JOHN LEE SCHELL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2006-SC-000662-MR
JOHN LEE SCHELL
V
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-00048
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
John Lee Schell appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict convicting him
of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and of being a first-degree persistent
felony offender (PF01), and sentencing him to twenty years' imprisonment. He argues
for reversal of the judgment because (1) the trial court refused his request for a new
lawyer after he complained of a conflict with his appointed lawyer, and (2) testimony by
the investigating officer improperly bolstered the credibility of a confidential informant .
We affirm the judgment because we do not agree that the trial court erred on either
issue.
I . FACTS .
At trial, the lead detective testified to using two confidential informants to make a
controlled buy of illegal Oxycodone tablets from Schell that culminated in this
prosecution . The two confidential informants testified live and the Commonwealth
played a recording of the controlled buy. The Commonwealth also presented evidence
that the Kentucky State Police Crime Laboratory determined that the tablets contained
Oxycodone, a Schedule II narcotic . Rejecting Schell's entrapment defense, the jury
convicted Schell of drug trafficking and PF01 ; and the trial court entered judgment
accordingly . This matter of right appeal followed .'
11 . ANALYSIS .
A. No Error Occurred From Handling of Complaints about Defense Lawyer.
Shortly after Schell's arraignment, the Department of Public Advocacy notified
the trial court that it had assigned his case to a lawyer from outside its office because of
a conflict. At a pretrial appearance several weeks later, Schell told the trial court that he
believed he had a "conflict" with his assigned lawyer and that he did not think his lawyer
was representing him properly . The trial court asked him to explain . Schell responded
that he had asked his lawyer to subpoena some witnesses and that "[he and his lawyer]
kind of had an argument about that." The court then asked him when he had asked his
lawyer to subpoena the witnesses . Schell responded, "yesterday" ; and Schell reported
that his lawyer had told him that he should have notified him about these witnesses two
weeks earlier . Schell further reported that he believed the phone number he had for the
lawyer was actually a fax number, which he could not call from jail. That is the
explanation he offered for not having called his lawyer. He reported that on the last
occasion he was in court, the lawyer had not asked him whether he had any witnesses
to call . Finally, Schell protested that, generally, the lawyer "is not agreeing" with
Ky. Const. § 110(2) (b) .
anything Schell said . The trial court then responded that to the extent that Schell was
moving to disqualify his lawyer, his motion was denied . No further discussion occurred
concerning this issue . A clerk's written notation in the record concerning this hearing
indicated that the case was then set for trial in slightly less than two months and that the
trial court denied a motion to disqualify the defense lawyer. The trial actually began a
few weeks later than the date mentioned in the clerk's notation .
Schell contends that his pro se motion for a new lawyer was erroneously denied
by the trial court without an adequate hearing, which violated his constitutional rights .
We disagree .
A defendant is not entitled to substitution of appointed counsel unless he can
show good cause. Good cause we have defined as including (1)(a) a complete
breakdown in attorney-client communications or (1)(b) a conflict of interest, which
results in (2) the defendant's legitimate interests being prejudiced .3 We have
recognized that "[w]hether good cause exists for substitute counsel to be appointed is
within the sound discretion of the trial court.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying this motion
for a new lawyer because Schell did not show good cause to warrant replacing his
Disqualification is defined as "[s]omething that makes one ineligible ; esp., a bias or conflict
of interest that prevents a judge or juror from impartially hearing a case, or that prevents a
lawyer from representing a party." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) . Substitution is
defined as "[a] designation of a person or thing to take the place of another person or thing."
Id. Although to some extent the terms disqualification and substitution are distinct, they are
somewhat interchangeable in the context of the present case in which Schell expressed
dissatisfaction with his attorney (seeking disqualification of the first attorney) and apparently
desired that a new attorney be appointed to represent him instead (seeking substitution of
new counsel) .
Deno v. Commonwealth , 177 S.W.3d 753, 759 (Ky. 2005), citing Baker v. Commonwealth ,
574 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Ky.App. 1978).
Id., citing Pillersdorf v. Department of Public Advocacy, 890 S.W.2d 616, 622 (Ky. 1994) .
lawyer with another one . Schell did not indicate that a complete breakdown in
communications had occurred . Although he noted that he and his lawyer had.
disagreed, he did not indicate that they were no longer able to communicate. In fact,
although he admittedly had not tried to call his lawyer earlier because of his belief that
he would be unable to make the call from the jail, his statements to the trial court
indicated that he had, nonetheless, brought his concerns to his lawyer's attention at an
in-person meeting and that the two of them had discussed his concerns, albeit with
some apparent friction . Despite the friction, Schell and his attorney were obviously still
communicating. At the time of the hearing, the trial was still several weeks away; and it
would have been reasonable to conclude that Schell and his attorney would be able to
cooperate to prepare a proper defense.
Although Schell claimed to have some unspecified "conflict" (a term that we
construe as some sort of dispute) with his lawyer, there is no suggestion in the record
that the lawyer had a conflict of interest in continuing to represent Schell . Nor was there
really any indication at the time of the hearing that Schell's legitimate interests were
being prejudiced. Essentially, the trial court heard from Schell that he and his lawyer
had recently argued because Schell wanted to subpoena certain witnesses, and his
attorney said that he should have provided that information sooner . Schell did not
definitively indicate whether his lawyer refused to call the witnesses or whether the
lawyer had simply expressed frustration at not being told earlier of Schell's desire to call
more witnesses. The trial court may have reasonably concluded that Schell and his
lawyer would be able to resolve their witness issues in the several weeks preceding trial
in light of effective trial strategy and other considerations . Our conclusion is supported
by the absence of further pretrial complaints by Schell about his lawyer.
We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the hearing provided by
the trial court on the pro se motion for substitute counsel was adequate . In Baker v_
.
Commonwealth , the Court of Appeals stated it was unaware of any precedent requiring
any type of formal hearing on a motion for substitute appointed counsel . Years later,
however, this Court indicated in Deno that the trial court had "followed the correct
procedure" in conducting an extensive hearing on a pro se motion for substitute
appointed counsel .' As Schell notes, the trial court in Deno allowed the defendant to
state his objections with the attorney and solicited responses from the lawyer. Because
the trial court did not question defense counsel in the instant case, Schell argues that he
did not receive an adequate hearing under the holding in Deno .
Our finding that the trial court followed the "correct procedure" in Deno does not
mandate the identical procedure for the instant case. A key distinction between the two
cases is that the substitution motion in Deno was made on the first day of trial.$ In the
case at hand, the substitution motion was made several weeks before the originally
scheduled trial date and, ultimately, over three months before the trial actually began .
Although the trial court in the instant case allowed Schell to make his complaints on the
Baker, supra, has been cited by this Court in cases involving motions for substitute
appointed counsel such as Deno, supra.
Baker, 574 S.W.2d at 327.
Deno, 177 S.W .3d at 760. Ultimately, the trial court in Deno determined there was no good
cause for substitution of counsel after being told of what largely amounted to disputes over
trial strategy (such as whether to call an expert witness and whether and in what manner to
try to discredit the victim). Id. at 759-60 .
Id. at 756.
record, it did not ask the lawyer for a response . Since trial was still weeks or months
away, perhaps the trial court reasonably determined that good cause for substitution
had not been shown at that time based on Schell's allegations alone. The trial court
might also have surmised that Schell and his attorney were still in the process of
developing their trial strategy, which could have been revealed to the Commonwealth to
Schell's prejudice if his lawyer had been compelled to respond to Schell's allegations at
that time.
The correct procedure in this case was not identical to the correct procedure
followed in the Deno case because of differing factual circumstances . A true
"breakdown in communications" was alleged in Deno with the defendant accusing his
lawyer of lying to him and not keeping him informed about his case .9 Here, all that was
alleged was some disagreement and apparent friction but not a total breakdown in
communications .
We stop short of declaring that no formal hearing is ever needed when a
defendant makes a pro se motion for substitution of counsel, despite Baker's statement
that no precedent at the time of its rendition then required it. In fact, although the
hearing in the case before us was not as extensive as Schell wanted, he did receive
from the trial court a hearing on his dissatisfaction with his lawyer. The hearing does
not always need to be as extensive as that provided in Deno, in which the trial court
properly exercised its discretion to question both the lawyer and defendant about
serious allegations of a "breakdown in communications ." So long as the trial court
allows the defendant to state on the record the reasons why he seeks substitution of
Id. at 759.
counsel, the trial court may exercise discretion to determine how extensive the hearing
needs to be in light of the factual circumstances of the individual case . In particular,
where the defendant's allegations, even if assumed to be true, would not establish good
cause for substitution of counsel, we would not mandate a procedure requiring the trial
court to delve further by questioning defense counsel . This is especially true where
doing so might expose defense strategy .'°
In addition to the arguments about switching lawyers, Schell also raises an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. He notes that although he expressed to the trial
court at the early pretrial hearing his desire to subpoena several trial witnesses, the
defense, ultimately, called only one trial witness. The lone defense witness was one of
the confidential informants . Schell also complains that he felt rushed to trial and
suffered from not always having the same attorney with him during pretrial procedures.
But we cannot determine the merits of these contentions based on the lack of a record
on that issue before us. And it would be premature for us to consider any ineffective
assistance questions at this time because there is no record made before the trial court
on this issue."
In his reply brief, Schell essentially contends that he made an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim before the trial court for which he should have received a
10
See Henderson v. Commonwealth , 636 S.W.2d 648, 650-51 (Ky. 1982) (affirming the trial
court's denial of a pro se motion for substitute counsel, noting that the trial court had heard
and evaluated the defendant's claims that his attorney did not tell him anything without any
explicit indication that the trial court had questioned the attorney about his client's
allegations) .
Humyhrev v. Commonwealth , 962 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1998) ("As a general rule, a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be reviewed on direct appeal from the trial court's
judgment, because there is usually no record or trial court ruling on which such a claim can
be properly considered . Appellate courts review only claims of error which have been
presented to trial courts .").
hearing, quoting Monroe v. U.S . ' 2 Even if he made such a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel at that time, however, the trial court did not rule on such a claim ;
the trial court simply denied what it perceived as a motion to "disqualify" counsel.
Again, in the absence of the trial court ruling on ineffective assistance of counsel, it
would be premature for us to decide such a matter on direct appeal .
Schell cites two federal appellate opinions holding that a thorough evidentiary
hearing is necessary to determine indigent defendants' claims that their counsel are
rendering inadequate representation . Those opinions are inapposite because they both
involved collateral appeals . 1 .3
B. No Palpable Error in Admission of Detective's Testimony
Bolstering "Best" Confidential Informant's Credibilit .
Although admitting that the issue was not preserved for review by objection,
Schell argues that palpable error occurred when the lead detective's testimony
improperly bolstered the credibility of one of the confidential informants who testified for
the Commonwealth . We disagree .
On direct examination by the Commonwealth, the detective described the
informant's past experience, how long she had worked as an informant, and which law
enforcement agencies she had aided. The Commonwealth elicited on direct
examination no testimony about the informant's reputation or character .
12
13
389 A.2d 811, 819-20 (D.C . 1978) ("A trial court's primary duty under the Sixth Amendment
when confronted with a pretrial claim of inadequate preparation and consultation by counsel
is to decide whether counsel has consulted with the defendant and prepared his case in a
proper manner . . . . The trial court has a constitutional duty to conduct an inquiry sufficient
to determine the truth and scope of the defendant's allegations.").
See Sawicki v. Johnson , 475 F.2d 183, 184 (6th Cir. 1973); Wilson v. Mintzes, 733 F.2d
424, 428 (6th Cir. 1984), vacated by Mintzes v. Wilson , 469 U .S. 926, 105 S .Ct. 317,
83 L.Ed.2d 255 (1984) .
On cross-examination by the defense, the detective's testimony extolled the
virtues of this confidential informant . With allusion to Kentucky Rules of Evidence
(KRE) 403, Schell contends that bolstering of the informant's credibility amounted to a
"needless presentation of cumulative evidence that proved to be far more prejudicial
than probative ."
When viewed in the context of the trial, the detective's testimony was not
improper bolstering because it mostly arose in response to cross-examination by the
defense . For instance, the detective stated that the informant simply had the desire to
help fix the local drug abuse problem when asked whether she or other informants
entered into written agreements in exchange for less jail time for offenses they
committed . He explained that this informant was not under such an agreement for
reduced jail time but was simply a paid informant while acknowledging that the other
informant involved in this case was under indictment herself and cooperating partly to
receive less jail time . Also, he reiterated how long he had worked with the informant
when directly asked whether they had worked together since a certain date . He stated
he had not known her to sell drugs when directly asked if she sold drugs . When asked
whether the name she used in court was her real name, he responded that it was but
that she used different names and disguises when making drug buys. When asked how
much money she made working for him, he stated that he did not know but, when
pressed for an estimate, stated an approximate number of cases she worked on with
him . When asked whether she knew the people she dealt with as an informant, he
stated that she usually did not know them but accomplished drug transactions despite
their distrust of unfamiliar people because she had the "gift of gab" and could overcome
their suspicions. When asked which ones she knew and which ones she did not know,
the officer said they had worked on so many cases together that it would be impossible
for him to state which ones she knew and which she did not. At one point, the detective
did volunteer his opinion that she was the most effective and reliable informant and the
one he most sought to use .
The defense at least implicitly attacked the informant's credibility by asking the
detective whether he had done a background check on her and what her criminal
history was (with the detective replying that he could not reveal that and acknowledging
that confidential informants were generally not "Sunday school' teachers") and asking
whether she reported her informant income on her tax return (with him responding they
would have to ask her) . So, to the extent that the confidential informant's credibility had
been attacked in the course of the defense's cross-examination of the detective, the
detective's bolstering would have been proper under KRE 608(a), which allows opinion
testimony as to a witness's "truthful character" to be presented "only after the character
of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or
otherwise ." And although the detective testified before this confidential informant took
the stand, defense counsel at least implicitly attacked the credibility of the confidential
informant while cross-examining the detective, thus, "opening the door" to his defense
of her .
Schell contends that the trial court should have interceded without prompting to
put an end to the bolstering testimony and admonished jurors to disregard the
responses that allegedly amounted to improper bolstering by instructing them that they
should satisfy themselves concerning the credibility of the confidential informant . But
10
such active and unsolicited intervention into the presentation of the evidence is not the
role of the trial judge. And our precedent recognizes that an admonition is often not
requested as a matter of trial strategy to avoid drawing further attention to the testimony
at issue; therefore, a trial court's failure to give an admonition on its own motion is not
necessarily a reversible error. 14
Without a timely objection to the detective's opinions concerning the confidential
informant, we may reverse only upon a finding of palpable error affecting Schell's
"substantial rights" and causing "manifest injustice . "'5 We find no such palpable error in
the present case, especially because the defense "opened the door" to this bolstering .
Since any claims of ineffective assistance are premature because of the lack of trial
court rulings on this issue, 16 we must assume that objections were not made and
admonitions not requested as a matter of trial strategy to avoid drawing further attention
to the detective's praise for the informant . We also note that despite the detective's
praise for the informant, defense counsel was able effectively to cross-examine her by
inquiring as to her lack of other gainful employment or income and her failure to report
her informant income as taxable income . Finally, in light of the other strong evidence of
guilt, such as the recording of the controlled buy played for the jury, the trial court's
allowance of the detective's praise for the informant was harmless error," if it was error
at all.
14
15
16
17
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S .W .3d 635, 659 (Ky. 2003) .
KRE 103(e); RCr 10 .26 .
Humphrev, supra.
RCr 9.24.
III . CONCLUSION .
For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment is affirmed .
All sitting . All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Samuel N . Potter
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Clint Evans Watson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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