BEVERLY CLAY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2006-SC-000380-MR
BEVERLY CLAY
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
NO . 05-CR-000006
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Beverly Clay, was convicted of attempted murder by a Greenup
Circuit Court jury. She now appeals as a matter of right pursuant to Ky. Const. ยง
110(2)(b) .
On appeal, Appellant raises seven issues : (1) that the trial court
improperly admitted evidence of other crimes and bad acts ; (2) that the jury
instructions were improper; (3) that the trial court erred in its final judgment; (4)
that it was error to refuse to require a witness to disclose the name of the drug
dealer who received stolen goods from a burglary of the victim's home ; (5) that it
was error to admit the victim's statements to two police officers as impeachment
testimony ; (6) that it was error to allow certain testimony pertaining to her
eligibility for parole ; and (7) that the victim did not suffer serious physical injury
for purposes of sentencing under the violent offender statute . For the reasons
set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's conviction .
I. Facts
Appellant and Donald Clay ("Don"), the victim, married in 1996 . They
separated in May 2004. After their separation, Appellant began a relationship
with Cynthia Rusk ("Cynthia") and they started living together . She gave
Appellant a ring and had the phrase "Sin of Bev" tattooed on her forearm .
Both however were abusing OxyContin and Cynthia stole items from
Don's home on November 12, 2004, to support their habit . The stolen property
was traded for more OxyContin .
Despite her separation from Don, Appellant remained the beneficiary on
his $200,000 life insurance policy. Then, in need of more money for drugs,
Appellant hatched a plan to collect on the policy. The plan was that Appellant
would help Cynthia gain access to Don's home, and once inside, Cynthia would
push him down the stairs, making his death look like an accident . Cynthia
agreed to the plan and in preparation, borrowed a baseball bat to hit him with and
acquired a gun by trading some OxyContin .
The attempted murder occurred on November 20, 2004 . Don came home
from work and Cynthia, who had been waiting for him in the bathroom with the
bat, instead shot him in the chest and face . A struggle ensued and Don
managed to wrestle the gun away from Cynthia and call 911 . Cynthia fled on
foot.
When police arrived, Don gave them the direction Cynthia had fled and
she was apprehended shortly thereafter . When arrested, Cynthia admitted the
shooting, but did not implicate Appellant .
During an interview with the police a few days later, however, Cynthia
claimed Appellant had been involved . According to Cynthia, Appellant came up
with the plan to kill Don to collect his life insurance and drove her to his house
that day. Appellant however denied any involvement .
Appellant was later indicted for attempted murder and pled not guilty . She
was found guilty by a jury of attempted murder and sentenced to twenty (20)
years imprisonment.
11. Analysis
A. Other Crimes, Wrongs, and Bad Acts
Appellant argues that the trial court erred on four occasions in admitting
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and bad acts. Specifically, Appellant takes
issue with evidence of the following: the burglary of Don's home, the alleged filing
of a false insurance claim, the solicitation of Cynthia's brother to kill Don, as well
as the romantic relationship between Appellant and Cynthia . In addition,
Appellant argues cumulative error.
The standard of review for the admission of evidence is whether the trial
court abused its discretion . Commonwealth v. English , 993 S.W.2d 941, 945
(Ky. 1999) . "The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision
was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles."
Id .
KRE 404(b) prohibits the use of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
solely to prove a propensity to commit a specific act. Such evidence, however,
may be admissible if offered for another purpose, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident, or if it is so interwoven with other essential evidence that the two
cannot be separated. KRE 404(b). In addition, KRE 404(c) requires that the
prosecution give notice to the defendant of its intention to present evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts. In determining the admissibility of other crimes
and bad acts evidence, the evidence is analyzed using a three-tier inquiry
addressing : (1) relevance, (2) probativeness, and (3) prejudice . Matthews v.
Commonwealth , 163 S.W.3d 11, 19 (Ky. 2005).
1 . Burglary of Don's Home
Appellant contends that it was error to admit evidence of the burglary of
Don's home on November 12, 2004, a week before the shooting .'
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth gave notice it intended to introduce the
evidence. In response to Appellant's motion in limine, the trial court held a
hearing on the motion. Although the court initially sustained Appellant's motion, it
reconsidered the matter, at trial when, during the Commonwealth's direct
examination of Don, and over Appellant's further objection, it changed its ruling
and allowed the evidence to be admitted .
Appellant argues that evidence of the burglary was inadmissible under
KRE 404(b) and KRE 403. The Commonwealth, however, contends that the
evidence was properly admitted, as such was offered for purposes other than to
prove Appellant's propensity .
Motive was pertinent to the issue in this matter, as there was evidence
that Appellant was the beneficiary on Don's life insurance policy despite their
separation . See White v. Commonwealth , 178 S .W.3d 470, 478 (Ky. 2005) ("We
' Appellant was not charged with burglary .
4
have long held that while motive is rarely an actual element of a crime, it is often
relevant to show criminal intent."). Moreover, evidence of the burglary supports a
motive to commit the charged offense, i .e., both the burglary and the shooting
were carried out for money. Cynthia testified that she and Appellant burglarized
Don's house for the purpose of obtaining money for drugs . They traded the
stolen property for OxyContin . It also supports an inference that they had a need
for money for drugs and directly connects both of them to each other as well as
to Don and his premises as a source for funds . Yet, when the burglary did not
solve their drug and money problems, Appellant decided to have Don killed, with
Cynthia's help, to get his insurance.
Moreover, the burglary evinces a plan that includes the attempt to kill Don.
The crimes share common characteristics, in that they both involved the same
participants (Appellant and Cynthia), the same location (Don's home), and the
same victim (Don) . Evidence of the burglary shows that, a week before the
shooting, Appellant stole a number of items from Don for drug money.
Appellant argues that the burglary and the shooting were not part of a
common plan because Cynthia testified she did not learn that Appellant was the
beneficiary on Don's life insurance policy until after the burglary . However,
Cynthia's ignorance of this fact is immaterial in our KRE 404(b) analysis, as it
was Appellant who came up with the plan, and she was clearly aware of her
status as the beneficiary . Further, the potential for undue prejudice from the use
of this evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative value. Thus, the
2 According to Cynthia's testimony, the plan was to make Don's death look
accidental, by hitting him with a baseball bat and shoving him down the
basement stairs . Cynthia, of course, brought a gun for backup . Apparently
becoming frightened, she shot Don, instead of using the bat.
5
evidence was clearly admissible as evidence of motive, opportunity, preparation,
plan and knowledge, all of which relate to her objective of obtaining money . See
Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 838 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Ky. 1991) .
2. Filing a False Insurance Claim
In addition, Appellant asserts error in regards to the prosecutor's comment
during closing argument, when he accused Appellant of helping Don file a false
insurance claim for the items stolen . Appellant argues this comment violated
KRE 404(b) and that she was entitled to pretrial notice pursuant to KRE 404(c) .
The issue was properly preserved .
The facts relevant to this issue are as follows . The victim, Don, was a
hostile witness for the Commonwealth, as Don apparently believed that Appellant
was not involved in the shooting . According to Don, he and Appellant had
separated amicably. Thus, the Commonwealth sought to explain Don's desire to
protect Appellant against criminal liability .
The Commonwealth suspected that Appellant had helped Don file a false
insurance claim with respect to the theft and thus that he wanted to protect her.
Don, in fact, had filed and collected on a $12,000 claim regarding the theft, yet he
also lost a $30,000 coin collection in the theft, uncovered under the policy, but
did not report it as stolen to the police . In his closing argument, the prosecutor
tried to explain to the jury why Don would want to protect Appellant, to wit:
And I think that insurance business is [a key piece of the puzzle] .
And I think it's an indication that [Appellant] knew well about the
burglary because she participated in it. Why wouldn't a man report
to the police a $30,000 coin collection? Especially if it hadn't even
been insured, as he said. "It wasn't insured," he said . Why
wouldn't he do that? Man, I'd be trying to find that. I'd be telling the
police about it, in case it popped up, they'd know it was mine.
Maybe I wouldn't care if I got it back from my wife, who burglarized
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my house with my knowledge and information . And helped me
make this false insurance claim as well.
(Emphasis added} .
In this respect, we note that a closing argument is just that -- an
argument. Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 744 S .W .2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987).
Because a closing argument is not evidence, the prosecutor's comment is
outside the scope of KRE 404(b), which by its plain terms prohibits the use of
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove a propensity to commit some
specific act. Moreover, "[i]t is unquestionably the rule in Kentucky that counsel
has wide latitude while making opening or closing statements ." Brewer v.
Commonwealth , 206 S.W.3d 343, 350 (Ky. 2006}. "A prosecutor may comment
on tactics, may comment on evidence, and may comment as to the falsity of a
defense position ." Slaughter, 744 S.W .2d at 412. In fact, he may state what he
believes from the evidence .
Moreover, when the court overruled Appellant's objection, it admonished
the jury that the prosecutor's remark was merely speculation . Given that a
prosecutor is allowed broad leeway in a closing argument, it was proper to
comment on why Don would want to protect Appellant and thus be hostile to the
prosecution . Neither did the prosecution persist in the accusation . See Meyer v.
Commonwealth , 472 S.W.2d 479, 486 (Ky. 1971) (where there is no
concentrated effort to persist in the argument, no prejudice occurs), overruled on
other grounds by Short v. Commonwealth , 519 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1975). Thus, we
find no error under KRE 404(b), (c) or otherwise.
3. Solicitation to Kill the Victim
Appellant also complains of Cynthia's brother, James Rusk's ("James"),
testimony that Appellant solicited him to kill Don. Appellant moved in limine to
suppress the evidence, but her motion was denied .
At trial, James testified, "Well, she offered me, to pluck [Don] off, [for] his
camper, his boat, and his truck . And there was no way I was doing it. I mean
that's just a bunch of nonsense, put it that way." Appellant argues the admission
of such evidence was error under KRE 404(b).
In a criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving
each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. KRS 500 .070. Here,
Appellant was charged with attempted murder and under our criminal code,
intent is an element of attempted murder. KRS 502 .020 ; KRS 506 .010; KRS
507 .020 .
Specifically, the jury instructions require proof of intent to kill.3
Appellant's intent was obviously disputed . Thus, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting testimony that Appellant solicited James to kill
Don .
4. The Lovers' Relationship
Evidence presented at trial indicated that Appellant was involved in a
romantic relationship with Cynthia . Appellant argues, however, that it was error
to admit evidence of the relationship, contending that such was impermissible
under KRE 404(b), or, alternatively, unduly prejudicial under KRE 403 .
In making the KRE 404(b) argument, Appellant attempts to characterize
her relationship as a bad act. We are not persuaded that evidence of a
3 "You will find the Defendant, Beverly Clay, guilty . . . under this instruction
if, and only if, you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of
the following: . . . B . That in so doing, it was Beverly Clay's intention that Don Clay
would be killed by shooting him" .
relationship between Appellant and Cynthia falls within the scope of KRE 404(b),
as her sexual orientation neither qualifies as a crime or bad act. Moreover, such
evidence was probative of her involvement in the crime, and thus, not unduly
prejudicial .
5. Cumulative Error
Having found no error in the admission of the evidence objected to under
KRE 404(b) and/or KRE 403, there could be no cumulative error.
B. Jury Instructions
Appellant next argues that the jury instructions were inconsistent with the
indictment, amounting to a constructive amendment of the indictment. The
indictment charged Appellant with criminal attempt to commit murder, either as a
principal or as an accomplice. It read in part, as follows :
That on or about the 20th day of November, 2004, in Greenup
County, Kentucky, the above-named defendant, acting alone or in
complicity with another, unlawfully committed the offenses of:
CRIMINAL ATTEMPT TO COMMIT MURDER, in violation of KRS
502.020, 506.010, and 507.020, a Class B Felony, violation code
09150-01, to wit: with the intent to cause the death of Donald Clay,
she solicited, aided, counseled and engaged in a conspiracy with
another person in the planning and commission of the attempted
murder of Donald Clay
(Emphasis added). Both parties tendered proposed instructions at trial. The trial
court, however, instructed the jury on criminal conspiracy to commit murder.
That instruction read as follows:
You will find the Defendant guilty of Criminal Conspiracy to Commit
Murder under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following :
A. That in this county on or about November 20, 2004 and before
the finding of the indictment herein, Beverly Clay entered into an
agreement with Cynthia Rusk that Donald Clay would be killed by
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shooting him with a handgun or hitting him with a ball bat; Beverly
Clay would drive Cynthia Rusk to Donald Clay's house, that if she
did so, such actions would constitute a substantial step in a course
of conduct intended to culminate in the killing of Donald Clay .
AND
B . That in so doing, it was the Defendant's intention that Donald
Clay would be killed by shooting him with a handgun or hitting him
with a ball bat.
AND
C. That pursuant to, in furtherance of, and during the continued
existence of such an agreement, the Defendant drove Cynthia
Rusk to Donald Clay's residence .
(Emphasis added). Conspiracy to commit murder is arguably a different offense
from attempted murder. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S .
781, 789, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 1129, 90 L. Ed . 1575 (1946) (conspiracy to commit a
crime is a different offense from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy) .
Appellant's proposed instructions, however, included an instruction on
criminal conspiracy to commit attempted murder. That instruction is remarkably
4 Appellant's proposed instruction reads as follows :
You will find the Defendant, Beverly Clay, guilty of Criminal
Conspiracy to Commit Attempted Murder under this Instruction if,
and only if, you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, all of the following:
A.
That in this County, on or about November 20, 2004,
and before the finding of the Indictment herein, Beverly Clay
entered into an agreement with Cynthia Rusk that Donald Clay
would be killed by shooting him with a firearm ; that Beverly Clay
would drive Cynthia Rusk to the victim's home in order to
accomplish the murder, and in so doing, such action would
constitute a substantial step in the course of conduct intended to
culminate in the killing of Don Clay; and that Beverly Clay would
solicit Cynthia Rusk to kill Don Clay by shooting him ;
B.
That in so doing, it was Beverly Clay's intention that
Don Clay would be killed by shooting him; and
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similar to the court's instruction . Although there is a discrepancy in the title given
to each instruction, in all other respects, both Appellant's proposed instruction
and the instruction delivered to the jury set out the elements of the case in
substantially the same manner. Despite this, Appellant now complains that the
instruction prejudiced her case, arguing that she could only be convicted of a
conspiracy to commit attempted murder.
We first address the issue of preservation . A defendant can preserve his
claim of error by any one of three methods : (1) offering a proposed instruction;
(2) by motion pointing out the grounds ; or (3) by specific objection prior to the jury
being instructed . RCr 9 .54(2) (emphasis added) . Although defense counsel
offered proposed jury instructions, which the trial court rejected, no attempt was
made to correct the instructions used. In fact, prior to the reading of the
instructions to the jury, defense counsel expressly stated he had no objection to
the court's instructions . Thus, the trial court was never asked to rule on
Appellant's constructive amendment argument. Consequently, this issue is
unpreserved, as Appellant's claim was not "fairly and adequately presented to
the trial judge". See id .
Thus, we may review only for palpable error pursuant to RCr 10.26 . A
palpable error is one that "affects the substantial rights of a party' . RCr 10.26 .
C.
That pursuant to, in furtherance of, and during the
continued existence of such agreement, Beverly Clay provided the
transportation to Cynthia Rusk in order to effect the killing of Don
Clay .
Accordingly, we now turn to the substance of Appellant's argument. An
indictment may only be amended with leave of the court. The amendment may
not charge a new or different offense . Further, an amendment shall not be
permitted which would prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. The
general rule is that instructions should substantially follow the language of the
indictment and submit the elements of the offense contained in the indictment.
Hunter v. Commonwealth, 239 S.W.2d 993, 995 (Ky. 1951). It is palpable error
to instruct the jury on an offense not included in the indictment . Caretenders, Inc.
v. Commonwealth , 821 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Ky. 1991).
Here, the indictment charged Appellant with attempted murder, either
"acting alone or in complicity with another'' . The complicity statute provides that
"[a] person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when, with the
intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he. . . engages
in a conspiracy with such other person to commit the offense" . KRS
502 .020(1)(a) . Thus, participation in a conspiracy is one type of activity that
suffices for accomplice liability . Indeed, the indictment alleges that the charged
offense was committed by conspiracy.6 Further, the instruction on conspiracy to
s "The court may permit an indictment, information, complaint or citation to
be amended any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense
is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced ." RCr
6.16.
6 The indictment charged, in relevant part, that "[Appellant] solicited,
aided, counseled and engaged in a conspiracy with another person in the
planning and commission of the attempted murder of Donald Clay" . (Emphasis
added) .
12
commit murder was supported by evidence, which showed that Appellant and
Cynthia conspired to actually murder Don, not merely to attempt to kill him .'
Concededly, it is palpable error to instruct the jury on an offense not
included in the indictment, but Caretenders is not controlling here, as the jury
was essentially instructed on one basis for finding accomplice liability under the
indictment, not a new or different offense . See 821 S .W.2d at 86; see also
American Tobacco, 328 U.S . at 789, 66 S.Ct. at 1129. Appellant's reliance on
Fulton v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. App. 1992), for the proposition
that she was charged with a different offense by constructive amendment of her
indictment, is thus misplaced.
In Fulton, the defendants were convicted of promoting contraband in the
first degree by complicity . On appeal, the defendants argued that the indictment
actually charged them with the misdemeanor offense of conspiracy to promote
contraband . This Court concluded that it was not error to instruct on complicity
where the indictment charged the defendants with a conspiracy which was, in
fact, committed . A defendant can be guilty of complicity by engaging in a
conspiracy which results in a completed offense . KRS 502 .020(1)(a) and (2)(a) .
In addition to the reasons already cited, we note that the jury was clearly
aware that Appellant was being tried for attempted murder, not murder, since the
victim survived and testified at trial. Thus, if anyone suffered prejudice, it was the
Commonwealth because the court's instruction deleted soliciting, aiding, and
counseling as bases for accomplice liability. Thus, no error occurred and no
substantial rights of Appellant were impaired .
This is contrary to Appellant's claim that the appropriate instruction
should be conspiracy to commit attempted murder.
13
C. Final Judgment
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in its final judgment,
which stated she was guilty of complicity to commit attempted murder, when the
jury was instructed on and returned a verdict finding her guilty of conspiracy to
commit murder. According to Appellant, this inconsistency violated the
constitutional requirement that the Commonwealth prove every element of the
case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court's final judgment states that "the case was tried before a jury
which returned the following verdict : Guilty of Criminal Attempt to Commit
Murder; KRS 502 .020 and 506.010 and 507 .020, a Class B Felony; Sentence of
Twenty years in KSWR ." (Emphasis added) . Further, the judgment states, "it is
ADJUDGED BY THE COURT that the defendant is Guilty of the following
charge(s) : Criminal Attempt to Commit Murder; KRS 502 .020, 506 .010, and
507 .020; Class B Felony."
Appellant concedes that this argument is unpreserved . Therefore, we
may review only for palpable error. RCr 10.26.
It has long been the rule that a defendant can be convicted only of the
offense charged in the indictment . Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 425, 236
S .W. 567, 568 (1922). In order to convict a defendant, "[t]he Commonwealth has
the burden of proving every element of the case beyond a reasonable doubt" .
KRS 500.070(1).
Appellant's argument here is essentially a rehash of her jury instruction
issue. See supra Part II .B. In addressing that argument, which was
unpreserved, we concluded that the discrepancy between the language of the
indictment and the instruction given to the jury was not error.
As to this issue, we conclude the Commonwealth did prove each element
of the offense . The indictment charged Appellant with being an accomplice to
attempted murder. A defendant is liable as an accomplice for an offense
committed by another if she engaged in a conspiracy with such other person to
commit the offense, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the
offense . KRS 502 .020(1)(a) . Thus, participation in a conspiracy is one type of
conduct which suffices for accomplice liability. The jury was instructed according
to this concept and found that Appellant conspired with Cynthia. Consequently,
Appellant was convicted of attempted murder, as charged in the indictment.
There was no error, palpable or otherwise .
D. Identity of the Drug Dealer
This issue is related to the burglary of Don's home on November 12, 2004.
With respect to the burglary, we concluded that Cynthia's testimony was properly
admitted under KRE 404(b) . See supra Part II.A.1 . At trial, Cynthia testified on
direct examination that she and Appellant traded property taken during the
burglary to a drug dealer in Ohio for OxyContin . During defense counsel's crossexamination, when asked the identity of the drug dealer, Cynthia refused to
divulge the name. The trial court ruled that Cynthia was not required to disclose
the name of the drug dealer, reasoning that disclosure may tend to incriminate
her and threaten her safety. On appeal, Appellant argues that the court erred in
refusing to require Cynthia to disclose the name of the drug dealer during cross-
examination because it denied her the identity of a material witness to the
transaction .
"The presentation of evidence as well as the scope and duration of crossexamination rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. This broad rule
applies to both criminal and civil cases". Moore v. Commonwealth , 771 S .W .2d
34 (Ky. 1988). Accordingly, we review for abuse of that discretion.
It has long been the rule that trial courts are vested with exceedingly broad
control over all aspects of cross-examination. This Court, in a pre-Rules case,
stated the following :
It is . . . recognized . . . that the trial court is vested with a sound
judicial discretion as to the scope and duration of crossexamination . Were this not so, any trial could be rendered a farce
and mockery; witnesses could be insulted and threatened ; juries
would become exhausted and exasperated; justice could be
frustrated and thwarted .
Com., Dept. of Highways v. Smith , 390 S.W .2d 194, 195 (Ky. 1965). KRE 611 (b)
authorizes the trial court to limit the scope of cross-examination when the
"interests of justice" so require. In construing KRE 611, this Court indicated the
following :
KRE 611 embodies the "wide open" rule of cross-examination by
allowing questioning as to any matter relevant to any issue in the
case, subject to judicial discretion in the control of interrogation of
witnesses and production of evidence . "[W]hile the trial court may
not limit cross-examination because it involves matters not covered
on direct, it may limit such examination when limitations become
necessary to further the search for truth, avoid a waste of time, or
protect witnesses against unfair and unnecessary attack ."
Derossett v. Commonwealth, 867 S .W.2d 195, 198 (Ky. 1993) . Thus, under KRE
611, trial courts retain the same kind of broad control they always had over the
scope of cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718, 721
(Ky. 1997) ; Baze v. Commonwealth, 965 S .W.2d 817, 821 (Ky. 1997).
Despite this broad authority, there are circumstances where the
Commonwealth is required to disclose the identity of a person not called as a
witness . In support of her argument, Appellant cites to Roviaro v. United States,
353 U .S . 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed .2d 639 (1957), and Burks v. Commonwealth ,
471 S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1971), which address the issue of disclosure of the identity
of a confidential informant . If the informant is an eyewitness to the crime, the
prosecution may not conceal the identity. Burks, 471 S.W.2d at 300-01 .
However, if the informer has merely provided a tip about criminal activity,
disclosure is not required . Taylor v. Commonwealth , 987 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Ky.
1998) . The differential reasoning is one of balance. Disclosure of the informer,
which is unnecessary to one's defense, might put the informer otherwise in
danger . Balance is, of course, in question here .
Upon review of the record, there is no evidence that the Commonwealth
received information from the drug dealer or was even aware of his or her
identity . Therefore, Roviaro and Burks are not controlling, as the issue in this
matter does not involve a confidential informant . Given the trial court's broad
power to limit the scope of cross-examination, the insignificance of the point at
issue within the context of this case, and the danger it might otherwise present to
Cynthia, it was not unreasonable to refuse to require Cynthia to disclose his or
her identity. Thus, we find no a buse of discretion .
E . Victim's Statements to the Police
As previously indicated, the victim, Don, was a hostile witness for the
Commonwealth . During direct examination, Don denied telling the police that he
believed Appellant was involved in the shooting . The Commonwealth therefore
sought to impeach Don with statements he purportedly made previously to two
11
police officers, Sheriff Keith Cooper and Deputy Darrell McCarty . Thereafter,
over defense counsel's objection, the trial court permitted Cooper and McCarty to
testify that Don told them that he believed Appellant was involved in both the
shooting and the burglary.
The first statement at issue concerns testimony from Cooper about his
conversation with Don a few days after the shooting . The Commonwealth called
Cooper as a witness and asked, "Did Don Clay tell you that [Appellant] was
involved in not only his shooting but the burglary there?" Cooper testified as
follows:
After Deputy McCarty and I had a conversation with him and I, what
we did was have him walk through the scene and just give a
preliminary overview of what had taken place, then we updated him
on information that we had. He did tell me that, but it was after we
had told him where the investigation had led us, that he told us that
he believed she was involved . Yes, sir.
(Emphasis added). Defense counsel objected to the answer and moved to
strike, but was overruled . The prosecutor continued his examination by asking,
"Was you, your answer was that Don Clay said that he thought his wife was in on
these things." Cooper responded, "Yes, sir. He did say that." Cooper further
testified to the following :
How it came about, there were two people that knew when he was
supposed to be returning home from work that day, his mother and
his wife . And, like I say, we updated him on, on information that we
had received during the investigation, and what he offered us was
that his wife must, would have been the only one that would have
18
told Ms. Rusk, who, the, the one that was actually convicted of the
shooting, that she must have given that information to Ms. Rusk
because his mother wouldn't have done it. So she had to have
been in on it. That's how it came about .
Following Cooper's testimony, the Commonwealth recalled McCarty as a
witness . When asked if Don had made statements concerning the shooting at
the scene of the crime, McCarty testified, "Yes, sir, that he thought that she was
involved and that she may be in the house." McCarty further testified that Don
told him that he believed Appellant had been involved in the burglary . According
to McCarty, Don stated, "That he believed she had also broke into his house."
On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred because these
statements constitute (1) Don's opinion on an ultimate issue and (2)
impeachment on a collateral matter. We review for abuse of discretion . English ,
993 S.W.2d at 945.
In Stringer v. Commonwealth , 956 S .W.2d 883, 889-92 (Ky. 1997), the
Court ruled that an expert witness may testify to an opinion on an ultimate issue.
The defendant was convicted of sodomy and sexual abuse of a child . There was
expert testimony by a physician that the child's vaginal injuries were consistent
with her history of sexual abuse. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
physician's testimony was inadmissible opinion evidence on an ultimate issue.
Although the testimony constituted an expert opinion on an ultimate issue, this
Court rejected the argument that such testimony is always prohibited . Thus, it
was held that expert opinion testimony is not inadmissible solely because it
speaks to an ultimate issue. Id . at 891-92 . That rule was extended to lay
opinions in McKinney v. Commonwealth , 60 S .W.3d 499, 504 (Ky. 2001), which
held that a lay witness may testify to an opinion on an ultimate issue .
19
With these principles in mind, we turn to the instant case. Pursuant to the
rule in Stringer, which was extended to lay opinions in McKinney , it was
permissible for Cooper and McCarty to testify as to Don's belief that Appellant
was involved in the shooting . Appellant's reliance on Neal v. Commonwealth , 95
S .W.3d 843 (Ky. 2003), is misplaced because the testimony at issue here does
not concern a collateral matter. In Neal , the defendant wanted to impeach the
codefendant on a collateral matter, blame-shifting for an earlier shooting. Here,
Don was contradicted as to what he said to the police after being shot, which
related to the charged offense. The police officers' testimony was relevant to a
material issue in the case, Don's unexplained bias at the time of trial . Thus, the
trial court properly exercised its discretion when it admitted this impeachment
testimony.
F. Parole Eligibility
Appellant argues that there was error in allowing the jury to hear that she
might be eligible for parole after serving 20% of her sentence . During the penalty
phase, Probation and Parole Officer Gary Spillman testified that Appellant's
minimum parole eligibility for attempted murder, a Class B felony, depends on
whether she is designated as a violent offender. $ If the trial court found that the
victim suffered serious physical injury, Appellant, as a violent offender, would not
8 KRS 439 .3401 provides that "`violent offender' means any person who
has been convicted of or pled guilty to the commission of . . . [a] Class B felony
involving the death of the victim or serious physical injury to a victim" and that
"[t]he court shall designate in its judgment if the victim suffered death or serious
physical injury ."
20
be eligible for parole until she served 85% of her sentence .9 However, if there
was a finding that the victim did not suffer serious physical injury, Appellant
would be eligible for parole after serving 20% of her sentence.'0
Following Spillman's testimony, Appellant moved for a directed verdict on
the issue of whether Don suffered a serious physical injury. The court denied
Appellant's motion for directed verdict and informed her that it would determine
whether Don suffered a serious physical injury at final sentencing . After
deliberating, the jury sentenced Appellant to the maximum sentence, 20 years .
The final judgment entered on May 4, 2006, did not initially reflect the
court's finding as to serious physical injury . The check box for indicating that the
victim suffered death or serious physical injury was left blank. However, on May
22, 2006, the court amended the judgment "to reflect that the victim of the crime
committed by the defendant suffered serious physical injury ."
Appellant hypothesizes that the judge knew at the time of Spillman's
testimony that she would not be eligible for parole until after serving 85% of her
sentence, as it was his decision to find that Don suffered serious physical injury.
Appellant would now have us impose a duty on trial judges to advise the jury
prior to penalty phase deliberations on the issue of serious physical injury.
Appellant concedes that this issue is unpreserved . However, she asks us
to review for palpable error under RCr 10.26.
9 A violent offender who has been convicted of a capital offense or Class
A felony with a sentence of a term of years or Class B felony who is a violent
offender shall not be released on probation or parole until he has served at least
eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed . KRS 439 .3401(3) .
'0 501 Ky. Admin . Regs. 1 :030 .
21
In support of her argument, Appellant cites to Lankford v. Idaho , 500 U .S.
110, 111 S .Ct. 1723, 114 L .Ed .2d 173 (1991), a capital murder case. In
Lankford , a jury found the defendant guilty on two counts of first-degree murder.
Prior to the defendant's sentencing hearing, the prosecutor announced that the
state would not seek the death penalty . There was no discussion of the death
penalty as a possible sentence at the sentencing hearing, where both defense
counsel and the prosecutor argued the merits of concurrent or consecutive, and
fixed or indeterminate, sentence terms. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial
judge indicated that he considered the defendant's testimony unworthy of belief
and that the seriousness of the crimes warranted more severe punishment than
that which the state had recommended . Subsequently, the trial judge sentenced
Lankford to death . The U .S. Supreme Court held that due process was violated
by sentencing where, at the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant and
his counsel did not have adequate notice that the judge might sentence the
defendant to death. Id. at 119-27, 111 S .Ct. at 1729-33.
We are hesitant to find a due process violation in this matter based on
Lankford . In Lankford , the defendant's death sentence was overturned on the
ground that he and counsel had not received "fair notice" that a sentence of
death was anything more than a remote possibility . Id . at 121, 111 S .Ct. at 1729 .
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel offered no evidence or argument
against a death sentence.
If defense counsel had been notified that the trial judge was
contemplating a death sentence . . ., presumably she would have
advanced arguments [addressing the aggravating circumstances
identified by the judge and his reasons for disbelieving Lankford] ;
however, she did not make these arguments because they were
22
entirely inappropriate in a discussion about the length of
[Lankford's] possible incarceration .
Id . at 122, 111 S .Ct. at 1730. Here, on the other hand, it was clear to both
Appellant and her defense counsel during the penalty phase that she might not
be eligible for parole until after serving 85% of her sentence. Therefore, given
the "unique" facts of Lankford --- where the defendant did not receive proper
notice that his life was at stake -- that decision is not controlling here ."
The violent offender statute provides that "[t]he court shall designate in its
judgment if the victim suffered death or serious physical injury." KRS
439.3401(1) (emphasis added). The court here stated as such in the amended
final judgment and Don did, in fact, suffer serious physical injury. There is no
requirement that the judge advise the jury prior to penalty phase deliberations on
the issue of serious physical injury, and we are not persuaded to impose such a
requirement here under this argument . Thus, we find no error occurred .
G. Serious Physical Injury
Appellant contends that it was error to sentence her pursuant to KRS
439 .3401 because there was no evidence that Don suffered serious physical
injury . 12 We find no merit in this argument. Don was shot twice, once in the face
and once in the chest, with a bullet remaining lodged in his chest . The trial judge
11
"The unique circumstance that gives rise to concern about the adequacy
of the notice in this case is the fact that, pursuant to court order, the prosecutor
had formally advised the trial judge and petitioner that the State would not
recommend the death penalty ." Id. at 111, 111 S .Ct. at 1725.
12
"`Serious physical injury' means physical injury which creates a
substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement,
prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or impairment of the function
of any bodily organ". KRS 500.080(15) .
23
reasonably found that being shot in the face and chest created a substantial risk
of death. Thus, the trial court did not err in applying the violent offender statute.
111111 . Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant's conviction .
All sitting . Lambert, C.J . ; Abramson, Cunningham, and Scott, JJ ., concur.
Noble, J., dissents by separate opinion, with Minton and Schroder, JJ ., joining this
dissent .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Thomas M. Ransdell
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : MAY 22, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,*uyrnar Courf of 'RrufurhV
2006-SC-000380-MR
BEVERLY CLAY
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D . NICHOLLS, JUDGE
NO . 05-CR-000006
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE NOBLE
Respectfully, I dissent.
First, the majority holds that it was not error to allow the Commonwealth Attorney
to claim in closing argument that Appellant colluded with her husband to file a false
insurance claim for the items stolen in a burglary that occurred prior to the attempt on
her husband's life. Appellant was separated from the victim, her husband. Prior to the
attempt to kill him, the husband's home had been burglarized, with several items stolen .
The trial court allowed testimony from the co-defendant that she and Appellant had
committed the burglary on the basis that it showed a pattern or scheme between the codefendant and Appellant which helped establish the motive to attempt to kill the
husband . Illustrating the danger of admitting collateral matters, even for a proper
purpose, the Commonwealth then pursued testimony about the burglary, and in effect
tried that crime as well. Extending attention to the burglary, testimony was elicited that
the husband had filed an insurance claim for the items he had insured, but that he failed
to tell the police that an uninsured $30,000 coin collection was also taken . At ,trial, the
Commonwealth viewed the husband as a hostile witness because he would not testify
that he believed Appellant was involved in the shooting, which at least begs the
question of why the Commonwealth called him as a witness and what difference his
opinion made in any event .
Based on this highly collateral material, the Commonwealth argued in closing
that the husband refused to claim that his wife was involved in the attempted murder
because she had helped him file a false insurance claim, despite the fact that there was
no testimony that a fraudulent claim had been made and the fraud theory was based
solely on the husband's failure to report the theft of an uninsured coin collection . In
short, the Commonwealth accused the husband and Appellant of insurance fraud, a fact
not in evidence and based only on the flimsiest of testimony . While the majority opinion
is correct that the Commonwealth has discretion in making its argument to the jury,
such is not unlimited . The Commonwealth enjoys only "reasonable latitude in argument
. . . . " Harne ss v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Ky. 1971). Even with that
latitude, "certain behavior exceeds the bounds of what is acceptable and enters the
realm of prejudicial error." Wager v. Commonwealth , 751 S .W .2d 28, 30 (Ky. 1988).
The Commonwealth was not trying a burglary case or an insurance fraud case, and
thus had no reason to argue that the evidence proved either. Defense counsel objected
to this, and the trial court should have stopped the collateral detour before it ever came
to closing argument . Certainly it is more than mere argument to accuse a defendant of
another crime-especially one not found in the evidence-at a point where the
defendant cannot make any response, given that the Commonwealth gets the last word
in closing. It was not readily apparent when the testimony regarding making an
insurance claim was given, seemingly irrelevantly, that the Commonwealth would make
the huge leap to claiming insurance fraud in closing argument. As in Wager , "The
Commonwealth's attorney went beyond the evidence presented, and pursued another
agenda, quite apart from the legal constraints of the case at hand ." Id . at 30-31 . This
commentary cannot help but be prejudicial, and it was reversible error to allow it.
Next, I disagree that the victim's statements to the police are admissible as
opinion evidence. It makes no difference here that a witness may testify to the ultimate
issue ; there still must be some basis of reliability even for a lay witness . Whether the
victim thought his wife, Appellant, attempted to kill him or not is irrelevant, and cannot
be made relevant just because at one point in time he thought she did it and at another
he thought she did not. All this proves is that he is a confused man who clearly could
not have a reasonable basis for either opinion if he can't decide what he thinks. Asking
him at trial whether he believed the Appellant was involved just so he could be
impeached with a prior inconsistent statement is part and parcel of the bootstrapping
that went on in this trial. Since the victim could give no foundation for his belief, he was
not a proper lay witness, and admitting such testimony was error.
Finally, given that this case involved "serious physical injury," I would disagree
with the majority that it was proper for the Commonwealth to argue in the sentencing
phase that the defendant would be eligible for parole after serving 20% of his sentence .
It is bad faith to argue such, when as a matter of law the Appellant must be classified as
a violent offender pursuant to KRS 439.3401, and under subsection (3) of that statute
must serve 85% of the sentence imposed before attaining parole eligibility . Trial courts
should not blatantly ignore the law, and if they do, there are consequences . Allowing
this argument does not provide "truth in sentencing," and borders on being deceptive .
For the above reasons, this judgment should be reversed .
Minton and Schroder, JJ., join .
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