop's requested
limited waiver of counsel was voluntarily and intelligently made . The court
simply summarily denied the motion because it was unaware of any legal
authority for Bishop's request, notwithstanding the fact that Bishop had cited
both Wake and Faretta in his pro se motion.
Because the denial of Bishop's right to hybrid representation was a
structural error affecting the framework of the trial, it is not subject to
harmless error analysis and requires automatic reversal. Hill, 125 S .W.3d at
228-29 . Accordingly, the judgment of the Floyd Circuit Court is reversed and
the case is remanded for a new trial.
Because the remainder of issues raised by Bishop are likely to arise
again on re-trial, we shall address them below.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF T-SHIRT
One of the pieces of evidence offered by the Commonwealth was a black
t-shirt with a "Support Your Local Highwaymen" slogan on the front that was
recovered in the search of Bishop's mother's house, where Bishop was residing
at the time of the murder . Pursuant to the consent of Hilda Bishop, Sergeant
Ronald Peppi of the Kentucky State Police ("KSP"), along with Trooper Todd
Kidd, engaged in a search of the Bishop home the day after the murder . The
black t-shirt which was seized was ultimately found to have Carolyn Bishop's
blood and DNA on the front, as well as burrs that were indigenous to the area
where her body was found.
In a pre-trial bond reduction hearing, Bishop's counsel first raised the
issue of a problem with the chain of custody of the black t-shirt, although
counsel did not specify at that hearing what the problem was . At trial, Bishop
objected to the admission of the t-shirt on grounds of a serious break in the
chain of custody because of the way it was obtained and transferred to the case
officer, Detective Terry Thompson of the KSP. The trial court overruled the
objection and allowed the t-shirt to be admitted into evidence.
Sergeant Peppi testified that after conducting their investigation at the
scene where the victim's body was found, Detective Thompson asked him and
Trooper Kidd to go to Appellant's mother's house . During the search of Hilda
Bishop's house, Peppi collected the black t-shirt from the top of a dresser in
Appellant's room, as well as a green knife pouch. Peppi stated that he put the
t-shirt in a brown evidence collection bag, folded the top over, and placed the
bag in the trunk of his cruiser. Peppi and Kidd then proceeded directly to
Nelson Frazier Funeral Home, where Detective Thompson had gone . The
testimony of Peppi, Kidd, Thompson and Trooper Todd Wheeler, who was
assisting Thompson that day, all confirmed that Peppi handed the bag with the
t-shirt over to Detective Thompson in the parking lot of the funeral home .
Thompson testified that he opened the bag and looked in to see the t-shirt and
then immediately placed the bag into another bag and put it in his trunk.
According to Thompson, he kept the bag containing the t-shirt locked in his
locker at the Post until he delivered it to Pat Hankla at the KSP Crime Lab in
Frankfort. Hankla, a forensic biologist at the crime lab, testified that
Thompson hand-delivered the bag with the t-shirt on September 6, and she
stored it in the lab's walk-in freezer when it was not being tested .
Bishop argues that the trial court erred in allowing the t-shirt to be
admitted when the chain of custody was not properly established. Bishop
points to the fact that no photograph was taken of the t-shirt when it was
collected from his mother's house, the original brown bag it was placed in was
not sealed, and the t-shirt was not properly listed on the KSP 41 (evidence
tracking) form .
Foundation and chain of custody rulings are reviewable under an abuse
of discretion standard. Penman v . Commonwealth, 194 S .W .3d 237, 245 (Ky .
2006) . With items of physical evidence which are clearly identifiable and
distinguishable, there is no requirement of proof of chain of custody . Rabovs
v. Commonwealth , 973 S .W .2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998) . Although the black t-shirt at
issue here was clearly identifiable and distinguishable, the blood and DNA
samples taken from it, which were the incriminating portion of the evidence,
were not. Thus, proof of chain of custody was required . See id.
Even with respect to substances which are not clearly
identifiable or distinguishable, it is unnecessary to
establish a perfect chain of custody or to eliminate all
possibility of tampering or misidentification, so long as
there is persuasive evidence that `the reasonable
probability is that the evidence has not been altered in
any material respect.'
Id. (quoting United States v. Cardenas , 864 F .2d 1528, 1532 (10th Cir. 1989)) .
Bishop seems to be arguing there was a break in the chain of custody
because of some irregularities in tracking the chain of custody. In particular,
the KSP 41 form completed by Detective Thompson listed the black t-shirt at
the end of the form in black ink, rather than in the blue ink used to list the
other items of evidence. At trial, Thompson explained that he simply forgot to
initially list the black t-shirt on the form, and thus he had to list the t-shirt on
the separate carbon copies of the form which had already been separated and
duplicated in blue ink.
Bishop also argues that there was a problem with chain of custody
because a photograph of the t-shirt was not taken at the time it was seized
from Hilda Bishop's home . We note that a photograph of the t-shirt in
question, which was apparently taken at the Crime Lab, was admitted into
evidence. Sergeant Peppi testified that he did not take a photograph of the
shirt at the residence because he had run out of film photographing the
original crime scene the night before . Detective Thompson testified that he
decided to have the Crime Lab photograph the t-shirt in order to preserve the
integrity of the evidence on the shirt as much as possible.
As for the fact that the original brown paper collection bag was folded
down at the top and not sealed, there was no evidence that the shirt was
altered or tampered with as a result of the bag not being sealed . And the
testimony of Sergeant Peppi and Detective Thompson was that the brown bag
was put into another bag and sealed when it was transferred to Thompson .
We do not see that any of the alleged irregularities in the collection and
tracking of the black t-shirt constituted a break in the chain of custody or
demonstrated a reasonable probability that the t-shirt was tampered with or
altered in any material respect . Like gaps in the chain of custody, irregularities
in the tracking of evidence would normally go to the weight of the evidence, not
to its admissibility. See id . Hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
here in allowing the black t-shirt and the evidence taken therefrom to be
admitted into evidence .
PRIOR BAD ACTS
Bishop's next assignment of error is the admission of prior bad acts in
the form of evidence of previous incidents of domestic violence by Dwayne
Bishop against Carolyn Bishop . Bishop takes issue with all of the rulings in
favor of the Commonwealth regarding the numerous prior bad acts it intended
to introduce at trial . However, the Commonwealth ultimately did not introduce
evidence of all of these prior bad acts, and we will address only those acts
actually introduced into evidence .
As a preliminary matter, we must look to the specific injuries Carolyn
Bishop sustained on the night she was murdered and her cause of death . Dr.
Greg Davis, Associate Chief Medical Examiner for the Commonwealth,
conducted the autopsy of Carolyn's body. In examining the body, Dr. Davis
testified to the following injuries he observed : deep stab wound to the heart ;
long laceration in the lip/mouth area; blunt force injury to the nasal area;
bruising and contusions to both ears ; deep laceration and bruising in the
periorbital region resulting in two black eyes; blunt force injuries to cheeks and
forehead; blunt force injury to hands and contusions on arms, hands, and
fingers, all characterized as defensive wounds ; scraping contusions on
abdomen, chest and right shoulder; bruising on knees; numerous, superficial,
clustered stab wounds to the right thigh and deep scratches in hip/thigh
region . In addition, Dr . Davis noted that he recovered a bullet in her buttocks
area from an old gunshot wound. Dr. Davis concluded the cause of death was
multiple blunt and sharp force injuries.
Under KRE 404(b), evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith." Such evidence may be admissible, however, if "offered
for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident ." KRE
404(b)(1) . Case law has also established that prior bad acts are admissible
under the pattern of conduct or modus operandi exception to KRE 404(b) if the
facts surrounding the prior act are so strikingly similar to the charged crime as
to create a reasonable probability that the acts were committed by the same
person and/or were accompanied by the same mens rea . Dant v.
Commonwealth , 258 S.W.3d 12, 19 (Ky. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)) . This Court has instituted a threepart test for assessing the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence under KRE
404(b), which includes examining the relevance, probativeness, and prejudice
associated with the prior crime . Bell v . Commonwealth, 875 S .W.2d 882, 889
(Ky. 1994) (citing Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook ยง
2 .25(11) (3d ed .1993)) .
As for previous acts of domestic violence committed against the same
victim by the defendant, this Court has held that a defendant's prior assault of
his wife was admissible to prove that the defendant intentionally murdered his
wife and had a motive to do so . Benjamin v. Commonwealth , 266 S .W .3d 775,
791 (Ky. 2008) . In Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S .W .2d 466, 470 (Ky. 1998),
this Court held that where the evidence of domestic abuse is not too remote in
time and there is evidence linking that physical abuse to the defendant,
evidence of a pattern of domestic violence by the defendant is admissible in a
trial for the murder of that same victim. See also Matthews v. Commonwealth,
709 S .W.2d 414, 418 (Ky. 1985) (holding that
a prior burglary charge was
admissible in murder trial because it was "part of the circumstances which
evidenced the domestic difficulties between the appellant and his wife") .
EPOs
We first address the evidence of the multiple emergency protective orders
("EPOs") filed by Carolyn Bishop against Appellant. At trial, a Deputy Clerk
from the Floyd Circuit Court testified to five EPOs that Carolyn obtained
against Appellant, dating from 1991-1995, only one of which resulted in a no
contact order. On hearsay grounds, the court did not allow the specific
allegations in the EPOs to be admitted . It has been held that "EPOs, issued at
the behest of the victim, ordering appellant to stay away from her house, in the
time framework of this case, are relevant as evidence of motive or state of mind
. . . . " McCarthy v. Commonwealth , 867 S .W.2d 469, 470 (Ky. 1993), overruled
on other grounds by Lawson v. Commonwealth , 53 S .W.3d 534 (Ky. 2001) . In
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 794 S .W.2d 165, 169 (Ky. 1990), we held that two
incidents of domestic violence, one seven years before the defendant's murder
of his wife and one four and half years before, were too remote in time to be
admitted at the murder trial. This Court reasoned , "[a]cts of physical violence,
remote in time, prove little with regard to intent, motive, plan or scheme ; have
little relevance other than establishment of a general disposition to commit
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such acts; and the prejudice far outweighs any probative value in such
evidence ." Id.
Although all of the EPOs here, as well as many of the other acts of
domestic violence we have yet to discuss, occurred more than five years before
Carolyn's murder, we believe the facts in the present case to be distinguishable
from Barnes . The evidence in the instant case established a long-term, ongoing
pattern of life-threatening domestic violence toward Carolyn that was
undeniably relevant to prove Appellant's motive and intent to kill Carolyn .
They were not isolated acts of physical abuse.
Appellant testified that he and Carolyn were married in the late 1980s
and that the relationship was not good from the start. Appellant admitted to
regularly abusing Carolyn . Although they separated in 1996, they continued to
see each other and the abuse continued. Tiffany Tackett, Carolyn's daughter,
likewise testified that the relationship was always abusive . Appellant admitted
to several of the specific incidents of domestic violence that we shall discuss
further below . In sum, we believe that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in this case in allowing the evidence of the EPOs to be admitted .
THREATS
Bishop also claims it was error under KRE 404(b) for the trial court to
admit evidence that he had on numerous occasions threatened to kill Carolyn.
Several witnesses testified that they had heard Bishop threaten to kill Carolyn .
Tiffany Tackett testified that in April of 2000, Appellant ran her car off the
road . Immediately thereafter, Appellant came over to her car and told her that
he had mistaken her for Carolyn in the car . Appellant then told Tiffany to relay
a message to Carolyn - that he was going to kill her (Carolyn) and her mother .
Carolyn's sister, Mary Lou Tackett, testified that about two or three weeks
before the murder, she heard Appellant repeatedly shouting at Carolyn over the
phone that he was going to kill her. Mark Tackett, Carolyn's brother, also
testified that he had heard Appellant threaten to kill Carolyn .
It should be noted that Bishop makes no hearsay arguments on appeal
relative to the introduction of any of the prior bad acts. And it has long been a
rule in this jurisdiction that threats against the victim of a crime are probative
of the defendant's motive, malice and intent to commit the crime . Richie v.
Commonwealth , 242 S.W .2d 1000, 1004 (Ky. 1951) ; Rose v . Commonwealth ,
385 S.W .2d 202, 204 (Ky. 1964) . Further, by Appellant's own admission, he
threatened to kill Carolyn many times . When asked on direct if he could
estimate how many times, Appellant responded that he could not hazard a
guess, adding that "it became a way that we communicated ." Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in allowing in Appellant's prior threats against Carolyn's
life .
BLACK EYES
The next evidence we shall examine was the testimony from several
witnesses that Carolyn often had black eyes after she had been with Appellant .
None of these witnesses testified that they witnessed the beating that caused
the black eyes, nor was there other direct evidence linking Appellant to these
black eyes. The testimony was general in nature, with not even a specific time
frame given when the black eyes were observed.
In Jarvis, 960 S .W.2d at 470, wherein the victim was observed by a
witness with bruises days prior to her death, this Court held that evidence that
the victim was physically abused "without any proper evidence linking that
abuse to the defendant is substantially more prejudicial than it is probative."
Similarly, in Smith v. Commonwealth, 904 S .W.2d 220, 224 (Ky. 1995),
witnesses reported seeing the victim within six months of his death with black
eyes and bruises, but no direct evidence was presented as to who had inflicted
the abuse . Acknowledging that it was a difficult call, this Court adjudged that
it was not an abuse of discretion to allow the evidence to be admitted . Id . In
light of evidence that the beating was close in time to the fatal beating, that the
appellant had the opportunity to beat the victim because they lived together,
and was coupled with direct evidence that appellant had beaten the victim in
the same time period, we opined that the jury could properly infer that
appellant was guilty of the unwitnessed acts of abuse . Id.
In balancing the Bell factors in the case at bar, we must conclude that
the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed its probativeness . Here, we
cannot say there is any direct evidence that Appellant physically abused
Carolyn during the time period she was seen with black eyes because no time
period was given. Likewise, we do not know if Carolyn was seen with black
eyes in the time period shortly before her murder. The witnesses testified only
that they often saw Carolyn with black eyes after being with Appellant.
13
Although there was a pattern of ongoing physical abuse by Appellant to which
Appellant readily admitted, that simply was not enough to allow the jury to
infer that Appellant was the one that caused all of the black eyes.
The Commonwealth argues that the evidence that Carolyn was often seen
with black eyes was admissible under the modus operandi exception to KRE
404(b) because both of her eyes were blackened at the time of her murder, and
Dr. Davis testified that the injury causing her black eyes was inflicted on or
near the time of death. Thus, the testimony was admissible to show that the
acts were committed by the same person or with the same mens rea. This
argument ignores the fact that there still must be evidence directly linking
Appellant to Carolyn's recurrent black eyes.
SPECIFIC ACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
We next address the evidence of specific instances of domestic violence
perpetrated against Carolyn . This evidence was introduced through the
testimony of police who responded to reports of these incidents and through
emergency room physicians who treated Carolyn for her injures.
Trooper Mike Thorpe testified that he responded to a report of a domestic
disturbance on December 9, 1990 . When he arrived at the residence, he
observed that Carolyn had been sliced with a knife and had cuts on her face,
back, neck, and stomach. Appellant was arrested at the scene. We adjudge
this evidence was properly admitted at trial as proof of Appellant's motive and
intent, as well as modus operandi, given the similarity of injuries to the cutting
injuries Carolyn sustained when she was murdered . See Benjamin , 266
S .W .3d at 791 and English , 993 S .W .2d at 945 .
Trooper Eddie Crum testified to two domestic incidents he responded to,
both in 1991 . When he arrived on the scene in the first incident, he observed
that Carolyn's face was red and had a cut on it, as well as a handprint.
Although Crum did not testify that Appellant was responsible for the injuries
and Appellant was not arrested, Crum testified that Appellant was the only
other person present at the scene . Given that Appellant was the only other
person at the scene and the totality of other evidence of Appellant's ongoing
domestic abuse of Carolyn, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion to
admit this evidence .
When Trooper Crum arrived on the scene at the second incident, he
observed Carolyn with a black eye . However, Crum testified that Appellant was
not at the scene and there was no evidence as to who was responsible for the
black eye . Given our previous ruling on the witnessing of Carolyn with black
eyes without further evidence linking Appellant to the injuries, we rule that it
was an abuse of discretion to admit evidence of this incident under KRE
404(b) .
We next turn to the testimony of Carolyn's emergency room treating
physicians . Dr. Francisco Rivera testified that he treated Carolyn on June 30,
1994, for a jaw injury that was reported to be inflicted by Appellant . On
August 6, 1995, Dr. Rivera treated Carolyn for injuries to the back of her head
and her left shoulder as a result of being hit with a pool stick by Appellant. Dr.
15
Rivera again treated Carolyn on July 15, 1996, for a wrist injury and a large
hematoma under her eye caused by a human bite. There was no testimony as
to who inflicted this injury .
Dr. Rivera's testimony as to the 1994 and 1995 injuries was properly
admitted as evidence of Appellant's motive and intent since there was evidence
linking him to the injuries. Appellant himself admitted inflicting the injuries
with the pool stick during his testimony. However, the testimony relative to the
1996 injuries was admitted in error, as there was no such evidence that
Appellant was responsible for the wrist and eye injuries .
Dr. Percival Patel testified that on August 8, 1992, he treated Carolyn for
a gunshot wound to her groin which she reported was inflicted by Appellant.
Apparently, this was the injury that explained the bullet recovered from
Carolyn's buttocks during the autopsy. During Appellant's testimony, he first
admitted being responsible for the gunshot injury, then later testified that
Carolyn had accidentally shot herself. Although Carolyn was not shot during
her murder and the evidence of the shooting was highly prejudicial, we
nevertheless adjudge that the probativeness outweighed the prejudice, and the
incident was relevant to show Appellant's motive and intent to kill Carolyn.
Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in its admission.
INJURY TO MARK TACKETT
The final prior bad act evidence before us is the testimony of Carolyn's
brother, Mark Tackett. Tackett testified that on April 7, 1996, Appellant came
to his trailer twice looking for Carolyn . The second time, he came in with a
16
gun, and hit Tackett in the head with it and knocked him out. Tackett testified
that he filed charges against Appellant, but ultimately dropped them .
While the prosecution is not privileged to show unconnected unlawful
conduct that had no bearing whatsoever upon the crime under scrutiny, all the
circumstances may be shown which have a relation to the particular violation
of the law imputed, even if, in doing so, other offenses may be brought to light.
Francis v. Commonwealth, 468 S .W.2d 287, 289 (Ky. 1971) . "E]vidence of prior
threats or violence against an unrelated third-party is generally regarded as
inadmissible character evidence." Davis v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W .3d 709,
722 (Ky. 2004) (citing Fugate v. Commonwealth , 202 Ky. 509, 260 S.W. 338,
341 (1924)) . In this case, however, Appellant was looking for Carolyn at the
time he came in the witness' trailer. Thus, we believe his violent conduct
toward Mark Tackett was admissible to show his malicious intent when he was
preying on Carolyn . Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion to allow this
evidence to be admitted .
EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL ABUSE OF VICTIM BY THIRD PARTIES
During the cross-examination of Mark Tackett, who was one of the
witnesses who testified to frequently seeing Carolyn with black eyes after being
with Appellant, defense counsel asked if he had ever seen Carolyn with black
eyes or bruises after being with anyone else . The Commonwealth objected, and
the trial court sustained the objection . Appellant argues that the trial court's
ruling erroneously denied him the opportunity to present evidence that Carolyn
had been abused by other people besides Appellant.
17
First, we have already spoken to the issue of testifying to observing
injuries without evidence linking the defendant to the injuries, and the same
reasoning would hold true for inferences that a third party committed the
injury. Here, the defense seeks to elicit the same prejudicial inference as to
third parties that it sought to exclude for Appellant . In this case, the trial court
did not prohibit the defense from presenting probative evidence that another
person had physically abused Carolyn for the purpose of showing that someone
else may have had a motive or the intent to kill her. See Eldred v.
Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 694, 705 (Ky. 1994), overruled on other grounds
by Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554 (Ky. 2003) . Further, the
testimony which Appellant complains he was wrongfully denied the opportunity
to present was not introduced by avowal as required by KRE 103(a)(2) .
Accordingly, there is no merit to Appellant's contention that he was denied the
right to fully present a defense by the trial court's ruling.
IMPROPER BOLSTERING
The remaining issue before us relates to the testimony of Kenneth Steele,
a former fellow inmate of Appellant's to whom Appellant confessed to the
killing. In 2000, Steele gave a statement to Detective Thompson that Appellant
had told him in jail that he murdered Carolyn . Subsequently in 2004, Steele
suffered a brain injury in a car accident that impaired his memory and
eyesight. At the trial in 2005, when asked if he remembered the jailhouse
conversation with Appellant in 2000, Steele responded that he could only
remember some of it. Steele testified that he remembered that Appellant told
18
him he murdered Carolyn, but he could not recall any of the specifics of the
conversation . The Commonwealth then asked him about certain specific
statements, and Steele replied that he could not remember. Additionally, when
the Commonwealth attempted to refresh Steele's recollection by having him
read the transcript, Steele indicated he could not read the statement because
of his visual impairment .
The next witness called by the Commonwealth was Detective Thompson
who was present when Steele gave his statement. When asked by the
Commonwealth if he remembered the contents of the statement given by
Steele, the defense objected on grounds of improper bolstering. The defense
argued that Thompson's testimony would serve only to bolster Steele's
testimony regarding Appellant's confession to him . The Commonwealth
countered that it sought only to ask Thompson about those specific portions of
Steele's statement that he could not remember. The trial court overruled the
objection and allowed the Commonwealth to proceed with the questioning . The
Commonwealth then asked Thompson about certain specific statements by
Steele - that Appellant had referred to Carolyn as a "fucking whore," and had
said to him, "well, the bitch won't mess with me anymore," and "Kenny, you
know I done it. You knowed I done it from the start ."
Appellant argues on appeal as he did below that Thompson's testimony
was introduced as a prior consistent statement of Steele and, thus, constituted
improper bolstering. See Smith v. Commonwealth , 920 S .W.2d 514, 516-17
(Ky. 1995) . Pursuant to KRE 801A(a)(2), a prior consistent statement is
19
admissible only if it is "offered to rebut an express or implied charge against
the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." See Noel
v . Commonwealth , 76 S .W.3d 923, 927 (Ky. 2002) . The Commonwealth
maintains that the testimony of Thompson was not a prior consistent
statement of Steele because Thompson did not repeat any of Steele's testimony .
Rather, Thompson only testified to specific portions of Steele's statement that
he was unable to remember because of his memory impairment . The
Commonwealth contends that the statements were therefore admissible under
KRE 801 A(a) (1), the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements.
A statement is considered inconsistent for purposes of KRE 801A(a)(1)
when the witness/ declarant denies the statement or is unable to remember it .
Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S .W .2d 24, 27 (Ky. 1997) ; Wise v.
Commonwealth , 600 S .W.2d 470 (Ky.App. 1978) .
In the present case, although Thompson's testimony was consistent with
Steele's general testimony that Appellant had confessed to Steele, the
Commonwealth had a legitimate reason to use Thompson to bring out the
specific statements of Steele which he was unable to remember . Hence, the
testimony of the specific statements made by Steele was admissible as a prior
Brock, 947 S.W.2d at 24 ; Wise, 600 S .W .2d at 470;
inconsistent statemen t.
Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969) . Of course, KRE 801A(a)(1)
requires that the proper foundation be laid as required by KRE 613 . 1
1 At trial, the trial court appears to deny the prosecutor's request to lay the foundation by
reading the statements to Steele (because he could not see to read).
20
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Floyd Circuit Court is
reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
Abramson, Noble, Schroder, and Venters, JJ ., concur. Cunningham, J .
concurs in result only by separate opinion in which Minion, C.J ., and Scott, J.,
join.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/ CROSS-APPELLEE :
Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/ CROSS-APPELLANT:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Dr.
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2009
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,*ixyrrmr C~aixrf of ~irnfixxhV
2005-SC-000361-MR
2005-SC-000373-MR
DWAYNE EARL BISHOP
V.
APPELLANT/ CROSS-APPELLEE
ON APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
NO . 00-CR-00061
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION BY JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM
CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY
I concur in result, but disagree as to the treatment given by the majority
concerning the evidence of the victim's black eyes . One does not normally
acquire a black eye except through some sort of violence, be it intentional or
accidental. Black eyes are evidence regularly used to support prosecution for
domestic violence. Evidence that the victim was observed with black eyes after
having been with Appellant is important evidence which supports a pattern of
physical abuse of the victim by Appellant. Trooper Eddie Crum gave further
evidence of the victim receiving physical injury at the hands of Appellant .
In fairness, I would also admit the evidence by witnesses who would have
testified that the victim had been observed with black eyes after having been
with someone other than Appellant. This is a case about violence. Let the
testimony about violence toward the victim in, and allow the jury to sort it out .
Minton, C .J . ; and Scott, J., join this opinion concurring in result only .
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