J.D. HAMMONS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : NOVEMBER 26, 2008
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2004-SC-000838-DG
J.D. HAMMONS
V.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2004-CA-001233-MR
LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT NO . 99-CR-00189
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
VACATING AND REMANDING
Appellant, J.D . Hammons was sentenced to life imprisonment based on
the testimony of a seven-year old child ("M .V.") who later recanted and
admitted she tells lies about people who make her mad, and who was mad at
Appellant for having "switched" her. His conviction and sentence was affirmed
by this Court on direct appeal. Appellant, pro-se, filed an RCr 11 .42 motion
alleging that the child witness was incompetent, and that trial counsel was
ineffective for not investigating nor challenging the child's competency. The
trial court, applying an incorrect standard for competency, denied the RCr
11 .42 motion without an evidentiary hearing . Appellant, assisted by an inmate
legal aid, missed the deadline for timely filing an appeal from the trial court's
denial of the motion. The Court of Appeals denied Appellant's motion for a
belated appeal . We granted discretionary review to determine whether
Appellant is entitled to a belated appeal from the denial of his RCr 11 .42
motion.
The record raises a serious question of fact as to competency of the child
witness . And in spite of numerous red flags, trial counsel did not challenge
competency, which raises a question of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Because the issues raised by Appellant in the RCr 11 .42 motion cannot be
resolved on the face of the record, Appellant was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing and the appointment of counsel on the motion . Therefore, under
Moore v. Commonwealth. and 'Hawkins v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 132 (Ky.
2006), he is entitled to a belated appeal.
A review of the record indicates the following . Appellant and his wife
Sheila operated the Hammons' Little Rascals Day Care Center in Laurel
The
County, Kentucky .
day care consisted of two trailers, one of which was
also J.D. and Sheila's home. M.V. and her younger sister, C .V., stayed at the
day, care approximately every other weekend and sometimes every weekend,
beginning in July, 1999 . At this time M.V. was seven years old and C .V. was
five . Their mother, Tracy, testified that the children would sometimes ask to go
to the day- care because they liked Sheila and the activities. Tracy testified the
children said they didn't like J.D . because he'd use a big switch and hit them
in the back. Prior to M.Ws attending the day care, Tracy had taken her for
counseling ; because of M.Ws interest in sex and body parts. The counselor
told Tracy that this was just a stage children go through. M.V. also had a
history of urinary tract infections before ever attending the day care.
The last time the children stayed at the day care was the weekend of
October 24, 1999 . The Monday after, Tracy and the children were at her
cousin's house. C .V. had mentioned previously that J.D . had taken a "big
switch" and hit the kids on the back. That day, C .V. mentioned the switching
again, and M.V. said the same thing. Tracy's cousin started asking M.V. about
sleeping arrangements at
the
day- care, when M.V. apparently made an
allegation of rape against J .D. Law enforcement became involved, and
Appellant was ultimately indicted on five counts of rape, one count of sodomy,
and one count of sexual abuse . The indictment charged the five counts of rape
as occurring on or about July 31, 1999; August 7, 1999 : August 21, 1999;
September 4, 1999, and September 25, 1999; the sodomy count occurring on
or about September 25, 1999 ; and the sexual abuse count occurring on or
about July 31, 1999.
At trial, the prosecutor used simple examples to show M.V. knew the
difference between truth and lie. However, when asked what happens when
you tell a lie, she didn't know. Nevertheless, she promised to tell the truth, and
questioning resumed without any objection by defense counsel. M.1% testified
that when she spent the night at the day care, sometimes she would sleep in
"the little bedroom", 1 sometimes she would sleep on the couch in the living
I Apparently referring to the bedroom with the child-size beds, which, on crossexamination, MY. admitted she slept in a lot .
room, and sometimes she would sleep in J .D .'s bedroom. M.V. said she would
sleep beside Sheila, and J.D . would be on the other side of Sheila, and C .V.
would be in the crib. M.V. testified that sometimes Sheila wasn't there and
that it would just be her and J.D. in the bed. When asked what J.D . did that
she didn't like, she said that J .D. stuck his tongue in her "private" and "it hurt
real bad." When asked to tell another thing that happened, she testified that
J.D . put his "private" in her "private" . When asked if this happened once or
more than once, she said "more than once." When asked if she knew how
many times it happened, she did not know. When asked if it happened on the
same weekend or different weekends, she said different weekends. She then
said "he does it all the time." When asked if he did anything else that she
didn't like, M.V. said that Appellant put his finger in her "private" and that she
had a kidney infection because of it.
Following the prosecutor's direct examination of M.V., the trial court
expressed concern as to the "private in the private" issue, because M.Ws
response of "more than once", could be interpreted as that it only happened
twice.2 Therefore, the prosecutor re-asked M.V. about how many times it
happened. He asked M.V. if it happened five times, more than five times, or
less. M.V. said "more than five." When asked to count to five, however, M.V.
was silent. When asked if she could hold up five fingers, the 'camera was off of
M.V., so it is not clear what she did. Appellant's assertion in his RCr 11 .42
motion was that she did nothing. The prosecutor asked again if it happened
2
The indictment charged five counts of rape.
We times or less than five times. M.V. said "more than five ." When asked if
she was sure it didn't just happen two times, M.V. was silent. When asked if
it
she thought happened ten times or less than ten times M.V. was silent.
When the prosecutor asked if it happened 10,000 times, M.V. was silent. The
camera was off of M.V., so it is unclear if she even gestured. No objection by
defense counsel was raised as to competency . On cross-examination, when
asked if she had talked to anybody about what she was going to say today
before she came in, she said "John", apparently referring to the prosecutor,
John Forgy. Defense counsel did not explore with the M.V. the consequences
of lying, nor whether she knew the difference between five times, ten, or ten
thousand, all issues relating to competency which were put in question on
direct examination.
Sheila Hammons testified that, according to her records, there was only
one time, October 9, when J.D . would have been alone at night in the trailer
with M.V. and C.V. Sheila explained that this was because there were more
overnight children at the day care than usual and she had to stay in the other
trailer with other children . Sheila testified that the last time she checked on
them that evening, at about 10:00 p.m., M.V. was asleep on the couch and C.V.
in the crib . She said that M.V. and C .V. were still asleep, in the same places,
when she got them up for breakfast in the morning. She testified that the
September 25 charges in the indictment could not have happened, as the day
care was closed that weekend because she and J.D. had gone to Dollywood in
Tennessee. The Dollywood receipt was entered into evidence. Sheila testified
that, according to her records, MY. and C .V. also did not attend the day care
the weekend of September 4 . 3
J.D. Hammons testified in his own defense and denied all of the
hit
allegations . He said that he would
the kids on the legs with a little stick if
they got to "fussin' and fightin"'.
Appellant was convicted of three counts of first-degree rape (allegedly
occurring on July 31, August 7, and August 21}, along with the sodomy charge
(allegedly occurring on September 25) and sexual abuse charge (allegedly
occurring on July 3 1) . He was found not guilty of the rape charges allegedly
occurring on September ,4 and September 25. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to this CoUrt.4
On August 5, 2002, M.Ws grandmother, Brenda, who then had
guardianship of M.V., called the Commonwealth Attorney's office to report that
M.V. had told her she had lied about Appellant raping her. Brenda was told to
contact Appellant's attorney, which she did. On August 6, Appellant's counsels
came to Brenda's home and took a taped statement from M.V., who was now
ten years old. She admitted that none of the things she said in court that J .D.
did were true. MY. said that she had lied about J.D . because he had switched
her on the back and her mom wanted to get him locked up. M.Ws explanation
as to why she was telling the truth now was that it was wrong for J .D. to be
Another of the five counts of rape charged in the indictment was alleged to have
occurred on or about September 4 .
4 2000-SC-0574-MR
5 Subsequent counsel, as trial counsel had apparently passed away by this time.
3
locked up for the rest of his life for something her mother put her up to doing .
When asked if she would be willing to say this in court, M.V. said "no", because
she was afraid she would be sent to "juvenile" for having lied about J.D . 6
When M.V. was asked if she would say this in court if they worked it out so she
wouldn't go to juvenile, M.V. agreed she would. M.V. also said that her mother
had raped her, with her fingers.
On August 22, 2002, Appellant, through counsel, filed in the Laurel
Circuit Court a "Motion for New Trial Based on the Complaining Witness in this
Case Admitting That She Lied About Being Sexually Abused", pursuant to CR
60 .02 . Subsequently, M.V. was interviewed by a Kentucky State Police
detective, accompanied by a social worker, regarding the recantation. M.V.
said she "told all those lies on" J.D . and said he raped her because she was
mad at him because he switched her on the back. Asked why she would say
that, M.V. said it was because she got mad at him. The detective asked how a
seven year old would know to say "rape" and what rape means. M.V. said her
mama said its when somebody hurts you . M.V. said that sometimes when she
gets mad at someone "I go off, tell certain lies and people believe me and stuff."
When asked if anyone told her to lie on J.D ., she said her mama did. The
detective told M.V. that she did not believe that M.V. was telling the truth now,
and that she thought that things had happened between her and J.D. M.V.
then said her grandmother said J.D. hadn't done those things, and was worried
that her grandmother would get mad if she said he had. The detective told
6 M.V. had been sent to a juvenile facility several months earlier for stealing .
M.V. that she wanted her to tell the truth, and her grandmother wouldn't be
mad. M.V. then agreed with the detective that J.D . had done the things she
had said before. The detective and social worker told M.V. she wasn't in
trouble, and they were proud of M.V . for telling the truth. M.V . explained she
had been afraid of going to "juvie" after talking to J.D .'s lawyer . The detective
had repeatedly told M.V. that she needed to know who told her to say it didn't
happen, and M.V. finally said her grandmother, because her grandmother
thought M.V. was lying about it. When the detective told M.V., that, because of
her testimony against J .D. no other children would get hurt, M.V . said that
wasn't true because she (M.V.) had raped her nine year old cousin. The
detective, a bit stunned, again asked M.V. what "rape" means . M.V. responded
that it was when somebody hurts somebody else . No further explanation of the
meaning of rape was elicited and M.V. was told they weren't there about the
cousin. When the detective asked M.V. if her mother had hurt her with her
fingers, M.V. said no . When asked why she had said it, M.V. said her
grandmother said it. When asked again, she said nobody told her to say that.
When asked again, M.V. said her grandmother said that her mom did it, and
that she "went along with her." The social worker told M.V. they believed her
(M .V.) in the beginning (first interview about J.D.) and she believes her now.
The detective told M.V. that she was not in trouble and that she was proud of
her for telling the truth. The social worker also told M.V. she was not in
trouble . The social worker asked M.V . if she doesn't feel better for telling the
truth? M.V. said "no". The social worker added, it's a big load off your
shoulders, isn't it? The detective answered she thought it was, and the social
worker said again she was very proud. M.Ws reaction_ - "I feel like telling lies .
. . I'm kidding!" M.V., laughing, said she tells lies on her boyfriend. A brief
discussion ensued about her boyfriend, when the conversation turned to M.Ws
parents. Asked about her father's whereabouts, M.V. at first said she didn't
know, but then said he was with the drug dealers. When asked where her
mother was, she said with the drug dealers.
The trial court held a hearing on the CR 60 .02 motion on December 3,
2002. At the hearing, M.Ws grandmother, Brenda, vehemently denied ever
telling M.V. to recant or that her mother had raped her. Her version of the
recantation was as follows. M.V. and C.V. had been staying with Brenda
because their mother could not take care of them at the time. M.V. was
outside playing with C.V., when C .V. was observed with her clothes down,
apparently masturbating. C.V . told Brenda that M.V. had done it to her.
Brenda brought M .V. inside and told her that just because she had been hurt
by J .D., she could not go around and hurt other children. At that time, M.V.
allegedly told Brenda that J.D . didn't really do anything to her, that she made
it up. When Brenda asked M.V. why she would say such a thing if were not
true, M.V. told her that she was mad at J.D. for having switched her and did
not want to go back there, so she said he raped her. That was the first
inclination Brenda had that M.V. had not been abused by J.D. After Brenda
expressed concern that J.D. was in prison for something he did not do, and
said she was going to call the authorities, M.V. got worried that she was going
to go to juvenile for having lied about J.D . M.V. also told Brenda that her
mother had raped her.
At the hearing, M.V. was told she would not get into trouble for whatever
she says, and they wanted her to tell the truth. M.V. had just started living
with her mother again at the time of the hearing, and said she wanted to live
with her mom. M.V. testified that her recantation wasn't true, and that J .D.
had done the things she said before. When asked about her previous
accusation that her mother had raped her with her fingers, she said that was
not true. When asked why she had said her mother raped her, M.V. said she
didn't know. M.V. admitted that she tells lies about people when she gets mad
at them. M.V. said that she was pretty sure J .D. had switched her and C.V. on
the back because they had red marks. When M.V. was reminded that she had
previously said her mother put her up to lying about J.D . to get him locked up,
M.V. denied this and said her grandmother had said that her mom was trying
to get money off of J.D.
Following the hearing, the trial court denied the CR 60 .02 motion.
Appellant, through counsel, appealed the denial. Appellant subsequently fired
his counsel to proceed pro-se, and requested the appeal from the CR 60.02
filed by counsel be, and it was, dismissed.
Appellant, pro-se, filed the RCr 11 .42 motion which is the subject of this
appeal. Therein, Appellant raised the issue that M.V. was not competent to
testify, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's not having
investigated and discovered M.V. had fabricated the story and for not
10
challenging M.Ws competency at trial. The motion also alleged counsel's
terminal illness had affected his performance . 7 The trial court denied the RCr
11 .42 motion without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant, uneducated and
relying on an inmate legal aid for assistance, missed the filing deadline for
appealing the trial court's denial of the RCr 11 .42 motion . The Court of
Appeals denied Appellant's motion for a belated appeal, citing its opinion in
Merrick v. Commonwealth, 132 S.W.3d 220 (Ky.App. 2004) . In Merrick, the
Court of Appeals opined, in dictum, that the belated appeal procedure was not
available in collateral proceedings . Appellant's motion for discretionary review
was held in abeyance pending this Court's decision in the consolidated cases of
Moore v. Commonwealth and Hawkins v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 132 (Ky.
2006). After the decision was rendered in Moore and Hawkins, we accepted
discretionary review, and appointed appellate counsel, to decide whether,
under the standard set forth in Moore and Hawkins, Appellant is entitled to a
belated appeal from the denial of his RCr 11 .42 motion .
In Moore and Hawkins we rejected the dictum in Merrick, and held that a
belated appeal is permitted from the denial of a collateral attack, if the
necessity for the belated appeal is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
We held that an individual proceeding pro-se is entitled to a belated appeal
from the denial of a collateral attack, if he was erroneously denied the
assistance of counsel in the collateral proceeding. Id.
7
Trial counsel apparently passed away from cancer a year after the trial.
Hawkins and Moore each filed a pro-se RCr 11 .42 motion to vacate his
judgment and sentence. In Hawkins' case, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on the motion, and appointed the Department of Public Advocacy to
represent Hawkins . The trial court ultimately denied Hawkins' RCr 11 .42
motion. Hawkins. directed his counsel to appeal the denial, but counsel missed
the filing deadline due to a mailing error. We recognized that missing a filing
deadline is per se ineffective assistance . Because Hawkins was entitled to
effective assistance of counsel in the RCr 11 .42 proceedings, we held that his
belated appeal should be granted. Moore, 199 S.W.3d at 139 .
In Moore's case, the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the
RCr 11 .42 motion, and no counsel was appointed for Moore . The trial court
ultimately denied the motion. Moore proceeding pro-se, filed his notice of
appeal more than two months late . We held that if Moore had been
erroneously denied the appointment of counsel on his RCr 11 .42 motion, then
he would be entitled to a belated appeal. Therefore, in Moore's case, we looked
to see if he had been entitled to counsel in the RCr 11 .42 proceeding. We held
that because the allegations raised in his RCr 11 .42 action could be
determined on the face of the record without an evidentiary hearing, Moore was
not entitled to appointment of counsel. Because he therefore had no right to
effective assistance of counsel in the RCr 11 .42 proceedings, we concluded
that, while he was entitled to appeal, it was his obligation to exercise that right
properly. Accordingly, we held Moore was not entitled to a belated appeal. Id.
at 140.
12
Under Moore and Hawkins , if Appellant was entitled to the appointment
of counsel on his RCr 11 .42 motion, then this total deficiency of representation
would justify a belated appeal. A movant is entitled to appointment of counsel
on an RCr 11 .42 motion if he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing thereon. An
evidentiary hearing is required if the RCr 11 .42 motion raises an issue of
material fact which cannot be conclusively resolved on the face of the record .
RCr 11 .42(5) ; Commonwealth v. Stamps , 672 S.W.2d 336 (Ky. 1984) ; Fraser v.
Commonwealth , 59 S.W. 3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001); Mills v. Commonwealth , 170
S.W.3d 310, 338 (Ky. 2005) . We have taken pains to recite pertinent parts of
the record to graphically show the need for a hearing. There is clearly an issue
of material fact (which cannot be resolved from the record) as to M.V.'s
competency.
KRE 601(b)(2) requires that a witness have the capacity to recollect facts .
A witness who does not know if something happened ten times or ten thousand
times raises a serious KRE 601(b)(2) question. Yet, counsel did not object, nor
cross-examine on M.V.'s ability to recall. And, a child who would agree that
something happened "more than five" times, but cannot count to five, certainly
raises a question. The record does not demonstrate M.V. knew how many "five"
was. When asked, the camera was not on her. She made no sounds. Did she
hold up five fingers? A material fact that the record does not explain. If M.V.
did not even hold up five fingers, as Appellant claims, and counsel did not
object, which he did not, there was ineffective assistance .
KRE 601 (b) (4) requires that a witness understand the obligation to tell
the truth. Competency is an ongoing determination for a trial court .
Kentucky v. Stinger, 482 U.S. 730, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1987) .
The trial court recognized that it was required to consider the record developed
in the CR 60.02 proceedings, in reviewing M.Ws competency for purposes of
the RCr 11 .42 motion.8 But then it applied the wrong standard, concluding
that just knowing the "difference between a lie and the truth" sufficed. This is
only half of what KRE 601(b)(4) requires. Competency requires more than just
knowing what "truth" means, it requires a witness understand the obligation to
tell it.
An appellate court may consider a trial court's competency determination
from a review of the entire record. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 107 S . Ct . 2658,
96 L. Ed. 2d 631 . What is M.Ws concept of the obligation to tell the truth?
The question was never asked and answered. The record doesn't answer this
for us, but only raises disturbing questions. The record gives evidence of the
following. When M .V. is mad at someone, she "lies on them" . She changes her
stories with impunity. At trial, M .V. didn't know what happens if you tell a lie.
Throughout this case, it was conveyed to M.V. (by the detective, social worker,
defense counsel, the mother, the prosecutor) that if she told the truth "now"
she would not get into trouble for past lies. But what is M.Ws concept of the
obligation to tell the truth? Even after being told by the detective and social
8 Finding no problem with M.Ws competency to testify as a witness, the trial court
concluded there could be no ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's not having
challenged it.
14
worker that they were proud of her for going back to the "truth", M.V. joked
that she had just lied, before saying she was just kidding. Her statements that
she raped her cousin were dismissed . Her statements that her mother had
raped her were not resolved. And it was perfectly alright to end their interview
laughing about the lies M.V. tells on her boyfriend .
Clearly, there is an issue as to M.Ws understanding of the obligation to
tell the truth, which is not resolved on the face of the record . Thus there is a
question of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, because counsel did not even
question M.Ws competency . Because Appellant's RCr 11 .42 motion raises
issues of material fact which cannot be resolved from the face of the record, he
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel on the
motion. Accordingly, under Moore and Hawkins, he is entitled to a belated
appeal of the trial court's denial of his RCr 11 .42 motion. Therefore, we must
vacate and remand to the Court of Appeals with instructions to grant the
belated appeal. Inherent in our decision that Appellant was entitled to a
belated appeal is the conclusion that he was erroneously denied an evidentiary
hearing on the RCr 11 .42 motion in the trial court. Therefore the Court of
Appeals will need to vacate the trial court's denial of the RCr 11 .42 motion and
remand the matter back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not challenging competency .
For the aforementioned reasons, the order of the Court of Appeals
denying the belated appeal is vacated and the matter remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Amy Robinson Staples
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Ste. 301
Frankfort, KY 40601
Dennis James Burke
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
207 Parker Drive, Ste. 1
LaGrange, KY 40031
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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