JOSHUA POPP V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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AS MODIFIED AUGUST 21, 2008
RENDERED : APRIL 24, 2008
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2006-SC-000311-M R
JOSHUA POPP
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-00088
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSI NG AND REMANDING
Following a jury trial in the Franklin Circuit Court, Appellant, Joshua Popp, was
convicted of one count of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree sodomy, two
counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and of being a second-degree persistent felony
offender . He was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. He appeals to this Court as
a matter of right . We reverse and remand for a new trial based on the erroneous
admission of hearsay evidence by a social worker. Because the case is being
remanded, we will also address those unpreserved errors likely to occur on retrial.
B .Y. is the biological daughter of Sarah Popp and Shaun Yunt. Sarah and Shaun
divorced in 1999, when B.Y. was about one year old. In 2001, Sarah married the
Appellant, Joshua Popp. B.Y. resided with Sarah and Joshua. B.Y .'s biological father,
Shaun Yunt, had visitation . On February 19, 2005, during a visitation, B .Y. (then six
years old) and Shaun, along with Shaun's wife, and Shaun's stepdaughters, ages 10
and 12, went to a Bob Evans restaurant . There, the three girls colored on children's
placemats . Afterwards, Shaun drove BY. back to Sarah's house . BY. continued
coloring in the car. Shaun asked BY. to see what she had colored, and she said he
could not see it because she was still coloring . He took it from her anyway and saw
what looked like a penis drawn on the placemat's boy figure . Shaun got upset and
asked B.Y. where she learned how to draw something like that or where she got the
idea . She said on a movie or something she had seen on TV. Shaun dated the
placemat February 19, 2005 . Upon arriving at Sarah's apartment, he confronted Sarah
and Joshua Popp's parents, who had just arrived, about the placemat . An argument
ensued as to where BY. had seen pornography. Subsequently, Sarah talked to B.Y.'s
school counselor about the placemat. The counselor told Sarah the school could call
social services for her "just in case", but that she (the counselor) felt there was no need
to be concerned . The counselor then placed a call to social services for Sarah, and
Sarah talked to a social worker. The social worker also told Sarah there was no need
for concern, but to let Shaun know that if he had any further concern he could direct it to
them.
About a month later, BY. came home from a visitation with Shaun, and told
Sarah that daddy (Shaun) did not think it was a good idea for her to sleep in Sarah and
Joshua's bed, and that daddy said he thought Joshua was touching her in a bad way.
Sarah asked BY. if she thought Joshua was touching her in a bad way, and BY. said
no. About a week later, at the dinner table, BY. told Sarah she should kick Joshua out.
Sarah asked why, and BY. said because of the bad thing he did to her. Sarah asked
The placemat depicts a boy and girl playing basketball .
2
what that was, but BY. would not talk anymore that night . The next morning, March 14,
2005, Sarah asked again, and BY. said that Joshua's "private spot" touched her
"private spot ." Sarah had a marital counseling appointment that day and told her
counselor what BY . had said. The counselor directed Sarah to social services
immediately thereafter. The case was assigned to investigating social worker Patricia
Adams . The case was also referred to the Frankfort City Police and assigned to
Detective Jeff Hulker.
On March 21, 2005, B.Y. was sent to the Children's Advocacy Center in
Lexington for a forensic interview. The interview was conducted by forensic interviewer
Reagan Gyorffy, and observed on closed circuit television by Adams and Detective
Hulker. Following a discussion about "private parts" and touching, BY. indicated that
Joshua had put his "private spot" in her "private spot", put his "private spot" in her "butt",
put his finger in her "private spot", and put his finger in her "butt" . BY. said she was in
the bed with Joshua when it happened, and that her mom was at work. B .Y. said that
afterwards, she went downstairs and played. On April 7, 2005, BY. was examined and
interviewed by Dr. Deborah Stanley, a pediatrician with the Children's Advocacy Center.
The examination showed no physical signs of sexual abuse, nor, when questioned by
Dr. Stanley, did BY. indicate that she had been sexually abused . BY. was also put into
counseling with a mental health therapist, Ms. Denise Insley. BY. did not make any
statements to Ms. Insley that she had been sexually abused.
Joshua Popp was charged with one count of first-degree sodomy, one count of
first-degree rape, two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and being a second-degree
persistent felony offender (non-sexual offense) . A jury trial commenced in December,
2005. BY., then age 7, testified effectively and at length . When asked what Joshua did
that he was not supposed to do, BY. testified that he put his "private" in her "private",
put his finger in her "private", put his finger in her butt, and put his "private" in her butt.
BY. said that she was in the bed with Joshua when it happened, and that her mother
was at work. When asked what happened afterwards, BY. said she went downstairs to
play.
Over objection, the investigating social worker, Patricia Adams, testified as to the
contents of the forensic interview of BY., basically reiterating that which BY. had
already testified to . Detective Hulker testified to the content of the same interview.
Other witnesses included Dr. Stanley, who testified that B .Y.'s physical examination was
normal, but that a normal exam does not rule out the possibility of sexual abuse . Ms.
Insley was questioned as to the behaviors and reporting patterns of abused children,
and basically testified that children vary and that any behavior or reporting pattern is
possible . The placemat was introduced through the testimony of Shaun Popp. Joshua
Popp testified in his own defense and denied ever sexually abusing BY. The jury found
Popp guilty on all charges. Popp was sentenced to a total of thirty years' imprisonment .
He appeals to this Court as a matter of right . On appeal, Popp raises numerous errors,
preserved and unpreserved .
We first turn to the preserved reversible error in this case, which involves
inadmissible hearsay by social worker Patricia Adams. Adams was assigned to the
case as the investigating social worker. - Adams did not interview BY. herself, but
observed, via closed circuit television, the forensic interview of BY. conducted at the
Children's Advocacy Center on March 21, 2005. At trial, the Commonwealth called
Adams to testify as to B .Y .'s statements in the forensic interview. Defense counsel
objected on grounds of bolstering. The Commonwealth argued that B .Y.'s credibility
had been impeached (on cross-examination), and that it was entitled to introduce the
interview as "prior consistent statements" for rehabilitation . The defense objection was
overruled . Adams thereafter testified from her notes and memory as to her recollection
of the interview questions and B.Y.'s answers. Her testimony basically reiterated what
BY. had already testified to in court .
The trial court's admission of this hearsay was clear error. There is no exception
to the hearsay rule for social workers or the results of their investigations . Sharp v.
Commonwealth , 849 S .W .2d 542, 546 (Ky. 1993). Moreover, the statements were not
admissible as prior consistent statements . The statements do not comport with KRE
801 A(a)(2), which requires the prior consistent statement be "offered to rebut an
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive ." There was no so such charge in this case, nor did the
Commonwealth argue this to the trial court. Rather, the Commonwealth offered up a
vague assertion that B .Y.'s credibility had been impeached (by cross-examination) and
that it was therefore entitled to introduce the interview as prior consistent statements for
rehabilitation . This reasoning was soundly rejected by this Court in Bussey v.
Commonwealth , 797 S.W.2d 483, 484-85 (Ky. 1990) . Justice Lambert, in writing the
opinion of the Court, enunciated :
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred to his
substantial prejudice by admitting the hearsay testimony of
four police officers. During the Commonwealth's case in
chief, Officers Shirley, Scott, Schiller and Mullhull were
permitted to repeat the victim's version of what transpired .
The Commonwealth argues that this testimony was properly
admitted because the victim's credibility had been attacked
during cross-examination. According to this theory, anytime
the credibility of a witness is attacked, hearsay evidence
which tends to corroborate the witness's story becomes
admissible . This view of the law is much too expansive .
The rule which permits rehabilitation of a witness is
limited to those circumstances in which the credibility of the
witness is attacked on the basis of a prior inconsistent
statement, recent fabrication, improper influence, or some
circumstance which impairs his present ability to recall and
narrate the event . Eubank v. Commonwealth , 210 Ky. 150,
275 S .W. 630 (1925), and Reed v. Commonwealth , Ky., 738
S .W.2d 818 (1987) . The Commonwealth's reliance on
Lowery v. Commonwealth , Ky., 566 S .W .2d 750 (1978), is
misplaced . In that case, the witness was impeached by
evidence that he had been drinking alcohol shortly before his
testimony . In view of this circumstance, the court permitted
rehabilitation of the witness by proof that he had earlier told
a story consistent with his testimony at trial . The prior
consistent statement was permitted because it disclosed that
the story was the same as before the "onset of the malady."
Nothing contained in the facts presented here permits
such a result. There was no contention of recent fabrication
nor was there any evidence that the victim's mental condition
had become diminished in the period between the
occurrence of the crime and trial . . . . Merely challenging the
truthfulness of a witness's testimony does not open the door
to a parade of witnesses who repeat the witness's story as
told to them . The law of Kentucky is well stated in Eubank v.
Commonwealth , supra, as follows :
"As a general rule, a witness cannot be corroborated
by proof that on previous occasions he has made the same
statements as those made in his testimony . Where,
however, a witness has been assailed on the ground that his
story is a recent fabrication, or that he has some motive for
testifying falsely, proof that he gave a similar account of the
matter when the motive did not exist, before the effect of
such an account could be foreseen, or when the motive or
interest would have induced a different statement, is
admissible." Id. at 275 S.W. 633.
This case well illustrates the reason for the foregoing
rule . The only witnesses to the occurrence of this crime were
appellant and the Bussey brothers . To arrive at a conviction,
it was necessary for the jury to believe the victim and
disbelieve appellant. As such, the jury was required to
determine the credibility of all fact witnesses. This process
was flawed when four law enforcement witnesses were
permitted to bolster the victim's testimony by repeating what
he had told them. Accordingly, we must reverse the
conviction.
Similarly, in the present case, nothing in the trial permits the introduction of the interview
as "prior consistent statements." The trial court's ruling was erroneous.
This Court has continuously held that the hearsay testimony of social workers is
inadmissible, and constitutes reversible error as it unfairly bolsters the testimony of the
alleged victim. Smith v. Commonwealth, 920 S .W .2d 514, 516 (Ky. 1995) (citing Sharp ,
849 S.W.2d at 546; Brown v. Commonwealth, 812 S .W.2d 502, 503-04 (Ky. 1991),
overruled on other rounds, Stringer v. Commonwealth , 956 S .W.2d 883 (Ky. 1997) ;
Mitch ell v. Commonwealth, 777 S .W.2d 930 (Ky. 1989) ; Reed v. Commonwealth , 738
S .W .2d 818, 821-22 (Ky. 1987); Hester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1987);
Bussey v. Commonwealth , 697 S .W .2d 139,141 (1985)) . See also Belt v.
Commonwealth, 2 S.W.3d 790 (Ky.App . 1999). This case falls squarely under this rule.
There was no evidence of abuse other than B .Y.'s allegations . In order to convict, the
jury was required to believe BY. and disbelieve the Appellant . The testimony of Patricia
Adams was highly prejudicial and unfairly bolstered the credibility of BY. Accordingly,
the admission of this testimony constitutes reversible error. Smith , 920 S .W .2d at 517 ;
Busses, 797 S.W .2d at 485.
We note that, on appeal, the Commonwealth now attempts to argue that the
interview was admissible as "prior inconsistent statements" under KRE 801A(a)(1),
rather than as "prior consistent statements" as argued at trial. This argument is without
merit . First, the interview was consistent with B .Y.'s testimony . Second, had the
Commonwealth wished to introduce any of the statements in this interview as prior
inconsistent statements, it would have been required to have laid the proper foundation
required by KRE 613(x). Noel v. Commonwealth, 76 S.W.3d 923 (Ky. 2002). This was
not done . Accordingly, this argument is without merit and will not be a basis for
justifying the admission of Adams's testimony .
As we are reversing this case based on the erroneous admission of the
testimony of social worker Patricia Adams, we will address only those errors likely to
occur upon retrial . The first involves the testimony of Detective Jeff Hulker. This error
is unpreserved, but so egregious as would have required reversal under RCr 10 .26 .
Detective Hulker observed the same forensic interview as Adams, and at trial was
allowed to reiterate the contents of the same interview. There is no hearsay exception
which would permit the introduction of this testimony . Further, as we stated in Smith ,
the rationale behind prohibiting hearsay testimony in situations involving social workers
is applicable to the case of a police detective relating prior statements by the victim .
920 S .W.2d at 516-17 . Detective Hulker's testimony was highly prejudicial as it unfairly
bolstered B .Y.'s credibility. Id . See also Belt, 2 S.W .3d at 792 ; Bussey, 797 S .W.2d at
485 .
Hulker also opined that the younger the child, the less likely a story is false,
because a young child would not be able to mentally form a story of sexual abuse .
Hulker went on to testify that in the interview, BY. had touched her arm when showing
how she was lying on the bed when the abuse happened, and that when someone
makes a physical gesture in an interview, that means they are having a "physical
memory", and that this would not happen if a story is fabricated . There was no scientific
basis offered for this testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals . Inc. , 509 U .S.
579, 113 S . Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed . 2d 469 (1993). The testimony was clearly improper
vouching. It is well settled that a witness may not vouch for the credibility of another
witness . Stringer, 956 S .W .2d at 888; Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S .W.2d 612,
614 (Ky. 1992); Hall v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Ky. 1993) . Further, "a
party cannot introduce evidence of the habit of a class of individuals . . . to prove that
the person was a member of that class because he/she acted the same way under
similar circumstances ." Miller v . Commonwealth, 77 S .W.3d 566, 572 (Ky. 2002)
(holding that detective's testimony as to her observation of the reporting pattern of
sexually abused children as a class was impermissible habit evidence) .
Another error likely to occur upon retrial involves admission of the child's
placemat. This issue was unpreserved . Shaun Yunt testified that B.Y. and her two
stepsisters, ages 10 and 12, were coloring on children's placemats at the Bob Evans
restaurant, and that BY . continued coloring in the car. Shaun asked B.Y. to see what
she had colored, and she said he could not see it because she was still coloring . Shaun
took it from her anyway and saw what looked like a penis drawn on the boy figure.
Shaun got upset and asked BY. where she learned how to draw something like that or
where she got the idea . She said on a movie or something she had seen on TV. At
trial, the placemat was introduced through the testimony of Shaun Yunt . B.Y . was never
questioned about it at trial . KRE 402 requires that evidence be relevant . In light of
B .Y.'s explanation that this was something she had seen on TV, the evidence does not
tend to prove or disprove that the alleged crimes occurred, which renders said drawing
irrelevant . KRE 401 . Accordingly, the placemat should not have been introduced into
evidence . However, on remand, if there is additional evidence which ties the drawing to
the alleged crimes, the trial court would be in a position to reconsider its admissibility.
Another unpreserved error involves the testimony of the mental health therapist,
Denise Insley. BY. was first referred to Ms. Insley by social services at the start of the
investigation . Thereafter, Insley had a number of counseling sessions with B.Y.,
primarily for the purpose of providing treatment for B .Y.'s behavioral and emotional
issues . Ms. Insley did not directly ask about, and BY. did not disclose, any abuse.
Insley was questioned at length by the prosecutor as to reporting patterns and
behaviors of sexually abused children, and whether B .Y.'s behavior and reporting
pattern were indicative of abuse. We have consistently held as inadmissible, evidence
of a child's reporting pattern or behavioral symptoms as indicative of sexual abuse . In
the context of expert testimony, this type of evidence is sometimes referred to as "Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome", and has been consistently held inadmissible
on grounds that this is not a generally accepted medical concept. Brown , 812 S .W .2d
at 504 (social worker's testimony that child's behavior was "consistent with abuse" was
reversible error). See also Hellstrom , 825 S .W.2d at 613-14; Hester, 734 S .W .2d at
458 ; Lantrip v. Commonwealth , 713 S .W .2d 816 (Ky. 1986) ; Busses, 697 S .W .2d at
141 . We have also consistently held that this type of evidence is inadmissible habit
evidence . Miller , 77 S .W.3d at 572 . Because Insley basically testified that any
reporting pattern or behavior is possible, and did not try to match B .Y.'s behavior to any
of the perceived behaviors or reporting patterns of abused children, the error in
admitting her testimony was harmless . However, on retrial, this testimony should be
excluded as inadmissible.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the Frankfort Circuit Court is
reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Mark Alan Bubenzer
101 Saint Clair Street
P .O . Box 1423
Frankfort, KY 40602-1423
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan Darwin Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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2006-SC-000311-MR
JOSHUA POPP
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L . GRAHAM, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-00088
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND MODIFYING OPINION
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellee, Commonwealth of Kentucky, is
DENIED. The Opinion of the Court, rendered on April 24, 2008, is MODIFIED on its
face by substitution of the attached opinion in lieu of the original opinion . Said
modifications do not affect the holding .
Minton, C.J . ; Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Schroder, and Scott, JJ., concur.
Venters, J ., not sitting .
Entered : August 21, 2008 .
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