CHESTER SEXTON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : APRIL 24, 2008
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2006-SC-000698-MR
CHESTER SEXTON
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDWIN M . WHITE, JUDGE
NO. 98-CR-00454
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Chester Sexton appeals as a matter of right from a judgment convicting him on
retrial of the murder of David Pepper. Sexton received a sentence of fifty years'
imprisonment . We must reverse the judgment because we agree with Sexton that the
trial court committed reversible error by refusing to include the defense of self-defense
in its wanton murder, second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide instructions
to the jury.
I . FACTS.
Sexton gave the following version of the events of his camping trip in the woods
with Pepper that culminated in Pepper's murder . During an evening of heavy drinking,
Pepper began "feeling on" Sexton ; and Sexton struck Pepper. Pepper then grabbed a
gun from his Jeep and threatened to sodomize Sexton in the same way Pepper had
himself been sodomized in prison . The two fought . Pepper held a gun to Sexton's
head and pulled down Sexton's shorts, Sexton believed that Pepper was trying to
penetrate him from behind . Sexton then offered to perform oral sex on Pepper to avoid
penetration . Pepper then allowed Sexton to stand, continuing to demand oral sex while
holding the gun. Managing to escape, Sexton fled to Pepper's Jeep and started it.
Sexton admitted that he struck Pepper with the Jeep, explaining that he did so to
protect himself from threatened forcible sexual assault. He also testified that after
running over Pepper and stopping the Jeep in the woods, he returned to the camp to
find Pepper moving on the ground . He and Pepper struggled over a gun, and the gun
discharged into Peppers chest .
According to the medical examiner, Pepper died either from the effects of the
gunshot wound to the chest or from the crushing injury to the chest . A grand jury
indicted Sexton for Peppers murder. Later, another grand jury indicted Sexton for
robbery and for allegedly forcefully taking Pepper's Jeep in the incident resulting in
Peppers death and for tampering with physical evidence for allegedly burning Pepper's
corpse .' The trial court joined the indictments for trial, and a jury convicted Sexton of all
fifty
three charges. The trial court sentenced Sexton to
years' imprisonment for murder,
ten years for robbery, and five years for tampering with physical evidence, with all
sentences to run concurrently.
A copy of the second indictment (indictment No. 00-CR-00067) does not appear in the
record provided to this court in the instant appeal . However, we have gleaned the relevant
charges in this second indictment from our prior decision reversing and remanding for retrial,
as well as other information contained in the record provided to us in this appeal .
In Sexton's earlier matter-of-right appeal, we reversed the convictions and
remanded the case to the trial court "for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion ." 2
We held that the trial court's failure to conduct a competency hearing was one reason
underlying our reversal . We stated that had that been the only error, the case could
have been remanded simply for a competency hearing with the convictions left standing
if Sexton were retrospectively found competent to stand trial. But we also required that
the case be retried for other errors, including the trial court's refusal to instruct on
imperfect self-defense .
On remand, the trial court conducted a competency hearing and found Sexton
competent to stand trial . On the day the new trial began, the trial court announced that
it would only retry Sexton on the homicide charges because, in its interpretation of our
opinion, the robbery and tampering with physical evidence convictions had not been
reversed . On retrial, the trial court refused to include Sexton's requested language "that
he was not privileged to act in self-defense" within the instructions for wanton murder,
second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide; although, it did include this
requested language within the instructions for intentional murder and first-degree
manslaughter. The trial court overruled Sexton's objection to the prosecutor's arguing
in its closing facts not in evidence regarding the date and length of Pepper's prison
term.
On appeal, Sexton argues that the murder conviction must be reversed because
the trial court erroneously (1) refused to include a self-defense instruction to wanton
murder, second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide; (2) ignored the law of the
Sexton v. Commonwealth, No . 200100000852-MR, 2004 WL 102481 at * 6 (Ky .
January 22, 2004) .
case by failing to retry Sexton on the robbery and tampering with physical evidence
charges ; and (3) allowed the Commonwealth to argue facts not in evidence in its closing
argument.
Il . ANALYSIS .
A. Trial Court Erred by Omitting Self-Defense Instruction .
We agree with Sexton that his conviction on retrial must be reversed because of
the trial court's refusal to add the language "that he was not privileged to act in selfprotection" to the wanton murder instruction (Instruction 1AA), the second-degree
manslaughter instruction, and the reckless homicide instruction . This issue was
preserved for our review by Sexton's objection to the trial court's failure to include
appropriate self-defense language in these instructions . The trial court should have
instructed the jury on self-defense, which we have made clear is available to homicide
offenses requiring a wanton or reckless mental state if the evidence warrants it .4
Sexton's testimony regarding Pepper's alleged attempts to sodomize him at gunpoint
was sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on self-defense . Given this evidence,
the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on self-defense as to the non-intentional
homicide offenses .
RCr 9.54(2) .
See, e.g., Allen v. Commonwealth , 5 S .W.3d 137, 139 (Ky. 1999) (jury must be instructed on
self-defense for wanton murder if there is evidentiary support for this defense) ; Este v.
Commonwealth , 64 S.W .3d 805, 811 (Ky. 2002) (jury must be instructed by including
language "that he was not privileged to act in self-protection" as an element of reckless
homicide if there is evidentiary support for this defense) .
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court's instructions complied with those
contained in former Justice Cooper's jury instruction manual .5 But this manual is not
binding authority. And we do not come to the same understanding of Cooper on this
point as does the Commonwealth. Cooper includes the self-defense language in
brackets in the intentional murder model s explaining that this language should only be
used if the evidence reasonably supports it. Although Cooper's model instruction on
wanton murder does not explicitly set forth the self-protection defense within its model
wanton murder instruction,' it cites Allen in its COMMENT on wanton murder
instructions . Allen explicitly provides for the availability of this defense to wanton
murder . 8 So a close reading of Cooper's manual indicates that the self-defense
language must be included in instructions for homicide offenses with wanton or reckless
states of mind so long as the evidence warrants it.
The Commonwealth argues that even if the trial court erred in not including the
self-defense language in the instructions as to the elements of wanton murder and the
other non-intentional homicide offenses, any deficiency was cured by Instruction 1 E .
But Instruction 1 E sets out an imperfect self-protection defense 9--not the self-defense
WILLIAM S. COOPER & DONALD P. CETRULO, KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES CRIMINAL
§§ 3.21, 3.23, 3 .24 (5th ed. 2006).
See id. at § 3 .21 .
See id. at § 3.23.
See id. at § 3.23, COMMENT on p. 3-34.
Instruction 1 E was entitled Wanton Belief Qualifications and instructed the jury as to what
lesser included offense occurred if Sexton had otherwise been guilty of murder and/or
manslaughter but had been "mistaken in his belief that it was necessary to use deadly
physical force against David Pepper in self-protection against death or deviate sexual
intercourse, or in his belief in the degree of force necessary to protect himself from it."
instruction that Sexton requested ° and that the trial court apparently found was
supported under the evidence for intentional homicide . We also note that the jury could
have convicted Sexton of wanton murder under Instruction 1AA without ever being
directed to consider imperfect self-defense under Instruction 1 E . Instruction 1 AA
provided that the jury could find Sexton guilty of wanton murder if and only if the
evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed Pepper by shooting him or
running him over with the jeep and :
B. That in so doing, he was wantonly engaging in conduct which
created a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the death of
David Pepper under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to
human life .
If you find Chester Sexton guilty under this Instruction, you will say
so by your verdict and no more. Go to Verdict Form II and then return to
the Courtroom .
Verdict Form II then simply asked the jury to find Sexton guilty or not guilty of wanton
murder . The jury indicated that it found him guilty of wanton murder by the foreperson's
signature .
Furthermore, in Instruction One on Self-Protection," the trial court crossed out
the reference to Wanton Murder (Instruction 1AA), which erroneously instructed the jury
that this defense was not available to wanton murder .
10
According to BLACK'S I-Aw DICTIONARY (8th ed . 2004), imperfect self-defense is defined as
"[t]he use of force by one who makes an honest but unreasonable mistake that force is
necessary to repel an attack" and can result in a lesser charge in many jurisdictions
(including Kentucky) . Perfect self-defense is defined as "[t]he use of force by one who
accurately appraises the necessity and the amount of force to repel an attack." Id.
Instruction One appeared as follows : "Even though Chester Sexton might otherwise be
guilty of an offense described in Instructions 1A,
or 1 B, if at the time Chester Sexton
killed David Pepper, he believed that Pepper then and there was about to use deadly
physical force or was threatening the use [of] physical force in order to engage in deviate
sexual intercourse, Chester Sexton was privileged to use deadly physical force against
David Pepper as he believed necessary in order to protect himself against it. You are
We recognize that possibly some of the error could have been negated by the
trial court's reading of its instructions to the jury. But the trial court told the jury that any
references to self-defense as available to wanton or reckless offenses were "typos ." So
the communication to the jury was that self-defense was not a defense to wanton or
reckless homicide offenses . This was error.
Mindful of the dismal prospect of 2 possible third trial of this case, we must
reverse, nevertheless, because ofthis error. 12 The trial court is directed on remand to
include the language Vat ho was not privileged to act in self-protection" in the jury
instructions for homicide charges requiring a wanton or reckless mental state if there is
evidence supporting such a defense.
B.
.
Because we reverse the murder conviction on the basis of erroneous jury
instructions, we need not address whether any error in the trial court's refusing to retry
Sexton on robbery and tampering with physical evidence charges contained in
Indictment No. 00-CR-00067 affected the validity of the murder conviction, which is the
only conviction now on appeal to this Court . While the trial court stated on the record
that it believed the robbery and tampering with physical evidence convictions not to be
disturbed by the earlier opinion of this Court on the first appeal, we note that our earlier
opinion expressly reversed and remanded all of Sexton's convictions without affirming
any part of the trial court's judgment. And we note that following the new competency
further instructed that Chester Sexton had no duty to retreat from David pepper before using
deadly force to protect himself."
Allen, 5 S.VV.3d at 139 (holding that "failure to give an instruction on self-protection as a
defense to the wanton murder charge was reversible enDr"vvhene evidence warranted the
instruction, especially as trial court had given instruction on self-protection as defense to
intentional murder ohmrge) .
hearing, the trial court did not enter a new judgment purporting to reinstate the robbery
and tampering with physical evidence convictions in 00-CR-00067. But the robbery and
tampering with physical evidence charges are simply not now before us.
C . Closing Argument Should Not Refer to Facts Not in Evidence .
Sexton contends that the prosecution engaged in egregious misconduct by
arguing facts not in evidence regarding the victim's prison record in closing argument.
The specific language he objects to is that In 1980 [David Pepper] went to prison for
three years" and that Pepper "made a mistake, way back, and now they're trying to
portray him as this monster when he turned his life around ." This argument responded
to Sexton's testimony that Pepper threatened to sodomize him as Pepper had been
sodomized in prison and a reference during the defense's opening statement to
Pepper's having spent time in prison .
Despite arguing facts not in evidence, these statements by the prosecutor in
closing were not the type of egregious misconduct that we consider to render the entire
trial fundamentally unfair 13 since it was responding to defense references to the victim's
prison stint. So we would not have reversed on this ground standing alone . But on
remand, we remind the trial court and the Commonwealth that arguing facts not in
evidence in closing argument is improper .
13
See Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S .W.3d 787, 805 (Ky. 2001) (recognizing that
prosecution is entitled to some latitude on closing argument and stating that convictions may
be reversed only if misconduct renders trial "fundamentally unfair .").
111 .
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Christian Circuit Court
and remand forfurther proceedings in accordance with this opinion .
All sitting . All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-1133
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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