BENJI MANNS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2008
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2006-SC-000929-TG
BENJI MANNS
V.
ON APPEAL FROM MAGOFFIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOANN S. COLEMAN, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-000055
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This case is on appeal from the Magoffin Circuit Court where Appellant, Benji
Manns, was convicted of three counts of first-degree trafficking second or subsequent
offense. Appellant was also found to be a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first
degree, and was sentenced to three consecutive terms of twenty years each for a total
of sixty years' imprisonment . He appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Appellant
raises five issues on appeal : (1) the trial court erred by not enforcing a plea agreement
allegedly reached by the parties; (2) the trial court should have suppressed the tape
recordings made by the undercover police officer ; (3) Appellant's request for an
instruction on facilitation should have been granted; (4) error occurred to the Appellant's
detriment related to the procedure regarding the PFO count ; (5) it was error to amend
counts 1 and 2 of the indictment to become second or subsequent offenses .
1. Background
On February 9, 2005, Detective Trent Combs was acting as an undercover agent
and came into contact with Appellant. The detective and Appellant met at a restaurant in
downtown Salyersville, Kentucky, where Appellant agreed to help the detective obtain
some oxycodone . The detective, Appellant, and a confidential informant got into the
detective's car. Appellant led them to the driveway of a residence that was later
identified as that of Michael Williams .
The detective gave $40 to Appellant for the purchase of drugs and remained in
the car while Appellant exited the car and met Williams outside the home . Appellant and
Williams then entered the home and exited a few minutes later . Williams and Appellant
approached the car from the passenger side. Appellant leaned into the car and said that
he had two oxycodone pills for $15 each. Appellant then showed the detective other
pills, which he claimed were morphine, and asked if the detective wanted them for $10 .
The detective had witnessed Williams hand the pills to Appellant, who then handed the
pills to the detective . Appellant asked the detective if he would like to purchase
marijuana because Williams had some, and the detective declined . On the way back to
town Appellant produced a marijuana cigarette and smoked it. The origin of the
cigarette was never revealed . The detective was wearing a concealed audio recorder
throughout this interaction .
On February 23, 2005, the detective met with Appellant on a street corner near
the Magoffin County courthouse . Appellant told the Detective that he could get him
some morphine pills for $15 each. The pair then walked up a couple of streets to a
house . They entered the house and the detective gave $40 to Appellant once again for
the purchase of drugs. Once inside the house, Appellant and an unidentified female
went into a bathroom and conducted a private conversation . Appellant exited the
bathroom a short while later and told the detective that $5 more was required to
purchase three pills. The detective gave him the money, and Appellant returned to the
bathroom with the female . Appellant exited the bathroom with morphine pills and offered
the detective a syringe to use the drugs, but the detective declined . The detective and
the Appellant left the house. The detective once again wore a concealed audio
recorder .
On June 20, 2005, the Magoffin County grand jury returned an indictment
charging Appellant with nine drug offenses, and the case was assigned to a special
judge. Three of the counts, for first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, were
taken to trial in July 2006. Prior to trial, two of the trafficking counts were amended to
reflect that they were second or subsequent offenses . The prosecution also obtained a
separate single-count indictment charging Appellant with being a persistent felony
offender in the first degree . The separate indictment was transferred from the regular
Magoffin Circuit Court judge to the special judge already sifting in Appellant's case.
At trial, the detective testified as to the drug deals. The audio recordings he
made during the deals were played for the jury. A chemist with the Kentucky State
Police testified that the drugs purchased on February 9, 2005 were actually
hydromorphone and oxycodone, and that the pills purchased on February 23, 2005
were morphine. The jury found Appellant guilty on all three counts of first-degree
trafficking .
The trial then proceeded to a second phase at which evidence was admitted
demonstrating that Appellant had been convicted of a prior trafficking offense . The jury
found Appellant guilty of being a subsequent offender.
The trial then proceeded to a third phase regarding the PFO charge, at which
evidence of prior convictions other than those used in the "subsequent offense" phase
described above was presented . The jury found that Appellant was a first-degree
persistent felony offender but was deadlocked as to the penalty. The judge imposed the
minimum penalty of twenty years on each count, to run consecutively for a total of sixty
years in prison .
II. Analysis
A. The Alleged Plea Agreement Will Not be Enforced
Appellant claims the trial court erred by denying his motion to compel the
Commonwealth to honor a plea agreement that Appellant contends was entered into by
both parties. Multiple plea offers appear in the record, but the one that Appellant seeks
to compel is not. The offer purportedly included a nine-year sentence to run
concurrently with time Appellant faced for a prior conviction for which he was on parole .
While there is a nine-year offer in the record, it does not state whether the sentence was
to be consecutive or concurrent with the other time that Appellant faced .
The issue of the supposed plea bargain was brought before the trial court on
multiple occasions . During a hearing on April 26, 2006, the prosecutor (who was new to
the case and was not the attorney who had supposedly made the offer) stated that she
could not ethically recommend an offer that was in direct contradiction to- statute . The
statute in question is KRS 533.060, which provides in essence that if a defendant
commits a felony while on parole, then any sentence he receives as a result shall not
run concurrently with any other sentence . Appellant continued to assert that the former
prosecutor had made the offer and had confirmed the offer via email. The email was
never produced. The trial court denied Appellant's request to enforce the alleged oral
plea offer, finding that it directly violated the statute .
Boiled down to its most basic elements this issue is simple : Appellant seeks to
have this case reversed and remanded because the trial court did not enforce an
alleged plea agreement, which does not appear anywhere in the record . Furthermore,
the supposed plea agreement is contrary to the requirements of KRS 533 .060 .
The Appellant relies heavily upon Workman v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W .2d 206
(Ky. 1979). In Workman , the defendant struck a deal with the Commonwealth in which
his charges would be dropped if he passed a lie detector test. The defendant passed
three such tests, but the Commonwealth proceeded to trial and obtained a guilty verdict.
This Court reversed the conviction and upheld the plea bargain, citing detrimental
reliance by the defendant and notions of public policy in having the Commonwealth held
to its word . Id. a t 207.
In the present case, there is no such detrimental reliance by Appellant . In fact,
Appellant does not appear to have taken any action that shows a particular reliance
upon the supposed agreement. More importantly, there is no agreement in the record
to which the Court can look. The alleged email acceptance referred to by Appellant is
not in the record . There simply is no evidence upon which this Court could reasonably
compel the Commonwealth to uphold the alleged agreement .
Alternatively, had Appellant and the Commonwealth proceeded with the alleged
plea agreement, the trial court would not have been bound by such merely because the
parties had delivered it to her. RCr 8.08 states clearly that "[t]he court may refuse to
accept a plea of guilty. . . ." In Hoskins v. Maricle , 150 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004), the Court
examined a case in which the trial judge had rejected a plea agreement as being too
lenient. The Court laid out a lengthy survey of both Kentucky and federal cases in
upholding the trial judge's ruling. The Court there stated :
"The proposition that a facially proper plea agreement must be approved
unless disapproval is required by a concern for the rights of the defendant
is a far too restrictive view of the court's proper concerns. The plea
bargaining process is an essential component of the administration of
justice, and if the court has reasonable grounds for believing that
acceptance of the plea would be contrary to the sound administration of
justice, it may reject the plea ."
Id . at 25 (quoting United States v. Severing , 800 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1986)) .
Though the Court in Hoskins was specifically embracing the judge's discretion to
reject a proffered plea agreement for being too lenient, it also supported the precedent
that a trial judge has discretion to reject plea agreements which are contrary to the
"sound administration of justice ." In the present case, Appellant objects to the trial
judge's refusal to enforce a plea agreement that would have directly contradicted
statutory requirements, which she could not ethically do. The enforcement of such a
plea "agreement" in these circumstances would certainly have been contrary to the
sound administration of justice.
B. Admission of Audio Recordings was Proper
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced into evidence and played for the jury the
audio recordings of the drug transactions made by the detective . There were two tapes,
one of each transaction, and the Appellant objected to both on the ground of untimely
discovery. Appellant also objected to the tape of the February 9th transaction on the
grounds that it contained hearsay from the non-testifying confidential informant, and that
it included unrelated, inflammatory subject matter and an unidentified male voice. In his
objection at trial, Appellant's counsel stated that the Commonwealth's attorney had
done everything in his power to provide quality tapes to him, but that they had arrived
too late regardless . The trial court overruled Appellant's motion to suppress the tapes
because of untimely discovery stating that the Commonwealth had complied with the
rule requiring disclosure no later than 48 hours prior to trial, RCr 7.26.
The Commonwealth had timely supplied tapes to Appellant's original attorney
(who withdrew prior to trial) . Apparently, those tapes were not transferred to Appellant's
new attorney. However, the Commonwealth is not responsible for an effective transfer
of files between defense attorneys . Even so, the Commonwealth supplied tapes to
Appellant's attorney well before the 48-hour time limit ended, and when those tapes
were found to be of poor quality, the Commonwealth supplied another set. Defense
counsel argued that weekends did not count when calculating the 48-hour time period,
and thus he had not received the second set of tapes 48 hours prior to the trial.
However, no authority has been presented to support such statement. Criminal Rule
7.26 does not indicate that weekends should not be counted when measuring the 48hour period . It is clear from the facts in this case that the Commonwealth did not commit
a discovery violation related to timeliness .
The Appellant next contends that the tape of the February 9th transaction should
be excluded because it contained hearsay statements from a non-testifying confidential
informant . The trial court overruled the objection, noting that the statements contained
in the tape were not hearsay since they were not being offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted .
The trial court was correct in this regard . In Norton v. Commonwealth, 890
S .W .2d 632 (Ky. App. 1994), the Commonwealth sought to enter into evidence tape
recordings of a drug transaction which, like the present case, contained the voices of
non-testifying witnesses. The court there held that the tapes did not constitute hearsay,
because they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and, instead, "were
evidence of the event itself, introduced for a non-hearsay purpose." Id . at 635 . That
purpose was to show that the events had occurred and that the statements testified to
had been made; the tapes were not being used to prove that the statements made were
in fact true. See, also Turner v. Commonwealth, 248 S .W.3d 543 (Ky. 2008) (holding
that informant's statements in audiotape of controlled buy were not hearsay) ; cf. Fields
v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 275, 279-80 (Ky. 2000) (disallowing a recording as
hearsay only because it was offered for truth of the matter asserted) .
The present case presents a situation similar to that in Norton . With an officer on
the stand, these tapes were introduced and played for the jury. The tapes were entered
for the purpose of proving that the events testified to by the officer did in fact occur. The
tapes were not entered into evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of any
statement contained therein, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
the tapes to be played .
Finally, Appellant objects to the playing of the February 9th audio tape on the
grounds that it contains conversations unrelated to the drug transaction and that it
contains the voice of an unidentified male. The argument is essentially that the
conversations were irrelevant, and prejudicial .
The Appellant offers no authority to support his reasoning that the presence of an
unidentified male voice on the recording renders it inadmissible, at least where the
statements by the person are immaterial . While the tape also contained a conversation
regarding the defendant's sexual exploits, it is within the discretion of the trial court to
determine the admissibility of evidence and the extent to which prejudice is created by
the admission of evidence. In this case, the trial court overruled Appellant's objection to
the tape for prejudice and irrelevance . The record reveals no prejudice from Appellant's
conversations, and this Court finds no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling .
C. Denial of Instruction on Lesser-Included Offense was Proper
The Appellant next alleges error in the ruling of the trial court denying an
instruction on the crime of facilitation as defined in KRS 506.080 . Appellant argues that
the facts show him to be a middle man who merely directed the detective to where he
could buy drugs and that he did not profit from the transactions . Appellant argues that
he was entitled to a facilitation instruction and that a reasonable jury could have found
him guilty of that crime rather than trafficking.
Appellant cites several cases in support of his claim that he was entitled to an
instruction on facilitation as a lesser-included offense . E.q., Webb v. Commonwealth ,
904 S .W.2d 226 (Ky. 1995). These cases hold that the defendant is entitled to an
instruction on facilitation when he is charged with committing the object offense (e.g.,
trafficking) by way of complicity. The problem with Appellant's theory is that he was
charged only as a principal, not as an accomplice (even as an alternative, as is
commonly seen in indictments), and facilitation simply is not a lesser-included offense of
trafficking in a controlled substance . In Houston v. Commonwealth , 975 S .W.2d 925
(Ky. 1998), this Court examined the offenses of trafficking and facilitation within the
context of the requirements of lesser-included instructions and concluded that
facilitation is not a lesser-included offense to trafficking, and thus the defendant was not
entitled to such instruction .
The offenses of trafficking in or possession of a controlled substance
require proof that the defendant, himself, knowingly and unlawfully
committed the charged offense . The offense of criminal facilitation
requires proof that someone other than the defendant committed the
object offense and the defendant, knowing that such person was
committing or intended to commit that offense, provided that person with
9
the means or opportunity to do so. Thus, criminal facilitation requires
proof not of the same or less than all the facts required to prove the
charged offenses of trafficking in or possession of a controlled substance,
but proof of additional and completely different facts. A fortiori, it is not a
lesser included offense when the defendant is charged with committing
either of the object offenses .
Id . at 930 (citations omitted) .
Because Appellant was charged as a principal, at best, criminal facilitation would
be an alternative charge to the trafficking charge that he faced, and the Commonwealth
chose to pursue the charge with the higher penalty . This does not mean Appellant was
entitled to a separate or lesser-included instruction on that alternative offense .
Since he was charged only as a principal, much of Appellant's argument for why
he was entitled to a lesser-included instruction was really an argument in favor of a
directed verdict on the trafficking charge (that is, he committed facilitation of trafficking,
a wholly inchoate and separate offense, rather than trafficking) . However, he does not
present the argument as one for a directed verdict and he does not cite anywhere in the
record where he did so at the trial court.
Even if he had, however, the facts in this case clearly supported an instruction on
trafficking, meaning a directed verdict would have been improper . Though Appellant
and the Commonwealth differ on the level of the Appellant's profit motive in the
completion of the drug transactions, it seems that his actions fall somewhere in between
the descriptions offered by the parties. The Appellant tells the story of a disinterested
guide (facilitator) pointing the way to drugs--Magoffin County's own oxycodone oracle .
The Commonwealth describes a business partner to drug dealers (trafficker) who jets
about brokering deals on the fly in exchange for a reasonable commission of drugs for
himself.
10
It is a stretch to call the Appellant a mere facilitator. A facilitator under these facts
perhaps would have stayed in the car while the officer entered the homes of drug
dealers or would have given the dealers' addresses to the detective and nothing more.
However, under these facts there is a person who not only went with the detective to the
dealers' homes but also entered the homes alone and initiated the transactions, carried
the buyer's money, and served generally as a trustworthy middle man for both parties to
the transactions . It is not clear from the evidence whether the Appellant received actual
consideration for his participation, but it is clear that he is not a mere facilitator.
Looking to the record, it is apparent that the Appellant was neither disinterested
nor was he the ringleader of the operation . Appellant seems to have been something
more of a runner or agent for the drug dealers with which he was familiar. In this light,
the Commonwealth's account is a reasonable (and ultimately better) representation of
the facts . But whatever Appellant's role, it is clear that his actions supported an
instruction for trafficking and did not require that he instead receive an instruction on
mere facilitation.
Appellant was not entitled to an instruction on facilitation as a lesser-included
offense because facilitation is not a lesser-included offense of trafficking in a controlled
substance, and the facts of his case do not bear out an inference which would support
an instruction on facilitation . The trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested
instruction .
D . The PFO Procedure was Proper or, Alternatively, Harmless Error
The Appellant alleges errors in the procedure surrounding the persistent felony
offender (PFO) charge. Specifically, he objects to the timeliness of the charge and the
failure to consolidate the underlying trafficking case with the PFO case .
As to the first claim, Appellant was indicted and arraigned on a single count of
first-degree PFO on Thursday, July 20, 2006, and the trial began on Monday, July 24,
2006. Appellant argues that this late charge prevented him from organizing an adequate
defense to the PFO charges. The Appellant's argument fails for two reasons .
First, he was well aware that the Commonwealth was seeking the PFO charge,
and the indictment on July 20 should not have come as a surprise . The trial record
reflects that the Commonwealth had informed the trial court and defense counsel in a
pretrial conference on January 19, 2006 that the prosecutor would be seeking a PFO
first degree charge. Also, the Appellant is expected to be familiar with his own criminal
record . Luna v. Commonwealth, 571 S .W.2d 88, 89 (Ky. App. 1977). The Appellant had
knowledge of his own record and six months' notice that he would be indicted on a PFO
charge ; the indictment four days prior to trial did not rob him of any opportunity to
prepare for the charge that he would have had if the indictment had been issued earlier.
Secondly, Appellant could have requested a continuance if he had a legitimate
defense for which he needed time to prepare ; however, Appellant's counsel expressly
declined to pursue a continuance because the Appellant was waiting in prison and had
filed a pro se motion for a speedy trial. Appellant's imprisonment was not a new factor,
as he had been there since June 2005. If the Appellant had had a serious argument
against the legitimacy of the prior convictions, he would have requested a continuance
as a few more weeks or months in jail would have been a small price to pay to avoid the
enhanced sentence he received due to the PFO charge. It is interesting to note that the
Appellant has yet to bring any challenge to the legitimacy of the prior convictions, and
he neglected to mention in his brief that he has previously been convicted of being a
second-degree PFO.
12
The Appellant next argues that the PFO charge should be vacated because it
was never consolidated with the underlying criminal case pursuant to RCr 9.12. On the
first morning of trial, the PFO case was "transferred" from the Magoffin Circuit Court to
the special judge hearing the case. After arguments were presented by both parties, the
Commonwealth made a motion to "amend" the criminal case so that it would include the
PFO charge. The motion was granted, and from that point forward the PFO charge and
the underlying criminal case were handled jointly . This is also reflected in the jury
instructions and verdicts which clearly show that the same jury handled the evidence,
instructions, and verdict for the criminal and PFO charges and sentencing . This Court
agrees with the Commonwealth that the handling of the two cases was "poorly styled"
by the trial court . Though the trial court may have used an awkward method, the effect
was to consolidate the cases and they were handled as such . Any error in this
procedure was a technicality and undoubtedly harmless under RCr 9.24.
E. The Amendment to the Indictment to Reflect Second or Subsequent
Offense was Not Error
The Appellant also claims error in the amendment of counts 1 and 2 of the
indictment to reflect that each count was a second or subsequent offense . The basic
rule with regard to amendment of an indictment is that the amendment may not reflect a
new offense, but it may alter a defendant's status which would require a greater penalty
at sentencing . See RCr 6 .16 ("The court may permit an indictment . . . to be amended
any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced ."); Riley v. Commonwealth , 120
S.W .3d 622, 631-32 (Ky. 2003).
Appellant's specific complaint was addressed by the Court of Appeals in Luna v.
Commonwealth , 571 S .W .2d 88 (Ky. App. 1977) . In Luna, the defendant was charged
13
with first-degree trafficking, and during direct examination admitted to a previous
conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance . The indictment was amended at that
point to reflect the second or subsequent offense and thus to subject the defendant to
the higher penalties . The Court of Appeals interpreted the enhancement provision "to
mean that this provision is not a separate or additional offense under the Kentucky
Penal Code, but is merely a means that permits evidence to be entered that may be
helpful to the court or jury in fixing the term of punishment." Id. at 89.
The current version of the trafficking in controlled substances statute includes a
similar penalty enhancement for subsequent offenses . First offenses are sentenced as
Class C felonies and second or subsequent offenses are sentenced as Class B
felonies . KRS 218A .1412(2) . However, KRS 218A.1412(1) only creates one offense :
first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. The amended indictment then did not
charge a new crime, including instead a sentence enhancement. Also, Appellant "is
presumed to know his previous record . In no way was he prevented from preparing his
defense more adequately, nor were there any surprises ." Luna , 571 S .W.2d at 89 .
Appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment . This Court thus concludes that the
amendment of the indictment was proper.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and sentence of the Magoffin Circuit
Court are affirmed .
Minton, C.J. ; Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Schroder and Scott, JJ., concur.
Venters, J ., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Emily Holt Rhorer
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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