JEREMY DESHANNON RICE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED ; AUGUST 21, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2006-SC-000743-MR
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JEREMY DESHANNON RICE
V.
77
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA GOODWINE, JUDGE
NO . 04-CR-001384
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Jeremy Deshannon Rice, was convicted by a Fayette Circuit
Court jury of wanton murder, first-degree robbery, and of being a second-degree
persistent felony offender . For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to fifty
(50) years imprisonment . He now appeals as a matter of right pursuant to Ky.
Const. § 110(2)(b) .
On appeal, Appellant argues (1) that he was deprived of his right to
confront and meaningfully cross-examine a witness and (2) that the trial court
erred in admitting DNA evidence. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm
Appellant's convictions .
I. Facts
The convictions stem from the shooting death of Carl Gene McClung, a
commercial truck driver, at a Lexington truck wash in 2003 . On the evening of
August 19, 2003, Appellant, Jeremy Rice, was working a 2 :00 p.m . to 12:00 a .m .
shift at Scrub-A-Truck with fellow employees Chris Fletcher, Patrick Fee, and
Billy Fee. Also present at the truck wash that evening was Pete Kyle, a friend of
Fletcher. Near closing time, McClung arrived in his truck and went inside ScrubA-Truck, where he asked that his truck be cleaned and was told there was a wait.
He then purchased a drink and returned to his truck.
While waiting for his turn, McClung apparently fell asleep inside his truck,
with the cab and running lights on. Fletcher and Appellant tried to awaken
McClung by knocking on the truck, but there was no response . Appellant said
something to the effect that McClung better wake up before he gets robbed (or
that McClung better wake up before he robs him) . Fletcher and Kyle took his
statement as a joke . They abandoned any further attempt to wake McClung up
and closed the truck wash for the night.
McClung was later found dead lying on the ground outside his truck by
Thomas Collins, a fellow truck driver, in the early morning hours of August 20,
2003.
He had been shot three times in the chest with a .22 caliber weapon .
There was change in his pocket, and six blank checks and $570 in cash in his
wallet.
The murder went unsolved for several months until police received
information from Arian Brown during a tape-recorded interview, in which he
implicated Appellant and Marc Anthony Buchanan . In the interview, Brown said
that Buchanan came to Brown's house just prior to the murder and asked for a
weapon larger than his .22 caliber revolver . Brown, however, did not comply with
Buchanarfs request Appellant showed up some time later, and during the
conversation Buchanan expressed a desire to commit a robbery whereupon
Appellant indicated he knew of a potential victim. Buchanan and Appellant then
left together . Brown talked to Appellant the next day about the robbery.
Appellant said that he and Buchanan had attempted to rob someone at Scrub-ATruck. Appellant claimed that Buchanan shot the victim when he fought back.
This information was used by police to obtain a warrant for the purpose of
obtaining biological evidence from Appellant in order to create a DNA profile.
Two hairs found on a mattress and blanket in the truck matched the DNA of
Appellant . Appellant and Buchanan were subsequently arrested and indicted for
the murder and robbery of McClung .
In addition to DNA evidence placing Appellant at the murder scene, the
jury heard Brown's tape recorded statement implicating Appellant in the robbery.
After divulging information, Brown refused to cooperate further with the police,
stating shortly before testifying that he had no knowledge of the Scrub-A-Truck
crimes. Brown, who had previously been arrested for murder and multiple
robberies, testified that he was questioned by police only about his own crimes .
He denied making statements to the police and claimed that it must have been
his twin brother on the tape . The tape was then played for the jury over
Appellant's objection .
Thomas Carpenter testified he drove Appellant and Buchanan to Scrub-ATruck on the night of the crime . When Carpenter parked the vehicle, Appellant
and Buchanan got out and disappeared from his sight. Within a few minutes,
Carpenter heard gunshots. When Appellant and Buchanan returned, Buchanan
smiled when Carpenter asked him if he had done what he thought he had done.
The jury convicted Appellant of wanton murder, first-degree robbery, and
of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to thirty
(30) years for the murder, and ten (10) years for the robbery, enhanced to twenty
(20) years by the second-degree persistent felony offender charge. The
sentences were run consecutively, for a total of fifty (50) years .
11. Analysis
A. Right to Confrontation and Cross-examination
Appellant argues he was denied his right to confront and cross-examine
Arian Brown in two instances . The first instance concerns Brown's denial at trial
that he discussed the Scrub-A-Truck crimes with police, which led to a tape of
the interview being played for the jury, as evidence of prior inconsistent
statements . Appellant complains that because Brown denied making such
statements he was unable to effectively question about the substance of what
was said to police, relying heavily on Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S . 415, 85 S .Ct.
1074,13 L.Ed .2d 934 (1965):
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of
the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness,
but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is
worthy of belief.
Id . at 418-19, 85 S .Ct. at 1076-77 (quoting Mattox v. United States , 156
U .S. 237, 242-43,15 S.Ct. 337, 339, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895)) .
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects the right of cross-examination in criminal cases. Cross-
examination is the principal method to test the believability of witnesses and the
truth of their testimony. Davis v. Alaska, 4415 U.S . 308, 316, 94 Wt. 1105, 1110,
39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). In this context, it is necessary to provide the defendant a
generous opportunity to cross-examine witnesses as to bias, prejudice, and other
conditions that might bear upon the credibility of their testimony. However, the
Confrontation Clause guarantees only "an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish." Kentucky . Stincer, 482 U .S. 730,
739, 107 S .Ct. 2658, 2664, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (gypting Delaware v.
Fensteren 474 U.S. 15, 20,106 Mt. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985)).
Here, Brown was sworn and offered testimony on both direct and crossexamination . Although Brown at various points in his testimony claimed no
memory or outright denied making statements to police, he was
nonetheless present and answered the questions posed to him on crossexamination . See United States v. Owens, 484 U .S. 554, 559-60,108 S .Ct.
838, 842-43, 98 L .Ed .2d 951 (1988) (Confrontation Clause was satisfied where
the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to bring out the witness' bad memory
and other facts tending to discredit his testimony) .
It is immaterial to our analysis, on these facts, that Brown was
uncooperative, leaving Appellant without the answers he had sought. There is
risk inherent whenever a witness is questioned, whether on direct or cross
examination, that he or she may forget or give evasive answers . This does
not mean that the witness must be declared "unavailable ." See KRE 804 ;
Epperson v. Commonwealth, 197 S .W .3d 46 (Ky. 2006) (prior testimony of
accomplice was admissible in capital murder prosecution, as accomplice was
"unavailable" to testify, given that he testified that he did not remember what
happened and did not remember his prior testimony). Rather, in those situations,
it is within the trial court's discretion to strike portions, or even all, of the
testimony. In finding no such abuse of discretion here, we stress that Brown was
uncooperative with both Appellant and the Commonwealth, certainly casting
doubt on the credibility of his accusatory taped statements to the police .
We further find from the record that Appellant was able to effectively
question Brown. During cross-examination, Appellant elicited testimony that
Brown received a very favorable plea offer in exchange for information he
provided to police. Appellant additionally revealed on cross-examination that he
has a twin brother, who could be the voice on the tape, further casting doubt on
its credibility . These factors persuade us to conclude that Appellant was afforded
his constitutionally-mandated opportunity for effective cross-examination.
We also find no error as to the playing of the tape for the jury. See KRE
801A(a)(1) (allowing the admission of prior inconsistent statements "if the
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is examined concerning the
statement, with a foundation laid as required by KRE 613"). The Commonwealth
laid a proper foundation for the admission of the tape by questioning Brown
about the points contained therein. See KRE 613 (requiring that before the prior
inconsistent statement of a declarant can be offered, "he [or she] must be
inquired of concerning it, with the circumstances of time, place, and persons
present, as correctly as the examining party can present them") . There was no
Confrontation Clause violation because Brown testified and was cross-examined
by Appellant's trial counsel . See Crawford v. Washington , 541 U .S. 36, 59 n .9,
124 S .Ct. 1354, 1369 n .9, 158 L.Ed .2d 177 (2004) ("[W]e reiterate that, when the
declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places
no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements .").
B. Plea Negotiations
Appellant additionally contends it was error to exclude evidence of a threat
a prosecutor made during Brown's plea negotiations, that he may be subject to
additional prosecutions should he fail to testify. Specifically, Appellant alleges
that the prosecutor's audio taped statements were probative of Brown's state of
mind . See Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed .2d
347 (1974) (internal citations omitted) :
A[n] . . . attack on the witness' credibility is effected by means of
cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases,
prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate
directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality
of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is `always relevant
as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his
testimony.' We have recognized that the exposure of a witness'
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.
We review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion . Commonwealth v.
English, 993,S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) .
The facts relevant to this issue are as follows . Brown had been charged
with murder and multiple robberies in an unrelated case . Appellant was in
possession of a tape of the plea negotiations, which included a discussion of the
terms of the prosecutor's offer. Pursuant to the deal, Brown pled guilty in
exchange for two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery, for which he received
two concurrent ten year sentences . Brown further promised to testify against
Appellant . Brown was apparently suspected of committing other offenses, for
which he had not yet been charged. The prosecutor told Brown that he would
not be charged or tried on the other offenses, unless he backed out of testifying.
Appellant sought to play the portion of the tape containing the prosecutor's threat
to show its effect on Brown, thus impeaching this credibility. At the time of trial,
the prosecutor who made the threat was out of the country and unavailable to
testify. The trial court refused to allow the jury to hear the tape, due to the risk of
undue prejudice, but allowed Appellant to present the tape by an avowal . See
KRE 403.
It is generally true that there is a need to provide defendants with
generous opportunities to attack the credibility of witnesses, requiring disclosure
of the terms of plea agreements . However, the right to probe for bias is not
unlimited . See Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook §
4.10[4], at 283-84 (4th ed . 2003) ("Needless to say, Davis and Van Ars,
do not
give defendants an unfettered right to cross-examine witnesses about possible
bias, interest, or corruption ."). One such limit is a trial court's discretion to
exclude relevant evidence that is unduly prejudicial pursuant to the KRE 403
balancing test.
The record reflects that, despite the limitations imposed by the trial court,
Appellant was able to successfully show Brown's motivation to speak to police .
The jury heard Brown testify that he had entered into a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth in exchange for his statement and testimony. Because Brown
had received ea favorable plea agreement, the jury could reasonably infer that
there would be repercussions had he refused to follow through with the deal .
Allowing the jury to hear the prosecutor's threat out of context and without letting
the Commonwealth to fully go into the details of the plea deal would have been
unduly prejudicial, given the prosecutor's unavailability . As such, we conclude
that there was no abuse of discretion in excluding the tape .
C. Appellant's Motion to Suppress DNA Evidence
Appellant's next argument concerns the admission of certain DNA
evidence . Based on information provided by Brown, police obtained a warrant
for the purpose of obtaining biological evidence from Appellant in order to create
a DNA profile. Two hairs found in the truck matched Appellant's DNA, leading to
his arrest and indictment .
Appellant moved to suppress biological evidence seized pursuant to the
warrant, alleging it was issued without probable cause . A suppression hearing
was held, where the trial court denied the motion after concluding that the
affidavit provided probable cause. The affidavit in support of the warrant stated :
Affiant has been an officer in the aforementioned agency for a
period of 6.5 years, and the information and observations contained
herein were received and made in his capacity as an officer thereof.
On the 20th day of August, 2003, at approximately 0410 am/pm,
affiant received information from/observed :
Officers from the Bureau of Patrol responded to Scrub-ATruck, 960 Nandino Boulevard, in reference to an
unresponsive male subject . The victim, Carl Gene McClung
was located deceased at the scene.
Mr. McClung, who worked as a commercial truck driver, had
parked his cattle truck at Scrub-A-Truck where he was
sleeping in the cab . Investigation at the scene showed that
Mr. McClung's assailants entered the cab of his truck and
assaulted him in an apparent robbery attempt.
Forensic examination of the crime scene discovered hair
samples that were consistent with Negroid characteristics
9
and not-consistent with Mr. McClung . Unidentified palm and
finger prints were recovered from the crime scene .
A pocketknife recovered from the scene had an amount of
blood . A swab of blood from the knife was tested to show
that there is a contributor in addition to Mr. McClung .
An autopsy determined Mr. McClung's death to be the result
of gun shot wounds . No casings were recovered from the
scene and the projectiles recovered from the deceased at
the autopsy were determined to be .22 caliber projectiles .
Acting on the information received, affiant conducted the following
independent investigation .
On 03-08-04, Detectives received information from an
individual who advised that he knew information concerning
the murder of Mr. McClung . During an interview with the
individual, he advised that the evening prior to the murder,
he had been approached by Mr. Buchanan . Mr. Buchanan
asked the individual if Buchanan could borrow a larger
firearm. Mr. Buchanan had a .22 caliber revolver but wanted
a larger pistol . The individual did not give Mr. Buchanan a
different pistol .
During this time, Mr. Jeremy Rice arrives at the location
where Mr. Buchanan and the individual were speaking. Mr.
Buchanan expressed his interest in committing a robbery
and Mr. Rice explained that he knew of a potential victim.
Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Rice then left.
The following morning, the cooperating individual
encountered Mr. Rice. During their conversation, Mr. Rice
told the individual that Rice and Buchanan attempted to rob
a subject at the Scrub-A-Truck (where Mr. Rice was
employed) . Mr. Rice told the individual that during the
attempted robbery, Rice and Buchanan entered the truck to
rob the victim, the victim fought back, and Mr. Buchanan
shot the victim.
Afterwards, the first time the cooperating individual saw Mr.
Buchanan after the incident, Mr. Buchanan told him that the
victim "tried to fight back."
Affiant has reasonable and probable cause to believe that grounds
exist for the issuance of a Search Warrant based on the
aforementioned facts, information and circumstances and prays
that a Search Warrant be issued, that the property be seized, or
10
any part thereof, and brought before any court and/or retained
subject to order of said court, such property being held against the
peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
/s/ Det. WM Brislin
Appellant once again contends that there was no probable cause to issue
the warrant .
Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress is two-fold .
Cummings v. Commonwealth, 226 S .W .3d 62, 65 (Ky. 2007). The factual
findings by the trial court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and
the application of the law to those facts is reviewed de novo. Id . ; RCr 9.78 ("If
supported by substantial evidence the factual findings of the trial court shall be
conclusive.").
Appellant complains that the alleged probable cause was based nearly
exclusively on an unidentified informant's declaration that he had committed the
offense . Although the informant, Arian Brown, was unidentified in the affidavit,
he was known to the police. As explained by the detective at the suppression
hearing, the name of the informant was not included in the affidavit due to safety
concerns . In support of his argument that the affidavit did not establish probable
cause, Appellant cites to an anonymous tip case, Kohler v. Enlade, 470 F .3d
1104 (5th Cir. 2006) (addressing a challenge to probable cause for a DNA
warrant in the context of a § 1983 action and concluding that uncorroborated
anonymous tips and other circumstantial evidence were insufficient to justify a
warrant for the suspect's biological material).
Here, the affidavit provided probable cause as it contained very specific
information of events and conversations occurring before and after the murder.
Specifically, the affidavit indicated that during an interview the informant related
to the detective the details of a conversation in which Appellant expressed his
interest in robbing the victim while he slept at Scrub-A-Truck . Moreover, the
informant described a subsequent conversation in which Appellant described
how the victim fought back and was shot during the attempted robbery at the
truck wash.
In addition, the information was corroborated by independent police
investigation . The informant's statement that the victim fought back during the
attempted robbery was corroborated by forensic evidence taken from the crime
scene, which revealed that McClung had likely been involved in a struggle, as
hair samples not consistent with McClung were found inside the truck along with
a pocketknife containing blood from a contributor other than McClung . Further,
the informant related to the detective that Buchanan possessed a .22 caliber
revolver on the night of the crime, which matched evidence found during
McClung's autopsy that his death was the result of gunshot wounds from a .22
caliber weapon .
Given these circumstances, we conclude that the affidavit provided
probable cause for the warrant. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31, 103
S .Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (adopting a "totality of the
circumstances" approach for determining whether an informant's tip establishes
probable cause for issuance of a warrant) ; Beemer v. Commonwealth , 665
S.W.2d 912, 915 (Ky. 1984) (adopting the totality of the circumstances test in
Gates ) . Therefore, the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion to suppress.
111 . Conclusion
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant's convictions .
Minton, C.J ., Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Schroder and Scott, JJ.,
concur. Venters, J ., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Randall L . Wheeler
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
William Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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