BENNY LEE HODGE, ET AL. V. HON. EDDY COLEMAN, SPECIAL JUDGE, LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT, ET AL. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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CORRECTED : JANUARY 25, 2008
RENDERED : JANUARY 24, 2008
TO BE PU,BLI§HED ,,
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NO. 2007-SC-000073-OA
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BENNY LEE HODGE
PETITIONER
AND
ROGER EPPERSON
V.
INTERVENING PETITIONER
ON APPEAL FROM LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, SPECIAL JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 85-CR-00070
HON. EDDY COLEMAN, SPECIAL JUDGE,
LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT ;
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST) ; AND
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
RESPONDENTS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE MINTON
AND
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
This case requires us to determine if indigent post-conviction petitioners
are entitled to public funds for the travel expenses of their out-of-county
witnesses in cases in which a court has determined that an evidentiary hearing is
necessary to resolve the post-conviction motion . We unanimously held in
Stopher v. Conliffe l that Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 31 .185 "does not
1
170 S.W.3d 307 (Ky. 2005)
apply to post-conviction proceedings ." 2 Despite St, ooher's sweeping prohibition
against the application of KRS 31 .185 to post-conviction proceedings,
approximately one ye ar later we issued Commonwealth v. Paisley3 in which we,
at a minimum, left open the possibility that KRS 31 .185 could be used as a
source for funding the hiring of expert witnesses for certain post-conviction
petitioners . This divergent approach to the potential availability of public funds
for indigent post-conviction petitioners has, understandably, caused confusion .
In an effort to eliminate that confusion, we now partially overrule Stopher and
hold that the special fund created in KRS 31 .185(4) can be used to pay out-ofcounty witness expenses for indigent post-conviction petitioners, provided that a
court has found that (1) the petitioner's post-conviction petition raises an issue
that cannot be resolved without an evidentiary hearing and (2) the proposed outof-county witness's live testimony at the evidentiary hearing is necessary for a full
presentation of the petitioner's case.
I . FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .
In order to understand the issues presented in the current case, it is
necessary first to recount its lengthy history. Benny Lee Hodge and Roger
Epperson were sentenced to death for their convictions for robbery, burglary,
attempted murder, and murder . We affirmed their convictions and sentences on
direct appeal . Following direct appeal, the trial court denied, without an
/d. at 309-10.
01 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2006)
Epperson v. Commonwealth , 809 S.W .2d 835 (Ky. 1990) .
evidentiary hearing, their Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11 .42
motions for post-conviction relief. We reversed and remanded the denial of the
RCr 11 .42 motions with instructions to the trial court to hold an evidentiary
hearing on their claims of jury tampering and of ineffective assistance of counsel
for failure to present mitigation evidence .
On remand, the trial court severed the jury tampering and ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. The trial court denied Hodge and Epperson's
request for funding to secure the attendance of out-of-state witnesses for the
jury-tampering issue, citing our decision in Sto her. Epperson and Hodge sought
emergency relief and a writ of mandamus compelling funding . Former Justice
Donald C . Wintersheimer, who was designated to hear and decide these
emergency motions, denied the requests for emergency relief; and in January
2007, we unanimously denied Hodge and Epperson's petition for a writ of
mandamus.
The trial court has already conducted a hearing on the jury-tampering
portion of Hodge and Epperson's RCr 11 .42 motions and rejected their claim for
relief on that issue . Nevertheless, Epperson has filed a motion asking us to
reconsider our order denying his request for funding . That motion for
Hodge v. Commonwealth , 68 S .W .3d 338, 342, 345 (Ky. 2001) ("In the case at bar,
the allegations of juror tampering rise to the level of a potential violation of a
constitutional right. . . . An evidentiary hearing must be held in this case to determine
whether the failure to introduce mitigating evidence was trial strategy, or 'an
abdication of advocacy.' Austin rv. Belll, 126 F.3d [843,] . . . 849 [(6th Cir. 1997)] .
And, if defense counsel's advocacy was deficient, then a finding must be made of
what mitigating evidence was available to counsel. Thereafter, the trial court must
then determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have
weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors differently.").
See Case Nos. 2006-SC-000825 and 2006-SC-000829 .
reconsideration has been ordered to be held in abeyance pending the resolution
of the cases at hand .
Early last year, Hodge filed a second petition for a writ of mandamus,
seeking state funds to secure the attendance of twenty-three out-of-state
witnesses for the ineffective assistance of counsel portion of the bifurcated post
conviction proceedings. According to Hodge's petition, he was born and raised
in Tennessee ; and he believes these Tennessee witnesses are necessary to his
claim regarding mitigation. Hodge contends that he is entitled to funds to secure
the attendance of those witnesses at the hearing previously ordered by this
Court.
As an intermediate step, we ordered the trial court to rule on Hodge and
Epperson's motion for out-of-state witness funds as a predicate to this ruling on
the merits of the writ. The trial court issued an order denying the motion for
travel expenses. Following our instruction, the trial court has not yet conducted a
hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel portion of Hodge and Epperson's
RCr 11 .42 motions.
We have entered an order granting Epperson's motion to intervene as a
petitioner in Hodge's petition for a writ. So the issues raised in the writ are
squarely before us and apply to Epperson and to Hodge .
II . ANALYSIS .
First, we must determine whether Hodge and Epperson-or, more broadly
speaking, any indigent post-conviction petitioner whose petition merits an
evidentiary hearing-are foreclosed from using public funds for the travel
expenses of their out-of-county witnesses . Because we find that the answer to
that question
is no, we then
must determine if Hodge and Epperson have met the
standards necessary for the granting of a writ. And the answer to that question is
yes.
A. Availability of Public Funds Under KRS 31 .185.
The post-conviction petitioner in Stopher sought a writ to compel the trial
court to conduct an ex parte hearing under KRS 31 .185 to seek funds for an
expert to support petitioner's motion.' We held that the issue of whether
KRS 31 .185 provides, in relevant part, as follows :
(1) Any defending attorney operating under the provisions of this chapter is entitled
to use the same state facilities for the evaluation of evidence as are available to
the attorney representing the Commonwealth . If he or she considers their use
impractical, the court concerned may authorize the use of private facilities to be
paid for on court order from the special account of the Finance and
Administration Cabinet.
(2) The defending attorney may request to be heard ex parte and on the record with
regard to using private facilities under subsection (1) of this section. If the
defending attorney so requests, the court shall conduct the hearing ex parte and
on the record .
(3) Any direct expense, including the cost of a transcript or bystander's bill of
exceptions or other substitute for a transcript that is necessarily incurred in
representing , a needy person under this chapter, is a charge against the county,
urban-county, charter county, or consolidated local government on behalf of
which the service is performed and shall be paid from the special account
established in subsection (4) of this section and in accordance with procedures
provided in subsection (5) of this section. However, such a charge shall not
exceed the established rate charged by the Commonwealth and its agencies .
(4) The consolidated local government, fiscal court of each county, or legislative
body of an urban-county government shall annually appropriate twelve and a
half cents ($0.125) per capita of the population of the county, as determined by
the Council of Local Governments' most recent population statistics, to a special
account to be administered by the Finance and Administration Cabinet to pay
court orders entered against counties pursuant to subsection (1) or (3) of this
section . The funds in this account shall not lapse and shall remain in the special
account.
(5) The Finance and Administration Cabinet shall pay all court orders entered
pursuant to subsection (1) or (3) of this section from the special account until the
funds in the account are depleted . If in any given year the special account
KRS 31 .185 provided expert funds for post-conviction petitioners was a matter of
first impression and that the resolution of that issue was "nothing more than a
matter of statutory interpretation ."$ We focused upon the "defending attorney"
language in subsections (1) and (2) of KRS 31 .185 and held that that language
evidenced the General Assembly's intent "to limit the use of funds or facilities
allowed under KRS 31 .185 to attorneys representing an indigent defendant at
triaV9 Or, in other words, "the plain meaning of KRS 31 .185(2) indicates that it
only applies to trial and does not apply to post-conviction proceedings ."' ° Later
in the opinion, however, we ventured further and flatly declared that "KRS 31 .185
[in its entirety] does not apply to post-conviction proceedings .""
In Paisley, the trial court ordered the Finance and Administration Cabinet
to pay $5,000 for private mental health testing of a post-conviction petitioner in
order to determine if that petitioner was mentally retarded and, thus, ineligible far
the death penalty. 12 The Commonwealth petitioned this Court for a writ to
including any funds from prior years is depleted and court orders entered
against counties pursuant to subsection (1) or (3) of this section for that year or
any prior year remain unpaid, the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall pay
those orders from the Treasury in the same manner in which judgments against
the Commonwealth and its agencies are paid .
(6) Expenses incurred in the representation of needy persons confined in a state
correctional institution shall be paid from the special account established in
subsection (4) of this section and in accordance with the procedures provided in
subsection (5) of this section .
Stopher , 170 S.W.3d at 308.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 309-10.
201 S.W.3d at 36.
prohibit the trial court from ordering it to pay for that private mental health
testing. 13
We noted that "[t]he establishment of mitigating circumstances at the
penalty phase is of the greatest importance when a defendant is facing the death
penalty."" So we held that the trial court properly ordered mental health testing
to be performed on the petitioner.'5 But we held that the trial court erred when it
ordered the Commonwealth to pay for private mental health testing without
petitioner having first shown that the use of the state mental health facilities for
the testing was impractical . 16 And we held that the Commonwealth was entitled
to a writ because it would have been unable to recoup the $5,000 from the
indigent petitioner once those funds had been expended, and the
Commonwealth faced the potential of having to pay for private funding for
numerous post-conviction petitioners ."
Confusion in our law has resulted from the fact that Stopher seemed to
establish a bright line rule that no funds were available under KRS 31 .185 for
indigent post-conviction petitioners while Paisley , without even mentioning
Sto her, seemed to open up the possibility for expert funding for a postconviction petitioner . This confusion is magnified by the fact that Paisley , rather
than quoting our earlier holding in Sto~her that KRS 31 .185 had no application to
13
14
15
16
17
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36 (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437, 456 (Ky. 1987)
(Leibson, J ., dissenting)) .
Id.
Id. at 37 .
post-conviction petitioners, instead relied upon KRS 31 .185-the very same
statute discussed at length in Steer--for the proposition that a post-conviction
petitioner may be entitled to public funds for the hiring of an expert witness if the
post-conviction petitioner could show that the use of the state facilities was
impractical .'$
Although much confusion could have been avoided if Paisley contained a
discussion of Stopher , the core holdings of the two opinions are not entirely
irreconcilable . The post-conviction petitioner in Stopher asked us to issue a writ
to order the trial court to hold a hearing on whether the petitioner was entitled to
expert funds under KRS 31 .185 to bolster the petitioner's recently filed RCr 11 .42
motion .' 9 At the time we issued our opinion, no Kentucky court of competent
jurisdiction had determined that the post-conviction petitioner in Stopher had
presented a known grievance necessitating a hearing, meaning that it would
have been premature to order expert funds for a hearing on an RCr 11 .42 motion
when the RCr 11 .42 motion itself may not have even stated grounds sufficient to
necessitate a hearing.2°
In Paisley, however, the trial court had already determined that the
petitioner's RCr 11 .42 motion could not be resolved without an evidentiary
18
19
20
Id. at 36. Compare this holding with our statement in Stopher that it was "clear from
the use of the words in the statute [KRS 31 .185] that the General Assembly intended
to limit the use of funds or facilities allowed under KRS 31 .185 to attorneys
representing an indigent defendant at trial." 170 S.W.3d at 309.
Sto her, 170 S.W.3d at 307.
See, e.g., Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W .3d 436, 441-42 (Ky. 2001) (holding that
purpose of RCr 11 .42 was to provide a forum for known grievances and that an
evidentiary hearing is required only if the 11 .42 motion raises issues which are not
refuted by the record) .
hearing . So the issue of expert funding in Paisley was properly before the
Court because an evidentiary hearing was going to be held . All that was truly at
issue in Paisley was whether the trial court could order public funds to be
expended for the post-conviction petitioner to have an independent expert mental
health evaluation without having first shown that the state examination facilities
were impractical for that purpose.
When read in conjunction, Stopher and Paisley jointly hold that an indigent
post-conviction petitioner may not receive public funds under KRS 31 .185 unless
a court of competent jurisdiction, whether at the trial or appellate level, has
determined that the post-conviction petition sets forth allegations sufficient to
necessitate an evidentiary hearing. Or, in other words, the threshold requirement
for an indigent post-conviction petitioner to receive funds under KRS 31 .185 is for
a court of competent jurisdiction to order that a hearing be held on the allegations
contained in the petition . Given that holding, it is clear that we went too far in
Stopher when we said that KRS 31 .185 has no application to post-conviction
proceedings.
21
22
201 S.W.3d at 36 .
Of course, also underlying our holding in Paisley was the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304,122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335
(2002), which prohibited the execution of mentally retarded individuals . The postconviction petitioner in Paisley claimed that his death sentence ran afoul of Atkins
because he was mentally retarded . 201 S .W .3d at 36. The trial court found that the
post-conviction petition was sufficient to warrant a hearing . The only issue before us
was whether the petitioner was entitled to private mental health testing at the
Commonwealth's expense without having first shown that the usage of the state's
mental health facilities was impractical.
Thus, to the extent that Stopher holds that KRS 31 .185 is never available
as an avenue for indigent post-conviction petitioners to obtain public funds,
Stooher is overruled .2s
The mere fact that an indigent post-conviction petitioner meets the
threshold to receive public funds under KRS 31 .185(3) and (6), however, is not
an automatic funding entitlement for every out-of-county witness whose name
appears on the petitioner's witness list. Rather, the trial courts in the
Commonwealth have the inherent authority to control the proceedings before
them to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay. This inherent authority
includes discretion to examine the post-conviction petition and the list of
proposed witnesses submitted by indigent post-conviction petitioners to
determine what is reasonably necessary for those petitioners fully to present their
claims.
In the case at hand, Hodge has apparently sought travel-related expenses
for twenty-three out-of-county witnesses. The Letcher Circuit Court has the
inherent discretion to scrutinize that proposed witness list and, after giving Hodge
an opportunity to be heard in the matter, to authorize travel expenses for those
out-of-county witnesses reasonably necessary for Hodge to present his claims
fully. If the trial court finds that some of the persons Hodge desires to call as
witnesses would present repetitive testimony or are otherwise unnecessary for
23
We express no opinion at this time on whether indigent post-conviction petitioners
are entitled to public funds for expert witness fees under KRS 31 .185 . That issue is
not before us in this original action.
10
Hodge's claims to be presented fully, the trial court may refuse to authorize travel
expenses for those unnecessary witnesses.
Finally, we firmly reject the Commonwealth's contention that an out-ofcounty witness called on behalf of an indigent post-conviction petitioner must
demonstrate indigency before being eligible for travel expense reimbursement . A
person need not lay bare his or her financial status in order to perform his or her
civic duty by testifying at an official court proceeding . Our conclusion is
reinforced by the fact that witnesses on behalf of the Commonwealth are not
required to prove indigency before being eligible for reimbursement . Out-ofcounty witnesses called on behalf of indigent post-conviction petitioners are
entitled to reimbursement in the same manner as are witnesses for the
Commonwealth."
In short, we hold that indigent post-conviction petitioners are entitled to
public funds for travel expenses for their out-of-county witnesses under
KRS 31 .185(3) and (6), provided that a court of competent jurisdiction has
determined that an evidentiary hearing is necessary in order to resolve the
allegations contained in the post-conviction petition. A ruling to the contrary
would deprive those indigent post-conviction petitioners of their right to present
fully their non-frivolous claims to the court. The trial courts must exercise
24
See KRS 421 .015 (providing that out-of-county witnesses are allowed travel
reimbursement at the level allowed for state employees); KRS 421 .030 (governing
expenses for witnesses on behalf of the Commonwealth who reside outside
Kentucky) .
Of course, a trial court also may utilize its discretion to order prepayment of
necessary witness expenditures if the court finds expense prepayment to be more
appropriate than expense reimbursement .
discretion to review the post-conviction petitioner's proposed witness list and to
authorize travel reimbursement only for those out-of-county witnesses
reasonably necessary for the post-conviction petitioner to present fully his claims.
Travel expenses for the witnesses who reside out-of-county shall be paid from
the special fund established by KRS 31 .185(4)-(5) and shall be governed by the
same general rules, regulations, and limits that are applicable to out-of-county
witnesses called on behalf of the Commonwealth, regardless of the financial
status of the witnesses.
B . Standard for Grantinci Writ.
We may grant a writ only
upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to
proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through
an application to an intermediate court ; or (2) that the lower court is
acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction,
and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and
great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not
granted .
Because Epperson and Hodge do not allege that the trial court is proceeding
outside its jurisdiction, our focus is on the second type of writ classification.
A writ is an extraordinary remedy that should be issued only in exceptional
circumstances.26 In other words, a writ may not issue "unless the petitioner can
demonstrate that traditional post hoc appellate procedures do not provide him or
her with an adequate remedy. ,27
25
26
27
Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004). Although Hoskins involved a
petition for a writ of prohibition, we have utilized the same standard if a petitioner
seeks a writ of mandamus . See, e.g., Stopher , 170 S.W.3d at 308 n .2.
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Graham, 192 S.W.3d 350, 356 (Ky. 2006).
Flynt v. Commonwealth , 105 S.W.3d 415, 422 (Ky. 2003) .
12
The "irreparable injury" requirement is not as absolute, however. Indeed,
a court may grant a writ without a showing of irreparable harm,
provided a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower
court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is
necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial
administration . It may be observed that in such a situation the court
is recognizing that if it fails to act the administration of justice
generally will suffer the great and irreparable injury. ,28
It appears clear to us that Hodge and Epperson have satisfied the
standards necessary to the granting of a writ. Stopher and Paisley were writ
cases . And a finding that Hodge and Epperson should merely raise these issues
on a direct appeal seems an unreasonable burden on the proper administration
of justice in that denying the writ would prevent Hodge and Epperson from
presenting witnesses on their behalf at the post-conviction hearing that we have
already ordered . In turn, Hodge and Epperson would likely then appeal, meaning
that we would in that future appeal reverse the trial court's decision to deny
funding, starting the process anew . Such needless delay is improper and
unnecessary because both the Commonwealth and the petitioners herein are
entitled to finality . Furthermore, the availability of funds for post-conviction
petitioners is certainly a matter of great importance to the courts throughout the
Commonwealth ,29 a fact that is magnified in this case since we previously
deemed Hodge and Epperson's mitigation-related claim to involve a "potential
28
2s
Bender v. Eaton , 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961).
See, e.g., Paisley , 201 S.W.3d at 37 (holding that facts "capable of frequent
repetition" is a factor to be considered in finding that a petitioner had satisfied the
irreparable injury prong of the standard for granting a writ).
13
violation of a constitutional right. ,3° Therefore, we find that Hodge and Epperson
have satisfied the prerequisites necessary to the granting of a writ.
III. CONCLUSION.
For the reasons previously stated herein, Benny Lee Hodge's and Roger
Epperson's petition for a writ of mandamus is GRANTED . In a manner
consistent with this opinion, the Letcher Circuit Court must approve travel-related
reimbursement expenses for out-of-county witnesses called on behalf of Hodge
or Epperson.
All sitting, except Noble, J.
Abramson and Schroder, JJ., concur. Cunningham, J., concurs by
separate opinion in which Lambert, C.J ., and Scott, J., join.
30
Epperson , 68 S.W.3d at 342 .
14
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Laurence E. Komp
P . O . Box 1785
Manchester, MO 63011
Armand I . Judah
Judah-McLeod PLLC
539 W. Market St., 2nd Floor
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR INTERVENING APPELLANT :
David M. Barron
Heather Christina McGregor
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 301
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Judge Eddy Coleman
172 Division Street, Suite 435
Pikeville, KY 41501
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
15
Rick L. Bartley
Commonwealth Attorney
115 Caroline Avenue
Pikeville, KY 41501
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY :
Damon L. Preston
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : JANUARY 24, 2008
TO BE PUBLISHED
,vuFrentr (~Vurf -of ~Rrufurhv
NO. 2007-SC-000073-OA
BENNY LEE HODGE
PETITIONER
AND
ROGER EPPERSON
INTERVENING PETITIONER
ON APPEAL FROM LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, SPECIAL JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 85-CR-00070
HON . EDDY COLEMAN, SPECIAL JUDGE,
LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT;
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST) ; AND
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
RESPONDENTS
CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM
I concur in the well-written opinion of Justice Minton. I write only to
emphasize a very important point, at least from my perspective, regarding trial
guidance.
Justice Minton ably speaks to the discretion allowed the trial judge in
paring down needed witnesses and eliminating those that are unnecessary.
Because of the age of this case, I am bold enough to suggest that the trial court
might decide that none of them are necessary. The court's broad discretion
should also allow the utilization of affidavits, avowals, and other procedural aids
available in filtering through proposed testimony.
This case went to trial almost twenty years ago. The crimes were
committed over twenty-two years ago. Before the trial court is a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial during sentencing. The issue
involves what mitigation evidence was available to defense counsel long ago
when the case. was tried . Supposedly, twenty-three mitigation witnesses from
Tennessee are now being sought - many of whom, if not all, are relatives . What
value any of these stale witnesses would have to mitigate, at this late date, such
an atrocious crime, committed so long ago, makes me wonder. This is not to
mention the implausibility, if not impossibility, of defense counsel at trial in the
distant past - or those called on his or her behalf - now being able to accurately
recall why such witnesses were not presented, or even if counsel was ever made
aware of them.
Basic fairness must surface through the foggy haze of time for the
Commonwealth, as well as Petitioners . We hold only, at least in my opinion, that
public funds are available for these witnesses - nothing more. See
Commonwealth v. Paisley , 201 S .W.3d 34 (Ky. 2006) .
Lambert, CJ ; and Scott, J., join .
uyrrutr Couxf -of ~irufurhv
2007-SC-000073-OA
BENNY LEE HODGE
PETITIONER
AND
ROGER EPPERSON
V.
INTERVENING PETITIONER
ON APPEAL FROM LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, SPECIAL JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO . 85-CR-00070
HON. EDDY COLEMAN, SPECIAL JUDGE,
LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT;
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST) ; AND
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
RESPONDENTS
ORDER OF CORRECTION
The Opinion of the Court by Justice Minton and Order Granting Petition for
Writ of Mandamus, rendered January 24, 2008, is CORRECTED on its face by
substitution of pages 1 and 14 attached in lieu of the original pages 1 and 14 of
the opinion and order., Said correction does not affect the holding .
ENTERED: January 25, 2008.
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