MATTHEW DERRY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED : DECEMBER 18, 2008
T,O,B
,;VUyrr1Ur
Gaurf of
2006-SC-000181-DG
MATTHEW DERRY
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2004-CA-000959
METCALFE CIRCUIT COURT NO . 03-CR-00019
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NOBLE
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Matthew Derry, challenged his conviction on the grounds that
his conviction in Metcalf County, after a mistrial had been declared on the
same charges in the middle of a previous trial in an adjacent county for lack of
venue, violated the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. The Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction. Because the mistrial was the result of
Appellant's own motion, the Court of Appeals ruled correctly that there was no
double jeopardy violation.
I. Background
Appellant, Matthew Derry, was charged with Rape in the First Degree,
Sodomy in the First Degree and Sexual Abuse in the First Degree in an
indictment filed in Barren Circuit Court . The case proceeded to trial on March
5, 2003 in Barren County. The jury was empanelled and sworn, and testimony
was taken from three witnesses. At some point, the Commonwealth was put
on notice that the house where the crime occurred actually sat in Metcalfe
County . On recess, the parties and the trial court judge, according to his later
in-court statements, "checked with the Sheriff, . . . checked with the Property
Valuation Administrator, and . . . looked at the maps," and concluded that
while part of the real estate was in Barren County, the house was in fact in
Metcalfe County. After explaining this to the jury, the trial court then asked
"So, is there a motion to dismiss the indictment?", to which the defense
attorney replied, "Yes, your honor." The trial court then specifically granted the
motion to dismiss the indictment on the record .
Later that day, the trial court entered an order declaring a mistrial and
dismissing the indictment without prejudice. In his comments to the jury, the
judge had said that the mistake about where the events occurred "will require
that I dismiss this case without prejudice" and that the Commonwealth could
"reindict if they choose to proceed in Metcalfe County," and held that "Barren
Circuit Court has no venue in this matter."
The Commonwealth did choose to indict the Appellant in Metcalfe
County. The Appellant objected to the indictment on the ground of double
jeopardy, claiming that when the trial court dismissed the indictment in Barren
County, it was tantamount to a directed verdict since jeopardy had attached
and the Commonwealth was unable to prove its case in regard to venue . The
trial court overruled the motion on the basis that the dismissal had been a
mistrial due to "manifest necessity." Appellant subsequently entered a
conditional Alford plea to one count of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, and
was sentenced to two years, a $ 1000 fine, and three years of conditional
2
discharge. He was required to register as a sexual offender and was ordered to
sexual offender assessment and treatment.
The Court of Appeals held that double jeopardy did not bar Appellant's
subsequent prosecution in Metcalfe County and affirmed his conviction . This
Court granted discretionary review .
11. Analysis
Appellant claims that he was entitled to a dismissal of the Metcalfe
County indictment because jeopardy had attached during the trial of the
previous indictment in Barren County . Specifically, he argues that there was
no manifest necessity for the trial court's mistrial because the trial could have
continued in Barren County He also argues that he actually moved for a
dismissal, rather than a mistrial, and the trial court granted the dismissal on
the grounds that an element-venue-could not be proven, thus making the
trial court's ruling "the functional equivalent of a directed verdict . . . ."
A. Venue
Appellant is correct to the extent that he argues that the trial could have
proceeded in Barren (County after discovery that the crime actually occurred in
Metcalf County. Venue is often tied to the concept of "vicinage," which refers to
the area surrounding the place of commission of an offense . Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 699, 240 S .W. 750, 752 (1922) . The Kentucky
Constitution, at section 11, provides that an accused in a criminal case "shall
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage . . . ." Just after,
the language refers to venue, by allowing the General Assembly to provide by
law how both the Commonwealth and the defendant may obtain a change of
3
venue to the most convenient co,
my in which a fair trial can be obtained.
Possibly because of this proximity, venue and vicinage have sometimes been
regarded as synonymous, though they are actually two distinct concepts . See
Wooslgy v. Commonwealth , 293 S .W.2d 625, 626 (Ky. 1956) .
Neither vicinage nor venue is inviolable . A trial is not made
unconstitutional because all members of the jury were not from the vicinage.
Baxter v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 207, 166 S.W.2d 24, 2 (1912) . Nor is a
trial unconstitutional because venue must be changed in order to get a fair
trial, as the plain language of the Constitution provides. Shipp v.
Commonwealth , 124 Ky. 643, 99 S .W . 945, 948 (1907) . The vicinage language
is geared more toward allowing jurors to have familiarity with the location of a
crime scene than it is to dictate place of trial . Venue, on the other hand, is a
statutory enactment establishing where a case must be tried . Although there
is some confusion on this, current law does not deem venue to be
jurisdictional . See Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 698 S .W.2d 832, 835 (Ky. 1985) ;
Bedell v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W .2d 779, 781 (Ky . 1993) . Though the older
versions of the venue statutes expressly stated that the concept was
jurisdictional, the modern statutes do not. Compare Ky. Stat. §1143 - 1147
(1936) (section titled "Jurisdiction of the Courts" and using the word
"jurisdiction" instead of "venue"), with KRS 452 .510 - 452.650 (enacted in
1962 and using only the word "venue") .
However, Kentucky statutory law and case law have continued to accord
a special status to venue. In criminal matters, KRS 452.510 requires, unless
otherwise provided by law, that venue of criminal prosecutions be in the county
4
or city in which the offen
was committed. This incarnation of the statute was
drafted in 1962, but follows older versions. This notion of venue has long been
the law. See Castle v. Commonwealth , 200 Ky. 577, 255 S .W. 151 (1923)
(holding that prosecutions must be confined to offens s committed within the
county, and the indictment must describe the offense, time and place of
commission) .
Much of the confusion about venue and jurisdiction comes from the
evolution of our statutory schema . Prior to 1962, venue was a jurisdictional
fact because the statutes of the time said so, and it had frequently been treated
as such . As Commissioner Stanley wrote,
The Bills of Rights of the Constitution of Kentucky (Section 11),
and of the Federal Constitution (Sixth Amendment) declare that a
person convicted of a crime shall be tried by a jury of the district or
vicinage wherein the crime was committed, except as provision for
a change of venue may be made . Section 1145, Kentucky Statutes,
declares that all offenses shall be tried in the courts of the county
in which they were committed, except in cases otherwise provided
for. Section 18 of the Criminal Code of Practice prescribes the
local jurisdiction of circuit courts "shall be of offenses committed
within the respective counties in which they are held."
Rounds v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 657, 139 S .W.2d 736, 738 (1940) . But see
Stewart v. Sampson, 285 Ky. 447, 148 S.W.2d 278, 281-82 (1941) ("The term
`jurisdiction' has been variously and many times erroneously applied and
confused with the related question of `venue', the latter of which relates
exclusively to the situs of the particular court in which-according to the
practice of the forum-the action should be brought. Correctly speaking, such
questions do not relate to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matters
involved, but only to the particular court wherein the action is localized,
notwithstanding all other courts of the same class within the sovereignty
possess jurisdiction of like subject matters. Whether or not a court in which an
action is brought and is pending is one of proper venue generally depends upon
collateral facts with reference to the residence of litigants, and other matters
localizing the action, and it is universally held that an erroneous decision of the
court in the determination of the facts required for such localizing does not
render its judgment void but only erroneous and until it is set aside in some
manner provided by law it remains valid in all respects .") . Thus, there was
little question that venue was jurisdictional at that time. This view was
reaffirmed in the landmark venue case, Woosley v. Commonwealth , which
stated,
Venue is a jurisdictional fact of locality charged in the indictment
and put in issue by a plea of not guilty. Venue must be proved . .
293 S.W.2d at 626 .
Things began to change in 1962, however, when the present set of
criminal venue statutes was enacted . The new statutes no longer state that
venue was jurisdictional .' The change led this Court's predecessor to declare,
"As the Commonwealth points out, the prosecution of a charge in the circuit
court of the wrong county is not a jurisdictional defect but one of venue, which
can be waived." Chancellor v. Commonwealth, 438 S .W .2d 783, 784 (Ky. 1969)
(emphasis added) . By 1985, significant changes had occurred in the
constitutional and structural make-up of the courts of the Commonwealth,
' Sections 1143 to 1147 of the old Kentucky Statutes, which included the
"jurisdiction" language, were recodified in 1942 at KRS 431 .010 to 43 1 .050, which in
turn were repealed in 1962 when the new versions were enacted .
6
with the 1976 Judicial Article having made Kentucky a state with a unified
court system.
In light of all these changes, this Court undertook to clarify the current
state of venue and jurisdiction in Commonwealth v. Cheeks as follows :
The jurisdiction to preside over the prosecution of offenses
committed in this state is vested in the circuit courts. . . . The
proper forum in which the case is to be prosecuted is the circuit
court in the county or city in which the offense was committed.
In the past, it has been erroneously stated that a circuit
court has no "jurisdiction" over the prosecution of an offense that
has been wholly committed in another county. The circuit courts of
this state are never without "jurisdiction" to preside over the
prosecution of offenses committed in Kentucky : rather, KRS
452 .510 stipulates that "venue" is improper in the circuit court of
a county other than that in which the offense has been committed.
698 S .W.2d 832, 834-35 (citations omitted) .
Because of these systemic changes, the Court then described the
relationship of venue to a prosecution:
"Venue" then is merely a statutory prescription that the
prosecution be in the county in which the offense has been
committed and that the prosecution is in a court which has
"jurisdiction" to preside over the case, i.e. the circuit court of that
county. The statutory prescription also requires proof by the
prosecutor that the offense did in fact occur in the county in which
the case is being prosecuted .
Id . a t 835 (emphasis added) .
The most important aspect of modern venue law, however, is a point
touched on by Chancellor: that KRS 452 .650 allows a defendant to waive venue
of a prosecution . The statute further states that failure to make a timely
motion to transfer prosecution to the proper county shall be deemed a waiver of
the venue of the prosecution. If venue is improper in the county where an
indictment is brought, the action can be transferred to a county where venue is
7
proper upon a timely motion. RCr 8.26 . Current law requires that such a
motion be made prior to trial for it to be timely under KRS 452 .650 . See
FAison v . Commonwealth, 405 S .W.2d 943, 945 (Ky. 1966) (requiring motion to
transfer be made prior to trial to be timely) . In fact, in his brief, Appellant
admits, "Any problem with the venue of the prosecution had been waived by
the defense by failing to [raise the issue] prior to the start of the first trial."
Thus, this Court concludes that the Barren Circuit Court was not
without jurisdiction to try Appellant . At most, Appellant enjoyed a statutory
right to be tried in the county where the crime occurred. However, it is clear
that Appellant waived this venue right by failing to raise the issue prior to the
beginning of his trial in Barren County.
This conclusion, however, does not resolve the case before this Court
because the Barren. Circuit Court ended Appellant's trial and prosecution in
Barren County and allowed him to be reindicted in neighboring Metcalfe
County.
B. Double jeopardy
A defendant may not be tried twice for the same crime . U.S . Const.
amend . V ; Ky. Const. § 13 . The core of the protection afforded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause is the "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal." Crist v._Bretz, 437 U.S . 28, 36 (1978) (internal quotation marks
omitted) . KRS 505.030 establishes that a prosecution for a violation of the
same statutory provision based on the same facts is barred by the former
prosecution when a defendant is acquitted or was convicted and the conviction
has not been set aside; there was insufficient evidence ; a final order or
8
judgment has not been set aside which required a factual determination
inconsistent with one necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution;
or the former prosecution was improperly terminated . See also Graham v.
Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1978) . However, under United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S . 82 (1979), double jeopardy is not violated when t e mistrial is
both the result of a defendant's motion and does not turn on issues related to
guilt.
Clearly, jeopardy had attached in Appellant's first trial because the jury
had been empanelled and sworn.
noted States v. Martin Line
U.S . 564, 569 (1977) . The question then is whether Appellant's retrial was
barred by double jeopardy .
Appellant attempts to demonstrate a double jeopardy bar by fitting what
happened at his first trial under the proscriptions in KRS 505 .030 under the
theory that the trial court's dismissal/ mistrial was effectively a directed verdict
in his favor. The problem with this is that venue is neither jurisdictional (as
discussed above) nor is it an element of any offense (as admitted by Appellant's
brief) . And as this Court's predecessor noted, venue "does not affect the issue
of guilt or innocence ." Rounds, 139 S .W.2d at 737 . Because venue and the
determination of any facts related to it do not affect guilt, a court's decision to
terminate a trial for want of proper venue cannot amount to an acquittal . An
acquittal requires either the judge or jury to evaluate and weigh the evidence
related to guilt and to determine that it is legally insufficient to sustain a
conviction. That did not occur here.
The fact that the trial court was under the mistaken impression that
venue was a necessary element and initially described its action as a dismissal
does not change this, since "'the trial judge's characterization of his own action
cannot control the classification of the action ."' Scott, 437 U .S. at 96 (quoting
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 478 n-7 (1971)) . The trial judge ended the
trial after it began and before a verdict was reached on grounds unrelated to
guilt or innocence : such action constitutes a mistrial . See R , dford v .- Lovelace,
212 S .W.3d 2, 78 (Ky. 2006) (-'[A] mistrial, by definition, does not dispose of
the merits of a case or necessarily preclude future litigation . . . ."' (quoting
Macklin v . Ryan, 672 S.W .2d 60, 61 (Ky. 1984)) . The trial court recognized this
notion by describing his ruling as a mistrial in the written order entered after
the oral "dismissal ."
This same reasoning applies to the fact that Appellant requested a
dismissal (rather than a . mistrial), which he argues was more of a directed
verdict motion, though he now admits that it was improper . Because Appellant
asked to end the proceeding before the merits could be addressed by the jury,
he actually asked for a mistrial. (A dismissal of the indictment could follow,
but the trial had to be ended first.) There can be no question that when
defense counsel asked for a dismissal, he knew the court's reasoning and
intentions because he had just heard the court explain to the jury that the case
was to be dismissed without prejudice and that the Commonwealth could
choose to reindict in Metcalfe County . Thus, the substance of the requested
relief, much like the substance of the relief itself, is the key. ' Appellant's
action, whatever its name, ended the trial and prevented the case from being
10
submitted to the jury, thus makin it very similar to what happened in Scott,
which the U.S. Supreme Court described as follows:
[11n the present case, respondent successfully avoided . . .a
submission of the . . . indictment by persuading the trial court to
dismiss it on a basis which did not depend on guilt or innocence .
He was thus neither acquitted nor convicted, because he himself
successfully undertook to persuade the trial court not to submit
the issue of guilt or innocence to the jury which had been
empaneled to try him .
Scott, 437 U .S. at 99 .
This means that Appellant's subsequent prosecution in Metcalf County
was not barred because there is no double jeopardy violation "where the
defendant himself seeks to have the trial terminated without any submission to
either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence . . . ." Scott, 437 U.S. at 1Q1
.
Appellant implies that Scott is not controlling because the dismissal/ mistrial
was the result of an agreement between the defense and the prosecution . That
the Commonwealth had no objection to Appellant's motion, however, does not
change the fact that Appellant's own motion led to the trial court's decision to
end the trial. See id. at 98-99 (IqrL a case such as this the defendant, by
deliberately choosing to seek termination of the proceedings against him on a
basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is
accused, suffers no injury cogrdzable under the Double Jeopardy Clause - .") . Simply put, the interests protected by Double Jeopardy Clause are not
implicated where a defendant initiates and receives (and perhaps where one
consents to) a termination of the proceedings against him that is not related to
guilt or the lack thereof. Id .. at 98 ("This is scarcely a picture of an all-powerful
state relentlessly pursuing a defendant who had either been found not guilty or
11
who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier
of fact. It is instead a picture of a defendant who chooses to avoid conviction
and imprisonment, not because of his assertion that the Government has failed
to make out a case against him, but because of a legal claim that the
Government's case against him must fail even though it might satisfy the 'trier
of fact that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.") The rule to be applied by this Court is perhaps best summed up by the
following:
Where . . . a defendant successfully seeks to avoid his trial prior to
its conclusion by a motion for mistrial, the Double Jeopardy
Clause is not offended 10, a second prosecution . "[A] motion by the
defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier
to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by
a prosecutorial or judicial error." Such a motion by the defendant
is deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued
his
right to have
guilt or innocence determined before the first trier
of fact.
Id . at 93-94 (quoting United States v . Jorn,, 400 U.S . 470, 485 (1971))
(alteration in original) . The application of this rule to this case is thus simple:
Because Appellant moved to terminate the proceedings against him in Barren
County on grounds unrelated to his lack of guilt, he voluntarily elected not to
be tried by the sitting Barren County jury, and his subsequent reprosecution in
Metcalfe County was not barred by double jeopardy.
III. Conclusion
This case has unusual facts that serve to juxtapose the concepts of
venue and double jeopardy, and allow for clarification of both . Because venue
is a statutory prescription, of where the trial should be held, Appellant was
initially entitled to have his case tried in Metcalfe County where the crime
12
actually occurred . Venue, however, is waivable under IRS 452 .650 . To avoid
such a waiver, improper'venue must be raised prior to trial. Appellant did not
raise the issue of improper venue in this case prior to his first trial, thus he
waived any venue right he might have had.
Once the first trial began and a Barren County jury was selected and
sworn, Appellant had a right to be tried by that jury. This is where a second
and different type of waiver occurred . Appellant waived any claim to a double
jeopardy violation in a subsequent trial in Metcalfe County when he made a
motion to end the Barren County trial on grounds other than guilt or non-guilt.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
Abramson, Cunningham, Schroder and Venters, JJ ., concur. Minton,
C.J., and Scott, J ., concur in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Thomas More Ransdell
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway,
Attorney General
Bryan Darwin Morrow
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.