CURTIS GORDON JR. V. HON. JUDITH MCDONALD-BURKMAN, (JUDGE, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION 9) AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY ()
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RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2008
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~ixvrrmr Courf of lim.
2008-SC-000084-MR
CURTIS GORDON JR.
V.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NUMBER 2007-CA-001921
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 07-CR-000428
HONORABLE JUDITH McDONALD-BURKMAN,
(JUDGE, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION 9)
AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Curtis Gordon Jr., seeks a writ of prohibition asking us to forbid the trial
court from retrying him on one count of forgery in the second degree and fortythree counts of theft by deception over $300. Without any discussion of the facts
or any explanation whatsoever for its decision, the Court of Appeals denied
Gordon's petition for a writ. After careful review, we affirm.
I . FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .
Gordon, a police officer, owned a business that provided security services
to the Louisville Metro Housing Authority ("Housing") and other customers .
Gordon's business charged Housing a higher hourly rate for security guards who
had law enforcement qualifications than it did for those lacking such
qualifications . Gordon was charged with one count of forgery stemming from his
allegedly forging the signature of a local police chief to falsely reflect that one of
Gordon's security guards had law enforcement qualifications. Gordon was
charged with forty-three counts of theft by deception over $300 for allegedly
charging Housing the higher hourly rate for employees who did not actually have
law enforcement credentials .
Shortly after Gordon's arraignment, the trial court issued a discovery
order stating, "[w]ithin the time frames outlined in the Rules of Practice of the
Jefferson Circuit Court, counsel shall comply with the Rules of Criminal
Procedure regarding discovery ." Although Gordon apparently never moved for
reciprocal discovery under Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 7.24, the
Commonwealth purportedly provided over five hundred pages of discovery to
Gordon . Meanwhile, Gordon was filing open records requests with Housing,
seeking documents relating to the relationship between Housing and Gordon's
business . Gordon also had subpoenas served upon officers who participated in
the investigation that led to his indictment. The Commonwealth filed a motion to
quash those subpoenas, arguing that the requested material was outside the
scope of discovery because of its claimed status as "work product."
The trial court held a hearing on the Commonwealth's motion to quash the
subpoenas, at which time Gordon argued that he had no obligation to provide
reciprocal discovery because he had not moved for reciprocal discovery . Gordon
contends that the trial court, acting on its own motion, raised the idea that the
Commonwealth move for reciprocal discovery . In any event, after the hearing,
the trial court issued an order stating that the Commonwealth had moved for
reciprocal discovery and that the Commonwealth was entitled to receive
reciprocal discovery from Gordon.
The trial court ruled that a local rule in Jefferson County, Jefferson County
Rule of Practice 803, required the Commonwealth to provide discovery, after
which the Commonwealth was entitled to reciprocal discovery from the defendant
unless the defendant declined, in writing, the discovery tendered by the
Commonwealth . Several days later, Gordon filed a document entitled "Notice of
Compliance [w]ith Court's Discovery Order" in which he stated that he had
provided several documents to the Commonwealth . Gordon's notice of
compliance did not suggest that he had any additional discoverable documents;
although, Gordon contends that he orally stated at the hearing on the
Commonwealth's putative motion for reciprocal discovery that he had additional
materials that the Commonwealth was free to inspect.
Approximately one week after Gordon submitted his notice of compliance,
the charges against him proceeded to a jury trial. After a jury had been
empanelled and sworn, and shortly before cross-examination of the
Commonwealth's third witness had begun, Gordon's counsel showed the
Commonwealth over thirty documents intended to be offered as defense trial
exhibits, many of which the Commonwealth claimed it had never seen before .
After a brief discussion about whether these documents were to be used solely to
impeach the Commonwealth's witness, cross-examination began . During that
brief cross-examination, the trial court excluded two documents that it ruled were
not being-used for impeachment purposes. The Commonwealth then sought
either a mistrial or a continuance to allow it time to review the remaining
documents, but the trial court declined to grant a continuance because the judge
was scheduled to attend a judicial college the following week. Over Gordon's
objection, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion for a mistrial .
Gordon has filed a petition for a writ of prohibition asking us to bar a
retrial, which is currently set for August 2008. Gordon contends that a retrial
would constitute double jeopardy . We disagree .
ll . ANALYSIS .
A.
Mistrial May Be an Appropriate Remedy for a
Violation of a Valid . Discovery Request .
We may grant a writ only "upon a showing that (1) the lower court is
proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no
remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court
is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there
exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and
irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted ."' Because the trial court
clearly was vested with the authority to preside over the charges against Gordon,
our focus is on the second type of writ classification . To the extent possible, the
"no adequate remedy by appeal" prong should be analyzed separately from the
"irreparable injury" prong.2
Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S .W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004).
Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961).
A writ is an extraordinary remedy that should be issued only in exceptional
circumstances .3 Indeed, we have ruled that the requirement that a writ may
issue only if a petitioner lacks an adequate remedy by appeal is "absolute . ,4 In
other words, a writ may not issue "unless the petitioner can demonstrate that
traditional post hoc appellate procedures do not provide him or her with an
adequate remedy."5
RCr 7.24(g) sets forth the remedies available to a trial court for discovery
violations . That subsection provides, in pertinent part, that when a party fails to
comply with its discovery obligations, a trial court "may direct such party to permit
the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as may be just under the
circumstances ." Gordon contends that the trial court should have utilized another
remedy, such as a continuance, instead of declaring a mistrial . But we have held
that a mistrial is among the proper sanctions that a trial court may impose upon a
party who fails to comply with valid discovery obligations .6 So the trial court's
imposition of a mistrial was a permissible remedy provided Gordon failed to
comply with his discovery obligation . And the question becomes whether Gordon
actually failed to fulfill his discovery obligation .
3
4
5
6
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Graham, 192 S.W.3d 350, 356 (Ky. 2006).
Adventist Health Systems v. Trudg, 880 S .W.2d 539, 541 (Ky. 1994), overruled on
other grounds by Sisters of Charity Health Systems, Inc . y. Raikes' , 984 S.W.2d 464
(Ky. 1998). See also Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801 .
Flynt v. Commonwealth,, 105 S.W.3d 415, 422 (Ky. 2003).
Weaver v. -Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Ky. 1997) .
B.
It is Not Necessary to Determine the Existence
of an Impeachment Exemption From Reciprocal
Discovery Process .
Under our statewide discovery, rule, reciprocal discovery generally is not
triggered until a defendant requests discovery from the Commonwealth .'
However, for whatever reason, the local rule in the Jefferson Circuit Court is
markedly different . Under the Rules of Practice of the Jefferson Circuit Court, as
approved by this Court in July 2006, the Commonwealth is obligated to provide
discovery to a criminal defendant, seemingly, regardless of whether the
defendant even requests discovery . $ Under Local Rule 803(C), a defendant is
obligated to provide reciprocal discovery to the Commonwealth automatically
unless the defendant notifies the Commonwealth, in writing, that he or she is
declining discovery .9
In the case at hand, there is no indication that Gordon notified the
Commonwealth, in writing, that he did not seek discovery . So, despite his
See RCr 7.24(1)-(3).
See Jefferson Circuit Court Rule 803(A)-(B) (available online at
http://apps .kycourts .net/localrules/rules/C30localrules .pdf).
Jefferson Circuit Court Rule 803(C) provides as follows :
If the Defendant(s) does not desire discovery pursuant to RCr 7.24(1) and (2), notice
declining discovery shall be provided, in writing, to the Commonwealth within five
(5) days of arraignment . Otherwise, within ten (10) days of compliance by the
Commonwealth, the Defendant(s) shall permit the Commonwealth to inspect, copy or
photograph (1) books, papers, documents or tangible objects which the Defendant(s)
intends to introduce into evidence and which are in the Defendant's possession,
custody or control ; and (ii) any results or reports of physical or mental examinations
and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with this particular case or
copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the Defendant(s) and
which the Defendant(s) intends to introduce as evidence or which were prepared by
a witness whom the Defendant(s) intends to call at trial when the results or reports
relate to the witness' testimony [RCr 7.24(3)] .
protestation to the contrary, Gordon was obligated to provide the Commonwealth
with reciprocal discovery . 10
Having determined that Gordon was required to provide discovery to the
Commonwealth, we must now determine whether the documents in question
were properly within the scope of materials that the Commonwealth was entitled
to receive under the reciprocal discovery process . Our review of this matter is
greatly hampered by the fact that since we have a truncated version of the record
before us, as is common in writ cases, we have not been provided with the
specific documents in question . But that omission is not fatal to our review
because the reason Gordon seems to contend that the materials were not
discoverable is the so-called impeachment exception under which materials
planned to be used for impeachment purposes are somehow rendered nondiscoverable. And it appears that the trial court may have also believed such an
exemption existed .
But the issue of whether an impeachment exception may
exist in our criminal rules is not necessary to the resolution of this case because
Gordon clearly intended to use the materials in question in his case in chief.
The documents in question would appear to fall directly within the scope of
both Jefferson Circuit Court Rule 803(C), which requires a defendant to permit
discovery by the Commonwealth of any "papers" or "documents" that a defendant
intended to introduce into evidence, and RCr 7 .24(3)(A)(ii), which likewise
requires a defendant to permit discovery by the Commonwealth of "papers,
10
The Commonwealth contends that it provided discovery to Gordon's attorney at the
day of Cordon's arraignment, that Gordon thereafter changed attorneys, and that
Gordon's new attorney was the one who disputed his client's reciprocal discovery
obligation .
documents, or tangible objects which the defendant intends to introduce into
evidence and which are in the defendant's possession, custody, or control."
Although we recently questioned whether an attorney could intend to "introduce
impeachment evidence before trial has even begun and before he or she even
knows what witnesses may need to be impeached,"" our criminal rules do not
explicitly provide for an impeachment exception . 12 And reasonable minds could
differ as to whether our rules contain an implied impeachment exception . But we
need not resolve that issue today since it is clear that Gordon sought to introduce
the documents in question because they had been pre-marked for introduction
into evidence . So it is clear that Gordon planned on using the materials at issue
in his case in chief, not just for possible impeachment of a Commonwealth's
witness. Furthermore, discovery was envisioned to avoid surprises at trial .
This leads to the conclusion that the trial court correctly found that Gordon
had committed a discovery violation . 13 And, as previously stated, a trial court has
the discretion to declare a mistrial for a discovery violation . The question
14
Gray v. Commonwealth , 203 S.W .3d 679, 685 n.1 (Ky. 2006).
See RCr 7.24.
Although Gordon's counsel stated at the hearing on the Commonwealth's motion to
quash that "boxes" of materials were available for the Commonwealth to inspect, the
written notice of discovery-order compliance, which Gordon submitted after the
hearing, did not contain a reference to any additional discoverable materials outside
the ones listed in that notice . So we agree with the Commonwealth that "[t]he
tendering of some documents and not others, without any additional notation that the
appellant retained documents which were subject to the court's discovery order,
would cause anyone to believe that the tendered documents were the only ones that
the appellant intended to introduce at trial."
Weaver, 955 S.W.2d at 725.
becomes, therefore, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it declared
a mistrial.'5
C . The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Granting Mistrial.
Although we have held that a court may decline to address a claim of
double jeopardy in a writ context because a petitioner has an adequate remedy
by appeal, '6 we have also held that a criminal defendant does not have an
adequate right of appeal when the trial court grants the Commonwealth's motion
for a mistrial over the defendant's objection ." So, although our review of this
case is hampered by the lack of written findings by the trial court18 and by the
lack of explanation by the Court of Appeals for its cursory denial of Gordon's
petition for a writ, we will exercise our discretion to review Gordon's double
jeopardy claim in this writ context .
15
16
Commonwealth v. Scott, 12 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Ky. 2000) ("a trial court's grant of a
mistrial will be overturned only if it is clearly erroneous or constitutes an abuse of
discretion .").
St. Clair v. Roark, 10 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2000) ("we conclude that although
double jeopardy is an appropriate subject for a writ of prohibition, it is not mandatory
that it be addressed in that context. The court in which the petition is filed may, in its
discretion, address the merits of the issue within the context of the petition for the
writ, or may decline to do so on grounds that there is an adequate remedy by appeal .
Neither approach is mandatory and the exercise of discretion may well depend on
the significance of the issue as framed by the facts of the particular case.").
Macklin v. Ryan , 672 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Ky . 1984).
Gordon has placed in the record what purport to be DVDs of the trial court's
proceedings. However, those DVDs bear the name and phone number of what
appears to be a private video recording business. As we recently explained in
another writ case, we may not review non-certified copies of the trial court
proceedings . Estate of Cline v. Weddle, 250 S.W.3d 330, 337 n. 20 (Ky. 2008) ("We
were not provided with certified transcripts or videotapes of the trial court's hearings
on these matters. Instead, the Estate appended a CD purporting to contain video of
the trial court's hearings to the briefs . The Civil Rules do not provide for our review
of such non-certified recordings, however."). However, because the parties do not
appear to disagree with the nature and sequence of events and discussions that led
to the declaration of a mistrial, we do not perceive that our viewing those relevant
proceedings would alter the outcome of this appeal .
In cases in which a first trial results in the declaration of a mistrial once
jeopardy attaches but before the rendering of a verdict, the double jeopardy
clause bars retrial "if the mistrial was granted without the defendant's consent
and in the absence of a manifest necessity to do so."'9 An appellate court must
be deferential to a trial court's decision to grant a mistrial.2°
We reject Gordon's argument that declaring a mistrial is somehow
rendered invalid by the trial court's alleged failure explicitly to find that there was
a manifest necessity for a mistrial . Obviously, such explicit findings by trial courts
are an invaluable aid both to counsel and to a reviewing court. But the lack of
19
20
Grimes v. McAnulty, 957 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Ky. 1997). KRS 505.030(4), which we
relied upon and cited in Grimes, refers, in pertinent part, to retrial being barred by a
former prosecution if "[t]he former prosecution was improperly terminated after the
first witness was sworn but before findings were rendered by a trier of fact ." Thus, in
another recent case involving a petitioner seeking a writ to bar retrial after the
declaration of a mistrial, we again relied upon KRS 505.030(4) to determine that
jeopardy attached after the swearing in of the first witness. Radford v. Lovelace,
212 S.W.3d 72, 79 (Ky. 2006). However, in other cases, we have held that
"U]eopardy attaches only when the jury is impanelled and sworn." Lear v.
Commonwealth , 884 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Ky. 1994). Importantly, the United States
Supreme Court has declared that the federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the
jury is impaneled and sworn is binding on the states . Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S . 28, 3738, 98 S .Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed .2d 24 (1976) . Thus, KRS 505.030(4), which was enacted
before the decision in Crist, appears to be in direct conflict with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal double jeopardy clause . But we need
not definitively resolve this quandary in this case because the jury had been sworn
and witnesses had been sworn, meaning that jeopardy had attached in Gordon's trial
under both Crist and KRS 505.030(4).
Grimes, 957 S.W.2d at 225 ("In reviewing a decision to grant a mistrial, the trial court
must have a measure of discretion . The interest in orderly, impartial procedure
would be impaired if he were deterred from exercising that power by a concern that
at any time a reviewing court disagreed with his assessment of the trial situation a
retrial would automatically be barred . Furthermore, [t]he adoption of a stringent
standard of appellate review in this area . . . would seriously impede the trial judge in
the proper performance of his 'duty, in order to protect the integrity of the trial. . . .")
(quotation marks and citations omitted) .
10
such findings is not fatal to the declaration of a mistrial, provided that the record
supports the trial court's decision to grant a mistrial .
In the case at hand, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion
in declaring a mistrial based upon manifest necessity . As noted by -the
Commonwealth, Gordon's own actions (or inactions) were responsible for the
situation that led to the mistrial and, given the apparently voluminous number of
documents in question, any continuance would likely have been lengthy to allow
the Commonwealth adequate time to examine and evaluate the documents.
We agree with the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the granting of a mistrial
is appropriate and fair in cases in which the mistrial is directly attributable to the
defendant's conduct-"[t]o hold otherwise would allow a defendant to avoid
prosecution by creating error purposefully while refusing to move for a mistrial ."22
Moreover, the charges against Gordon appear to have largely depended upon
various contracts and documents between Gordon and Housing, meaning that
Gordon's failure fully to comply with his reciprocal discovery obligation to provide
documents from, or relating to, Housing is rendered more detrimental to the
Commonwealth . Moreover, the trial court did not hastily declare a mistrial .
Rather, the trial court first attempted to exclude documents not provided in
discovery, although that situation proved unduly time-consuming because it
21
22
Arizona v. Washington , 434 U.S . 497, 516-17, 98 S .Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed .2d 717 (1978)
("The absence of an explicit finding of "manifest necessity" appears to have been
determinative for the District Court and may have been so for the Court of Appeals.
If those courts regarded that omission as critical . [T]hey required too much . Since
the record provides sufficient justification for the state-court ruling, the failure to
explain that ruling more completely does not render it constitutionally defective .")
(footnote omitted) .
United States v. Gantley , 172 F.3d 422, 430 n .5 (6th Cir. 1999).
required the Commonwealth to object to each of the documents improperly
sought to be introduced . In short, although we agree with Gordon that the trial
court could have remedied the situation through the imposition of other sanctions
such as excluding evidence or granting a continuance, we are not convinced that
the trial court abused its discretion by declaring
mistrial.
III . CONCLUSION .
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed .
All sitting, except Venters, J. All concur .
23
Actually, as noted by the Commonwealth, the exclusion of the documents in question
would likely have been a harsher remedy than a mistrial because Gordon's defense
presumably would have been hampered if all of the documents in question had been
excluded from evidence . As matters now stand, assuming they otherwise comply
with the Rules of Evidence, the documents presumably may be utilized by Gordon
upon retrial .
12
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Thomas E. Clay
Clay, Kenealy, Wagner & Adams, PLLC
462 South Fourth Avenue, Suite 1730
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
HONORABLE JUDITH McDONALD-BURKMAN,
(JUDGE, JEFFERSON . CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION 9):
Judith E. McDonald-Burkman
Jefferson Circuit Judge
600 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST) :
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
118 Capitol Building
700 Capital Avenue
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
John Balliet
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney
514 West Liberty Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Teresa Ann Young
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney
514 West Liberty Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
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