DERWIN NICKELBERRY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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F.
DERWIN NICKELBERRY
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN K. MERSHON, JUDGE
NO . 05-CR-003685
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This is an appeal from a judgment in which Appellant was convicted of fifteen
(15) counts of First-Degree Robbery and three (3) counts of Theft by Unlawful Taking
Over $300 for the armed robberies of a series of businesses in the Louisville area in
2003. Appellant assigns as error that: he was not tried within the 180-day time period in
KRS 500.110 ; his co-defendant's confession was not corroborated as required by RCr
9.60; the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions because it was based
solely on the testimony of two accomplices; the Commonwealth did not offer the
testimony of the victims, in violation of his right to confrontation ; and he was denied the
correct number of peremptory challenges . We reject the claimed errors due to their lack
of merit or the failure to preserve the error for appellate review. Hence, we affirm.
In late summer/early fall of 2003, a string of armed robberies was committed in
the Louisville area. The businesses robbed were a Sonic restaurant, a Waffle House,
an Applebee's, a Dairy Queen, a Burger King, a Kentucky Fried Chicken, a Wendy's,
and a Blockbuster Video store . On December 14, 2005, Appellant, Derwin Nickelberry
(along with several co-defendants) was indicted in connection with the robberies on one
(1) count of Criminal Syndication, three (3) counts of Theft by Unlawful Taking Over
$300, and thirty-nine (39) counts of First-Degree Robbery. A portion of these counts
were tried before a jury on October 2 - 6, 2006. Co-defendant Antiwan Tillman also
stood trial with Nickelberry . Two other co-defendants, Tommy Hardin and Jeannine
Spicer, accepted plea deals and testified at trial . Nickelberry was ultimately convicted of
three (3) counts of Theft by Unlawful Taking Over $300 and fifteen (15) counts of FirstDegree Robbery, and was sentenced to an aggregate of seventy (70) years
imprisonment.
KRS 500.110
KRS 500.110 provides :
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of this
state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of
imprisonment there is pending in any jurisdiction of this state
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis
of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he
shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty (180)
days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the
prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the
prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of
his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be
made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided
that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance .
At the time of Nickelberry's indictment in this case (December 14, 2005), he was serving
a ten-year prison sentence pursuant to prior judgments entered on June 24, 2005 and
September 19, 2005 . Nickelberry's counsel filed a speedy trial motion in the present
case on March 23, 2006, and I'Ackeberry was tried October 2- (1 2006. 54ckelberry
argues that because he was not tried within the 180-day time period in KRS 500 .110,
his indictment should have been dismissed.
It appears from the record that the first time the issue of KRS 500.110 was raised
was before this Court . While defense counsel filed a speedy trial motion, that motion
was based on state and federal constitutional grounds, not on statutory grounds . Issues
not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Gr ndy v.
Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Ky. 2000) .
In any event, KRS 500.110 would not apply in this case because it appears from
the record that a detainer was not filed relative to the indictment in this case . The
existence of a detainer is a strict requirement for the activation of KRS 500 .110 .
Donahoo v. Dortch, 128 S.W .3d 491, 493 (Ky. 2004).
RCr 9.64
Nickelberry argues that his conviction for First-Degree Robbery of the Sonic
restaurant was not supported by sufficient evidence because the testimony of Tommy
Hardin, which implicated Nickelberry in the robbery, was not corroborated as required
by RCr 9.60. RCr 9.60 provides, "[a] confession of a defendant, unless made in open
court, will not warrant a conviction unless accompanied by other proof that such an
offense was committed ."
It is undisputed that the only evidence of ANickelberry's involvement in the Sonic
robbery was from the testimony of Tommy Hardin, one of Nickelberry's co-defendants in
the case who pled guilty and agreed to testify at Nickelberry's trial. Unlike the other
robberies, there was no testimony by the victim in the Sonic robbery . It is Nickelberry's
position that because the only evidence against him in the Sonic robbery was the
testimony of Hardin, which Nickelberry maintains was a confession of a defendant, said
testimony could not constitute sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime under RCr
9.60 .
From our reading of RCr 9.60, "[a] confession of a defendant" refers to the
confession of the defendant who is challenging his conviction under RCr 9.60, not the
confession of a co-defendant, and Nickelberry did not give a confession in this case .
There is no authority for application of RCr 9.60 to a confession of a co-defendant. In
fact, as we shall discuss further below, even the uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant is sufficient evidence to support a conviction of the defendant. Hod e v.
Commonwealth , 17 S .W .3d 824, 841 (Ky. 2000), cert. den . , 531 U .S. 1018, 121 S. Ct .
581, 148 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000) . The purpose of RCr 9 .60 is to insure proof of corpus
delicti, beyond the out of court confession of the accused, which was established in the
instant case . See Lofthouse v. Commonwealth , 13 S.W.3d 236, 242 (Ky. 2000) ; Taylor
v. Commonwealth , 461 S.W.2d 920, 922-23 (Ky. 1 970) . In any event, Hardin testified in
open court against Nickelberry regarding his involvement in the Sonic robbery.
A trial court's decision regarding a directed verdict motion is reviewed under the
standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W .2d 186, 187 (Ky.1991) :
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all
fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of
the Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court
must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is
true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility
and weight to be given to such testimony . On appellate
review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence
as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find
guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal .
Hardin testified that late in the evening of July 29, 2003, he, Spicer and Nickelberry
drove to an area next to the Sonic restaurant. After the restaurant closed, a white male
employee exited the restaurant and began walking to his car. Hardin and Nickelberry,
armed with a pellet gun, forced the employee back into the restaurant . Once inside, the
employee tripped the security alarm, and it began to sound . According to Hardin,
Nickelberry became angry and started beating the employee about the head with the
pellet gun . Nickelberry and Hardin then fled the scene without stealing any money from
the restaurant.
Detective Bryan Arnold testified that when he arrived at the scene of the Sonic
robbery, there was a large amount of blood present and the victim had already been
transported to the hospital by ambulance. Detective Arnold stated that the victim did not
identify either of the robbers .
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there
was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to believe that Nickelberry was guilty of
First-Degree Robbery of the Sonic restaurant. Accordingly, the motion for directed
verdict was properly denied .
ACCOMPLICE CORROBORATION
Nickelberry next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions because they were based solely on the testimony of his two accomplices,
Hardin and Spicer. Nickelberry asks this Court to adopt an accomplice corroboration
requirement and, in the alternative, maintains that juries should be given a cautionary
instruction on the use of accomplice testimony . Nickelberry admits that he did not
specifically raise the issue of accomplice corroboration, but rather only argued generally
that Hardin's and Spicer's testimony was insufficient to support his convictions .
Even if we accept that the issue was preserved for review, we adjudge that it has
no merit. While Kentucky previously had an accomplice corroboration requirement, RCr
9.62, said requirement was abolished in 1980. In 1980, Kentucky returned to its
common law view that the testimony of an accomplice was competent, and that any
issue of the witness' credibility was for the jury.
,
fee Murphy v. Commonwealth , 652
S .W.2d 69, 72 (Ky. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by Q rmel v. Texas ', 529 U.S .
513, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 146 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2000). As recently as 2000, this Court
reaffirmed the rule that a conviction can be solely supported by the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice . Ngdge, 17 S.W.3d at 841 . We see no reason to depart
from this view today .
As for Nickelberry's contention that the jury should have at least received a
cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony, Nickelberry did not request such an
instruction or object to the failure to give such an instruction . See RCr 9 .54(2).
Therefore, this issue is precluded from our review. Fulcher v. Commonwealth, 149
S.W.3d 363, 373 (Ky . 2004).
We likewise reject Nickelberry's argument that he was denied his constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him as to those charges where the victims of the
robberies did not testify . U.S . Const. amend . VI . There is no requirement that the
victim of the crime testify at trial. As discussed above, Nickelberry's convictions were
sufficiently supported by the testimony of other witnesses to the crimes: his
accomplices, Hardin and Spicer. See Hod e, 17 &W.3d at 841 . And both Hardin and
Spicer were subject to the rigorous cross-examination by Nickelberry . Hence, there
was no Confrontation Clause violation .
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Nickelberry claims that the trial court incorrectly calculated the number of
peremptory challenges to which he was entitled . Nickelberry claims that under RCr
9.40, the defense was entitled to a total of thirteen (13) peremptory challenges, instead
of the eleven (11) allotted by the trial court.
At the conclusion of volt dire, the trial court brought up the subject of how many
peremptory challenges each party should receive in this case. The prosecutor and
Nickelberry's counsel agreed that each defendant got nine (9) strikes to share between
them, and then each defendant got one (1) additional strike to exercise independently
from the other. After consideration of the issue, the court agreed and allotted a total of
eleven (11) peremptory strikes to the defense. The defendants used all of their
peremptory strikes .
According to this Court's reading of RCr 9.40 in Springer v. Commonwealth,
998 EMS 439, 444 (Ky. -1999), because the two defendants were tried jointly, and two
alternate jurors were seated, the defendants were indeed entitled to a total of thirteen
(13) peremptory strikes in this case . However, as conceded by Nickelberry, this issue
was not preserved for appellate review. Nickelberry seeks review of the error under
RCr 10.26.
This Court in Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky . 2007), has recently
revisited the issue of peremptory strikes and returned to the rule espoused in Thomas _
Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1993), that prejudice is presumed when a
defendant is forced to exhaust a peremptory challenge on a prospective juror who
should have been excused for cause, overruling Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d
99 (Ky. 2006). In the instant case, however, Nickelberry does not claim that he was
forced to use a peremptory strike on a juror who should have been excused for cause .
In fact, he has no complaint about the jury in his case. Rather, Nickelberry contends
that it was palpable error that the defense was not allotted the two (2) other peremptory
strikes to which he was entitled under RCr 9 .40.
In Mills v. Commonwealth , 95 S.W.3d 838, 843 (Ky. 2003), this Court stated, "we
have repeatedly held that an improper allocation of peremptory challenges is reversible
error `if the issue is properly preserved by the adversely affected litigant ."' (quoting
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cook, 590 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Ky.
1979)). Shane neither eliminated the requirement of preservation of a peremptory
calculation error, nor elevated said error to automatic palpable error status . In the case
at bar, Nickelberry not only failed to object to the number of peremptory challenges
allotted him, but was one of the parties responsible for misadvising the court as to the
correct number of peremptory strikes. That fact, coupled with the fact that Nickelberry
has no complaint on appeal about the jury, leads this Court to conclude that there was
no palpable error.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
hereby affirmed .
All sitting . All concur, except Venters, J., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
James David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender
Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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