ANDRE EUGENE FANT, JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 1, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,;vuyrrmr Courf of ~i
2006-SC-000862-MR
ANDRE EUGENE FANT, JR
V.
L
_/F-~
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-001757
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIR MING
Appellant, Andre Fant Jr ., was convicted of three counts of complicity to firstdegree robbery (KRS 515 .020, 502.020) and three counts of complicity to first-degree
assault (KRS 508.010, 502.020) after a two day jury trial in Jefferson Circuit Court, for
incidences that occurred on April 3, 2005. Appellant offered proposed jury instructions
on facilitation (KRS 506.080(1)) as to all the robbery and assault counts, which the trial
court denied. He was sentenced to ten years concurrent on each robbery count and
twenty years consecutive on each assault count, for a total of seventy years . Appellant
appeals the trial court's denial of his request for jury instructions on facilitation to firstdegree robbery and first-degree assault . Because the testimony presented at trial was
not such that a reasonable juror could doubt that the Appellant was guilty of the crime
charged, but conclude that he was guilty of the lesser-included offense, we affirm .
On April 3, 2005, Appellant met the three co-defendants for the first time while at
the home of a mutual acquaintance . The group left in the car of one co-defendant,
Blake Daniels . At some point during the car ride, Appellant and another co-defendant,
Cecil Hampton, engaged in a conversation about committing a robbery . Both Appellant
and Cecil were armed with .22 caliber weapons that they intended to use to commit the
robbery. At this point, they saw Alan Tapscott walking down the sidewalk . Appellant
and Cecil got out of the car and approached Mr. Tapscott . Cecil testified that Andre
pushed Mr. Tapscott to the ground and went through his pockets . Cecil further testified
that when Appellant found nothing of value on Mr. Tapscott's person, he shot him while
he was on the ground . The other two co-defendants, Blake Daniels and Jerome Hester,
also got out of the car, and saw Mr. Tapscott lying on the ground, but ran back to the
car after Mr. Tapscott was shot . A bystander who heard the gunshots shouted out to
the four co-defendants, asking them if they were all right. One of the co-defendants
shot twice at the bystander, hitting him in the knee, and an employee of a nearby bar
testified that the person who did the shooting was standing by the car. Both Cecil and
Blake testified that the Appellant talked about shooting Mr. Tapscott once the four codefendants returned to the car.
The four co-defendants then went to Appellant's aunt's apartment. Appellant
changed his clothes and then the four co-defendants headed back out. While out, the
conversation again turned to money and robbery. Testimony from co-defendant Hester
indicated that Appellant and Cecil brought up the conversation .
About this time, they drove past Dan's Bar and Grill and saw two men waiting
outside the bar. Testimony from Cecil, Blake, and Jerome indicated that Appellant and
Cecil left the car and approached the two men. One of the men, Ben Ford, testified that
two individuals came up to them and demanded money . The other man, Dan Collins,
laughed when the gun was pointed at him, which caused the person pointing the gun at
him to start shooting . Neither man could identify the assailants and indicated that their
focus was on the gun that was pointed at them. Both men testified that of their two
assailants, the taller one stood back a bit and the shorter one actually did the shooting
(Appellant is 6'1 ", Cecil is 5'7") . Cecil testified that Appellant actually shot Mr. Collins
after Mr. Collins laughed at him and that Cecil took Mr. Collins' wallet after Mr. Collins
fell to the ground .
Dan Clark, the owner of the bar, was closing the register when he saw through
his tinted front window, a figure standing over Mr. Collins wearing a dark jacket . Mr.
Clark's trial testimony indicated that he could see that it was a dark jacket, and it was his
impression that the jacket had a large plaid pattern, but that he could not be certain as
to the actual pattern, or lack thereof, on the jacket because he was viewing the assailant
through a tinted window . He further testified that what he perceived to be a "plaid"
pattern on the jacket could have been a result of shadows and light . Photos in evidence
of the co-defendants taken later that night showed that Cecil was wearing a dark letter
style jacket with white sleeves, while Appellant was wearing a dark, puffy, nylon jacket .
Mr. Clark testified that he saw a car pull off and that he knew the assailants had
jumped into the car. He was able to follow the car long enough to call 911 and report
the vehicle's license plate number. While the vehicle the assailants were riding in was
stopped at a red light, Mr. Clark was able to secure assistance from police officers he
spotted at a nearby gas station. After following the suspect vehicle for a little while, the
police pulled it over. When stopped, Blake was driving the car, Appellant was in the
passenger seat, and Cecil and Jerome were in the back seat of the vehicle . Ben Ford's
wallet and two .22 caliber firearms were found in the glove box of the vehicle .
Gunshot residue tests performed on all four co-defendants showed no significant
amounts of antimony, barium or lead on Cecil, Blake, or Jerome . Appellant had
significant amounts of lead on his left palm; however, the forensic expert testified that
the results were not conclusive in determining which individual had discharged the
firearm.
The Appellant did not testify to his version of the events that transpired that night,
nor did he present any other evidence tending to show his state of mind. Based on the
evidence introduced, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request
for jury instructions on facilitation to first-degree robbery and first-degree assault .
The trial court is required to give jury instructions "applicable to every state of
[the] case covered by the indictment and deducible from or supported to any extent by
the testimony." Lee v. Commonwealth , 329 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Ky. 1959) . An instruction
on a lesser-included offense is required only if, based on the evidence presented at trial,
"a reasonable juror could entertain reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of the
greater charge, but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of
the lesser offense ." Thompkins v. Commonwealth , 54 S .W.3d 147, 151 (Ky. 2001)
(quoting Skinner v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Ky. 1993)) .
Under KRS 506 .080(1), a person is guilty of criminal facilitation when :
acting with knowledge that another person is committing or
intends to commit a crime, [an individual] engages in
conduct which knowingly provides such person with means
or opportunity for the commission of the crime and which in
fact aids such person to commit the crime .
On the other hand, a person is guilty of complicity under KRS 502 .020(1) when:
with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission
of the offense, he :
(a) Solicits, commands, or engages in a
conspiracy with such other person to commit
4
the offense ; or
(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such
person in planning or committing the offense ;
or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the
commission of the offense, fails to make a
proper effort to do so.
Facilitation is a lesser-included offense of complicity because it has the same
elements as complicity, except that the state of mind required for its commission is less
culpable . Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Ky. 1977) . An individual would
be guilty of criminal facilitation if "he furnished [another] with the means [or opportunity]
of committing a crime knowing that he would use it to commit a crime but without
intention to promote or contribute to its fruition." Id. (emphasis added) . This Court has
explained that while "[f]acilitation reflects the mental state of one who is `wholly
indifferent' to the actual completion of the crime," an individual may be guilty of
complicity to a crime even "without physical aid or involvement in the crime, so long as
the defendant's actions involve participating with others to carry out a planned crime ."
Perdue v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 148, 160 (Ky. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U .S. 885,
117 S . Ct. 151, 136 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1996) . In this case, the Appellant would have only
been entitled to a jury instruction on criminal facilitation if his indifference to the planned
robberies was fairly deducible from or supported to any extent by the evidence admitted
at trial. Lee, 329 S .W.2d at 60.
In the case sub 'u1 dice, there was no evidence presented at trial from which a
reasonable juror could entertain reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of the greater
charge (of complicity to first-degree robbery and first-degree assault), but believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense (of
facilitation to first-degree robbery and first-degree assault) . All the testimony introduced
pointed to Appellant as one of the two teenagers who initiated the discussion of
committing robberies that night . Furthermore, the testimony was consistent that
Appellant was one of the two teenagers who approached, beat, robbed, and shot Mr.
Tapscott. After this vicious attack, all four co-defendants went back to Appellant's
aunt's home . Appellant changed his clothes and then left with the three other codefendants in search of more victims to rob. The testimony is consistent that Appellant
was one of the two assailants who attacked Mr. Ford and Mr. Collins . Additionally, Mr.
Clark, the bar owner, testified that the man who shot Mr. Collins was wearing a dark
colored jacket that had what appeared to be a large-squared plaid pattern to it. Pictures
introduced into evidence that were taken that night show that only Appellant wore a
plain dark coat, and that the puffy style of the coat had several horizontal seams. It
would have been reasonable for a juror to conclude, based on the totality of the
evidence, that Appellant was guilty of complicity because his actions involved
participating with the other three co-defendants in planning and carrying out the crime .
None of the evidence presented at trial would have supported a theory that the
Appellant was indifferent to the events that transpired .
Because the evidence presented at trial indicated that Appellant was participating
with others to carry out the planned crimes, and because it did not support to any extent
the claim that Appellant was indifferent to the fruition of said crimes, we affirm.
All sitting . All concur, except Abramson, J ., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Frank William Heft Jr.
Jefferson District Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Cicely Jaracz Lambert
Deputy Appellate Defender
Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Kristin N . Logan
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Dr.
Frankfort, KY 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.