ROSCOE TRUITT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
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RENDERED : OCTOBER 23, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2007-SC-000376-MR
ROSCOE TRUITT
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SUSAN LYNN SCHULTZ, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-000418
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Roscoe Truitt, was convicted by a Jefferson Circuit Court jury in April
2007 of one court of first-degree rape . Appellant waived jury sentencing and was
consequently sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. Appellant now appeals to this
Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
Appellant makes two arguments in his appeal. First, he argues that the trial court
committed reversible error by precluding him from introducing evidence taken from the
rape victim's Myspaceecom l profile. Second, he argues that the jury was improperly
instructed on his right to remain silent and not testify . For the reasons set forth herein,
we affirm Appellant's convictions .
On or about September 24, 2001, sixteen-year-old V.W. was attacked and raped
in her downtown Louisville neighborhood . V.W. could not positively identify her
assailant at that time but provided a description similar to the appearance of Appellant .
In April 2004, samples from the rape kit used to investigate VW's allegation tested
positive for semen . DNA from that semen sample matched Appellant's DNA. On
February 8, 2005, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Appellant with rape in
the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, kidnapping, and wanton endangerment in
the first degree .
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting Appellant from
introducing excerpts from the rape victim's Myspace profile into evidence
Prior to trial in 2007, Appellant filed a motion to introduce evidence pursuant to
KRE 412(b)(1)(B) and (C) . Specifically, this evidence consisted of forty-five pages of
information V.W., posted on her Myspace profile. The Myspace entries were gathered
Myspace.com is "a website that allows its users to create an online community
where they can meet people. Myspace can be used to share photographs, journals, and
`interests' with mutual friends . People with Myspace accounts can create a `profile,' to
which they can link their friends, and the owner of the profile can either invite people to
become friends, or other Myspace users can ask the owner of the profile to become
friends with the owner of the profile . If the owner of a profile accepts another Myspace
user as a friend, the friend's profile picture is posted on the profile owner's Myspace
page, along with a link to the friend's Myspace profile. The owner of a profile can kick
friends off his profile, deleting that friend's profile picture from the owner's profile page.
In addition, a profile owner can completely block other Myspace users from viewing his
profile page. The owner of a profile can post blogs on his own profile page, allow other
Myspace users to post comments on his profile page, or post comments on other users'
profile pages ." Spanierman v. Hughes ,
F.Supp.2d
(D. Conn. 2008).
by Appellant in 2007, nearly six years after the rape . V.W. was twenty-one when the
entries were collected. In one of the postings V.W. wrote :
When I was fifteen, a man I didn't know got me drunk and slept with me . We
continued sleeping together for months afterward . He was supposed to fill the
void of my father. He missed his mark, and filled something else instead . When
I was seventeen, a man I didn't know welcomed me into his home and his heart .
He would later fill the void of my father. When my son was born he loved him
too, because he wanted to. He didn't have to. When I was nineteen, a man
twice my age offered me a friendship I could not refuse . He later became my
lover. That man fills my life with stress, anger, joy, sweat, tears, excitement &
love.
Another posting stated : "How can you say that no child is left behind? When I was
fifteen . . . I was victim to several pedophiles . One of which was my mother's
boyfriend ." An additional posting listed several of V.W.'s interests, which included
sexual devices, "polyamory", and "bi-pride."
Appellant argued that these and other statements were admissible under KRE
412(b)(1)(B) to establish V.W.'s consent to having sex with Appellant and under KRE
412(b)(1)(C) as evidence directly pertaining to the offense charged. Additionally,
Appellant argued that these statements are relevant to V.W.'s credibility, because they
make it more likely that V.W. consented to having sex. The Commonwealth argued in
response that Appellant failed to establish that the events described in the Myspace
postings referred to him and that the materials did not fit within the exception set forth in
KRE 412(b)(1) . In particular, the Commonwealth argued that the drunken sexual
encounter V.W. referred to at age fifteen involved her mother's boyfriend and happened
in Nebraska, not Kentucky. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Appellant
failed to establish that the evidence was admissible under KRE 412(b)(1)(B) or (C) and
that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative .
During her avowal testimony, V.W. testified about her Myspace profile. V.W.
denied that Appellant had anything to do with the Myspace entries and that the entries
referred to events that happened in Nebraska and not Kentucky. V .W. admitted that
she does have exploratory sexual interests, but that when she was raped she did not
have such interests . The trial court admitted the Myspace entries as an avowal exhibit .
The standard of review for admission of evidence is whether the trial court
abused its discretion . Commonwealth v. English , 993 S .W .2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) .
"The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles ." Id .
"The primary objective of KRE 412 is 'to protect alleged victims of sex crimes
against unfair and unwarranted assaults on character."' Robert G. Lawson, The
Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2.30[3], at 161 (4th ed . LexisNexis 2003) (citation
omitted) . Thus, it "insure[s] that [the victim] does not become the party on trial through
the admission of evidence that is neither material nor relevant to the charge made ."
Barnett v. Commonwealth , 828 S .W.2d 361, 363 (Ky. 1992). KRE 412 "provides such
protection by closing the courtroom door to the kinds of evidence that have been used
historically to wage character warfare on such victims : (1) specific acts of `sexual
behavior' and (2) evidence of `sexual disposition ."' Lawson, supra, sec 2.30[3].
However, the bar to admitting the victim's character evidence is not absolute . KRE 412
contains exceptions when it conflicts with the defendant's right to self-defense . Lawson,
supra, sec 2 .30[4] . KRE 412(b)(1) states:
In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible
under these rules :
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered
to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or
other physical evidence ;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with
respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused
to prove consent or by the prosecution ; and
(C) any other evidence directly pertaining to the offense charged .
However, even if evidence qualifies under one of the exceptions outlined in KRE
412(b)(1), the trial judge must balance the evidence's probative value against its
potential for prejudice under KRE 403. Lawson, supra, sec. 2 .30[4][e] .
Appellant first argues that V.W.'s entries referring to her sexual behavior around
the age of fifteen are admissible under KRE 412(b)(1)(B) because he believes the
information is relevant to show that V.W . may have consented to having sex with him .
However, Appellant presents no evidence to support the theory that the Myspace
entries refer to him. Appellant instead states that the Myspace entries are "arguably a
description of what occurred between V.W . and [him] . "2 The only evidence regarding
who is referred to in the Myspace entries comes from VW's avowal testimony . V.W.
clearly testified that Appellant was not the man from the entries. Appellant's conjecture
regarding VW's Myspace entries cannot satisfy the "specific instances" requirement of
KRE 412(b)(1)(B). See In re KW, 666 S .E.2d 490 (N .C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that
without direct evidence of specific instances, a victim's Myspace page is not admissible
under North Carolina's rape shield rule). His argument is little more than an attempt to
put V.W.'s sexual behavior in front of the jury and is thus inadmissible under KRE
412(b)(1)(B).
2 As the Commonwealth notes, Appellant has never once stated that he is the
man referenced in the Myspace entries . Such an assertion would in fact amount to an
admission that he committed rape in the third degree, KRS 510.060, since V.W. was
fifteen at the time of the rape.
Appellant next argues that V.W.'s Myspace entries are admissible under KRE
412(b)(1)(C) . However, again Appellant offers no evidence indicating that her postings
are "evidence directly pertaining to the offense charged" or that Appellant is implicated
in them . While her postings do allude to the fact that she was sexually active around
the age of fifteen, that conduct was irrelevant to the trial. The only true question is
whether Appellant raped V.W. The Myspace postings provide no relevant evidence to
answer that question . Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit error in
denying Appellant's motion to admit V.W's Myspace entries under KRE 412(b)(1) .
11. The trial court's jury instructions on Appellant's right to remain silent were
appropriate
Appellant finally argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding
his right to remain silent . Appellant never testified in his defense at trial. Upon
Appellant's request, the jury was instructed, "The defendant is not compelled to testify,
and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not
prejudice him in any way." The given jury instruction differed from the instruction
Appellant tendered . Appellant believes that the language used by the trial court violates
RCr 9 .54(3) which states :
The instructions shall not make any reference to a defendant's failure to testify
unless so requested by the defendant, in which event the court shall give an
instruction to the effect that a defendant is not compelled to testify and that the
jury shall not draw any inference of guilt from the defendant's election not to
testify and shall not allow it to prejudice the defendant in any way.
Hence, Appellant argues that the jury instruction language "should not prejudice him" is
inappropriate and instead should have been "shall not prejudice him ." Appellant also
argues that the language "defendant is not compelled to testify" improperly suggested
that the Commonwealth wanted him to testify but could not force him to do so.
The given jury instruction in this case mirrors the model instruction provided in 1
Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal ) sec 2.04A (1999). That model
instruction is the same one found to be constitutionally required when requested by a
defendant in Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S . 288, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 67 L. Ed. 2d . 241
(1981). While the language of RCr 9 .54(3) is different than the jury instruction used
here, RCr 9.54(3) contains no magic language requirements . Additionally, this court
has approved similar jury instruction language in several recently published opinions .
See, e .g . , Ragland v. Commonwealth , 191 S .W.3d 569, 591 (Ky. 2006), Commonwealth
v. Haaer, 41 S .W.3d 828 (Ky. 2001) . The jury instruction provided by the trial court was
appropriate . There is no error here .
For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment and sentence of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed .
All sitting . All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville Metro Public Defender
Elizabeth B . McMahon
Assistant Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew Robert Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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