JASPER POLLINI V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
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2006-SC-000835-MR
JASPER POLLINI
V
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM DOUGLAS KEMPER, JUDGE
NO. 02-CR-001146
COMMONWEALTH .OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Jasper Pollini appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Pollini was originally
tried before a Jefferson County jury in June of 2003, and found guilty of complicity to
murder, complicity to first-degree burglary, complicity to second-degree burglary, and
complicity to receiving stolen property . He was sentenced to life without the possibility
of parole for twenty-five years for the murder conviction, fifteen years' imprisonment for
the first-degree burglary conviction, ten years' imprisonment for the second-degree
burglary conviction, and one year imprisonment for the receiving stolen property
conviction, to be run concurrently. On direct appeal to this Court, Pollini's burglary and
receiving stolen property convictions were affirmed . However, holding that the murder
did not occur during the commission of a burglary, and therefore could not be used as
an aggravating circumstance, Pollini's murder sentence was vacated and remanded for
re-sentencing . Pollini now appeals from the final judgment of that re-sentencing trial, at
which the jury imposed the maximum sentence of life imprisonment to be run
consecutively with the remaining sentences . He raises two issues for review. Finding
no error, we affirm .
The factual background underlying Pollini's convictions is thoroughly set forth in
Pollini v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W. 3d 418 (Ky. 2005). In short, Pollini was found guilty
of the murder of Byron Pruitt. Pollini, who was seventeen years old at the time of the
offenses, broke into a residential garage to steal tools and a generator . He was unable
to remove the generator, however, and sought help from Jason Edwards, the boyfriend
of his sister . After the pair loaded the generator into their vehicle, Pollini decided to
break into another garage at the home of Dan Ziegler.
Ziegler awoke during the break-in and confronted Pollini with a gun . Pollini ran
and Ziegler called 911 . He also called his neighbor, Pruitt, to warn him. Meanwhile,
Pollini had returned home and realized he had left his toolbox in Zeigler's garage .
Edwards refused to return, but Pollini was able to persuade his sister, Crystal Plank, to
drive him back to Ziegler's home. As they approached, Pruitt was coming down the
driveway towards Plank's car; he was carrying a pistol . Pollini, who had obtained a gun
when he returned home, pointed the gun out of the window and fired a shot which
struck Pruitt in the chin. He died several hours later.
At the re-sentencing trial of Pollini's murder conviction, the jury was presented
with a written summary of the evidence from the first trial which had been prepared by
the trial court. Additionally, the jury reviewed videotapes from the guilt phase of Pollini's
original trial . These tapes included the testimonies of defense expert witness, Dr. Allen
Josephson ; Pruitt's mother, Anna Pruitt ; and Dan Ziegler .
In his first allegation of error, Pollini challenges the introduction of testimony from
Anna Pruitt. Pollini argues that the testimony constituted improper victim impact
testimony under KRS 532.055(2)(a)(7) . Further, Pollini asserts that the testimony was
irrelevant, cumulative and unduly prejudicial .
When a new jury is impaneled for retrial of a penalty phase, it is generally
necessary to admit evidence from the earlier guilt phase proceedings, as the new jury
cannot be expected "to sentence in a vacuum without any knowledge of the defendant's
past criminal record or other matters that might be pertinent to consider in the
assessment of an appropriate penalty." Boone v. Commonwealth, 821 S .W .2d 813, 814
(Ky. 1992) quoting, Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S .W .2d 794, 797 (Ky. 1987). The
amount and type of evidence provided to the new jury is within the trial court's sound
discretion . Neal v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 843, 851 (Ky. 2003).
Ms. Pruitt's testimony concerned the evening of her son's death, how she
learned that he had been shot, and the actions of the EMS personnel treating Byron .
She testified that she was initially told that his injuries were not life-threatening, and that
she followed the ambulance to the hospital in her own vehicle . However, upon her
arrival to the hospital, she learned that Byron had died en route.
Ms. Pruitt's testimony provided the re-sentencing jury a full understanding of the
evening of Byron's death, a description of the victim's physical state after being shot,
and the circumstances of his final moments. While the jury had been provided the trial
court's written summary of the offenses, Ms . Pruitt's testimony afforded a more
comprehensive understanding of the aftermath of the shooting . The testimony allowed
the re-sentencing jury to fully understand the circumstances surrounding the
commission of Pollini's crimes . Thompson v. Commonwealth , 147 S .W.3d 22, 37 (Ky.
3
2004)(in re-sentencing trial, trial court has discretion to admit evidence from prior
proceedings that is "relevant and reasonably calculated to inform the jury of the nature
of the crimes") . For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
decision to admit the testimony.
Moreover, upon a review of the testimony, we do not believe that Ms. Pruitt's
testimony was unduly prejudicial or cumulative. Though emotional, the testimony
consisted entirely of Ms. Pruitt's factual description of the evening of her son's death .
Furthermore, it provided. a more detailed and thorough understanding of the crime and
its aftermath than could be gleaned from the recitation of the facts included in the trial
court's written summary . There was no error in the admission of the testimony.
Furthermore, Pollini's assertion that Ms. Pruitt's testimony was improperly
admitted victim impact testimony is without merit. The Commonwealth sought to call
Ms. Pruitt as a live witness at the re-sentencing proceedings to provide victim impact
testimony. The trial court properly rejected this request under KRS 532 .055(2)(a)(7), as
the Commonwealth's right to present victim impact testimony was satisfied by the live
testimony of Susan Pruitt, Byron's widow. Anna Pruitt's videotaped testimony was
limited entirely to a factual account of the offenses . She gave no testimony concerning
the crime's impact on her life. Upon review of the record, it is clear that the trial court
denied the Commonwealth's request to present Anna Pruitt's live victim impact
testimony, but permitted her prior, videotaped testimony to help the jury fully understand
the nature of the crimes. There was no error.
Pollini next alleges multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct in the
Commonwealth's closing argument: (1) that the Commonwealth's Attorney improperly
appealed to the jury's passion by referencing "juvenile crime in general" ; (2) that the
4
Commonwealth's Attorney improperly denigrated the mitigating evidence of Pollini's age
at the time of the offense ; (3) that the Commonwealth's Attorney improperly commented
on Pollini's chance of receiving parole and urged the jury to abdicate sentencing to the
Parole Board ; and (4) that the Commonwealth's Attorney improperly inserted his own
personal experiences in other cases involving juveniles. Pollini urges that, considered
collectively or individually, the Commonwealth's statements during closing arguments
constituted flagrant misconduct, which denied him due process of law.
Upon review of the record, we do not believe that the Commonwealth exceeded
the wide latitude afforded attorneys in making closing arguments . Tamme v.
Commonwealth , 973 S.W.2d 13, 39 (Ky. 1998) . The Commonwealth's brief reference
to general difficulties in sentencing a juvenile as an adult was neither improper nor
prejudicial . We likewise find no error in the Commonwealth's comments concerning
Pollini's young age at the time of the crime, as the comments were limited strictly to the
specific circumstances of this case. Hodge v. Commonwealth , 17 S .W.3d 824, 853 (Ky.
2000)("[W]hile it would be improper in closing argument to attack the concept of
mitigating circumstances, a prosecutor may question the validity and propriety of the
specific evidence offered in mitigation in a particular case."). When reviewed in their
entirety, the Commonwealth's remarks regarding Pollini's parole eligibility were accurate
and based on the evidence admitted during the re-sentencing proceedings . Cf . Perdue
v. Commonwealth , 916 S.W.2d 148, 164 (Ky. 1995)(finding reversible error in closing
argument where prosecutor made several "misstatements concerning parole eligibility").
Finally, the Commonwealth's remarks concerning his personal experiences with juvenile
offenders did not exceed the lines of propriety. The comments did not compare Pollini
to other specific offenders, but rather were made in an attempt to express his personal
opinion as to the appropriate sentence based on the evidence .
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling defense counsel's multiple
objections to the Commonwealth's closing argument. To the extent that certain of these
alleged errors are unpreserved, we further find that none rise to the level of palpable
error . RCr 10 .26 . The conduct of the Commonwealth's Attorney in this case was not so
prejudicial as to deprive Pollini of due process of law. Partin v. Commonwealth , 918
S .W.2d 219, 224 (Ky. 1996).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed .
Lambert, C.J . ; Abramson, Cunningham, Minton, Schroder, and Scott, JJ., concur.
Noble, J., concurs, but would agree with the trial court that this evidence having been
admitted in the first trial and not held to be error on appeal, makes it admissible in the
re-sentencing as no more than the original jury would have heard, and not because it
gives "a more comprehensive understanding of the aftermath of the shooting ."
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Daniel T. Goyette
Elizabeth B . McMahon
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Michael A. Nickles
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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