WILLIAM M. HENSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED ; AUGUST 21, 2008
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WILLIAM M. HENSON
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M . OVERSTREET, JUDGE
NO. 04-CR-00224
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
As a result of a drunk-driving automobile wreck, Appellant, William M. Henson,
was convicted of Second-Degree Manslaughter, three counts of Second-Degree
Assault, Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence, Failure to Produce Insurance Card,
and Persistent Felony Offender in the Second Degree (PFO 11). Appellant assigns as
error that witnesses were allowed to provide cumulative, inflammatory victim impact
testimony during the guilt phase of trial and that the prosecution presented the surprise
testimony of a key witness that should have been provided to the defense during
discovery . We reject both claims of error and thus affirm .
On July 23, 2004, just before midnight, a blue Pontiac was rounding a curve on
State Highway 12 in Shelby County when it crossed the center line and almost collided
with a vehicle driven by Jimmy Baxter . Baxter veered his car over to the very edge of
his lane to avoid colliding with the blue Pontiac . Baxter testified that he could see in his
rear view mirror that the blue Pontiac then began to head off the shoulder of that car's
side of the road . Baxter next observed the blue Pontiac overcorrect and head into the
path of a white car that had been traveling behind Baxter's car. As soon as Baxter got
around the curve and did not see the white car behind him, Baxter turned around
because he knew the two cars had collided.
Baxter was the first person on the crash scene. When he got there, he observed
that the blue Pontiac had landed in a ditch close to the white Honda and had been
smashed in on the passenger's side. When Baxter first approached the white Honda,
he noticed that the driver's side door of the blue Pontiac was closed and there was no
one on the outside of the car. Within a minute of walking to the white Honda, Baxter
observed that the driver's side door of the blue Pontiac was open and a male, later
identified as Appellant, was lying on the ground just outside the driver's side door.
Baxter also observed a woman in the passenger seat of the blue Pontiac who looked to
be crushed and pushed almost to the center of the car. Baxter stated that the woman
was not moving and appeared to be dead .
Baxter testified that he saw a male, later identified as Matthew Burgin, trying to
exit the driver's side of the white Honda, but that his legs were so badly crushed he
could not get out. Next to Burgin, Baxter observed a female, later identified as Burgin's
sister, Kelly Samples, screaming and lying face down on the dashboard with her head
stuck through the center of the windshield. Baxter observed another female, later
identified as Amy Mowery, in the front passenger side of the white Honda .
When EMS and law enforcement authorities arrived on the scene, it was
confirmed that the woman in the passenger side of the blue Pontiac, later identified as
Tammy Stephens, was dead. Deputy Riley Kennedy of the Shelbyville Sheriff's
Department, who was the first police officer on the scene, testified that when he arrived,
Appellant was lying on the ground about two feet away from the driver's side of the blue
Pontiac with his feet at the driver's side door. Kennedy observed that the front driver's
side door was open, but the rear driver's side door was closed. When Kennedy
checked on Appellant, Kennedy reported that he could smell the odor of alcohol about
him . Kennedy stated that he could see numerous beer cans scattered around the blue
Pontiac, some full and some empty. A cooler containing beer cans was also found in
the blue Pontiac.
Burgin, Samples, Mowery, and Appellant all sustained extensive injuries in the
crash . Burgin and Samples were transported via emergency air care to two different
hospitals in Louisville . Appellant was transported to Jewish Hospital in Shelbyville
where his blood and urine were tested for the presence of intoxicants . Appellant's blood
alcohol was found to be 0.27 grams per 100 milliliters.
Jeff Ivers of the Shelby County EMS testified there had been a 50% intrusion into
the passenger side of the blue Pontiac . According to Ivers, the rear of the blue Pontiac
was buckled and pushed over such that any occupant in the back seat would have been
trapped in the vehicle. Ivers described the position of Tammy Stephens' body as
seated upright in the passenger seat of the blue Pontiac, trapped between the
passenger door and the console . Ivers stated that her legs were trapped by the
dashboard in the passenger side floorboard. Deputy Coroner Janet Morris testified that
blood samples were drawn from Stephens and that her blood alcohol level was found to
be 0.294 grams per 100 milliliters . From the examination of Stephens' body, the
Coroner concluded that she died instantaneously from blunt force trauma as a result of
the accident .
Detective Jason Rice, an accident reconstruction ist for the Shelbyville Sheriff's
Department, testified that he was called to the scene by Deputy Kennedy because it
was a fatal accident . When Rice arrived on the scene, he was briefed by Kennedy and
Deputy Daniel Wills on what was known about the accident up to that point. Rice was
initially told that there were no witnesses to the accident .
As part of his job as accident reconstruction ist, Rice testified that he is required
to file a "fatal summary" of the accident, as well as an accident report. Rice stated that
the "fatal summary" is to be filed within two to four hours after the accident, whereas the
accident report is usually filed within three to five working days after the accident . In
Rice's accident report, Rice stated that Appellant had been driving the blue Pontiac and
further stated :
Mr. Henson was ejected from the vehicle thru [sic] driverside
window . Mr. Henson suffered sever [sic] injuries from impact
and the ejection path in which he took .
Dennis McWilliams, expert accident reconstruction ist witness for the defense,
testified that Appellant's and Stephens' injuries, which were predominantly on their right
sides, were not consistent with Appellant being the driver of the vehicle . McWilliams
explained that if Appellant had been driving, his injuries would have been the result of
colliding with the left side of Stephens' body, yet Stephens did not sustain injuries to her
left side. McWilliams testified that the only explanation for Appellant's injuries was that
he was sitting in the back seat during the accident . McWilliams also rejected the notion
that Appellant was ejected through the driver's side window because the window was
not broken and was down only halfway in the photographs, which would not have been
wide enough for Appellant's body to be ejected .
The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Michael Moore, Tammy
Stephens' brother. He testified that he saw Appellant earlier that evening when he
showed up at a friend's house at around 11 p.m., carrying a 12-pack of beer. Moore
stated that Appellant drove himself to the house and was drinking at the time, although
he was not "fully drunk." Moore left shortly after Appellant arrived and did not see who
was driving when Appellant and Stephens left. According to Moore, although the blue
Pontiac was initially purchased by Stephens, Stephens did not have a driver's license,
so Appellant took over payments on the car and was the one who usually drove it.
A co-worker of Appellant's, Bobby Reynolds, testified that Appellant rode home
with him from work in West Virginia the evening of the accident and that Appellant was
drinking beer in his car on the way back. Reynolds stated that when they arrived back
in Shelby County at around 9 :30 p.m. that evening, Appellant got in his car and left .
Defense witness General Morgan testified that he saw Appellant and Stephens
sometime between 11 :00 p .m. and midnight on the night of the accident when he
stopped at the B and N off of State Highway 12. Morgan stated that he saw Stephens
in the driver's seat of the car and Appellant in the passenger seat drinking a beer.
When they recognized each other, Appellant got out of the car to talk with Morgan. At
some point during the conversation, Appellant got in the back seat of the car with his
feet outside on the pavement, while Stephens was still in the driver's seat . After talking
for a little while, Morgan got back in his car and left.
On August 5, 2004, Appellant was indicted on one (1) count of Murder, three (3)
counts of First-Degree Assault, one (1) count of Second Offense Operating a Motor
Vehicle Under the Influence of Intoxicants, one (1) count of Failure to Produce
Insurance Card, and PFO 11 . After a jury trial held from May 22 - 24, 2006, Appellant
was found guilty of Second-Degree Manslaughter, three counts of Second-Degree
Assault, Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of Intoxicants, Failure to Produce
Insurance Card, and PFO II. The jury recommended enhanced sentences of twenty
(20) years for the Second-Degree Manslaughter and twenty (20) years on each of the
three counts of Second-Degree Assault, to be served consecutively . The jury also
recommended a six-month sentence and $500 fine for the Operating a Vehicle Under
the Influence of Intoxicants conviction, and a ninety-day sentence and $1,000 fine for
the Failure to Produce Insurance Card conviction . The trial court followed the jury's
recommendations, except that all sentences were ordered to run concurrently for a total
of twenty (20) years, and the fines were waived because Appellant had been declared
indigent. This matter of right appeal by Appellant followed .
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing in cumulative and
inflammatory victim impact evidence regarding the injuries sustained by Matthew
Burgin, Kelly Samples, and Amy Mowery . At trial, Matthew Burgin, Kelly Samples and
Amy Mowery all testified to the extensive injuries they suffered in the wreck. In addition,
the Commonwealth asked the victims about their recovery and the long-term effects of
their injuries.
When the Commonwealth asked Amy Mowery what she went through during her
recovery from the injuries, Mowery responded that she experienced a lot of pain and
depression, and lamented how she was forced to be dependent on other people. The
prosecution then asked her about the lingering effects of the injuries and how it affected
her today. Mowery stated that she is in pain every day and described the things that
she no longer can do, adding that it was a horrible feeling to not be able to do the things
she used to do. The Commonwealth asked Matthew Burgin what things he could no
longer do since the accident, Burgin testified how his recreational activities and mobility
were limited by his leg injuries, that he cannot run now and that he experiences a lot of
pain in his back, knees, hips, ankle and joints . The prosecution next asked if Burgin
was the same person today that he was before the 2004 accident Burgin responded
that he was not the same person, and went on to describe how he sometimes "locks up"
while driving at night when he sees another car coming down the street. Burgin testified
that it took months before he could drive again and that not a day goes by when he
does not think about the accident .
Appellant argues that the above testimony about the long term effects of the
injuries was improper and irrelevant victim impact testimony . In viewing the trial, we see
that the only objection made regarding the above questioning of Mowery and Burgin
was to the Commonwealth's question to Burgin about what things he could no longer do
since the accident . Accordingly, this is the only issue preserved for appellate review.
KRE 103(a)(1) .
To prove First-Degree Assault, the Commonwealth is required to show that
Appellant caused "a serious physical injury" to the victims. KRS 508.010(1). "'Serious
physical injury' means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which
causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or
prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ." KRS 500.080(15) .
"'Physical injury' means substantial physical pain or any impairment of physical
condition ." KRS 500.080(13) . Determinations as to the relevance and admissibility of
evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and those decisions will not
be overturned unless they are arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
legal principles . Johnson v. Commonwealth, 184 S.W.3d 544, 551 (Ky . 2005) . In our
view, the testimony about the physical activities Burgin could no longer do was relevant
to show the prolonged nature of the impairment to his health and bodily function as a
result of the accident. Clearly, the evidence of the pain he still has in his back and lower
extremities and his lack of mobility is relevant to show that he suffered a serious
physical injury .
Over the objection of Appellant, the Commonwealth was also permitted to offer
the testimony of Michelle Samples, the mother of Matthew Burgin and Kelly Samples.
At the outset of Michelle Samples' testimony, Appellant objected to her testimony,
claiming it was going to be cumulative of the testimony already given by Kelly Samples
and Matthew Burgin and that it was clearly for the purpose of garnering sympathy for
the victims. The Commonwealth argued that her testimony relative to Kelly Samples'
injuries was not cumulative because Kelly could not remember much of what happened
on the night of the accident due to her head injury . The trial court allowed Michelle
Samples to continue testifying, qualifying its ruling by stating "but let's try to limit it
somehow."
Michelle testified to the multiple injuries sustained by Matthew and about the
various hospitalizations and surgeries he endured as a result of the accident .
Responding to a question by the Commonwealth about how the wreck had changed
Matthew, Michelle testified that he has emotional issues, he cannot play the sports he
used to play, he cannot run or stand for any length of time, and he has scarring . She
also testified that he was unable to finish college as a result of his injuries and
surgeries . As to Kelly, Michelle likewise testified about the injuries she sustained, the
progression of her recovery and her three hospitalizations as a result of the accident . At
one point, Michelle got choked up talking about Kelly being in the critical care unit
because of her closed head injury and extensive facial fractures . When asked how the
wreck had affected Kelly, Michelle testified that she has breathing and sinus problems,
lots of facial scarring, and she had to have braces because of the damage to her teeth.
Michelle also stated that the wreck had changed Kelly emotionally, and that she got
teased at school because of her facial scars and had to sleep in her parent's room for
some time after the accident .
Appellant contends that Michelle's testimony was either cumulative of testimony
already given by Kelly Samples and Matthew Burgin regarding their injuries or was
inflammatory and irrelevant victim impact evidence . KRE 403 provides :
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
"The balancing of the probative value of such evidence against the danger of undue
prejudice is a task properly reserved for the sound discretion of the trial judge ."
Commonwealth v. English , 993 S .W .2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citation omitted) ; see also
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 543 (Ky. 1988), overruled on other
grounds by Hudson v. Commonwealth, 202 S .W .3d 17 (Ky . 2006) . Evidence is not to
be introduced by the Commonwealth if it serves no legitimate evidentiary purpose other
than to engender sympathy for the victim or his family . Ice v. Commonwealth, 667
S .W.2d 671, 676 (Ky. 1984) .
Although Michelle's testimony regarding Kelly's and Matthew's physical injuries,
treatment, and recovery was partially cumulative of their testimony, Michelle gave more
detailed testimony about their injuries and the progression of their recovery .
Kelly was
only twelve years old when the accident occurred, and she suffered a closed head
injury, which resulted in her having little or no memory of the accident and her
immediate treatment . As the mother of Kelly and Matthew, who was there to oversee
their care and recovery, Michelle provided legitimate evidence regarding the
seriousness of their physical injuries . See Commonwealth v. Mocker, 865 S.W.2d 323,
325 (Ky. 1993) (noting mother's testimony about son's injuries she observed, along with
son's testimony was sufficient to prove "serious physical injury" element of First-Degree
Assault) .
As for the testimony regarding the emotional effects of the accident, while some
of this testimony may have
not
have been relevant during the guilt phase, if there was
any error, we deem it harmless given the isolated nature of the testimony and probative
value of the bulk of her testimony . RCr 9 .24 . Contrary to Appellant's characterization of
Michelle's testimony, it was not overly emotional and did not appear to be offered for the
sole purpose of engendering sympathy for Kelly and Matthew. Although Michelle did
choke up briefly during her testimony about Kelly's injuries, she quickly regained her
composure and continued her testimony. Unlike other cases where reversal was
warranted because of inflammatory victim impact testimony during the guilt phase, this
was not a case where the witness gave lengthy testimony about the emotional loss
suffered by the family as a result of the crime. See Ice, 667 S .W.2d at 675-76; Clark v.
Commonwealth, 833 S.W-2d 793,796-97 (Ky. 1991) .
Given our ruling above, we reject Appellant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct in
offering Michelle's testimony. We also note that Appellant did not raise the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct in objecting to Michelle's testimony.
We now move on to Appellant's argument that he was denied a fair trial when the
Commonwealth presented the surprise testimony of a key witness that should have
10
been provided to the defense during discovery . During the direct examination of
Detective Jason Rice, the accident reconstruction ist for the Commonwealth, Rice
testified that, although he was initially told there were no witnesses to the accident,
some time on the .night of accident, he learned about Jimmy Baxter. Rice stated that he
conducted a short interview of Baxter at the scene, and then a more lengthy second
interview of Baxter some days after the accident, after he had already completed his
accident report. Rice testified that he not learn about Baxter first seeing the driver's
side door of the blue Pontiac closed and then seeing it open with Appellant lying outside
the driver's side door until after the second interview of Baxter. Based on the
information provided by Baxter in the second interview, Rice testified that, contrary to
the theory in his police report that Appellant had been ejected through the driver's side
window, he now believed that Appellant voluntarily exited the vehicle through the
driver's side door after the accident .
Upon giving this testimony, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Defense
counsel stated that Rice was testifying to witness statements that were not provided to
him during discovery . Defense counsel alleged that Rice was simply regurgitating
Baxter's prior testimony to cover up for the fact that Baxter's testimony conflicted with
Rice's theory in his police report that Appellant had been ejected from the vehicle . It
was defense counsel's position that the Commonwealth was required to provide him
with either Baxter's statement or a supplemental statement or report from Rice putting
the defense on notice that Rice's opinion on how Appellant had exited the vehicle had
changed . Defense counsel claimed that this surprise testimony undermined his whole
defense. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, adding, however, that the
defense was entitled to cross-examine Detective Rice on the fact that his opinion
changed about how Appellant exited the vehicle, and why he had never amended his
report to reflect this change of opinion .
On cross-examination of Detective Rice, the defense questioned him extensively
about his earlier opinion that Appellant had been ejected from the vehicle during the
accident. The defense asked Rice to explain how Appellant could have been ejected
from the vehicle if the driver's side window was intact. Rice testified that, from his
recollection, the window was not intact and, in any event, it did not matter how Appellant
exited the vehicle because it did not affect his opinion that Appellant was the driver of
the vehicle . Rice testified that it was clear that Appellant had been driving the car
because Stephens was pinned in the passenger side with her feet still in the floorboard
and Appellant ended up on the outside of the car next to the driver's side door.
When asked why he changed his opinion after writing the accident report when
he had already talked to Baxter, Rice explained that he conducted a second, more
thorough interview of Baxter a week or two after the accident during which Baxter first
told him about seeing the door of the blue Pontiac closed and then opened with
Appellant on the outside of the driver's side. Rice testified that in investigating an
accident, he usually calls witnesses to interview them again a week or two after the
accident because they are often in shock immediately after the accident and will
recollect things about the accident after some time has passed . When asked why he
did not supplement his report to reflect the new information on how Appellant exited the
vehicle, Rice responded that he did not think it was a significant fact because his
opinion that Appellant was the driver of the vehicle, which was the crux of the case, did
not change.
12
RCr 7.24(2) authorizes "pretrial discovery and inspection of official police reports,
but not of memoranda, or other documents made by police officers and agents of the
Commonwealth in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of
statements made to them by witnesses or by prospective witnesses (other than the
defendant) ." See Lowe v. Commonwealth , 712 S.W.2d 944, 945-46 (Ky. 1986) . RCr
7.26(1) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he attorney for the Commonwealth shall produce all
statements of any witness in the form of a document or
recording in its possession which relates to the subject
matter of the witness's testimony and which (a) has been
signed or initialed by the witness or (b) is or purports to be a
substantially verbatim statement made by the witness. Such
statement shall be made available for examination and use
by the defendant.
Pursuant to the pre-trial discovery order in this case, the Commonwealth provided
Appellant with Rice's accident report. The Commonwealth had no written or recorded
statement from Baxter . However, the Commonwealth furnished the defense with its
witness list, which included Jimmy Baxter, as well as Baxter's phone number .
Apparently, the defense never contacted Baxter prior to trial .
In Yates v. Commonwealth, 958 S .W.2d 306 (Ky. 1997), a police officer failed to
mention in his written report that he had seen the defendant near the place where the
murder weapon was discovered, and failed to file an amended report containing this
fact. Yates claimed the Commonwealth engaged in misconduct when it only made the
written statement available to the defense and failed to inform the defense of the
omitted portion of his statement. Id. at 307. This Court held that the Commonwealth
had no duty to advise Yates of the additional information from the police officer not
contained in his written report:
13
Despite the fervor with which Appellant presses this issue,
he is unable to cite, and we are unable to find, any rule or
precedent which would require the Commonwealth to take
such action . RCr 7.26(1) is clear in requiring only written
statements to be made available for use by the defendant. It
is not an infrequent occurrence during a criminal trial that a
witness who has produced or signed a written statement
reveals details not contained in the document. There is no
authority that would require a trial judge to confine a
witness's testimony to the four corners of his or her written
statement. Trial lawyers scrutinize the motive or basis for
such omissions or additions through the art of crossexamination .
Id. at 308. The Court further noted that the omitted information was not exculpatory,
and there was no evidence that the Commonwealth withheld the information as part of a
conspiracy to obtain a conviction. Id.
In the case at bar, the Commonwealth was not required under RCr 7.24(2) to
disclose Baxter's verbal statements to Rice, and given that Rice did not amend his
report, there was no supplemental police report available for discovery . As in Yates,
there was no indication that the Commonwealth was intentionally withholding evidence
to ambush the defense at trial. The Commonwealth included Jimmy Baxter on its
witness list and the defense was free to interview him before trial. Also, as in Yates, the
substance of the testimony at issue (that Appellant voluntarily exited the vehicle from
the driver's side of the car after the accident) was certainly not exculpatory .
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth had a duty to disclose the evidence at
issue because it was a significant piece of evidence that he was denied the right to form
a defense against prior to trial, citing Barnett v. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 119 (Ky.
1988) (defendant entitled to pre-trial knowledge of expert serologist's theory that
defendant had trace amounts of blood on his hands and arms attributable to washing
away blood from victim's wounds) . However, unlike Barnett, the information that was
14
not disclosed was not the basis of Rice's ultimate conclusion that Appellant was driving
the car. See also Milburn v. Commonwealth , 788 S .W .2d 253, 256 (Ky. 1989) (no
discovery violation found where expert opinion was not based on additional undisclosed
premise that defendant was entitled to defend against) . Rice testified that he based his
opinion that Appellant was driving the car on the position of Stephens' body after the
accident, not on how Appellant exited the vehicle . From the discovery information,
Appellant was well aware of the position of Stephens' body and the fact that the
Commonwealth believed she was the passenger in the vehicle and Appellant was the
driver.
The case at hand is likewise distinguishable from Akers v. Commonwealth, 172
S.W .3d 414 (Ky. 2005), wherein an additional police report regarding the crime was
withheld from the defense and deemed reversible error. In the instant case, there was
no police report withheld from the defense. Thus, there was no discovery violation .
We also note that Appellant never specified how this "surprise evidence" that he
voluntarily exited the car undermined his whole defense . Appellant was still able to
cross-examine Rice on his initial ejection theory and on why he failed to later amend his
report. Further, Appellant was still able to present his own accident reconstruction ist
expert to refute the Commonwealth's claim that Appellant was driving .
"In matters dealing with discovery it is within the discretion of the trial court to
permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as may be just under the circumstances ."
Berry v. Commonwealth , 782 S.W.2d 625, 627-28 (Ky. 1990), overruled on other
grounds by Chestnut v. Commonwealth , 250 S.W.3d 288 (Ky. 2008) . The trial court in
15
this case did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial and in allowing
Detective Rice to testify to how his opinion of how Appellant exited the car had changed
after his subsequent interview with Baxter.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Shelby Circuit Court is
affirmed .
All sitting . All concur, except Venters, J., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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