WILBERT HARP V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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CORRECTED : OCTOBER 27, 2008
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2007-SC-000288-MR
V.
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-000714
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
i . INTRODUCTION .
Wilbert Harp appeals as a matter of right' from his convictions for indecent
exposure, first-degree sodomy, and seven counts of first-degree sexual abuse.
Because the jury instructions on the seven sexual abuse counts were identical,
containing no identifying characteristics that required the jury to differentiate
among each of the counts, we reverse Harp's sexual abuse convictions . We
otherwise affirm Harp's indecent exposure or sodomy convictions .
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
Harp moved in with his girlfriend and her four-year-old daughter, B .B .
According to B.B ., Harp began sexually molesting her sometime after they all
Ky. Const . § 110(2)(b).
moved to a different apartment several months later.
According to B.B., Harp
engaged in a variety of sexual acts with her while her mother was at work. B.B .
eventually disclosed the incidents to her mother, but the mother took no action at
that time because Harp assured the mother that nothing improper was occurring .
While B.B . and her aunt were looking at a magazine that contained an
advertisement depicting a couple kissing, B .B. told the aunt that Harp had done
the same thing to her. The aunt reported B .B.'s statements, which eventually led
to Harp's being questioned by the police. Harp admitted inappropriate contact
with B .B . but blamed the contact on B .B .'s curiosity about sex. After being
admitted to a psychiatric hospital, Harp wrote a letter to his psychologist
describing sexual contact with B .B. but, again, blaming B .B. for the contact .
Harp was ultimately indicted for one count of first-degree sodomy, seven
counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and one count of indecent exposure . A jury
convicted Harp on all charges contained in the indictment . Harp was sentenced
to twenty-five years for the sodomy conviction ; two and one-half years'
imprisonment on each sexual abuse conviction ; and ninety days for the indecent
exposure conviction, all to run concurrently . This appeal followed .
Ill. ANALYSIS .
Harp raises six issues . He contends that the trial court erred by
(1) admitting the letter he wrote to his psychologist, (2) admitting evidence of
sexual contact with B .B . not charged in the indictment, (3) finding B .B . competent
to testify, (4) allowing improper bolstering of B.B.'s testimony, (5) failing to direct
a verdict on the indecent exposure charge, and (6) failing to instruct the jury
properly because the instructions on multiple counts of first-degree sex abuse
failed to require the jury to make separate factual findings and reach a
unanimous verdict on each count.
Because we agree with Harp that the jury instructions regarding the sexual
abuse charges were erroneous, we shall discuss that issue first. Since the
flawed sexual abuse instructions caused Harp no discernible prejudice in the
sodomy and indecent exposure convictions, we affirm those convictions . We
must also address the remaining issues because they are either pertinent to the
sodomy or indecent exposure convictions, or concern matters likely to arise upon
remand of the sexual abuse charges.
A. Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in
Failing to Add Distinguishing Characteristics
to Each Sexual Abuse Charge.
Harp argues that it was error for the trial court not to add language to each
of the seven sexual abuse instructions so that the jury would be required to
distinguish from the evidence one count from another . We agree .
Each sexual abuse instruction was identical and read, in pertinent part, as
follows:
You will find the defendant, Wilbert Hiatt Harp, guilty under this
instruction if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, all of the following:
(a)
That in this county, between the 1 st day of December 2003
and the 1 st day of February 2006, the defendant subjected
[B .B.] to sexual contact ;
AND
(b)
That at the time of such contact, [B.B.] was less than 12 years
of age .
We have previously held that "when multiple offenses are charged in a
single indictment, the Commonwealth must introduce evidence sufficient to prove
each offense and to differentiate each count from the others, and the jury must
be separately instructed on each charged offense . Q Thus, we have clearly
held-before Harp's trial-that a trial court errs in a case involving multiple
charges if its instructions to the jury fail "factually [to] differentiate between the
separate offenses .,,3 Very recently-after Harp's trial-we similarly reinforced
that holding by again explaining that "[w]hen the evidence is sufficient to support
multiple counts of the same offense, the jury instructions must be tailored to the
testimony in order to differentiate each count from the others . ,4
Based on this precedent, it is apparent that the trial court erred by
submitting seven identical sexual abuse instructions to the jury. We again
instruct the bench and bar of the Commonwealth that in a case involving multiple
counts of the same offense, a trial court is obliged to include some sort of
identifying characteristic in each instruction that will require the jury to determine
whether it is satisfied from the evidence the existence of facts proving that each
of the separately charged offenses occurred .
Having found that the instructions at issue were erroneous, we now turn to
the more difficult question of whether that error may be deemed harmless .
Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Ky. 2002).
Combs . v. Commonwealth, 198 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Ky. 2006).
Bell v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Ky. 2008). Accord State v. Rudd,
759 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Mo .App. 1988) ("We agree with the general proposition that if
multiple offenses are submitted against a single defendant, the different offenses
submitted should be distinguished . As much is inherent in the well established rule
that the giving of distinctive instructions is a proper method of submitting multiple
offenses .").
Despite our earlier statements seemingly to the contrary, we now hold that a
failure to include proper identifying characteristics in jury instructions is reversible
error, provided that a timely objection to the error has been made .
. We recognize, of course, that an erroneous jury instruction may
sometimes be an unfortunate, yet ultimately harmless error.5 But a party
claiming that an erroneous jury instruction, or an erroneous failure to give a
necessary jury instruction, bears a steep burden because we have held that "[i]n
this jurisdiction it is a rule of longstanding and frequent repetition that erroneous
instructions to the jury are presumed to be prejudicial ; that an appellee claiming
harmless error bears the burden of showing affirmatively that no prejudice
resulted from the error. ,6 Regrettably, we have sometimes failed to utilize the
presumption of prejudice associated with erroneous jury instructions in at least
some of our recent decisions .' However, to clear up any possible confusion
among the bench and bar of the Commonwealth, we now expressly return and
adhere to the presumption of prejudice inherent in an erroneous instruction as
expressed in McKinnev . Of course, that presumption can be successfully
5
s
See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15, 119 S .Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35
(1999) (finding omission of element of offense in jury instruction harmless error);
RCr 9.24.
McKinnev v .Heisel , 947 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Ky. 1997). We recognize that McKinnev is a
civil case . But we believe the heightened stakes of a criminal case must lead to at
least an equally, if not more rigorous, approach to harmless error in jury instructions .
Indeed, McKinney's proper approach to jury instruction errors has been recognized
in criminal cases . See Batts v. Commonwealth, 2005 WL 3500779 at *3 (Ky.
Dec. 22, 2005); Wilson v. Commonwealth , 2004 WL 2624155 at *3 (Ky. Nov. 18,
2004); Commonwealth v. Hager, 35 S.W.3d 377, 379 (Ky.App. 2000).
See, e.g., Thacker v. Commonwealth , 194 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Ky. 2006); Wright v.
Commonwealth , 239 S.W.3d 63,68 (Ky. 2007).
rebutted by showing that the error "did not affect the verdict or judgment. ,8 But
viewed through that proper procedural lens, the erroneous instructions in the
case at hand cannot be deemed harmless.
Our precedent of longstanding leaves no doubt that we have adhered to
the "bare bones" principle of jury instructions .9 Indeed, former Chief Justice
Palmore apparently coined the "bare bones" phrase in a 1974 civil case, although
the phrase has been similarly applied to criminal cases.° We have explained
this bare bones approach to instructions as meaning that as a general matter,
"evidentiary matters should be omitted from the instructions and left to the
lawyers to flesh out in closing arguments ."" Or, as we more recently explained,
jury instructions should tell the jury what it must believe from the evidence in
order to resolve each dispositive factual issue while still "providing enough
information to a jury to make it aware of the respective legal duties of the
parties ."'
We remain committed to the bare bones instructional principle, confident
that it works well in most cases to "pare down unfamiliar and often complicated
issues in a manner that jurors, who are often not familiar with legal principles,
5 C.J.S . Appeal and Error § 968 (2008) . See also Emerson v. Commonwealth,
9
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230 S .W.3d 563, 570 (Ky. 2007) (stating that an error is harmless if there is "no
reasonable possibility it affected the verdict. . . ...).
See, e.g., Baze v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 817, 823 (Ky. 1997).
Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W .2d 530, 535 (Ky. 1974) ("Our approach to instructions is
that they should provide only the bare bones, which can be fleshed out by counsel in
their closing arguments if they so desire."). We recognized Justice Palmore as the
originator of the "bare bones" phraseology in Olfice, Inc . v. Wilkev , 173 S .W .3d 226,
228 (Ky. 2005).
Baze , 965 S.W.2d at 823.
Wilkev , 173 S.W.3d at 229.
can understand . "s But instructions must not be so bare bones as to be
misleading or misstate the law.'`
As mentioned, we have determined that the law requires specific
identifiers to be placed in each count in a case involving multiple counts of the
same offense . So a failure to include at least some basic evidentiary
identification in the sexual abuse instructions at hand was a misstatement of the
law. Furthermore, the lack of specificity in the instructions readily lends itself to a
potential unanimity problem . '5
No doubt able counsel could--and in this case, did--attempt to "flesh out"
the generic sexual abuse instructions in closing argument by telling the jury
which specific act of sexual abuse was covered by which specific count of the
charges . And, in dictum, we have appeared to approve of such attempted
corrective and curative action by the Commonwealth .
Earlier this year, in Bell v. Commonwealth, we encountered a similar
situation whereby a trial court gave multiple jury instructions on sexual offenses
without including any distinguishing characteristics . 16 And earlier in the opinion,
we had already held that Bell's convictions must be reversed due to the trial
13
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15
16
Bell, 245 S.W.3d at 744 ("The wording of the instructions, however, calls into
question the unanimity of the verdict. A criminal defendant, of course, is entitled to a
unanimous verdict . Ky. Const . § 7, as interpreted in Cannon v. Commonwealth,
291 Ky. 50, 163 S .W.2d 15 (1942); RCr 9.82(1). When the evidence is sufficient to
support multiple counts of the same offense, the jury instructions must be tailored to
the testimony in order to differentiate each count from the others. While the
Commonwealth differentiated the offenses during its closing arguments, there is
nothing in the written instructions to distinguish each count of rape, sexual abuse and
sodomy.").
court's unduly coercive actions during jury deliberations." But we exercised our
discretion to address the jury instruction issue because it was likely to occur on
retrial .
We held that the failure to include any distinguishing characteristics in
the instructions was error but found that the error would have been harmless
because
[t]he Commonwealth, in its closing, identified the five distinct
incidents [of rape or sexual abuse]. Because the jury ultimately
found Bell guilty of all five counts of sexual abuse, it can be
rationally and fairly deduced that each juror believed Bell was guilty
of the five distinct incidents identified by the Commonwealth .'9
In essence, our imprecise and unfortunate dictum in Bell can be taken to
stand for the proposition that able counsel may "cure" a defective jury instruction
in closing argument. But we very recently made it clear in a unanimous opinion
that jury instructions, which a jury is presumed to follow, must be based solely
upon the evidence ; and "an attorney's arguments do not constitute evidence ."2°
17
18
19
20
/d. at 742-43.
Because we had already found that Bell's convictions must be reversed for other
reasons, our discussion of the jury instruction issue was obviously dictum . Thus, our
statements on the jury instruction issue are not binding precedent . Indeed, perhaps
the most esteemed jurist in our nation's history, Chief Justice John Marshall,
cautioned against later courts being bound by the dicta of a previous court. See
Cohens v. State of Virginia , 19 U.S. 264, 399-00, 5 L.Ed.257, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821)
("It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are
to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used . If they
go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in
a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision . The reason of this
maxim is obvious. The question actually before the Court is investigated with care,
and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are
considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other
cases is seldom completely investigated .").
Bell, 245 S.W.3d at 744.
Dixon v. Commonwealth,
S .W.3d
, 2008 WL 2165961 at * 7 (Ky. May 22,
2008).
Therefore, we reached the plain conclusion that "the arguments of counsel are
not sufficient to rehabilitate otherwise erroneous or imprecise jury instructions ."21
Our conclusion that arguments of counsel cannot rehabilitate erroneous
jury instructions is directly in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's
pronouncement that "arguments of counsel cannot substitute for instructions by
the court" because a defendant's right to have the jury base its deliberations
solely upon the evidence cannot be "permitted to hinge upon a hope that defense
counsel will be a more effective advocate" than the prosecution . 4r, in other
words, the concept of fleshing out bare bones instructions permits counsel to
attempt to explain the instructions to the jury but does not permit counsel to
attempt to correct erroneous jury instructions .
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the instructional error in the case at
hand was not cured by the Commonwealth's closing argument. Indeed, we have
previously stated in a similar case that if the issue had been preserved, we would
have found a similar instructional error to necessitate reversal .23 Likewise, we
find that the Commonwealth has failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice
in the case at hand, 24 meaning that the failure to include identifying language in
the sexual abuse instructions necessitates reversal of Harp's sexual abuse
21
22
23
24
Taylor v. Kentucky , 436 U.S. 478, 488-89, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978) .
Miller, 77 S.W.3d at 576 .
In its brief, the Commonwealth seems mainly to contend that there was evidence to
support the giving of seven distinct sexual abuse instructions . With that
unremarkable conclusion, we agree . Rather than serving as a method to save
Harp's convictions, however, the Commonwealth's argument merely serves to
highlight how easy it would have been for the trial court to have followed our earlier
directive to include identifying characteristics in each instruction.
convictions . Bell is overruled to the extent that its dictum suggests that a failure
to include the requisite specific identifying language in jury instructions can be
rendered a harmless error by the curative powers of counsel's closing
argument.
B. No Error in Admitting Letter to Psychologist.
Harp contends that it was error to admit into evidence a letter he wrote
while being treated at a psychiatric hospital . We disagree .
As we have stated many times, we may disturb a trial court's decision to
admit evidence only if that decision is an abuse of discretion .26 And a trial
judge's decision represents an abuse of discretion only if the decision "was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles . ,27
Generally, Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 507 protects information
gathered by a "psychotherapist"28 from disclosure .29 But the General Assembly
has expressly abolished the patient privilege in child abuse cases .30 And the
25
26
27
2s
2s
30
We decline Harp's invitation to find that the sodomy instruction was similarly fatally
flawed . No unanimity problem is apparent in regards to that instruction because
Harp was charged with only one count of sodomy. Our precedent does not support a
conclusion that a trial court is required to include any identifying evidentiary detail in
instructions in which a defendant is charged with only one count of an offense . See
Bell , 245 S.W.3d at 744 ("When the evidence is sufficient to support multiple counts
of the same offense, the jury instructions must be tailored to the testimony in order to
differentiate each count from the others.") (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 313, 320 (Ky. 2006).
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
A licensed psychologist is considered a psychotherapist . KRE 507(a)(2)(B) .
See KRE 507(a)(2)(B) .
See Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 620 .050(3) ("Neither the husband-wife nor
any professional-client/patient privilege, except the attorney-client and clergypenitent privilege, shall be a ground for refusing to report under this section or for
excluding evidence regarding a dependent, neglected, or abused child or the cause
thereof, in any judicial proceedings resulting from a report pursuant to this section .
10
case at hand is a criminal proceeding involving an abused child-B.B .3' So
KRS 620.050(3) applies, meaning that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the letter .32
C. No Error to Admit Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Bad Acts .
Before trial, the Commonwealth gave notice that it intended to introduce
evidence of all sexual contact between Harp and B.B ., regardless of whether the
conduct was specifically contained in the indictment against Harp . Harp
unsuccessfully sought to exclude the evidence of uncharged sexual contact with
B .B., which the trial court denied. On appeal, Harp contends that the admission
of the evidence in question was erroneous. We disagree .
KRE 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
This subsection shall also apply in any criminal proceeding in District or Circuit Court
regarding a dependent, neglected, or abused child."); Mullins v. Commonwealth,
956 S.W.2d 210, 211-12 (Ky. 1997).
31
32
KRS 600.020(1)(e) defines an abused or neglected child as a child whose health or
welfare is harmed or threatened with harm when a parent, guardian or person
exercising custodial control or supervision of the child "[c]ommits or allows to be
committed an act of sexual abuse . . . upon the child. . . ."
Even if we accepted for argument's sake any of Harp's arguments and assumed that
the letter should not have been admitted, its admission would have been a harmless
error because the gist of the letter (i.e., Harp's admission of having sexual contact
with B.B .) was cumulative of Harp's admission to the authorities that he engaged in
sexual conduct with B.B . See, e.g., Coulthard v. Commonwealth, 230 S.W.3d 572,
585 (Ky. 2007) ("Thus, not only were the circumstances surrounding Appellant's
refusal to provide fingerprint samples undisputed, but also the evidence was
cumulative in the sense that the jury already heard a plethora of evidence regarding
evasive actions taken by Appellant. Under these circumstances, we simply cannot
see how there is any reasonable possibility that this evidence contributed to the
jury's verdict .") (footnote omitted) . Furthermore, the evidence against Harp was
overwhelming . See, e.g., Brewer v. Commonwealth , 206 S.W.3d 343, 352 (Ky.
2006) (holding that admission of improper investigatory hearsay was harmless error
due to its cumulative nature and because evidence of defendant's guilt was
overwhelming).
conformity therewith ." However, such evidence is admissible if offered for
another purpose, "such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . ." 33 In determining the
admissibility of KRE 404(b) evidence, we focus upon three matters:
(1) relevance, (2) probativeness, and (3) prejudice .34 As stated previously, we
may reverse a trial court's decision to admit evidence only if that decision
represents an abuse of discretion .
The Commonwealth bore the burden of proving each element of each
charge against Harp beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Commonwealth
was required to offer proof of Harp's intent . Accordingly, the evidence of other
sexual contact between Harp and B.B ., including, among other things, Harp's
exposing his genitals to B .B. on multiple occasions, was both highly relevant and
probative . Additionally, the evidence Harp challenges on appeal also was
admissible as proof of at least identity and absence of mistake or accident .38
33
34
KRE - 404(b)(1).
Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 19 (Ky. 2005).
35
36
37
KRS 500.070(1).
38
See, e.g., KRS 510.148(1) (requiring, inter alia, person to intentionally expose his
genitals to be guilty of indecent exposure in the first degree)
See, e.g., Noel v. Commonwealth , 76 S .W.3d 923, 931 (Ky. 2002) ("Appellant
asserts that admission of C.M.'s testimony that Appellant had sexually abused her
` more than one time' violated the KRE 404(b) proscription against admission of
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . However, this testimony falls within the
exceptions for evidence offered to prove intent, plan, or absence of mistake or
accident. KRE 404(b)(1).").
12
As we have definitively held, "evidence of similar acts perpetrated against
the same victim are almost always admissible . . .
.',39
And we do not perceive
that any prejudice suffered by Harp was sufficient to overcome the general rule
regarding admissibility of similar acts perpetrated against the same victim . Thus,
we find no error in the trial court's decision to admit the KRE 404(b) evidence in
question .
D. No Error in Finding-B .B. Competent to Testify .
Harp contends that the trial court erred by finding B .B. competent to
testify . We disagree .
Under KRE 601, a witness is competent if the witness can "perceive
accurately that about which she is to testify, can recall the facts, can express
herself intelligibly, and can understand the need to tell the truth . The competency
bar is low with a child's competency depending on her level of development and
upon the subject matter at hand .,,40 Of particular bearing to this case is the fact
that "[a]ge is not determinative of competency[,] and there is no minimum age for
testimonial capacity . '41 Because "[t]he trial court is in the unique position to
observe witnesses and to determine their competency[,]" we have held fast to the
principle that "[t]he trial court has the sound discretion to determine whether a
witness is competent to testify. ,42
39
40
41
42
Id., citing Price v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 885, 888 n. 4 (Ky. 2000).
Pendleton y. Commonwealth , 83 S.W.3d 522, 525 (Ky. 2002).
Id.
Id.
13
B.B. demonstrated that she knew such fundamental factual things as her
age, date of birth, grade level, school name, and teacher's name . She also was
able to recall her latest birthday party and Christmas presents, as well as the
names of her former schools. At trial, B .B. identified Harp as the perpetrator and
was able to provide details of the acts committed against her by Harp.
Importantly, B .B. indicated when she was unable to recall a fact or event.
A witness is not deemed incompetent solely because of young age or
inability to recall each and every detail of life with mathematical precision. And
B.B . demonstrated a sufficient ability to recall the most pertinent facts intelligibly
while knowing the importance of telling the truth. So from our review of the
record, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
B .B. competent to testify . 43
E. No Bolstering of B.B .'s Testimony Sufficient to
Constitute a Palpable Error Occurred .
Harp contends that B.B.'s testimony was improperly bolstered by the
testimony of Valerie Mason, a forensic interviewer, and Detective Rhonda
Speaker of the Louisville Metro Police Department's Crimes Against Children
Unit. Harp admits that this issue is unpreserved . So our review is limited to
determining if any error is palpable . An error is palpable only if it "is so
43
44
See id. at 526 ("A review of D.A.'s testimony reveals that she was able to identify
Appellant as the perpetrator, and could provide details of the acts committed against
her. Furthermore, Appellant had the ability to cross-examine D.A. and undermine
her credibility with the jury, if he felt her testimony had been coerced by the social
worker. No error occurred .").
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26.
14
manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the
judicial process .,,45
We question whether bolstering occurred at all in this case . Even
assuming that it did, we disagree with Harp's contention that any bolstering
constituted a palpable error.
Generally, "a witness's credibility may not be bolstered until it has been
attacked .,46 However, the testimony at issue is not a bolstering of B .B.'s
testimony. Indeed, neither Mason nor Speaker directly spoke of B.B.'s character
for truthfulness. However, the jury could have inferred that Mason was indirectly
vouching for B.B .'s credibility by testifying about things like the fact that she had
conducted more than 3,000 interviews with children but that not all of those
cases resulted in the issuance of charges . Similarly, the jury could have inferred
that Speaker was indirectly vouching for B .B.'s credibility by testifying that she
had investigated cases "Men) she had found insufficient evidence to charge a
suspect. It is important to note, however, that B.B.'s credibility was not totally
unchallenged because some evidence was introduced showing that B .B .'s own
mother allegedly did not believe B .B. when she first disclosed Harp's alleged
sexual misconduct .
Because neither Mason nor Speaker directly vouched for B .B .'s credibility,
we question whether any improper bolstering of B .B .'s credibility occurred . But
even if we assume for argument that Mason and Speaker's testimony
45
46
Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006).
Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical Center , 125 S.W.3d 274,
283 (Ky . 2004).
15
constitutes, at most, an indirect bolstering of B.B.'s credibility, that error is simply
not so fundamental and intolerable as to have threatened the integrity of the trial.
In short, the fact that a jury may have been able to infer that a witness was, at
most, indirectly vouching for the credibility of another witness is simply not the
stuff from which palpable errors are made .
F . Trial Court Properly Denied Directed
Verdi ct as to Indecent Exposure Charge .
Harp contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict on the indecent exposure charge. We disagree .
The familiar standard for ruling on a motion for directed verdict is as
follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty, a directed verdict should not be given . For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as
to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under
the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury
to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal .48
47
48
The parties disagree whether this issue is preserved as Harp raised a different
ground for his directed verdict motion before the trial court than he does on appeal .
Of course, for preservation purposes, an appellant is not permitted to make a
different argument on appeal than was made in the trial court. Kennedy v.
Commonwealth , 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976). Thus, preservation of this issue is
questionable, at best. However, Harp's argument would fail even if the issue were
perfectly preserved .
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186,187 (Ky. 1991).
16
A person commits the offense of indecent exposure in the first degree if he
"intentionally exposes his genitals under circumstances in which he knows or
should know that his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm to a person under
the age of eighteen (18) years ." 49 The jury instruction on this charge was in
accordance with KRS 510.148(1). Nevertheless, Harp contends that the
indecent exposure charge merged with the sexual abuse charge.
B.B . testified that once Harp showed her his penis and masturbated in
front of her to the point of ejaculation . That specific episode could not have been
simultaneously covered by a sexual abuse charge because exposure of Harp's
penis without any touching of or by B .B. would have been insufficient to have
constituted sexual abuse .50 Thus, it was clearly not unreasonable for the jury to
find Harp guilty of indecent exposure .
IV. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, Wilbert Harp's indecent exposure and sodomy
convictions are affirmed . Harp's sexual abuse convictions are vacated, and
those offenses are remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
49
50
KRS 510.148(1).
51
KRS 510.110, which governs sexual abuse in the first degree, requires a person to
subject "another person" to sexual contact. Thus, exposing one's own genitals,
without any touching by another person, would not constitute sexual abuse in the first
degree .
Cf. Combs, 198 S.W.3d at 580-81 (stating that evidence that defendant masturbated
could be evidence of indecent exposure);
17
All sitting . Minton, C .J . ; Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, and Venters, JJ.,
concur. Schroder, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion . Scott, J .,
concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville Metro Public Defender
Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Elizabeth B. McMahon
Assistant Public Defender
Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender
100 Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan Darwin Morrow
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
RENDERED : OCTOBER 23, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,*uyrtmr Courf of ~RrufurkV
2007-SC-000288-MR
WILBERT HARP
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P . MORRIS, JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-000714
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE SCHRODER
CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY
I concur in result only, because, as to part III(E), I believe the majority erred in its
legal analysis and in leaving an issue open which is likely to arise again on retrial . The
majority recognized that the jury could infer that Mason and Speaker were "indirectly"
vouching for B.B .'s credibility, but then questioned whether this was error because they
did not "directly" vouch. In Bell v. Commonwealth, 245 S .W .3d 738, 744-45 (Ky. 2008),
we recognized that a witness does not have to explicitly vouch for another witness's
credibility in order for the testimony to be improper, but that implicit vouching runs afoul
of the law as well. Id . Therefore, under Bell , I believe the testimony was error.
I am also puzzled by the majority's apparent belief that because B.B .'s credibility
was challenged somewhat through the mother's testimony, that this could open the door
for the vouching. If the majority is equating the mother's testimony with evidence
referring to character for untruthfulness, this would open the door only to evidence
referring to character for truthfulness. KRE 608(a). The majority recognized, and I
agree, that Mason's and Speaker's testimony did not refer to character for truthfulness .
Therefore, it would not be admissible under KRE 608(a).
For the aforementioned reasons, I believe the admission of the testimony at
issue was error. As to the convictions we are affirming, however, I agree with the
majority that no palpable error occurred, and would affirm those convictions . However,
because the case is being remanded in part, we also have the issue of the testimony
arising again on retrial . Because I believe the testimony was error, I believe it should be
inadmissible on retrial. The majority, although concluding that even if the testimony was
error, it was not palpable, did not actually decide if it was, in fact, error. In order to avoid
confusion on retrial, or the issue arising again on appeal, I believe it was incumbent
upon the majority to actually decide whether or not this testimony is, in fact, error. For
these reasons, I concur in result only.
RENDERED : OCTOBER 23, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
~sixpreme C~aixrE of `irufurkV
2007-SC-000288-MR
WILBERT HARP
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-000714
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE SCOTT CONCURRING IN PART
AND DISSE NTING IN PART
Altho ugh I concur with the majority's opinion on the other issues, I must
dissent on issue IIIA as the Commonwealth clearly pointed out to the jury the
separate items of evidence supporting each of the seven charges ; thus, the error
was clearly harmless in this instance . I concede, however, that l, too, am
displeased at the frequency with which our trial courts fail to differentiate multiple
instructions from each other. This displeasure, however, is not sufficient to
obviate the "harmless error' rule in instances like these ; where there is no
question that differentiating factors existed in the evidence and were pointed out
to the jury in closing by the Commonwealth .
Thus, the majority's reliance on Dixon v. Commonwealth, --- S .W.3d ---,
2006-SC-000682, 2008 WL 2165961 (Ky. May 22, 2008) to overrule the
harmless error analysis in Bell v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Ky.
2008), is simply inappropriate . As the court in Dixon acknowledged, "the issue
[therein was] not whether the instructions were erroneous"- even though they
did fail to differentiate which of the two "hammer blows" supported the separate
offenses . Dixon, --- S-W.3d ---, 2006-SC-000682, 2008 VVL 2165961 at *7 (Ky.
May 22, 2008). Notably, Dixon only dealt with double jeopardy issues and
affirmed the conviction discussed therein .
Moreover, the comment that "an attorney's arguments do not constitute
evidence," has never been questioned . See, e.-g., 75A Am .Jur .2d Trial § 443
(2008). Its purpose is to collate the evidence with the instructions, which is what
occurred here . Thus, the commands of RCr 9 .24, that "[n]o error . . . in anything
done or omitted by the court . . . is ground for . . . setting aside a verdict . . .
unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent
with substantial justice," should be followed .
Here, as in Bell, the majority acknowledges that, "[n]o doubt able counsel
could - and in this case, did attempt to `flesh out' the generic sexual abuse
instructions in closing argument by telling the jury which specific act of sexual
abuse was covered by which specific count of the charges." These were
reminders by counsel as to what the evidence was - not evidence itself. Now,
by unequivocally holding "that a failure to include proper identifying
characteristics in jury instructions is reversible error" and overruling Bell, the
majority effectively prohibits the application of harmless error in these instances .
It is for this reason I respectively dissent on this issue .
1 The majority opinion refers to the harmless error review in Bell as dicta, which it
was clearly not. Dicta is a statement in an opinion which is unnecessary to the ultimate
determination . Williams v. West, 258 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Ky. 1953). The analysis
referenced in Bell rendered the error harmless. Bell, 245 S.W.2d at 744.
2
'Suprrmt (~Vurf of ~Rrufurhv
2007-SC-000288-MR
WILBERT HARP
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
NO . 06-CR-000714
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER OF CORRECTION
The Memorandum Opinion of the Court, rendered October 23,
2008, is CORRECTED on its face by the substitution of page l . Said
correction does not affect the holding.
ENTERED : October 27, 2008 .
F JUSTICE JOHN D . MINTON
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