KENNETH R. CAMPBELL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2008
,tSixyrrme Cour~ of 'Pt
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2007-SC-000382-MR
KENNETH R. CAMPBELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BRECKINRIDGE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM MONARCH, JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-00131
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
2007-SC-000383-MR
JOSEPH J. METTEN
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BRECKINRIDGE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM MONARCH, JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-00133
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Kenneth R. Campbell and Joseph J. Metten appeal as a matter of right'
from a circuit court judgment. Campbell, Metten, and two other co-defendants
were tried jointly. Because their cases involve common issues and stem from
Ky. Const . § 110 (2) (b).
the same investigation, we elect to issue a joint opinion resolving both of their
cases. Campbell was convicted of tampering with physical evidence, first-degree
wanton endangerment, methamphetamine manufacture with firearm
enhancement, marijuana possession with firearm enhancement, and drug
paraphernalia possession with firearm enhancement and was sentenced to fifty
years' imprisonment. Metten was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine,
first-degree wanton endangerment, marijuana possession, and possession of
drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment .
Both appellants contend that their convictions and sentences must be
reversed because (1) the trial court erred by failing to select a jury at random,
(2) the trial court erred by failing to excuse a juror who knew a defense witness,
and (3) the Commonwealth created error by offering all four co-defendants a
package plea deal that required all four to plead guilty in order to make the deal .
Campbell contends separately that the trial court erroneously denied his motion
for a directed verdict on the firearm enhancement of his drug offenses . Because
we find no reversible error, we affirm .
I . FACTS .
This case arose from an investigation into suspicious purchases of
pseudoephedrine (Sudafed) at a store in a neighboring county. Metten had
made one of the purchases, and he had an outstanding bench warrant for traffic
offenses in another county.
His mother's boyfriend, Campbell, was also listed
on the store's Sudafed log. To investigate the suspicious purchases, law
enforcement officers arrived at Campbell's residence to conduct a "knock and
talk." Metten answered the front door. Metten denied being Joseph Metten, and
he denied knowing if Joseph Metten was at the residence.
While the officers talked to Metten, a child appeared at the door.
Responding to the officer's question, the-child told them that Campbell was in the
back. The child opened the door. The officers could then see Campbell,
Thomas Hall, and David Allen inside the house; and they could also see Metten
fleeing out the back door. MeRen was later taken into custody at another
location . The officers also detected the smell of ether and observed items that
led them to believe that methamphetamine was being made there . They also
found marijuana in the residence and noted the presence of five children and
Metten's mother, who was also Campbell's girlfriend . 2
Metten, Campbell, Hall, and Allen were all indicted for manufacturing
methamphetamine, wanton endangerment, and other charges . Before trial, the
Commonwealth offered to recommend sentences of ten years' imprisonment for
each defendant if all four defendants would plead guilty--a package plea deal .
Metten and Campbell expressed interest in this plea bargain, but Allen and Hall
flatly refused the deal. The Commonwealth ultimately refused to extend the plea
offer to Metten and Campbell individually .
The four co-defendants received a joint jury trial . The trial court had
trouble seating a jury because many potential jurors were excused for cause .
Even after calling in four potential jurors who had initially been excused, the trial
According to Metten's brief, law enforcement searched the residence after obtaining
consent from Campbell and his girlfriend . Neither Metten nor Campbell contests the
constitutional validity of the "knock and talk" or the search in this appeal .
court still did not have enough potential jurors to try the case.3 The trial court
then noticed a man who had been sitting in the courtroom all day. Upon
questioning the man, the trial court learned that the man had been summonsed
for jury duty ; but he did not hear the clerk call his name during roll call . The man
told the trial court he had remained in the courtroom all day, had taken the oath
to answer truthfully the questions posed to the venire, and had heard all of the
questions the court asked . The court allowed counsel for each co-defendant4 to
question the man . This prospective juror's responses revealed no bias or other
reason why he should not serve, so the trial court put the man on the jury panel
over Metten's objection .
The parties each exercised their peremptory strikes,
leaving twelve jurors and one alternate to hear the case. Ultimately, one juror
was excused for pending litigation against one of the defendants . So the man
who had not heard his name called at roll call sat as a juror in the trial of this
case.
During his case in chief, Hall called his wife, Alicia Hall, to testify. This
prompted the trial judge to announce an immediate recess in the trial
proceedings and to hail counsel into chambers. In chambers, the trial judge
explained that upon seeing Alicia Hall in person, he recognized her as the
Thirty-seven jurors were eventually placed on the jury pool-apparently to allow the
Commonwealth eight peremptory strikes, the defendants eight joint peremptory
strikes (Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9 .40(1)), each of the four
defendants one additional peremptory strike since an additional alternate juror was
also called (RCr 9.40(2)), and each of the four defendants a second additional strike
since more than one defendant was being tried (RCr 9.40 (3)), for a total of twentyfour peremptory strikes .
Each co-defendant had his own separate attorney; none was jointly represented by
the same attorney .
daughter of Barry Lucas, whom he characterized as a "notorious criminal in the
community." The trial court expressed concern that jurors might recognize Alicia
Hall as a member of the Lucas family and stated that the jurors should have been
questioned about the effect of the Lucas family's reputation in voir dire.
After the trial court administered the oath to Alicia Hall as a witness, a
juror asked to speak with the judge in chambers. The juror explained that he had
known Alicia Hall when she was a child and "a Lucas." He knew her father and
was aware of the family's problems . After sending the juror back to the
courtroom, the judge noted that Barry Lucas had "been indicted for everything in
the world at one time or another" and expressed his concern about the effect of
Alicia Hall's testifying because of Barry Lucas's notoriously bad reputation in the
community and a series of indictments and convictions, even stating a fear that
"at this point in time, it ain't going to be a fair trial." He worried that a juror "could
be somebody that Barry has tried to kill for fooling around with her, or that Barry
has tried to shoot or sell drugs to." He specifically noted an incident a few years
before the instant trial where Barry Lucas had been indicted for trying to shoot
someone, and the judge asked defendant Hall if he was the one Lucas had tried
to shoot:
Trial Court :
Not too long ago, I lose track of time, he was
under indictment for having attempted to shoot
someone for fooling around with her. And
there was, how long have you all been
married?
Defendant Hall :
Four years .
Trial Court :
Did he try to shoot you? Are you the one he
tried to shoot?
Defendant Hall:
No .
Trial Court :
He ran somebody off the road up here at
Hardin and tried to shoot them for screwing
around with her.
Defendant Hall :
No, that was for screwing around with his wife.
Trial Court :
Well, same thing, same problem . I will do
whatever you all want to do. I don't care . A
jury may well say she is a Lucas . They are
every damn one guilty . If she's a Lucas, they
are guilty . That may well be. Or they may say,
I ain't going to believe nothing they have to say
from now on out. But that is the reputation we
are putting on the line here .
Following this exchange, Metten moved for a mistrial. But Allen and Hall wished
to proceed .
The trial court then brought the juror separately back into chambers for
further questioning . The juror then explained in more detail that he had dated
Alicia's aunt fourteen or fifteen years before this trial, and he stated that he and
the aunt "did not go around [the Lucas] side of the family" much because of Barry
Lucas . He stated he had feelings about Barry Lucas, but these feelings did not
carry over to Alicia Hall and that he could separate her from his father. The trial
court admonished the juror not to inform the other jurors that Alicia Hall was the
daughter of Barry Lucas and sent him to rejoin the jury.
After denying Metten's motion for a mistrial, the trial court then allowed
Alicia Hall to testify. She testified that before they were apprehended at
Campbell's residence, Hall and Allen were sent to Campbell's residence by her
for the purpose of delivering a sewing machine to Campbell's girlfriend, who was
at that residence . She also admitted to having purchased Sudafed herself,
stating that she was pregnant at the time and took it for congestion as her doctor
recommended .
Hall and Allen argued they were only at the Campbell residence to deliver
the sewing machine and had no awareness of the meth lab there . Metten also
denied being aware of the meth lab and stated he was only at the Campbell
residence to spend time with family but denied living there himself . He admitted
lying to the officer about his identity because he knew of an outstanding bench
warrant for his arrest and did not want to go to jail . He also admitted buying
Sudafed on one occasion but said he did so for Campbell and denied being
involved with Campbell's methamphetamine manufacturing. Campbell admitted
to manufacturing methamphetamine (although he denied doing so on the day
police arrived at the house to investigate) but denied his guilt of other charges
against him and contested the firearm enhancement
The jury acquitted Allen and Hall on all charges . It also acquitted Metten
of one charge (tampering with physical evidence) but convicted him on other
charges, including manufacturing methamphetamine and first-degree wanton
endangerment .5 The jury recommended twenty years' imprisonment for the
manufacturing methamphetamine charge and five years' imprisonment on the
wanton endangerment charge, to be served consecutively for Metten's sentence .
The jury convicted Campbell of first-degree wanton endangerment, tampering
The jury also convicted Metten of possession of marijuana and possession of drug
paraphernalia and recommended a sentence of twelve months' imprisonment for
each of these offenses . These misdemeanor sentences were each ordered to run
concurrently with the felonies . KRS 532.110(1)(a) .
with physical evidence, firearm-enhanced methamphetamine manufacture,
firearm-enhanced marijuana possession, and firearm-enhanced drug
paraphernalia possession . For Campbell's sentence, it recommended fifty years'
imprisonment for firearm-enhanced methamphetamine manufacture and five
years' imprisonment for each of the other offenses, to be served concurrently for
a total of fifty years' imprisonment. The trial court entered judgment against
Metten and Campbell in accordance with the jury's verdicts and sentencing
recommendations . Metten and Campbell then separately filed their appeals.
II . ANALYSIS .
A. No Error Occurred in Placing Potential Juror
Who Did Not Answer Durinq_Roll Call on Panel .
The appellants contend that they were deprived of the right to a randomly
selected jury when the trial court placed on the jury panel the potential juror who
had not heard his name called during roll call. We shall refer to this juror as
"Juror S" in order to protect the juror's privacy. As they contend, because of
Juror S's failure to answer in roll call, Juror S's number was not placed in the box
from which the clerk randomly pulled potential jurors' numbers to come forward
to participate in voir dire . Appellants argue that "[b]y including [Juror S] as the
final juror 'drawn' on the voir dire panel, the court manipulated the list of names
who will eventually compose the empanelled jury," increasing the likelihood that
Juror S would serve on the jury or be eliminated by a peremptory strike by the
defense .
We find no indication that the trial court tried to manipulate the jury list.
Rather, it appears that the trial court's actions substantially complied with
RCr 9 .30, which provides that:
(1)
In a jury trial in circuit court the clerk, in open court,
shall draw from the jury box sufficient names of the
persons selected and summoned for jury service to
compose a jury as required by law. If one or more of
them is challenged, the clerk shall draw from the box
as many more as are necessary to complete the jury.
(b)
If there is an irregularity in drawing from the jury box,
the names of the jurors so drawn shall be returned to
the box.
(c)
(2)
(a)
When it appears that the names in the jury box are
about to become exhausted, the judge may obtain
additional jurors by drawing from the drum, or, with
the consent of the parties, by ordering the sheriff or a
bailiff appointed by the court to summon any number
of qualified persons.
The jury-selection process shall be conducted in accordance
with Part Two (2) of the Administrative Procedures of the
Court of Justice.
Jury selection began with the clerk drawing out potential juror names from the
box for questioning and then drawing out additional juror names as potential
jurors were excused for cause in accordance with RCr 9.30(1)(a). The entire
venire was about to be depleted . This would have allowed the trial court to draw
more names from the drum or order law enforcement to summons other qualified
persons. RCr 9 .30(1)(c) . Instead, the trial court made efforts to obtain a
sufficient jury panel with potential jurors who had already been summonsed for
jury duty. According to Appellants, the trial court re-called potential jurors whose
absences had been previously excused, 6 but further questioning resulted in one
being eliminated for cause.' Juror Ss presence was then discovered, and the
trial court called on Juror S to see if he might qualify as a potential juror.
I
I
We note preservation of this issue is questionable at best. Metten joined
Allen's objection, but Allen stated that the objection might be cured with further
inquiries into Juror S's presence and attention during voir dire questioning .
Metten failed to renew his objection after the trial court indicated Juror S would
be seated on the panel following questioning . Campbell never even explicitly
joined Allen's objection and stated there would be no objection on his part so
long as Juror S was subject to voir dire questions .
Although the trial court's handling of this matter may have deviated from
the procedure laid out in RCr 9.30, we find no substantial deviation from the
required random selection process. Juror S was a potential juror who had
already been summonsed for jury service that day, and his name was initially not
put in the box as a result of innocent human error and not as a result of any
intentional act to reserve him for last.
This case differs from Robertson v. Commonwealth, 8 where we found a
substantial deviation meriting reversal, despite apparent lack of prejudice,
because the trial court had the jurors called in order of their juror number for
questioning, with numbers 1 through 12 called first, with jurors excused for cause
The Commonwealth claims these four jurors had arrived late, resulting in their names
not initially being placed in the jury box. Whether the four jurors had excused
absences or arrived late is not germane to the issues of this case .
Appellants do not claim error in the trial court re-calling these potential jurors whose
absences had previously been excused .
597 S.W.2d 864 (Ky. 1980).
10
replaced by the next number in order. The deviation in Robertson was
substantial because it created a problem whereby the parties knew who each
replacement could be and could manipulate their strikes to obtain a particular
person on the panel .9
In contrast to Robertson, no one in the instant case knew in advance that
Juror S would be called last. And we fail to see how the trial court's method of
dealing with the potential juror shortage in this manner prejudiced Metten or
Campbell, since no one knew in advance that Juror S would be questioned last,
since Juror S was questioned in the same manner as other potential jurors, and
since nothing prevented any party from exercising a peremptory strike on Juror S
if they did not wish him to serve . Moreover, all parties, including Metten and
Campbell, were permitted to examine Juror S in as much depth as they deemed
proper; yet, those examinations failed to show that Juror S was biased for or
against any defendant or the Commonwealth .
Because of Metten's questionable preservation and Campbell's lack of
preservation of this issue, ° the lack of substantial deviation from the random
9
10
Id. a t 865 .
As our predecessor court stated in Price v. Commonwealth , 474 S.W.2d 348, 350
(Ky. 1971): "where two or more defendants are being tried together, it is incumbent
upon each party to timely make the court aware of his objection to any of the
proceedings . This may be done on behalf of one of the parties or jointly on behalf of
others, but the court must be informed of the position taken by a party or he cannot
later complain ." As Campbell never joined any objection to Juror S being placed on
the jury panel at all, but simply stated through counsel that Juror S should be
subjected to voir dire questioning like other jurors, he cannot complain now that
Juror S was placed on the jury panel after being subjected to voir dire questioning .
selection process, and the lack of prejudice, we find no reason to reverse
Appellants' convictions on this basis."
B.
No Reversible Error in Denying Mistrial
When Juror Recognized Alicia Hall.
Next, Appellants contend that the trial court should have granted a mistrial
because one juror knew Alicia Hall (formerly Alicia Lucas). 12 They argue this
juror should have been excused for cause, which would have left an insufficient
number of jurors to decide the case, thus, necessitating a mistrial . We review the
trial court's denial of this mistrial motion under an abuse of discretion standard .'
This juror, whom we will refer to as Juror M to protect his privacy, came
forward to disclose to the trial court that upon seeing Alicia Hall on the witness
stand, he recognized her because he had known her when she was a child, then
known as Alicia Lucas. Juror M stated that he had dated Alicia's aunt about
fourteen or fifteen years before . We first note that this is not the type of "close
familial relationship" that, by itself, merits dismissing a juror for cause . For
example, although a juror should be dismissed for cause if he/she has a close
11
see Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 824, 840 (Ky. 2000) (noting lack of "any
premeditation or manipulation of the jury selection process" and finding any error
harmless where two alternate jurors misunderstood clerk's reading of alternate juror
number to be excused following clerk's random draw of alternate jurors to be
excused, resulting in wrong juror leaving and wrong juror staying on to decide case).
12 We note that Campbell claims on page 20 of his brief that his counsel moved for a
mistrial . However, after reviewing the cites to the record provided by the parties
concerning this matter, we have not found any instance in which Campbell explicitly
moved for a mistrial on his own behalf or joined Metten's motion for a mistrial . Even
if Campbell had moved for a mistrial, the result would not be different as we have
concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial .
13
Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Ky. 2004). We have also stated
that "[a] trial court's decision whether to remove a juror from a panel that has already
been seated is reviewed for abuse of discretion." Lester v. Commonwealth ,
132 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Ky. 2004).
12
family relationship with a party, we have stated that a more attenuated family
relationship such as being a distant cousin does not mean a juror must be
dismissed for cause . 14 We have even stated that an "ex-brother-in-law" of a
partysomeone who presumably might have had a close relationship with a
party at one time but whose relation by marriage had ended sometime in the
past--should not necessarily be dismissed for cause.15 And we found no error in
a juror not being dismissed for cause where she reported that her daughter had
once been friends with one of multiple defendants, but the daughter and the codefendant had not had contact for approximately three years . 16 In this case, the
juror did not claim to have had close contact with Alicia Hall (then Lucas) in the
past. He simply recognized her because he had dated her aunt . Furthermore,
he stated he had not seen Alicia for years before trial. Thus, there was no
reason to declare a mistrial due to Juror M's mere acquaintance with Alicia
several years before trial .
Even Juror M's awareness of Alicia's father's troubles and bad reputation,
which led him to avoid "that side of the family" several years before trial, would
not create a "manifest necessity" for a mistrial" since Juror M stated that Barry
14
15
16
17
Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Ky.1985) (in reviewing alleged errors
in failing to excuse certain jurors for cause, including a juror whom the
Commonwealth's attorney had always regarded as his uncle, stating "[w]e have no
fault to find in regard to the ex-brother-in-law or even the distant cousin and we trust
that, under this statement of principle, no uncles will survive the challenge for cause
on retrial .")
Ratliff v. Commonwealth , 194 S.W.3d 258, 266 (Ky. 2006).
See Woodard , 147 S.W.3d at 68 ("a mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be
resorted to only when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings and there is a
manifest necessity for such an action.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
13
Lucas's reputation had nothing to do with Alicia herself, his opinion of any
defendant would not change as a result of Alicia being married to one of the
defendants, and his former acquaintance with Alicia and knowledge of her family
reputation would not affect his consideration of the case .$ This case is distinguishable from Randolph v. Commonwealth ,' in which
a juror's employment relationship with a party (she served as secretary to the
Commonwealth's attorney) meant she should be dismissed for cause .20 There
was no employment relationship or other close relationship at issue here. Nor is
this case similar to Marsch v. Commonwealth, wherein we held that jurors who
admitted to having already developed opinions regarding the case could not be
rehabilitated by leading questions asking if they could disregard their prior
opinions . Juror M had not previously developed opinions of this case or even
of witness Alicia Hall . These two cases, cited by Appellants, do not establish an
1s
19
20
21
22
See Turner v. Commonwealth, 153 S .W.3d 823, 833 (Ky.2005) (finding no abuse of
discretion in trial court not excusing for cause juror with personal relationship to two
witnesses who also remembered reading something about case in the newspaper
since juror made affirmative statement that she had developed no prejudices and
could render a fair and impartial verdict).
We also note that the trial court's expressed concerns about the Lucas family's
reputation possibly tainting the whole trial (which should have been explored in voir
dire, in his opinion) were simply personal concerns that were not reflected by any
juror's statements nor expressed to the jury at any point. Thus, having had the
benefit of being able to examine the entire record, we must disagree with the trial
court's spontaneous, unfortunate exclamation that the revelation regarding Alicia Hall
being Barry Lucas's daughter meant that the defendants could not receive a fair trial .
7 16 S .W.2d 253 (Ky. 1986) (overruling on other grounds recognized in
Commonwealth v. Wolford, 4 S .W.3d 534 (Ky. 1999)).
Randolph , 716 S.W.2d at 255.
743 S.W.2d 830 (Ky. 1987).
Id. at 833-34. See a/so Montgomery v. Commonwealth , 819 S.W.2d 713, 716-18
(Ky. 1991) (discussing how jurors who had already admitted to forming opinions in
case could not be rehabilitated by "magic question" about putting such opinions
aside).
14
abuse of discretion by refusing to dismiss Juror M for cause or by denying a
mistrial . So we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court denying a mistrial
since it was not necessary to (dismiss Juror M for cause.
It is significant that Alicia's testimony directly concerned only Allen and
Hall, both of whom the jury acquitted . Alicia said nothing about Metten . So,
logically, there is no reason why her alleged "bad family reputation" would have
made the jury more likely to infer from her testimony that Metten must have been
involved in making methamphetamine . Given the lack of any association
between Alicia and Metten, he could not have suffered any prejudice due to "guilt
by association" with her. In sum, we find no reason to reverse Metten's
conviction on this ground .
Similarly, Alicia's testimony did not directly implicate Campbell, nor did she
claim such a close relationship with Campbell that the jury might have assumed
"guilt by association" due to her family's reputation . She stated that she knew
him from work, that she or her husband had given him a ride to work on a couple
of occasions, that he seemed like a nice person, and that she had sent her
sewing machine to Campbell's girlfriend after a yard sale . Campbell did not elect
to cross-examine her. Given the innocuous nature of Alicia's testimony and her
mere passing acquaintance with Campbell and Juror M, we find no reason to
reverse Campbell's conviction especially in light of his failure to cite to the record
to show where he moved for a mistrial on this ground .23
23
Since Campbell apparently failed to join the mistrial motion, he has not preserved
this issue. Price, 474 S.W.2d at 350 . Thus, we review this issue under the standard
of RCr 10.26 ("A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
15
C . No Error in Goinq to Trial When Co-Defendants
Reiected "Package Plea Deal ."
Each Appellant contends that we should reverse his convictions and
remand the case to the trial court with instructions to sentence him to ten years'
imprisonment on amended charges in accordance with a "package plea deal,"
which co-defendants Hall and Allen rejected, but which Metten and Campbell
now say they would have accepted . While conceding that they had no
constitutional right to a plea bargain ,24 they contend that the "package plea deal"
conditioned upon all defendants agreeing to the plea bargain was arbitrary and
left the decision of whether they went to trial in the hands of other defendants .25
While we recognize that some federal courts have expressed concern that
such "package plea deals" may be coercive where they have led to a defendant
pleading guilty and have led to even more searching analysis of whether a guilty
plea is truly voluntary, we are unaware of any authority that would support
reversing a conviction entered against a defendant who did not plead guilty
because of a co-defendant's refusing a package plea deal . As Appellants admit,
24
even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may
be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.")
In our view, any error did not affect Campbell's substantial rights and no manifest
injustice resulted . Thus, he is not entitled to relief .
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S . 545, 561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) .
25
26
We cannot agree with Appellants that this "package plea deal" left the decision to go
to trial in other defendants' hands as Metten was free to enter into an open plea of
guilty.
See, e.g., United States . v. Usher, 703 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Gonzalez-Vasquez , 219 F .3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2000).
16
"a plea bargain is merely a contract ; only the guilty plea and subsequent
deprivation of liberty implicate the Constitution ." ~
Essentially, the Commonwealth was not required to offer any of the
defendants a plea bargain .2$ So the fact that Metten and Campbell were not able
to enter into a plea bargain with the Commonwealth because of their codefendants' refusal of this "all for one deal" does not entitle them to relief.
D.
Trial Court Properly Denied Campbell's Motion
for Directed Verdict on Firearm Enhancement .
The Commonwealth sought to have Campbell's sentences for drug
offenses enhanced under KRS 218A.992 (possession of firearm at time of and in
furtherance of drug offenses) . Campbell moved for a directed verdict on the
firearm enhancement, based on lack of proof of the firearm's operability, and
argues that the trial court committed reversible error in denying this motion . The
jury found Campbell guilty of all three drug offenses (methamphetamine
manufacture, marijuana possession, and drug paraphernalia possession) and
further found beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell had possessed a firearm
in furtherance of all three drug offenses . The jury recommended the maximum
enhanced sentences available for these three offenses (fifty years' imprisonment
on the enhanced methamphetamine manufacture, and five years' imprisonment
27
2s
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S . 504, 507-08, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed .2d 437 (1984) .
Commonwealth v. Corey, 826 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Ky. 1992) (in holding that trial court
lacked authority to initiate and accept conditional guilty plea over Commonwealth's
objection, stating "that whether to engage in plea bargaining is a matter reserved to
the sound discretion of the prosecuting authority" and also noting both parties' right
to jury trial under RCr 9.26 and defendant's right to enter open plea of guilty under
RCr 8.08.)
17
each on the enhanced possession of marijuana and enhanced possession of
drug paraphernalia convictions) .
Police had found a rusty or corroded sawed-off shotgun behind the
headboard of a bed in Campbell's home when searching the home for evidence
of suspected methamphetamine manufacture. The gun was not subjected to any
ballistics testing before trial, and neither party presented proof as to whether the
gun was actually capable of firing . The Commonwealth had announced its
intention at an in-chambers conference during trial to offer a police officer's
testimony that the gun would actually fire bullets, but the trial court sustained
Campbell's objection that this evidence should be excluded due to lack of prior
notice .2g So this case squarely presents the question of whether the prosecution
has the burden of proving the operability of a firearm in order to enhance
sentences for drug offenses under KRS 218A.992 or whether the inoperability of
the firearm is an affirmative defense that the defense has the burden of proving .
The firearm enhancement is set forth in KRS 218A.992, which states, in
pertinent part, that:
1)
Other provisions of law notwithstanding, any person who is
convicted of any violation of this chapter who, at the time of
the commission of the offense and in furtherance of the
offense, was in possession of a firearm, shall :
(a)
29
Be penalized one (1) class more severely than
provided in the penalty provision pertaining to that
offense if it is a felony; or
The trial court stated it would exclude the Commonwealth's evidence of the
weapon's operability, based on lack of prior notice, but stated that the
Commonwealth could offer rebuttal evidence if the defense presented evidence that
the weapon was inoperable . Since the defense offered no evidence of its
inoperability, no proof was ever presented either way on whether it was or was not
operable .
18
(b)
Be penalized as a Class D felon if the offense would
otherwise be a misdemeanor .
A firearm is defined in KRS 237.060(2) as "any weapon which will expel a
projectile by the action of an explosive ." By the plain language of this definition,
a gun must be able to shoot bullets or other projectiles to qualify as a "firearm .» 30
This is in contrast to federal firearm enhancement for drug offenses where the
relevant statutory definition of firearm explicitly includes weapons designed to
eject projectiles by explosive action or weapons that can be converted to eject
projectiles by explosive action, as well as those that actually will eject projectiles
by explosive action .
In Arnold v. Commonwealth ,32 the Court of Appeals recently held that in
carrying concealed deadly weapons cases, the inoperability of the weapon is an
affirmative defense that the defense had the burden of proving . This holding
conforms to our precedent.33 And we find no reason to treat the alleged
inoperability of a weapon differently in the context of firearm enhancement of
drug convictions .
30
31
32
33
Although the gun must be able to shoot projectiles, we find no indication in the
statutory definition that the weapon must be loaded to qualify as a firearm . Thus, the
fact that the sawed-off shotgun was unloaded is of little consequence. See
Commonwealth v. Harris, 344 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Ky. 1961) (pre-Penal Code case
finding that under former statute criminalizing the carrying of concealed deadly
weapons, it was not necessary to show that a firearm was loaded .).
See 18 U .S.C. § 921 (3):
"The term `firearm' means (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an
explosive ; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or
firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device . Such term does not include an
antique firearm ."
109 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Ky.App. 2003).
See Mosely v. Commonwealth , 374 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Ky. 1964).
19
Although firearm definitions for carrying concealed deadly weapons and
for firearm enhancement purposes are provided in different sections of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes, the language in these sections is identical . Both
KRS 527.010(4) (applicable to carrying concealed deadly weapons cases under
KRS 527.020) and KRS 237 .060(2) (applicable to firearm enhancement of drug
offenses under KRS 218A.992) define a firearm as "any weapon which will expel
a projectile by the action of an explosive ." But this definition is not an element of
either offense . Rather, the basic elements of the offense of carrying a concealed
deadly weapon are set forth, subject to certain specified exceptions, in
KRS 527 .020(1):
A person is guilty of carrying a concealed weapon when he or she
carries concealed a firearm or other deadly weapon on or about his
or her person.
Required elements for firearm enhancement of drug offenses are found in
KRS 218A .992(1):
Other provisions of law notwithstanding, any person who is
convicted of any violation of this chapter who, at the time of the
commission of the offense and in furtherance of the offense, was in
possession of a firearm[ .]
Because the operability of the firearm is not an element of the firearm
enhancement, the inoperability of a firearm is an affirmative defense for which
the defense has the burden of proof. So the total lack of proof as to operability
does not entitle Campbell to a directed verdict on the firearm enhancement .
34
Deadly weapon is defined as including "[a]ny weapon from which a shot, readily
capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged" .
KRS 500.080(4)(b).
20
Furthermore, the proof was sufficient to create a jury issue as to the
elements of the firearm enhancement : possession of a firearm at the time the
drug offenses were committed and possession of a firearm in furtherance of the
drug offenses . Whether or not the gun was covered by bedding, it was found in
Campbell's home and, thus, in his constructive possession.35 Furthermore, given
its proximity to the marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and methamphetamine
manufacturing equipment found, the jury could reasonably infer that it was used
in furtherance of the drug offenses . Thus, the trial court properly denied the
directed verdict motion pursuant to the directed verdict standard in Benham v.
Commonwealth : 36
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all
fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as
to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.
35
36
See Pate v. Commonwealth , 243 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Ky. 2007) ("Mrs. Pate testified
that Appellant actually lived in the apartment and his clothing and legal documents
(e.g., social security card) were located in the apartment . When he was arrested,
Appellant told police that the equipment they were seizing was his and that they were
seizing it illegally . In light of this evidence, we reject Appellant's argument that he did
not possess, constructively or otherwise, the equipment found in the apartment .")
See also H ouston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Ky. 1998) (holding that
constructive possession of firearm sufficient for firearm enhancement of drug
offenses and that constructive possession established where loaded guns found in
various places in other rooms of apartment where appellant caught running from one
room to another) ; Commonwealth v. Montague, 23 S .W.3d 629, 632-33 (Ky. 2000)
(while limiting Houston 's holding to cases where defendant has "immediate control"
over firearm in constructive possession during commission of a crime, stating that
facts in Houston still sufficient to invoke firearm enhancement) . Likewise, in this
case, whether buried under bedding or not, there is at least a jury question as to
whether the firearm found behind the headboard of the bed in Campbell's house was
in his immediate control .
816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991).
21
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under
the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury
to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittaI. 37
We also . note that the jury was properly instructed that it must find the
elements of the firearm enhancement provision beyond a reasonable doubt. The
jury instructions explicitly asked whether the jury found Campbell guilty of each
drug offense and,, in regard to each offense, whether the jury "believe[d] from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was in possession of a
firearm when he committed the offense and in furtherance of the offense ." 38 This
"in furtherance" language properly tracks the statute and, certainly, is more than
adequate to fulfill the requirement that a nexus between the firearm possession
and the drug offense be shown .39 Furthermore, the jury was also instructed on
the definition of a firearm with the exact language of KRS 237.060(2). So we find
no fault with the jury instructions as to the firearm enhancement .
Because the jury was properly instructed on the firearm enhancement
issue and the evidence was sufficient to withstand the directed verdict motion, we
find no reversible error in the trial court's handling of this matter. So we affirm
37
/d. at 187.
38
Thus, this instruction comports with the requirements of Apprendi v. New Jersey ,
530 U .S. 466, 490, 120 S .Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed .2d 435 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
See Johnson v. Commonwealth , 105 S .W.3d 430, 435 (Ky. 2003) (where firearm
enhancement sought under KRS 218A.992, holding that "[a] proper instruction would
have required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of some
nexus between Appellant's possession of the pistol and each of the individual drug
and paraphernalia possession charges ; i.e., that Appellant possessed the firearm `in
furtherance of the underlying offenses.").
39
22
the enhancement of Campbell's drug offenses for possession of a firearm at the
time of and in furtherance of the commission of the offenses .
III . CONCLUSION .
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment is affirmed as to both
Campbell and Metten.
All sitting, except Venters, J . All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
KENNETH R. CAMPBELL:
Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
JOSEPH J . METTEN:
Euva D. May
Assistant Public Advocate
Appellate Division
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Heather M. Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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