WILLIAM ASHLEY YEAGLE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : NOVEMBER 26, 2008
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WILLIAM ASHLEY YEAGLE
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
NO . 05-CR-000447
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINON OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, William Ashley Yeagle, appeals, as a matter of right, Ky.
Const . ยง 110(2) (b), his Daviess Circuit Court conviction on a single count
of murder for the 2003 death of Carol Hamilton . Appellant was found
guilty by a Daviess County jury and sentenced to forty (40) years in
prison . This appeal followed .
Facts
Appellant is an admitted user and manufacturer of
methamphetamine and many of his friends and acquaintances are
associated with the methamphetamine drug culture. On August 22,
2003, Appellant's friend, Rodney Lyle, arrived home to find Carol
Hamilton and Michelle Gaddis in his residence. After eating dinner, Lyle,
Hamilton and Gaddis began to use methamphetamine together . Lyle
called Appellant to see if he was going to come by his house that night,
since they wanted more methamphetamine .
Hamilton, who was romantically involved with Appellant, talked to
Appellant on the telephone and got into an argument with him . During
the phone conversation, Appellant told Lyle that he had some
methamphetamine and that he was on his way to Lyle's house .
Appellant then told Lyle to seize Hamilton, tie her up, and prevent her
from leaving the residence . Lyle told Hamilton what Appellant requested
him to do and advised her to leave because Appellant was very angry.
Hamilton laughed about it, but did leave Lyle's residence before
Appellant arrived.
When Appellant arrived at Lyle's residence around 11 :00 at night,
he was still very angry. He brought a duffle bag that contained guns into
the house. Appellant threw a bag of methamphetamine to Lyle and told
him to "dig in." Lyle then injected the methamphetamine into his arm
using a syringe. According to testimony, Lyle had a "bad trip," or
negative reaction to the drug, experiencing temporary blindness, stupor,
and other symptoms. At some point, thereafter, Hamilton came back to
the house while Lyle was in a stupor. Appellant then seized Hamilton .
Gaddis saw Appellant tie Hamilton's hands behind her back. Hamilton
called to Gaddis for help, but Appellant told Gaddis to go away or "she
was next."
As Lyle emerged from his stupor, he saw Appellant choking
Hamilton with some type of rawhide cord that broke during the
throttling. Lyle observed Appellant become frustrated and begin a series
of abuses to the now unconscious, but not dead, Hamilton . Appellant
took a mercury thermometer, broke it open, and poured the mercury into
Hamilton's ear. Appellant then collected various cleaning products from
beneath Lyle's kitchen sink and filled Lyle's used syringes with the
solutions, whereupon he injected these chemicals into Hamilton . Finally,
Appellant grabbed an extension cord, wrapped it around Hamilton's
neck, and choked her to death .
Appellant wrapped Hamilton's body in a camouflage tarp,
whereupon Lyle helped Appellant carry the body outside and put it into
the trunk of Hamilton's car . Appellant then drove Hamilton's car,
followed by Lyle and Gaddis in Appellant's car, to Appellant's farm on the
Green River. Once at the farm, they parked the victim's car down by the
river, with her body still in the trunk. Appellant, Lyle, and Gaddis then
all went back to Appellant's house on the farm and smoked more
methamphetamine. Appellant gave Gaddis, Lyle, and Appellant's other
romantic interest, Kim Warner, who joined them in Appellant's
farmhouse, $100 each to keep quiet about the murder .
Early the next morning, Appellant and Lyle went over to
Appellant's brother-in-law's, Darrin Buck's, house. Appellant told Buck
that he had just killed a girl and that he needed to borrow a boat. Buck
agreed and smoked some methamphetamine with them.
3
At trial, Appellant admitted that he and Buck disposed of
Hamilton's body, explaining that they launched Buck's boat onto the
Green River, and piloted it to his farm on the river. Appellant removed
Hamilton's body from the trunk of her car, and placed it into a large
Rubbermaid tool box, with holes drilled in it and filled with iron parts to
make it sink. Using the boat, they dumped the box containing
Hamilton's body in the middle of the Green River. Hamilton's body was
never recovered.
Although he ultimately denied killing Hamilton, Appellant testified
at trial as to how he disposed of Hamilton's car . First, Appellant took the
car to the Nashville, Tennessee airport and parked it in the long-term
parking lot . He allowed the car to sit in the parking lot for some time
and then returned to Nashville and retrieved it. Appellant then took the
car to a friend's farm in Ohio County, and once there, he dismantled it.
The majority of the parts were thrown into a pond on the property. Some
items including the car doors and seats, Appellant placed behind a shed
on the property.
Police eventually found Hamilton's car, cut up, in a pond belonging
to James Bratcher. Some of the car parts, including the seats, were
found behind a building on the property. Appellant's fingerprints were
found on some tape that had been used to wrap the car seats .
Appellant also talked to other members of the local drug culture
and made admissions that connected him with the murder and revealed
his motive for killing her: he thought Hamilton was a police informant.
4
Appellant had a conversation with his old high school friend, Terry
Dennis, wherein he told Dennis that he thought Hamilton was a snitch .
As they stood by a large ravine, Appellant told Dennis that if he ever
found out that he was also a snitch, he could disappear quickly over the
edge. Appellant told Dennis that he would disappear just like Hamilton
did, that he had made Hamilton disappear, that Hamilton "got what she
got," and that several people might be getting the same thing.
In November of 2003, Appellant was at the home of a longtime
acquaintance, Charles Robertson, when he admitted to Robertson that
he killed Hamilton . Appellant said he killed her because she was a police
informant. Appellant asserted that Lyle was with him when he did it.
Appellant told Robertson how he choked Hamilton to death at Lyle's
house . Appellant then told Robertson how he had put the body in a box,
drilled holes, weighed it down, and dumped it in the Green River .
At trial, Appellant's defense consisted primarily of shifting the
blame for Hamilton's death. Appellant denied murdering Hamilton, but
did admit to disposing of the car and her body. The jury, however, found
him guilty of murder and sentenced him to a term of forty (40) years in
the penitentiary. On appeal, Appellant alleges three (3) errors: 1) the
trial
court erred by denying him use of Michelle Caddis' mental health
records, 2) the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and 3)
the trial court erred by improperly admitting prior "bad acts" evidence .
For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's conviction .
1. Caddis Medical Records
5
In his first claim of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred by
not allowing him to have the mental health records of Michelle Gaddis
from Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) that were created
when she underwent a competency evaluation for her concurrent
criminal action involving Hamilton's murder.
Before trial, Appellant made a motion for Caddis's KCPC records
compiled while she was under indictment and undergoing competency
evaluation, claiming that these records might be useful for impeachment
purposes . The Commonwealth objected to Appellant's use of the records.
Appellant, however, argued that Gaddis had waived the confidentiality of
the records and the fact that she went to KCPC at all showed that she
had mental problems . The trial court requested the records and
reviewed them in camera .
After the in camera review, the trial court told counsel that it had
obtained the records from KCPC, but was having trouble making sense of
them, so the court allowed counsel for both sides to review the KCPC
reports off-the-record and advise the court what was relevant. After
review, Appellant asserted that some of the records showed possible
mental retardation, malingering and neurofunction exaggeration that
was relevant to impeachment and requested admission for those records .
Appellant proposed to question Gaddis'treating KCPC doctor about her
medical records. The trial court, however, rejected Appellant's request,
ruling that evidence of possible malingering and/or mental retardation
was not sufficient to overcome the confidential nature of witness medical
records .
In analyzing the issue, we begin with the standard for introduction
of evidence concerning a prosecution witness's psychotherapy records.
As we held in Commonwealth v. Barroso,
(1) If the psychotherapy records of a crucial prosecution
witness contain evidence probative of the witness's [in]ability
to recall, comprehend, and accurately relate the subject
matter of the testimony, the defendant's right to compulsory
process must prevail over the witness's psychotherapistpatient privilege, and
(2) In camera review of a witness's psychotherapy records is
authorized only upon receipt of evidence sufficient to
establish a reasonable belief that the records contain
exculpatory evidence.
122 S.W.3d 554, 563-564 (Ky. 2003) . In Barroso , this Court was called
upon to balance the psychotherapist-patient privilege contained in KRE
507(b) with the criminal defendant's right to cross-examine a witness .
Although we did recognize that the KRE 507(b) privilege is an "absolute
privilege," not subject to avoidance merely because a defendant may
"need" the evidence, we also recognized that, generally, constitutional
rights prevail over state court rules. Id. at 558. We also acknowledged
state privilege rules must yield to constitutional rights . Id. at 562.
Quoting the Connecticut Supreme Court, we reaffirmed in Barroso
what we characterized as a universally recognized proposition:
The capacity of a witness to observe, recollect and narrate an
occurrence is a proper subject of inquiry on crossexamination . If as a result of a mental condition such
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capacity has been substantially diminished, evidence of that
condition before, at and after the occurrence and at the time
of trial is ordinarily admissible for use by the tries [of fact] in
passing on the credibility of the witness .
Id. at 562 (quoting State v. Esposito, 471 A .2d 949, 955 (Conn. 1984)) .
We recognized, however, that not every mental disorder affects the
credibility of a witness or their ability to recall events :
Certain forms of mental disorder have high
probative value on the issue of credibility.
Although the debate over the proper legal role of
mental health professionals continues to rage,
even those who would limit the availability of
psychiatric evidence acknowledge that many
types of "emotional or mental defect[s] may
materially affect the accuracy of testimony; a
conservative list of such defects would have to
include the psychoses, most or all of the
neuroses, defects in the structure of the nervous
system, mental deficiency, alcoholism, drug
addiction and psychopathic personality.
Id . (quoting United States v . Lindstrom, 698 F. 2d 1154, 1160 (11th Cir.
1983)) . We then adopted a test to determine if the particular mental
illness was one that affected credibility or the ability to recall:
Factors a court should consider in allowing such
evidence are the nature of the psychological
problem the temporal recency or remoteness of
the condition, and whether the witness suffered
from the condition at the time of the events to
which she is to testify. For example, a mental
illness that causes hallucinations or delusions is
generally more probative of credibility than a
condition causing only depression, irritability,
impulsivity, or anxiety.
Id . at 562-563 quoting People v . Anderson, 22 P .3d 347, 391 (Cal. 2001)
(Kennard, J ., concurring)) .
We also noted in Barrosq that "[a] person's credibility is not in
question merely because he or she is receiving treatment for a mental
health problem." Id. at 563 . Recognizing this, we set forth a test for
introduction of mental records:
Thus, we depart from the less restrictive standard
established in Eldred and hold that in camera review of a
witness's psychotherapy records is authorized only upon
receipt of evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief
that the records contain exculpatory evidence .
Id. at 564 .
Here, Appellant asserts that the mere fact that Gaddis was sent to
KCPC for an evaluation shows that she had mental problems . However,
we find no evidence in the record that Appellant demonstrated a
reasonable belief that Caddis's competency evaluation records had any
exculpatory impact. Thus, the trial court was not required to conduct an
in camera review of Caddis's medical records .
Moreover, Appellant did not establish the records contained such
evidence as would be necessary, or even helpful, to his defense .
Therefore, there was no error in denying Appellant's request to use the
records on the cross-examination of Gaddis or her treating psychiatrist .
As we held in Barrosq, after the party seeking disclosure of the medical
records introduces evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief
that the records contain exculpatory evidence, the trial court conducts
an in camera review ; then, only if "satisfied that the records reveal
evidence necessary to the defense is the evidence to be supplied to
defense counsel." Id. at 564 . (qM2gn People v. Stanawgy, 521 N .W.2d
557, 575 (Mich. 1994)) .
Here, an in camera review, conducted despite Appellant's failure to
demonstrate the necessity for such a hearing, revealed possible mental
retardation, malingering and neurofunction exaggeration . However, the
trial court found that evidence of possible malingering and borderline
intelligence was not probative on the issue of Gaddis' credibility or
competence as a witness . Significantly, the trial court found that
Appellant's proposed cross-examination of Gaddis'treating psychiatrist
for impeachment purposes was not sufficient to overcome Gaddis'
psychotherapist-patient privilege. We agree.
Appellant claimed that his concerns about Caddis were enough to
warrant an in-camera review . However, the nature of Appellant's
concerns was vague and essentially an assertion that the information in
Gaddis' records might affect her credibility. Further, Appellant failed to
demonstrate how anything in the records would affect Gaddis' "ability to
recall, comprehend, and accurately relate the subject matter of the
testimony." Peak v. Commonwealth,, 197 S.W.3d 536, 546 (Ky . 2006) .
Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to
deny Appellant's motion and therefore, no error.
IL Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct
For his second assignment of error, Appellant asserts that the
Commonwealth committed reversible error during the guilt phase closing
10
argument by referencing the "cold" nature of Appellant's testimony as
showing no feeling of remorse .
During his closing argument, the Commonwealth's Attorney
developed the theme that Appellant was only concerned with covering up
the death of Hamilton . To this end, the prosecutor commented that
Appellant showed no expression of concern or remorse about the murder
as he testified to the jury; he repeated that theory several times .
Specifically, the prosecutor stated that Appellant treated Hamilton like "a
piece of trash" and argued that is "not how one would treat someone that
one admittedly had a romantic relationship with." Counsel commented
that what happened to Hamilton bothered lots of people, but not the
Appellant .
We begin our analysis with our standard of review . Appellant
concedes that this issue was not preserved for appellate review, and
requests palpable error review under RCr 10.26 . "To prove palpable
error, Appellant must show the probability of a different result or error so
fundamental as to threaten his entitlement to due process of law."
Brooks v. Commonwealth 217 S .W.3d 219, 225 (Ky. 2007) (citing Martin
v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W .3d 1 (Ky. 2006)) : For palpable error to be
found, the error must be "shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable ."
Martin, 207 S .W.3d at 4.
When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct in a closing
argument, "the required analysis, by an appellate court, must focus on
the overall fairness of the trial and not the culpability of the prosecutor .
11
. a prosecutor may comment on the tactics, may comment on the
evidence, and may comment as to the falsity of a defense position."
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 74 4 S .W.2d 407, 411-412 (Ky. 1987) .
Reversal based on misconduct of the prosecutor is only warranted if the
misconduct is so severe as to render the entire trial fundamentally
unfair. Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Ky. 1996),
overruled on other grounds by Chestnut v. Commonwealth , 250 S .W.3d
288 (Ky . 2008) .
Here, although Appellant asserts that the comments of the
prosecutor were outside the evidence and amounted to only the
prosecutor's opinion, we note that the Commonwealth's Attorney is
permitted to comment on the evidence, as well as the demeanor of the
witnesses, as it goes ultimately to credibility.
In the case-at-bar, the prosecutor simply drew permissible
inferences concerning perception of the cold, seemingly rehearsed,
testimony of Appellant and commented on his stoic demeanor. As we
have previously held, comments on the demeanor of a testifying
defendant are proper, as is the opinion of the prosecutor as to the
evidence. Woodall v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 104, 125 (Ky. 2001) .
Further, it would be logically unsound to hold these comments, made in
closing argument, as palpable error, for reasons that we have previously
concluded that actual witness testimony about lack of remorse, when
unpreserved, is not palpable error. See Epperson v. Commonwealth, 197
S .W.3d 46, 54 (Ky. 2006) .
12
Therefore, we find the comments by the Commonwealth did not
constitute palpable error. Appellant's trial was not rendered
fundamentally unfair, nor was there any "shocking or jurisprudentially
intolerable" commentary by the prosecution . Martin , 207 S.W.3d at 4.
III. Prior "Bard Acts" Evidence
For his final assignment of error, Appellant argues the admission
of evidence pertaining to drug use, by Appellant and the various
witnesses, was improper as it constituted inadmissible prior "bad acts"
evidence under KRE 404(b) . For the following reasons, we disagree.
The Commonwealth filed notice of its intent to use other crimes,
wrongs, and acts in its case-in-chief against the Appellant. Appellant
objected and requested the Commonwealth allege specific crimes and
acts. The Commonwealth requested that witness Terry Dennis be
allowed to testify that he and Appellant used drugs and delivered drugs
during a period after Hamilton's death when Appellant admitted to
Dennis that he killed Hamilton . The Commonwealth also sought to
admit testimony that Darrin Buck, Appellant, and Lyle were under the
influence of drugs when they talked to Buck. Further, the
Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence that Appellant gave Lyle
drugs just before he killed Hamilton, and that they were using drugs
while discussing disposal of the body. The Commonwealth also sought
to introduce testimony that Gaddis saw Appellant give Lyle drugs
immediately before Hamilton was killed. Finally, . the Commonwealth
13
sought to admit drug statements made by Appellant in his statement to
the police.
Appellant objected that all the drug use was gratuitous and should
be removed. After listening to the Commonwealth's position, the court
found that methamphetamine permeated the case and that it was unfair
to not allow the evidence in. Thus, the trial court admitted all the
requested drug evidence under the theory that it was inextricably
intertwined and finding that separation could not be accomplished
without extreme prejudice to the Commonwealth, with the exception of a
witness' comment about "being high as a kite ." The court further found
that much of the evidence also went to motive, intent, and plan.
We begin with the standard of review for admissibility of other
crimes or "bad acts ." The basic rule is that evidence of uncharged
misconduct is inadmissible, subject to the exceptions set forth in KRE
404(b) . O'Bryan v. Commonwealth , 634 S.W .2d 153, 156 (Ky. 1982) .
Under KRE 404(b), generally, evidence of other crimes or wrongs is
inadmissible, but can be admitted if it is "for some other purpose such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake." KRE 404(b)(1) . We note that the list of
permissible uses under KRE 404(b) is not exhaustive . Tamme v.
Commonwealth , 973 S.W.2d 13, 29 (Ky. 1998) .
Under KRE 404(b)(2), evidence of other crimes or wrongs is also
admissible if it is so inextricably intertwined with other evidence
essential to the case that separation of the two could not be
14
accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering party. As we
noted in Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779, 793 (Ky. 2003), "KRE
404(b)(2) allows the Commonwealth to present a complete, unfragmented
picture of the crime and investigation."
For this regard, we note:
[o]ne of the accepted bases for the admissibility of evidence
of other crimes arises when such evidence "furnishes part of
the context of the crime: or is necessary to a "full
presentation" of the case, or is intimately connected with and
explanatory of the crime charged against the defendant and
is so much a part of the setting of the case and its
"environment" that its proof is appropriate in order "to
complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its
immediate context or the `res gestae' or the "uncharged
offense is `so linked together in point of time and
circumstances with the crime charged that one cannot be
fully shown without proving the other . . . "' [and is thus] part
of the res gestae of the crime charged .
Norton v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W .2d 632, 638 (Ky. App . 1994) (quoting
United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980)) .
This Court has set forth a three (3) part test used to determine the
admissibility of evidence under KRE 404(b) : 1) relevance, 2)
probativeness, and 3) prejudice . Bell v . Commonwealth, 875 S .W.2d
882, 889-891 (Ky. 1994) ; see also Matthews v. Commonwealth , 163
S .W.3d 11, 19 (Ky. 2005). Under Bell, evidence of prior bad acts and/or
other wrongs must be relevant for some purpose other than to prove
Appellant's criminal disposition . 875 S.W .2d at 889 . Moreover, a trial
court's decision concerning the introduction of evidence under KRE
404(b) will only be reversed if there is an abuse of discretion . Matthews ,
163 S.W .3d at 19.
15
Here, application of the Bell test shows the trial court did not
abuse its discretion . Under the first Bell prong of relevance, evidence of
Appellant's and the witnesses' methamphetamine use was relevant
because its use was inextricably intertwined with the other proof in this
case . It necessarily provided the context for their association, conduct,
and discussions . All of the major witnesses in this case were
methamphetamine users . The methamphetamine drug culture was the
basis of their association with each other and its use formed the basis of
their interaction . Its use figured into the events as they unfolded. Thus,
the trial court correctly recognized that it was impossible to remove
methamphetamine references from this trial without severely
compromising the Commonwealth's ability to present its case. Likewise,
methamphetamine use was relevant to motive because Appellant believed
Hamilton was a police informant regarding his methamphetamine
manufacture and distribution and insinuated to witnesses that this is
why she was killed.
The second Bell prong is whether the proposed evidence is
"sufficiently probative of its commission by the accused to warrant its
introduction into evidence." 875 S .W.2d at 890 . The drug use discussed
by the witnesses involved Appellant using methamphetamine or, as in
the case of Lyle, providing methamphetamine just before the death of
Hamilton . The methamphetamine use was probative as to why Appellant
would fear that Hamilton was an informant and provides the basis of
why Appellant would seek retribution . It is also probative of the actions
16
and motivations of the parties that helped Appellant after the murder :
Appellant was a known drug dealer and supplied their
methamphetamine habits .
Finally, the third Bell prong is whether "the potential for prejudice
from the use of other crimes evidence substantially outweigh[s] its
probative value ." 889 S .W.2d at 890. We note that exclusion is only
proper if the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value .
Here, there was little potential for undue prejudice . We recognize that
Appellant was prejudiced by the evidence introduced against him,
however, the test is for undue influence . Price v. Commonwealth , 31
S.W.3d 885, 888 (Ky. 2000) ("the real issue is whether [Appellant] was
unduly prejudiced, i .e ., whether the prejudice to him was unnecessary
and unreasonable .") . Here, we find no such undue prejudice.
In addition, Appellant's defense was based on methamphetamine .
First, at trial, he blamed Hamilton's death on a methamphetamine
overdose . Next, he tried to explain his actions in disposing of the car and
Hamilton's body by admitting that he was a methamphetamine
manufacturer, claiming that, because he made the drugs that he alleged
had killed Hamilton, he was responsible for her death; so, to hide his role
in Hamilton's overdose, he dumped the body in the river and dismantled
the car. Moreover, Appellant cross-examined the prosecution witnesses
extensively on the effects of methamphetamine on their perception of the
major events . Indeed, Appellant even argued in closing that all the
witnesses were under the influence of methamphetamine and that
17
"methamphetamine led to Carol Hamilton's death." Here, clearly, the
404(b) evidence satisfied the Bell inquiries and the trial court properly
found the evidence of methamphetamine use by both Appellant and the
witnesses was so inextricably intertwined with the material facts of this
case, as to render of evidence of methamphetamine use admissible.
Thus, there was no error.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant's conviction .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Office of the Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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