RUSSELLVILLE WAREHOUSING V. KHRIS BASSHAM, DECEASED, ET AL.
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RENDERED : November 1, 2007
TO BE PUBLISHED
,Sillitrrmt Courf Of
2006-SC-000885-WC
RUSSELLVILLE WAREHOUSING
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2006-CA-001224-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 02-64829
KHRIS BASSHAM, DECEASED ;
GLENDA BASSHAM, SURVIVING SPOUSE
OF KHRIS BASSHAM ;
HON. R. SCOTT BORDERS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Among the grounds for reopening a final workers' compensation award are newly
discovered evidence and mistake . An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the
defendant-employer's motion to reopen, which was based upon evidence that came
into existence after an award was rendered and changed a medical expert's opinion
regarding causation . Although the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) affirmed
insofar as the evidence did not come within the legal concept of newly discovered
evidence, a majority reversed on the ground of mistake . The Court of Appeals found
the Board's construction of what constituted "mistake" to be so broad as to undermine
the doctrine of res iudicata and reversed on that basis. We affirm .
Khris Bassham was born in 1952 and graduated from high school with no
specialized or vocational training . He was exposed to manganese dust for about seven
years in the course of his work, which included loading 50-pound bags of manganese
powder into a bin . Early in 2002, he began to lose weight and to have difficulty sleeping
and negotiating stairs . Later, he developed a tremor in his hands and greater difficulty
walking. He last worked in October 2002 and was referred to a neurologist shortly
thereafter. After testing revealed a level of manganese in his blood that was nearly 2
'/2
times the normal limit, Bassham filed an application for benefits. His wife testified at
the June 2004 hearing on his behalf . She stated that his weight had dropped to 84
pounds. His arms and legs were contracted ; he was unable to move by his own
volition; and he was on a feeding tube, oxygen, and a catheter.
Dr. Hoos, a neurologist who evaluated Bassham at Vanderbilt University on
December 30, 2002, noted that his speech was sometimes slurred . His gait was
abnormal . He kept his feet wide apart, and he was unsteady. His main complaint was
difficulty walking. Dr. Hoos stated that blood studies ruled out neuropathy, immunologic
causes of neuropathy, immunologic conditions that may be associated with an
underlying cancer, and myasthenia gravis. He explained that manganese targets the
nervous system and that the classic symptoms of manganese toxicity resemble those of
Parkinson's disease; however, Bassham had symptoms that involved the cerebellum
and were not typical of Parkinson's . Dr. Hoos acknowledged that he had never seen a
case of manganese toxicity, did not know the full spectrum of the condition, and would
not be surprised to learn that it caused problems with the cerebellum . Nonetheless, he
diagnosed an organic ataxia due to a disease of the nervous system. In February 2003
he noted that a brain MRI was normal. He continued to think that the high manganese
blood level was work-related but that Bassham's symptoms were not due to manganese
toxicity .
Dr. Nausieda specialized in Parkinson's disease and other movement disorders
and ultimately became Bassham's treating neurologist . In the first of three depositions,
Dr. Nausieda stated that manganese is one of the toxins known to produce
Parkinsonian symptoms. He explained that an elevated manganese level is a common
feature in Parkinson's disease and that he had studied the relationship since the early
1970s . He noted that the physicians at Vanderbilt had tested Bassham exhaustively for
inherited ataxias and syndromes known to occur in some cancer patients but that all
tests were negative . Despite finding highly elevated blood manganese levels, they had
dismissed the possibility of manganese toxicity . Instead, they diagnosed progressive
ataxia, which is an imbalance syndrome related to cerebellar dysfunction. Dr. Nausieda
testified that he first saw Bassham in March 2003, at which time he showed a severe
gait disturbance, could not walk without full assistance despite keeping his legs wide
apart, had a masked face, and appeared to be acutely psychotic. He diagnosed acute
manganism with neuropsychiatric manifestations and a spastic ataxic gait and noted
that the symptoms resembled those of workers in third-world countries who have been
exposed to raw manganese.
Dr. Nausieda noted that Bassham's manganese levels remained abnormally high
in April 2003 . Biochemical screens were normal ; copper, mercury, and lead levels were
normal; and there was no evidence of infection or inflammatory disease. An
electroencephalogram revealed pathologically slow brain wave activity. The most
recent brain MRI revealed mild generalized atrophy that was consistent with some type
of toxic effect. Medication helped reduce the symptoms temporarily, but by mid-June
Bassham was significantly worse and totally dependent on others. He had deteriorated
even more by September and required round-the-clock care . Dr. Nausieda concluded
that his symptoms resulted from manganese toxicity and that all other conditions had
been ruled out.
Dr. Gray performed a neuropsychological evaluation in June 2003. He stated
that he data he obtained was consistent with a neuro-toxic encephalopathy and that
Bassham's neuro-cognitive profile and progressive decline were consistent with the
literature concerning manganese toxicity. He acknowledged, however, that his
background regarding manganese exposure was limited and deferred to Dr. Nausieda.
Dr. Wolens, a specialist in occupational and environmental medicine, examined
Bassham for the employer in February 2004. He stated that he suspected manganese
toxicity initially, but his research indicated that Bassham's rapid and profound
deterioration and his diffuse cortical atrophy were unprecedented in the medical
literature. Dr. Wolens reviewed air sampling data regarding the employer's facility and
stated in a supplemental report that the cumulative manganese levels would be
expected to be low and that it was unclear why Bassham's levels had been elevated .
Dr. Corwin, a neurologist, reviewed Bassham's medical records at Dr . Wolens'
request. He diagnosed an organic ataxia of unknown origin . He also listed numerous
differential diagnoses, including chronic meningoencephalitis, lipid storage disorder,
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, cerebrocerebellar degeneration, Alzheimer's disease, Pick's
disease, multi-infarct dementia, head injury, mild chronic epilepsy, neuronal storage
disease, and A.I .D.S. He did not address causation .
Dr. Nausieda testified in a second deposition that, like manganese toxicity, some
of the conditions that Dr. Corwin listed could only be excluded on autopsy. Testing had
ruled out meningoencephalitis, other infections of the nervous system, a bacterial
infectious process, or an immunologic disorder. A test for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
was indeterminate, but the negative EEG and lack of clear-cut serologic data militated
against the diagnosis . Cultures for fungi, anaerobic bacteria, and tuberculosis showed
no growth . He stated that Dr. Corwin had listed diseases that can cause progressive
cognitive decline and severe gait disturbance but had ignored Bassham's occupational
history, which overwhelmingly suggested a more obvious etiology. Likewise, regardless
of how safe Dr. Wolens found the workplace to be, the fact remained that Bassham
handled manganese and had high blood levels of the substance . He attributed the
severity of Bassham's symptoms to the fact that he was exposed to manganese oxide,
while the cases in the medical literature involved other forms of manganese .
Dr. Racette, a specialist in movement disorders at the Washington University
School of Medicine, testified for the employer based on a medical records review and
Dr. Nausieda's deposition . He noted that Bassham's history included a family member
who had died from a prion disease, and he disagreed with most of Dr. Nausieda's
conclusions . He did not think that Bassham suffered from occupational manganism or
that he exhibited either the signs or symptoms of the condition. In his opinion, a more
likely diagnosis was a prion disease, caused by a slow virus, the most commonly-known
form of which is Mad Cow disease . Dr. Racette stated that Bassham's symptoms were
consistent with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, a rapidly-progressing prion disease that is
often characterized by ataxia, dementia, and unsteady gait.
After reviewing Dr. Racette's deposition testimony, Dr. Nausieda stated that it
raised nothing that he had failed to consider and explained why he continued to think
that Bassham's symptoms were due to manganese toxicity. Asked about Mad Cow
disease and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease as possible diagnoses, he stated that the spinal
fluid analysis and electroencephalogram ruled them out.
The AU reviewed the conflicting evidence regarding causation in great detail
and noted that a university evaluation by Dr. Fletcher did not carry presumptive weight
because it did not address the issue. Based on the evidence of work-related
manganese exposure, the elevated blood levels of manganese, and the testimonies of
Drs. Nausieda and Gray, the AU determined ultimately that Bassham suffered from an
occupational disease that manifested itself in a neurological disorder and resulted in
total disability. Neither party appealed ; thus, the decision became final .
Bassham died on November 11, 2004, about two months after the award . His
widow moved to be substituted as a party, attaching a copy of the certified death
certificate . It confirmed that a pathological study was performed at the time of death
and listed the cause of death as apparent manganese poisoning due to probable
exposure to raw manganese . The employer conceded that the widow was entitled to a
continuation of the award under KRS 342 .730(3)(a) ; however, it refused to stipulate that
manganese poisoning was the cause of death. Moreover, it requested a copy of the
pathology report or permission to have an autopsy performed at its own expense . The
AU awarded continuation benefits, noting that there had yet to be a finding that
Bassham's death was work-related .
In May 2005 the widow filed a motion for death benefits. She attached a report
from Dr. Sparks, who had treated Bassham at the Muhlenberg Medical center since
2003. It indicated that post-mortem pathologic studies were not consistent with
Parkinson's disease, which some physicians had diagnosed. It also stated that
manganese is a known neuro-toxin, the symptoms of which are seen more often in
third-world countries where it is handled in its raw state. Dr. Sparks concluded that
Bassham's neurological deterioration and death resulted from manganese toxicity. The
ALJ entered an order on September 12, 2005, that confirmed the continuation of
benefits under KRS 342.730(3)(a) .
On October 31, 2005, the employer filed a motion to reopen, seeking a
revocation of all previous awards on the basis of newly discovered evidence or mistake.
The employer acknowledged that KRS 342.125 did not permit a reopening to affect
sums already paid but requested an order permitting it to terminate payment to
Bassham's widow. Attached to the motion was a September 7, 2005, report from Dr.
Nausieda, stating that the autopsy data did not support a diagnosis of manganese
toxicity and that pathologic examination indicated that Bassham appeared to have
suffered from a slow virus. Moreover, the National Prion Laboratory had confirmed the
presence of Creutzfeldt-Jakob agent in his nervous system, and no evidence suggested
that he had more than one primary neurologic disorder . The employer argued that the
autopsy evidence could not have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence in
the initial proceeding and, in the alternative, that Slone v. R & S Mining, Inc. , 74 S.W.3d
259 (Ky . 2002); Durham v. Copley, 818 S.W .2d 610 (Ky. 1991) ; and Messer v. Drees,
382 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1964), supported a reopening on the ground of mistake.
However, the AU concluded that the employer failed to make a prima facie showing
under either ground .
As the AU noted, Black's Law Dictionary 579 (7' ed . 1999) explains that "newly
discovered evidence" is a legal term of art. It refers to evidence that existed but that
had not been discovered and with the exercise of due diligence could not have been
discovered at the time a matter was decided . Stephens v. Kentucky Utilities Company,
569 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1978), explains further that when the term is used in a statute, it
may not be construed to include evidence that came into being after a matter was
decided. The decisive effect of evidence does not arise unless it is properly viewed as
being "newly discovered ." See Walker v. Farmer, 428 S.W .2d 26 (Ky. 1968) .
Bassham's autopsy report was not newly discovered evidence for the purposes of KRS
342 .125 because it did not exist when Bassham's award was rendered; therefore, its
decisive effect was immaterial unless another ground existed for reopening . The
employer argues that mistake was such a ground .
Messer v. Drees, supra, concerned a motion to reopen the claim for a 1960
injury. Messer sustained a work-related blow to the head and alleged that the injury
aggravated a degenerative cervical spine condition, causing it to be disabling . The
referee awarded a permanent partial disability. While review by the full Board was
pending, Messer sought to reopen in order to introduce recently-obtained medical
evidence, which indicated that he also suffered from a traumatic neurosis . Attached
was a psychiatrist's report and counsel's affidavit that further proof would enable
Messer to show a change of conditions and the existence of a mistake in the referee's
disability estimate .' The employer objected based on medical evidence that Messer's
inability to work did not result from an organic cause . The Board found Messer's
evidence to be inadequate and dismissed the motion.
Messer filed a subsequent motion to reopen, again based on change of
conditions and mistake. He attached another psychiatrist's affidavit, which indicated
that he was permanently and totally disabled due to post-traumatic encephalopathy, an
organic brain disease that caused blackouts, severe memory loss, and impaired
thinking and concentration . The employer's expert conceded that head trauma could
precipitate or aggravate that type of disability . Although the Board found no change of
condition or mistake in the initial award and viewed the motion as a belated attempt to
submit evidence that should have been produced in the initial proceeding, the court
disagreed. It acknowledged that Messer's actual malady and total disability might have
existed since his accident but emphasized that the symptoms necessary to diagnose it
did not become apparent until after the hearing . Thus, the court found the distinction
between mistake and change of conditions to be insignificant in such circumstances
and distinguished authority in which there was no change in the worker's condition . It
concluded that both of the motions were proper and remanded the claim for further
proof on the nature, cause, and extent of disability.
In Fayette County Board of Education v. Phillips, 439 S.W .2d 319 (Ky. 1969), the
parties did not dispute that the defendant-employer had knowledge of Phillips'
concurrent employment. Phillips failed to introduce any direct evidence of that fact, and
the defendant-employer neglected to include the concurrent earnings when submitting
1 At that time, KRS 342.125 permitted reopening for a "change of conditions" rather
than a "change of disability."
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average weekly wage information . On that basis, the "old" Board held that the
defendant-employer did not know of the concurrent employment and refused to
consider the concurrent wages when calculating Phillips' award.
Phillips filed a motion to reopen based on "mistake" and submitted evidence that
the defendant-employer knew of the concurrent employment . But the Board dismissed
it, reasoning that the "mistake" was Phillips' inadvertent failure to prove employer
knowledge, which was not the type of mistake the statute contemplated . The court
pointed out, however, that a "mistake" also occurred when the defendant-employer
failed to apprise the Board that the wage it submitted did not include Phillips' concurrent
earnings . It held that such a mistake warranted reopening and reversed .
Consistent with the principle of res iudicata, subsequent decisions make it clear
that the "mistake" provision is not an invitation to retry a litigated claim and that litigation
must end when a decision becomes final unless extraordinary circumstances exist.
Where the parties present conflicting evidence on a question of fact in the initial
proceeding and a decision on the matter is final, subsequent evidence that the finding
was mistaken does not show a "mistake" within the meaning of KRS 342 .125 . See
Darnall v. Ziffrin'Truck Lines, 484 S .W .2d 868 (Ky. 1972); Young v. Harris , 467 S.W.2d .
588 (Ky. 1971). Nor is such evidence the type of "very persuasive reason" to which the
court referred in Slone v. R & S Mininq, Inc. , supra at 261 .
In Durham v. Copley , supra, the insurance carrier obtained evidence before the
claim was decided, which indicated that the work-related incident caused an injury of
which Durham was unaware . Noting that the carrier failed to reveal the injury to
opposing counsel until seven weeks after the claim was dismissed, the court permitted
10
a reopening on the ground of mistake in order to prevent what it considered to be a
manifest injustice. This is not such a case . This is also not a case such as Wheatley v.
Bryant Auto Service , 860 S .W.2d 767 (Ky. 1992), which involved an obvious mistake of
law in awarding total disability benefits for 425 weeks rather than life. Likewise, this is
not a case such as Messer v. Drees , supra, or Fayette County Board of Education v.
Phillips, supra .
Causation was hotly contested in the initial claim. The parties offered conflicting
evidence regarding the cause of Bassham's symptoms, including extensive evidence
that a prion disease or some other non-work-related condition was the cause. Based
on the evidence, the ALJ found that Bassham suffered from a work-related
occupational disease. Under such circumstances, post-award evidence that the finding
was mistaken did not show a "mistake" within the meaning of KRS 342.125 . Thus, the
ALJ did not err in concluding that the employer failed to make a prima facie case for
reopening and reviewing the award.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
Lambert, C .J ., and Abramson, Cunningham, Minton, Noble and Scott, JJ .,
concur. Schroder, J ., dissents without opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
RUSSELLVILLE WAREHOUSING :
JAMES GORDON FOGLE
ANTHONY K. FINALDI
FERRERI & FOGLE
203 SPEED BUILDING
333 GUTHERIE GREEN
LOUISVILLE, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
KHRIS BASSHAM, DECEASED ;
GLENDA BASSHAM, SURVIVING SPOUSE
OF KHRIS BASSHAM:
PHILLIPE W . RICH
HUGHES & COLEMAN, P.S .G.
200 S . SEVENTH STREET
SUITE 110
LOUISVILLE, KY 40202
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