JOSUE MARQUEZ AREVALO V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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APPELLANT
JOSUE MARQUEE AREVALO
V.
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-00677
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This is an appeal from a judgment convicting Appellant of intentional
murder and sentencing him to forty (40) years in prison . We reject Appellant's
claims of error that the jury should have been instructed on first and second
degree manslaughter, that a witness was entitled to review her prior
inconsistent statement before it could be admitted, that the 911 call was
improperly admitted, and that evidence of Appellant's attempt to obtain a gun
three months before the crime was not admissible under KRE 404(b) . As to the
claim that a police officer was improperly used as an interpreter during
Appellant's statement to police, we adjudge that even if it was error, it was
harmless error. Hence, we affirm.
On March 14, 2006, Lexington Police responded to a call reporting a
shooting at 828 Ward Drive. The 911 call came from a neighbor named Juan
Villa, who did not witness the shooting but heard the gunshots . When the
police arrived on the scene, they found that the deceased, Pedro Lilly, had been
shot to death while seated in his car in his driveway. An autopsy revealed that
Lilly had been shot four times.
At the scene, police encountered Carmella Arevalo, Lilly's paramour,
repeatedly screaming, "Josue shot my Pedro" in Spanish. Subsequently,
during a recorded interview with Carmella, she stated that after hearing the
gunshots, she looked out her door and saw her son, Josue Arevalo, running to
his car. Police questioned several other witnesses at the scene, none of whom
claimed to have seen Josue or anyone else shoot Lilly. However, three of these
witnesses, Juana Lopez, Eduardo Cortez, and Sixto Roblero, testified that they
saw Josue running and getting into his car after the shooting, although none of
them saw him with a weapon . An acquaintance of Josue, Matthew Robey,
testified that in late 2005, Josue came to his house looking to obtain
a gun.
Robey testified that Josue said he wanted a gun because he believed his
stepfather had raped him when he (Josue) was drunk and had passed out.
Andrea Croom testified that Josue had asked her if she knew where he could
get a gun because he "wanted to kill a Mexican." Two other witnesses, Lynn
Smith and Melissa Rogers, testified that Josue had told them that he was going
to kill or hurt a "fucking Mexican." Smith and Croom both stated that they
saw Josue with a gun prior to the shooting that looked like the gun the
prosecution claimed was the murder weapon at trial.
In Josue's statement to police, he denied shooting Lilly and maintained
that he was at his home on Race Street at the time of the shooting. A search of
Josue's home after the shooting revealed a gun and ammunition. The
fingerprints on the gun matched Josue's fingerprints, and the gun was
determined to be the gun that fired the bullets recovered from the scene and
from Lilly's body.
On May 19, 2006, Josue Arevalo was indicted for the murder of Pedro
Lilly. Pursuant to a jury trial on July 23-24, 2007, Josue was found guilty of
murder and sentenced to forty (40) years imprisonment. This matter of right
appeal followed.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
At trial, Josue requested jury instructions on first and second-degree
manslaughter, in addition to the instruction for murder submitted by the
Commonwealth . The trial court denied the request, and the jury was
instructed only on murder .
Josue argues that he was entitled to instructions on first and seconddegree manslaughter because there was evidence from which the jury could
conclude that he acted wantonly (KRS 507.040) or under extreme emotional
disturbance MRS 507.030(1)(b)) when he killed Lilly. It is the duty of the trial
court to instruct the jury on every theory of the case deducible from the
evidence. Fredline v. Commonwealth, 241 S.W .3d 793, 797 (Ky. 2007) (citing
Manning v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 610,614 (Ky. 2000)) ; RCr 9 .54(1) .
While that duty includes instructions on any lesser included offenses which are
supported by the evidence, that duty does not require an instruction on a
theory with no evidentiary foundation. Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S .W.2d
925, 929 (Ky. 1998) (citing Barbour v. Commonwealth, 824 S.W. 2d 861, 863
(1992), overruled on other rounds bv. McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 875
S .W.2d 518 (1994)) . A trial court's rulings on instructions are reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard . Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258,
274 (Ky. 2006) (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W .3d 563, 569-570
(Ky. 2004)) .
Josue presented no evidence in this case, and his defense was a
complete denial of any involvement in the killing of Lilly. In his statement to
police, which was admitted into evidence, Josue claimed he was at his
apartment on Race Street at the time of the killing. There was no evidence
upon which an inference of a wanton state of mind could be based in this case.
There was no evidence of anything less than an intentional state of mind. Lilly
was shot four times, twice through the shoulder and twice through the chest,
through a closed window while seated in his car in his driveway. While there
was evidence of a possible motive, that Josue believed Lilly had raped him
some months before the killing, there was no evidence of any shouting,
altercation, or struggle that preceded the shooting. Further, there was
abundant evidence that the killing was premeditated .
Josue relies heavily on Commonwealth v. Wolford, 4 S.W.3d 534, 539-40
(Ky. 1999), wherein this Court stated:
We reiterate the long-standing rule that where, as
here, a defendant claims an alibi, or the evidence is
purely circumstantial and does not conclusively
establish his state of mind at the time he killed the
victim, it is appropriate to instruct on all degrees of
homicide and leave it to the jury to sort out the facts
and determine what inferences and conclusions to
draw from the evidence.
In Wolford, we ruled that the trial court properly instructed on second-degree
manslaughter because the evidence did not conclusively establish the
defendant's state of mind . However, we view Wolford as distinguishable from
the instant case. In Wolford, the two victims and three co-defendants had been
part of an ongoing family feud. On the night of the shootings, the victims
began walking toward the defendants' family property with a baseball bat and a
club after gunshots had been fired toward the victims' family property. The two
victims were shot to death, and at trial, the evidence as to who shot the victims
and how the shooting occurred was convoluted and contradictory. Unlike the
present case, there was evidence from which it could be inferred that the
defendant in Wolford acted wantonly, either during an altercation with the
armed victims or in wantonly shooting in the direction of the victims to scare
them away or defend himself.
As stated above, in the instant case, there was no evidence that Lilly was
armed or that there was any disagreement or altercation prior to the shooting.
As in Ratliff, 194 S.W .3d at 275, Parker v. Commonwealth , 952 S.W.2d 209,
212 (Ky. 1997), and Foster v. Commonwealth, 827 S.W .2d 670, 677-78 (Ky.
1991), all of the evidence established that the shooting was an intentional act.
Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to give a second-degree
manslaughter instruction in this case .
Josue also maintains that an instruction on first-degree manslaughter
was warranted in this case because there was evidence from which it could be
inferred that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
(EED) . KRS 507 Josue points to the testimony of Matthew Robey
.
.030(1)(b)
that Josue said he wanted a gun because he believed Lilly had raped him one
night after he had passed out drunk.
To be entitled to a first-degree manslaughter instruction based on EED :
Where must be evidence that the defendant suffered "a
temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or
disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause
one to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force of
the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from
evil or malicious purposes ." McClellan v.
Commonwealth , 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky.1986) .
"[T]he event which triggers the explosion of violence on
the part of the criminal defendant must be sudden and
uninterrupted. . . . [I]t is wholly insufficient for the
accused defendant to claim the defense of extreme
emotional disturbance based on a gradual
victimization from his or her environment, unless the
additional proof of a triggering event is sufficiently
shown." Foster v. Commonwealth, 827 S.W.2d 670,
678 (Ky.1991) (citations omitted) . And the "extreme
emotional disturbance . . . [must have a] reasonable
explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is
to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be." Spears [y.
Commonwealth] , 30 S.W. 3d [ 152], 155.
Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 81-82 (Ky. 2006).
According to Robey's testimony, it was in December of 2005, over three
months before the shooting, that Josue told him about his belief that Lilly had
raped him. Thus, even if that could be a reasonable explanation for Josue's
alleged EED, the event was long before the killing, and there was no evidence of
ongoing EED or any more recent triggering event. Unlike Holland v.
Commonwealth , 114 S.W.3d 792, 807-08 (Ky. 2003), where we allowed that the
triggering event could fester for a period of time, there was no evidence in the
instant case of any continuing confrontations between Josue and Lilly or even
any confrontation on the night of the shooting. There was no evidence of any
shouting or argument before the shooting, and in Carmella Arevalo's statement
to police, she claimed to be unaware of any tension or hostility between her son
and Lilly. Like the defendant in Cecil v. Commonwealth, 888 S.W.2d 669, 674
(Ky. 1994), the evidence showed that Josue acted with premeditation. Josue
tried to obtain a gun to kill Lilly some three months before the shooting, and he
told various witnesses that "he was going to kill a fucking Mexican." Thus, the
trial court properly denied the first-degree manslaughter instruction based on
EED.
OFFICER BUENO AS INTERPRETER OF STATEMENTS TO POLICE
Officer Lorenzo Bueno of the Lexington Metro Police Department was
called as a witness for the Commonwealth . Officer Bueno testified about
arriving at the scene of the shooting and what he saw and heard there . Bueno
also acted as interpreter in the subsequent police interviews of Josue and
Cannella Arevalo, who were both Hispanic. The statements of both Josue and
Cannella were played at trial.
Prior to trial, Josue moved to have one of the court interpreters used at
trial translate Josue's statement, instead of relying on Officer Bueno's
translation on the audiotape. Josue's trial attorney argued that because
Officer Bueno was an interested party employed by the police, and was
unsworn during the interview, his translation of Josue's statement should not
have been played for the jury. The trial court ruled that because neither Josue
nor the Commonwealth alleged any substantive errors in the translation, it
would allow the audiotape of Josue's statement with Officer Bueno interpreting
to be played at trial.
On appeal, Josue argues that the trial court erred in not allowing the
statements of Josue and Cannella to be translated at trial by the formal court
interpreters . It must be noted that Josue did not make the same objection to
the playing of Cannella's statement to police, although Josue did object to the
introduction of that statement on other grounds, as we shall discuss later.
Hence, only the argument regarding the translation of Josue's statement was
preserved for review. RCr 9.22.
KRE 604 provides, "An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these
rules relating to qualifications of an expert and the administration of an oath or
affirmation to make a true translation." Josue does not challenge the
qualifications of Officer Bueno to testify as a Spanish-speaking expert under
KRE 702. Indeed, Officer Bueno confirmed at trial that he
is a native Spanish
speaker and has spoken Spanish all his life. Rather, Josue's argument stems
from the fact that Officer Bueno was a police officer and was unsworn at the
time he translated Josue's statement.
Regarding the fact that Officer Bueno was unsworn at the time Josue's
statement was given to police, the statement of Josue to police was not
presented as the in-court testimony of Josue. The statement was presented
under KRE 80IA(b) as an admission of a party. At the time Josue gave his
statement and Officer Bueno translated the statement, no oath was required
because it was not a court proceeding . At trial, Officer Bueno was under oath
as a witness when he testified and authenticated the statement. KRE 603.
As to the argument that Officer Bueno was not a disinterested
interpreter, we note that under KRS 30A.400(1), a person detained in police
custody, who cannot communicate in English, shall be provided an interpreter
prior to any interrogation or taking of a statement from that person . The
statement may only be admitted against a person entitled to the services of an
interpreter if the statement was made in the presence of a "qualified
interpreter." KRS 30A.400(2) . KRS 30A.405(1) provides:
Any person appointed as interpreter pursuant to this
chapter shall be qualified by training or experience to
interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially , both
receptively and expressively, using any necessary
specialized vocabulary.
(emphasis added) . However, Josue did not raise the requirements of KRS
Chapter 30A or even move to suppress Josue's statement on grounds that
Officer Bueno was not impartial. Rather, Josue merely requested that the
interpreters used at trial translate the statement. In our view, even if it was
error to allow Officer Bueno's translation of the statement to be presented to
the jury, that error was harmless because there is no assertion that any of the
translation of the statement was incorrect, and the statement was not harmful
to Josue's case since he denied all involvement in the shooting in the
statement. RCr 9.24.
PRIOR STATEMENT OF CARMELLA AREVALO
When the Commonwealth questioned Cannella Arevalo on direct about
the statement she gave to police and about her telling another witness that
Josue had been at her house on the day of killing, Carmella repeatedly stated
that she did not remember making such statements. Pursuant to KRE
801A(a)(1), the Commonwealth then sought to impeach the testimony of
Carmella with her prior inconsistent statement to police. Josue objected to the
playing of the taped statement, arguing that Carmella should have a chance to
first review such statement outside the presence of the jury. The trial court
overruled the objection and allowed the tape to be played .
In that statement, Carmella told police that Josue was at her house on
the day of the shooting when she got home from work. She stated that when
she walked in the door, Josue jumped up from the couch, grabbed at his waist
and ran out the door. Cannella next remembered hearing the shots and
looking out the door and seeing Josue running to his car and driving away.
Citing Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24, 31 (Ky. 1997), Josue
argues that when Cannella testified that she did not remember making the
10
statement to police, the Commonwealth was first required to play the
statement outside the presence of the jury so it could be reviewed by Carmella.
We do not read Brock or our evidentiary rules as entitling the witness to review
the statement before it is offered into evidence. ~ 613(a) states in pertinent
p
Before other evidence can be offered of the witness
having made at another time a different statement, he
must be inquired of concerning it, with the
circumstances of time, place, and persons present, as
correctly as the examining party can present them;
and, if it be in writing, it must be shown to the
witness, with opportunity to explain it.
The Commonwealth made the required time, place and persons present
inquiry under ~ 613, and because the statement was in the form of an
audiotape recording, it was not required to first be shown to the witness. In
Brock, the Court stated with regard to a recorded statement:
Finally, any attempt to impeach or refresh the
recollection of a witness with a tape recorded
statement must be conducted first in chambers
outside the hearing of the jury so that the jury will not
be prejudiced by having heard the recording in the
event it is determined to be inadmissible .
Id. at 31 (citation omitted) . However, the above language relates to cases where
the trial court needs to hear the recorded statement to determine its
admissibility. See also Thacker v. Commonwealth , 401 S .W.2d 64 (Ky. 1966),
overruled in ~ on other rounds ~ Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788
(Ky. 1969). In the instant case, there was no substantive objection to the
admissibility of the statement. Thus, the trial court did not need to hear the
taped statement and play it outside the presence of the jury. Hence, there was
no error in admitting Carmella's statement to police .
911 CALL
During the trial, the Commonwealth called Juan Villa, the next door
neighbor of Lilly and Cannella, as a witness. During his testimony, the
Commonwealth offered into evidence an audiotape recording of the 911 call
made by Villa immediately after the shooting. Villa tells the dispatcher that "he
killed his stepfather," and describes seeing the defendant get in his car and
drive away after the shooting. At trial, Villa testified that he did not actually
witness the shooting, but looked out his window right after he heard the shots
and saw the victim in his car and Josue driving away. The defense objected to
the playing of the tape, arguing that there were other unidentified voices on the
tape whose statements could not be subject to cross-examination at trial .
In listening to the audiotape of the 911 call, we note that while another
female voice could be heard screaming and crying in the background, none of
what she was saying was discernible . The Commonwealth maintains that the
other voice on the tape was Carmella's and that anything she or Villa said on
the tape would be admissible as an excited utterance under KRE 803(2) .
An "excited utterance", which is an exception to the hearsay rule, is a
"statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant
was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." KRE
803(2) . The 911 call by Villa was made immediately after the shooting, which
would clearly qualify as a startling event. The sound of Villa's voice, as well as
12
the screaming and crying heard in the background, demonstrate the
circumstances of chaos and excitement in which the call was made. See Soto
v. Commonwealth , 139 S.W.3d 827, 860 (Ky. 2004) (stating that a 911 call by
victim immediately after shooting held to be admissible) . Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the audiotape of the 911 call to be
played .
PRIOR BAD ACTS
Josue argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing prior
bad act (KRE 404(b)) testimony to be admitted regarding his solicitation of
prostitutes, his use of marijuana, and the fact that a witness' wife called the
police because Josue was harassing the family in attempting to obtain a gun .
The arguments relative to the testimony about Josue's solicitation of
prostitutes and his use of marijuana are not preserved for appellate review.
RCr 9.22 . There was no objection to this testimony at trial, and the arguments
were not otherwise raised before the trial court.
At trial Matthew Robey testified that when Josue attempted in December
2005 to obtain a gun from him, his wife became concerned and called the
police to report that Josue was harassing the family. Josue argues that this
evidence was of unrelated criminal activity that served no purpose other than
to portray him as a criminal.
Under KRE 404(b), "(evvddence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith." However, such evidence may be admissible to prove
13
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident. KRE 404(b)(1) . In determining the admissibility of
other crimes and bad acts evidence, the evidence is analyzed using a three-tier
inquiry addressing: (1) relevance, (2) probativeness, and (3) prejudice.
Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 19 (Ky. 2005) (citation omitted) .
A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of prior bad act evidence will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion . Id .
Robey's testimony that Josue tried to get a gun from him in December of
2005 to kill his stepfather was relevant and probative of his intent and plan to
kill Pedro Lilly. It also was relevant to the killer's identity in this case, since
Josue denied having anything to do with the murder of Lilly. As for the
testimony that Robey's wife called the police because Josue was harassing the
family in trying to get a gun, we believe such evidence was admissible to show
his persistence in attempting to procure a gun, and was not unduly prejudicial.
No evidence was presented as to what happened after the police were called or
whether Josue was ever criminally charged as a result of this call.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court
is affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Matthew Boyd
Boyd & Boyd, PLLC
3131 Custer Dr., Suite 5
Lexington, KY 40517
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Heather Michelle Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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