DEVRON D. WADLINGTON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : OCTOBER 23, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2006-SC-000640-MR
DEVRON D. WADLINGTON
V
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM TRIGG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-00047-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Devron Wadlington appeals as a matter of right' from a circuit court
judgment convicting him of wanton murder and sentencing him to twenty
years' imprisonment . Wadlington claims that his conviction must be reversed
because, at trial, the trial court erred when it (1) initially refused to order
separation of witnesses on the second day of trial, (2) allowed the introduction
into evidence of a 9mm gun that Wadlington alleges had no connection to the
shooting death of the victim, and (3) failed to instruct the jury on self-defense.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm .
Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
I - FACTS.
Wadlington and a co-Defendant, George Kelly Mayes, were indicted and
jointly tried for the murder of LaWarren O'Keith Suns, who was shot and killed
during a melee outside Henry's Place, a raucous nightspot at Cerulean in rural
Trigg County. The evidence presented at trial against the two was
circumstantial . No eyewitness positively identified Sims's shooter, and the
bullet that killed Sims was never found . But eyewitnesses testified to seeing
Mayes raise his shirt and pull a gun from his waistband when confronted by
Anthony Wilson, who had apparently been hit with a beer can thrown by
Mayes. And several eyewitnesses recalled seeing Mayes and Wadlington at the
scene shooting guns into the crowd or into the air. At least one witness
thought Wadlington had a 9mm gun.
One witness, James Rodell Acree, testified that he drove Mayes,
Wadlington, and others to Henry's Place in Mayes's car. Acree said that he
stayed outside until patrons started leaving the building . At that point, Acree's
cousin asked him to help him search inside the building for a set of keys .
While inside, Acree heard gunfire outside . He stated that after the gunfire
stopped, he went outside ; and Mayes motioned for Acree to get the car . Acree
drove Mayes and Wadlington to Cadiz. He stated that Mayes fired shots out of
the car while leaving the scene . Acree reported hearing Mayes ask Wadlington,
"did you hit him?" He related that Mayes, who was in the front passenger seat,
reached over and pressed the accelerator when Acree attempted to stop for a
police roadblock in Cadiz. Acree dropped Mayes and Wadlington off before
driving the car to Mayes's mother's house in Cadiz. Later, he met Mayes and
helped him clean out his car. They took a Budweiser box and a bullet out of
the car and threw them into the weeds.
Another witness, Billy Alexander, testified that he found a handgun near
the doorway of his house after Mayes stopped by. Alexander threw the gun
into a field next to his house. Acree and Alexander eventually led police to the
Budweiser box, the bullet, and the handgun. Acree and Alexander were crossexamined about their status as convicted felons, their incomplete initial
statements to police, and their expectations of getting favorable treatment for
cooperating with the prosecution. Acree admitted to being high on drugs the
night of the murder, despite serving as the designated driver.
Police recovered a live .45 bullet in the Budweiser box and found a 9mm
gun in the same wooded area. In the field near Alexander's house, police found
a .45 gun that was missing the magazine but had a live round in the chamber.
Police searched the area around Henry's Place and found .45 shell casings and
a 9mm casing nearby. They also found a spent .45 shell casing on the grounds
of a nearby residence. Police also searched Mayes's car and found a spent
shell casing from a .45 . Testing revealed that both guns were functional. An
FBI weapons expert testified that the .45 shell casings recovered came from the
.45 gun found by police . He stated that the 9mm shell casings found did not
come from the 9mm gun found, however.
The medical examiner performed an autopsy and concluded that Sims
died of a gunshot wound; although, the examiner was unable to locate a bullet
in the body. She could neither determine the range or distance from which the
bullet was fired nor determine the type of bullet or gun used.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury to
decide whether Mayes and Wadlington were guilty, either- individually or acting
in complicity with the other, of murdering Sims while intending to kill Wilson ;
of wanton murder ; or of a lesser degree of homicide . The jury convicted both
Mayes and Wadlington of wanton murder.
We affirmed Mayes's conviction in Mayes v. Commonwealth , No. 2006SC-000656-MR, 2008 WL 466134 (Feb. 21, 2008 . Rehearing denied May 22,
2008) . This is Wadlington's separate appeal. Since Mayes's and Wadlington's
appeals to this Court arose out of the same trial and they assert at least one
common issue, we will draw freely from our opinion in Mayes.
II. ANALYSIS .
A. No Reversible Error in Trial Court's Denial of
Motion for Separation of Witnesses .
Wadlington contends that the trial court committed reversible error by
denying his motion for separation of witnesses, a motion that he made for the
first time on the second day of testimony after three witnesses had testified .
The following exchange occurred on the record :
THE COURT:
You may call your next witness .
MR. OVEY :
[Prosecutor]
Carl Copeland . I'll call - I don't
think he's arrived yet. So we can
proceed - I'll call Detective Stegar.
MR. HAGAN :
[Counsel for Wadlington]
Judge, may we move for a
separation of the witnesses?
THE COURT:
Well, I think it's too late.
MR. HAGAN :
Well, I think that the witness that
he just called, Carl Copeland, has
now come into the courtroom .
MR. OVEY:
The time for the separation was
yesterday.
THE COURT:
It's too late because we've had a full
day of testimony, and it would be
unfair to enforce it now.
Wadlington draws our attention to Kentucky Rules of Evidence
(KRE) 615, which provides that upon a motion for separation of witnesses, the
trial court "shall order witnesses excluded so they cannot hear the testimony of
other witnesses[ .]" While we do take note of the use of the mandatory term
shall, we agree with the trial court that after a full day's testimony, much of the
desired effect of separation may have been lost. In fact, our case law states
that "a party has a right to the separation of witnesses upon a timely request" 2
and recognizes that the denial of a motion for separation of witnesses made
after witnesses have testified can be harmless error.3
Mills v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Ky. 2003) .
Justice v. Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d 306, 315 (Ky. 1998) (holding that denial of
motion to separate witnesses was harmless error because "[t]he rule was adopted
to prevent witnesses who have not yet testified from altering their testimony in light
of evidence adduced at trial . In the case at bar, Appellant argues that Martin and
Lockhart tailored their testimony to contradict the testimony of Appellant's wife,
Demaris. However, the motion to separate came after Demaris had testified. Thus,
the motion came too late to prevent the prejudice alleged on appeal.") (citation
omitted) .
.
Later on, when Copeland took the witness stand and after Stegar had
testified, Mayes's counsel approached the bench to make a motion for a
mistrial because Copeland was allowed in the courtroom while Stegar testified.
Counsel represented to the court that the defense had made sure that
witnesses were not in the courtroom while the three witnesses before Stegar
testified .4 The trial court replied that it had no way of knowing who was in the
courtroom during all prior testimony or whether there were witnesses listening
to other witnesses' testimony. Counsel argued that it was appropriate to call
for separation of witnesses at any point during the trial. Although denying the
mistrial motion, the trial court then ordered the separation of witnesses, with
the exception of the investigating officers, whom defense counsel agreed could
remain in the courtroom.
Although Copeland was apparently present for Detective Stegar's
testimony, we find no reversible error in the earlier denial of the motion to
separate witnesses . As the trial court noted, it had no way of knowing whether
witnesses had listened to other witnesses the preceding day; and, thus, any
error in denying the motion as untimely was likely harmless . Furthermore,
following our review, we cannot say that Copeland's testimony was clearly
duplicative of Stegar's testimony. Stegar testified about how the police
investigation proceeded, covering topics such as where bullets were found and
Although Mayes's counsel actually said they were careful that "our" witnesses were
not in the courtroom while others testified, we note that neither defendant actually
called any witnesses or presented any other proof in the guilt phase. In fact, the
Commonwealth called all guilt-phase witnesses .
which witnesses were interviewed. Copeland, on the other hand, testified
about his own eyewitness observations at the club and surrounding area the
right of the murder . Wadlington fails to pinpoint how any particular portion of
Copeland's testimony was unreliable or likely changed by Copeland hearing
Stegar's testimony. 5 Wadlington contends that Copeland was a "critical
prosecution witness," who was "one of the few witnesses who claimed to have
seen [Wadlington] with a gun that he pointed over the crowd and shot." But
this statement shows that other witnesses testified to the same effect, making
Copeland's testimony on this point cumulative . He also claims Copeland's
testimony was internally inconsistent and inconsistent with his statement to
police . But he does not claim that his counsel was unable to cross-examine
Copeland on such inconsistencies, nor does he make a showing that the
inconsistencies resulted from hearing Stegar's testimony as would be the case
if parts of Copeland's testimony essentially mimicked parts of Stegar's
testimony. So we find no reversible error arising from the trial court's handling
of this matter.
B. No Palpable Error Resulted from Admission
of 9mm Gun into Evidence .
Next Wadlington contends that the trial court committed reversible error
in admitting into evidence a 9mm gun, which he contends was not connected
in any way with the fatal shooting of Sims . This 9mm gun was found by
5
See Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 590, 595 (KY . 2008) (stating that "[t]he
mere threat or speculation that a witness could tailor testimony is not persuasive
of its own accord to warrant prejudicial error.") .
investigators in the woods wrapped in a T-shirt. Testing revealed this gun was
not the source of the 9mm shell casing found near Henry's Place. According to
Wadlington, the gun had no connection to the crime because it was not the
source of the 9mm shell casing found; and the Commonwealth offered no direct
physical evidence that he owned or possessed such a gun . But at least one
witness claimed to have seen Wadlington with a 9mm gun.
Wadlington admits this issue is unpreserved but argues that admission
of the gun constitutes palpable error under Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 10.26. The Commonwealth argues that defense counsel did
not object to admission of the gun as a matter of trial strategy, pointing to
remarks by defense counsel in closing argument drawing attention to the lack
of direct evidence that the 9mm gun found was connected to the crime by
noting that the 9mm shell casing found did not come from the 9mm gun found
in the woods and arguing that if the jury was unsure which bullet hit Sims, it
had reasonable doubt and could not convict.
Whether or not trial counsel's lack of objection to the gun's admission
was intentional trial strategy, we find no palpable error in its admission.
Although this gun was not definitively established as firing the bullet that
killed Sims, it was, nonetheless, relevant evidence under KRE 401, which
broadly defines relevant evidence as making the existence of a material fact
more or less probable and, thus, presumptively admissible under KRE 402,
which generally states that relevant evidence is admissible . Billy Alexander
testified to having found a gun near his door after Mayes and Wadlington
stopped by his residence the night of the shooting and to having thrown that
gun out into the woods where the Budweiser box was eventually found . After
investigators found a .45 gun on the lot next to Alexander's house, a police
canine directed the officers to the 9mm gun, which was found under an old car
seat not far from the place where the .45 was found. Although experts testified
that the 9mm shell casing found did not come from the 9mm gun found in the
woods, a jury might still reasonably infer that the 9mm gun was used in the
shooting that resulted in the untimely death of LaWarren Sims .
Given the possible relevancy of the evidence ; the lack of preservation of
this issue ; and the possibility that defense counsel elected not to object to its
admission but, instead, to point to its introduction as showing shoddy police
work, we cannot conclude that the trial court's admission of this evidence
amounted to palpable error under RCr 10.26 . 6
C . No Error in Denial of Self-Defense Instruction .
Wadlington's tendered jury instructions included intentional murder and
first-degree manslaughter instructions that required that the jury find "he was
not privileged to act in self-protection" to convict on those charges.
(Wadlington was actually convicted of wanton murder,7 and his tendered
instruction on that charge did not contain the self-protection requirement) .
However, Wadlington did not specifically object to the absence of a self-defense
See Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S .W.3d 1, 3-4 (Ky. 2006) (discussing palpable
error standard and placing particular emphasis on the term "manifest injustice .")
The trial court instructed the jury with separate instructions on, among other
matters, intentional murder with transferred intent and wanton murder. The jury
found Wadlington guilty under the wanton murder instruction .
instruction after the trial court orally stated that it was simply "denying" his
tendered instructions . Our precedent establishes that because a busy trial
judge might easily overlook a particular portion of tendered instructions, a
party should bring the specific problem in jury instructions to the trial court's
attention by objection to preserve the issue for appeal, rather than merely
relying on its tendered instructions.$
Nevertheless, even accepting for the sake of argument that the issue is
properly preserved, we find no error in the trial court's not giving a self-defense
instruction, given the evidence presented in this case. Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 503 .050 clearly establishes that a person is privileged to use
physical force, especially deadly physical force (such as shooting a gun), only
under very limited circumstances :
(1)
The use of physical force by a defendant upon another
person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such
force is necessary to protect himself against the use or
imminent use of unlawful physical force by the other person .
(2)
The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon
another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only when
the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect
himself against death, serious physical injury,; kidnapping,
sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat, felony
involving the use of force, or under those circumstances
permitted pursuant to KRS 503 .055 .
(3)
Any evidence presented by the defendant to establish
the existence of a prior act or acts of domestic violence and
abuse as defined in KRS 403 .720 by the person against
whom the defendant is charged with employing physical
force shall be admissible under this section .
8
Grooms v. Commonwealth, 756 S.W .2d 131, 139-40 (Ky. 1988)
10
(4)
A person does not have a duty to retreat prior to the
use of deadly physical force.
According to Wadlington, the following facts supported a self-defense
instruction :
The crowd of 200-300 young people, already divided based
on county affiliation and prior confrontations, was drinking, using
drugs, pushing each other on the dance floor, and tossing beer
cans at each other. Anthony Wilson, who had tried to start a fight
with Kelly Mayes the week before, was angry and looking for a
fight. When the partiers were heading to their vehicles after being
asked to leave Henry's Place, Anthony instead repeatedly
approached Kelly and Devron [Wadlington] in an angry,
threatening manner . Kelly kept raising his shirt to show off his
gun, giving the well-recognized "back off" message; but Anthony
persisted in his loud-talking approach on Kelly and Devron,
despite the efforts of friends to deter him . Rodell Acree, the
designated driver for Kelly and Devron, testified somebody was
trying to hurt them; and they were trying to get out of there .
The Commonwealth contends that this evidence "did not show that Wadlington
had formulated a reasonable belief that he had to shoot Sims to protect himself
from death. There was no evidence that Wadlington's life was in imminent
danger."
We agree with the Commonwealth that this statement of facts still does
not demonstrate entitlement to a self-defense instruction . The dance-floor
pushing and throwing beer cans could be reasonably regarded as "unlawful
physical force"; but these actions essentially ceased when everyone was
ordered to leave, and Wadlington does not directly claim that he was
responding to pushing and throwing beer cans by eventually firing shots.
Furthermore, no one saw him shoot the gun in the air or otherwise until after
leaving Henry's Place, where the pushing and beer can throwing had taken
place. Rather, Wadlington seems to be arguing that he had to protect himself
in response to Wilson's "loud talking" and approaching in an angry,
threatening way; but he does not allege that Wilson was brandishing a weapon,
actually exhibiting physically violent behavior directed towards Wadlington and
Mayes, or, even threatening them with imminent physical violence.
Furthermore, there is no indication that Wilson was threatening them with
deadly force . Thus, no error occurred from the trial court's not instructing the
jury on self-defense .
III . CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment .
Minton, C.J . ; Abramson, Noble, Schroder, Scott, and Venters, JJ.,
sitting. All concur. Cunningham, J ., not sitting.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Donna Lynn Boyce
Appellate Branch Manager
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Perry Thomas Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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