BILLY C. WILLIAMS V. THOMAS C. RATLIFF, JR., ET AL.
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PU BLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
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BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : APRIL 24, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2007-SC-000418-MR
BILLY C. WILLIAMS
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NUMBER 2007-CA-000589
SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT NO. 07-J-00020
THOMAS C. RATLIFF, JR., ET AL .
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING AND REMANDING
This matter of right appeal is from the Court of Appeals' grant of a petition for a
writ of prohibition . In the court below, Appellee Thomas Ratliff Jr. ("Ratliff") sought and
was granted a writ prohibiting the Family Court Division of the Shelby Circuit Court from
ordering genetic testing in a paternity action brought by Appellant Billy C. Williams
("Williams") . The Court of Appeals held that because there was no finding by the family
court that the child who was the subject of the paternity action was born out of wedlock,
Williams lacked standing to rebut the presumption of Ratliff's paternity. On the record
before this court, we must affirm the Court of Appeals . However, for reasons
hereinafter set forth, we remand to the Family Court for further proceedings.
1 CR 76.36(7) allows an appeal as a matter of right from a judgment in any
proceeding originating in the Court of Appeals.
Appellee Ratliff and Melissa Earlene Ratliff were married in Jefferson County,
Kentucky on April 23, 1999 . Melissa Ratliff filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in
the Oldham Circuit Court on March 5, 2003, but a decree dissolving the marriage was
never entered. On August 3, 2005, Melissa Ratliff gave birth to Constance Aradia
Farley ("Constance") . On October 28, 2005, an action was filed in the Henry Family
Court by the Cabinet for Families and Children through Melissa Ratliff to establish that
Williams was Constance's father. The complaint was verified and stated that "the
alleged father of the child is Billy Williams ." Nearly a year later, on September 2, 2006,
Melissa Ratliff died . On October 6, 2006 a motion was made by the Henry County
Attorney to amend the complaint to add Thomas Ratliff as a defendant in the paternity
action . On December 14, 2006 an order was entered by the Henry Family Court
dismissing the action and noting that since Melissa was married at the time of her
demise, Constance's paternity was not in question . Thereafter, on January 5, 2007,
Appellant filed a petition in the Family Court of Shelby County to establish his paternity
of Constance and to be awarded her "care custody and control ."
On February 19, 2007, an order of the Shelby Family Court was entered
compelling the genetic testing of Appellant, Appellee and the infant Constance . The
Family Court's order was based on its conclusion that nothing in the Uniform Act on
Paternity (KRS Chapter 406) prevented Williams from qualifying as a "putative father.
,2
This determination is key since a "putative father" is among the limited class of persons
2 In the original model Uniform Act on Paternity (1960), the definition of the
phrase "child born out of wedlock" included a child "born to a married woman by a man
other than her husband ." Unif. Act on Paternity ยง 1 (2001). The General Assembly
declined to include this portion of the definition when it adopted the Commonwealth's
version of the Uniform Act on Paternity in 1964. Kentucky's divergence from the original
U .A.P. is noted in the model act's official comment .
permitted to seek a determination of paternity under KRS 406 .021(1). The Family Court
concluded that in light of Melissa Ratliff's death and the relatively young age of
Constance, genetic testing would be in the best interests of the child . Appellee brought
this original action seeking to prohibit enforcement of the Family Court's genetic testing
order. 3
Upon review, the Court of Appeals agreed with Ratliff's assertion that "putative
father" is a specialized legal term, defined as "[t]he alleged biological father of a child
born out of wedlock .
,4
Where a term has acquired a specialized meaning, courts are
required to apply that meaning when interpreting a statute . Relying on the absence of
a judicial finding that Constance had been "born out of wedlock" as defined in KRS
406.011, the Court of Appeals held that Williams had not established that he was a
"putative father" and was not, therefore, among the class granted standing to bring a
paternity action under KRS 406 .021(1). 6 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals granted the
writ prohibiting enforcement of the Shelby Family Court's order and this appeal followed
as a matter of right.
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 406, by the plain language, is limited in
application to instances of births out of wedlock . KRS 406.011 sets forth the terms of
the Commonwealth's statutory presumption of paternity:
3 CR 76.36(1) .
4 Black's Law Dictionary (7 t" ed. 1999).
5 Payton v. Norris , 42 S .W .2d 723 (Ky. 1923).
6 "Paternity may be determined upon the complaint of the mother, putative father,
child, person, or agency substantially contributing to the support of the child ."
"A child born during lawful wedlock, or within ten (10) months thereafter, is
presumed to be the child of the husband and wife. However, a child born
out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other
than her husband where evidence shows that the marital relationship
between the husband and wife ceased ten (10) months prior to the birth of
the child ." (Emphasis added .)
Under this statute, when read in conjunction with KRS 406 .021(1), two means are
provided for one claiming to be the father of a child to assert his status as the father.
One claiming to be the father of a child born to an unmarried woman may petition the
court to establish his paternity and thereafter be heard on his claim. One other than the
husband who claims to be the father of a child born to a married woman must establish
that the "marital relationship" between the husband and wife ceased ten months prior to
the birth of the child . One claiming under this provision may be heard, and providing
probability is shown, obtain genetic testing. One claiming to be the father of a child born
to a married woman without also proving that the marital relationship between the
husband and wife ceased ten months prior to the birth of the child may not be heard on
his claim as he is unable to establish standing under the statute .
Kentucky case law establishes that the presumption of paternity "can be
overcome only by evidence so clear, distinct and convincing as to remove the question
from the realm of reasonable doubt . ,7 A review of the record herein shows that
Appellant Williams presented no evidence to the Family Court that Constance was a
child "born out of wedlock" as that term is defined or that the marital relationship
between the Ratliffs had ceased ten months prior to Constance's birth . $ In essence,
7 Montgomery v. McCracken , 802 S.W.2d 943, quoting Simmons v. Simmons,
479 S .W.2d 585, 587 (Ky. 1972) .
8 In Appellant's brief he attempts to bolster his argument by introducing affidavits
and other documents that were not presented to the Family Court . This practice violates
Williams asked the Family Court to do on his behalf what he would not or could not do
for himself-rebut the presumption of paternity. Williams presented no competent proof
that he qualifies as a putative father or that the marital relationship had ceased at least
ten months before Constance's birth . As such, the presumption of paternity was not
rebutted and the Family Court exceeded
its
authority when it ordered genetic testing .
Williams argues that Ratliff is not entitled to a writ since he failed to show that he
lacks an adequate remedy by appeal or that great injustice and irreparable injury will
befall Ratliff if the writ is not granted . However, a writ is the proper remedy where a
substantial miscarriage of justice will result and correction of a lower court's error is
necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly administration of justice.9
Furthermore, the substantial miscarriage of justice need not be accompanied by a
shoving of great and irreparable injury. 10 Here, a miscarriage of justice would have
occurred 4 the duly-enacted statutory presumption of paternity was not observed .
Moreover, upon the occurrence of genetic testing without observance of the statutory
presumption, any injury resulting therefrom would be irreparable .
The family court ordered genetic testing of the Appellee and Constance without
any substantive evidence supporting the Appellant's claim of paternity or any showing
that Constance was born out of wedlock . While the family court's desire to
CR 76.36(5), and is prejudicial to the Appellee . These documents were not considered
by this Court in reaching its decision .
9 Independent Order of Foresters v . Chauvin, 175 S .W.3d 610 (Ky. 2005);
Grange Mut Ins . Co. v. Trudg, 151 S .W.3d 610 (Ky. 2005); Hoskins v . Maricle, 150
S .W .3d 1, 20 (Ky. 2004); Bender v . Eaton, 343 S .W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961) .
10 Independent Order of Foresters, 175 S .W. 3d at 616-17; The St . Luke
Hospitals, Inc. v. Kopowkski l 160 S.W .3d 771, 775 (Ky. 2005).
expeditiously and conclusively determine the issue of paternity is admirable, its order for
genetic testing was improper. As a matter of public policy and proper statutory
interpretation, to require genetic testing based on nothing more than a petitioner's "sayso" is contrary to the framework for litigation of paternity issues established by the
General Assembly. Kentucky law does not afford genetic testing to anyone and
everyone who is willing to file a petition.
In this case, even though the mother is deceased and the public policy interest of
promoting marital harmony no longer exists, Williams must first show that Constance
was born out of wedlock as the phrase is defined in KRS 406 .011, and thereafter make
at least a showing of probability of paternity before the genetic testing step will be
required . As the Family Court was of the opinion that no such requirement existed, no
preliminary showing was made. In the interest of giving Williams a fair opportunity to be
heard, we will remand this cause to the trial court with directions to allow Williams thirty
days in which to amend his petition and support it with evidence sufficient to establish a
probability that he is the father of Constance . Upon motion of either party, the Family
Court shall hold an evidentiary hearing . Upon the Family Court's conclusion that
Williams has made the required showing of probable paternity, Appellant's claim may go
forward and genetic testing required . Otherwise, Williams' claim shall be dismissed with
prejudice by the Family Court.
All sitting . Lambert, C.J ., and Cunningham, Minton, Noble, and Scott, JJ .,
concur. Abramson, J ., files a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part
in which Schroder, J ., joins.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Joseph S . Yates
JOSEPH S . YATES, PSC
45 South Main Street
P. O . Box 6
New Castle, KY 40050
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES :
Carrie Lynn Cotton
301 Washington Street
Shelbyville, KY 40065
Hon. John David Myles
Judge, Shelby Family Court
535 '/Main Street
Shelbyville, KY 40065
RENDERED : APRIL 24, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2007-SC-000418-MR
BILLY C. WILLIAMS
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NUMBER 2007-CA-000589
SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT NO . 07-J-00020
THOMAS C. RATLIFF, JR., ET AL
APPELLEES
OPINION BY JUSTICE ABRAMSON
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
I concur with the remand of this case for further proceedings regarding
Williams's claim of paternity as to Constance . I dissent from those portions of the
majority opinion which would require Williams to establish first that marital relations
between Melissa Ratliff and Thomas C. Ratliff, Jr., ceased ten months prior to
Constance's birth. My dissent in J .N .R. and J.S .R. v. Honorable Joseph O'Reilly,
Judge, Jefferson Family Court, and J .G .R., Real Party in Interest,
S.W .3d
(Ky.,
April 24, 2008) details what I find to be the proper construction of the relevant paternity
statutes . In this case, the Ratliffs' divorce decree which has been pending for over two
years when Constance was born and Melissa Ratliff's paternity action expressly naming
Billy Williams as Constance's father constituted a sufficient showing for the Family
Court to determine that the marital relationship had ceased in the relevant timeframe ;
that Williams is a "
SchrodBr, ]. .joins.
father" ; and that genetic testing is appropriate .
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