LARRY BROCK V. MANALAPAN MINING COMPANY, ET AL.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 20, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,Suprmr d1outi of
2006-SC-000786-WC
LARRY BROCK
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2006-CA-001048-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 84-25962
V.
MANALAPAN MINING COMPANY
SPECIAL FUND, HON. IRENE STEEN,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD, AND
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the claimant's motion to reopen
based on findings that he was no more disabled at reopening than he had been at the
time of the initial award and that any change in his condition was due to the natural
aging process. The Workers' Compensation Board (Board) and the Court of Appeals
affirmed . We affirm .
The claimant was born in 1953, completed the ninth grade, and had a history of
performing heavy manual labor. In 1984, he experienced a sudden onset of lower back
pain while shoveling coal at work. Diagnostic tests revealed the presence of a
herniated lumbosacral disc and/or degenerative changes. The four testifying physicians
characterized the injury differently and assigned impairment ratings that ranged from
0% (low back strain) to 20% (herniated disc). Two physicians restricted heavy lifting,
bending, and stooping . The claimant's application for benefits alleged that he had
become permanently and totally occupationally disabled .
The parties stipulated the claimant sustained a work-related injury and gave
adequate notice. The "old" Board found that he was unable to return to heavy physical
labor but determined that his permanent occupational disability under Osborne v.
Johnson , 432 S.W .2d 800 (Ky. 1968), was only 70% . Convinced that the injury
aroused a pre-existing disease or condition and caused it to become disabling, the
Board apportioned liability for income benefits equally to the employer and the Special
Fund under KRS 342.120 . The claimant never returned to work. He later sought and
received a social security disability award .
The workers' compensation claim lay dormant until April 27, 1998, when the
claimant filed a motion to reopen based upon an alleged worsening of condition and
increase in occupational disability due to the injury . Attached to the motion were
reports of increased physical restrictions, various cervical and thoracic abnormalities,
unsuccessful pain management treatment, and a newly-alleged psychiatric condition .
The motion was granted to the extent that the parties were permitted to take additional
proof. After a March, 1999, benefit review determination in which an arbitrator found
the claimant to be totally disabled, the employer sought de novo review before an ALJ.
The matter was reassigned for that purpose in April, 1999.
As indicated in the pre-hearing conference memorandum, the contested issues
included the extent and duration of disability, whether there was a worsening of
condition, whether the claimant's psychological and cervical problems were caused by
the injury, and whether various prescription drugs were compensable . At the August,
1999, hearing, the parties agreed to place the claim in abeyance to permit Dr. EINaggar to perform further diagnostic testing and possibly surgery.
Diagnostic studies revealed a small disc herniation and other abnormalities at
L5-S1 for which Dr. El-Naggar recommended surgery. They also revealed
abnormalities at the cervical and thoracic levels for which he recommended non
surgical treatment . However, the employer refused to authorize treatment on the
grounds that the cervical and thoracic conditions were unrelated to the injury and that
any changes in the lumbar condition were due to the natural aging process . Thus, the
claimant filed a motion to compel payment.
In an order entered on January 14, 2000, the ALJ directed the employer to
authorize "treatment and/or surgery for Plaintiffs low back problems which are clearly
associated with the work-related injury herein" but found that no persuasive testimony
linked a psychiatric condition or the use of psychotropic medication to the work-related
injury. The remainder of the claim was held in abeyance. Pursuant to the claimant's
motion for clarification, the ALJ stated in a subsequent order that the employer was
liable for the lower back treatment that Dr. El-Naggar recommended but that it had no
liability for the cervical, thoracic, or psychological conditions . Shortly thereafter, counsel
for the claimant moved for leave to withdraw, explaining that differences had arisen
between them. The motion was granted .
Dr. Lockstadt performed the recommended surgery, and the claimant obtained
new counsel . In May, 2002, the ALJ granted his motion to remove the claim from
abeyance and schedule a final hearing . The second hearing was continued at the
parties' request due to settlement negotiations . At the hearing, the AU placed the
claim in abeyance again because the claimant thought that he might undergo another
surgical procedure . At a third hearing, held in July, 2003, the claim was again placed in
abeyance to enable the parties to conduct settlement negotiations . After two years
passed with no activity of record, the AU scheduled a status conference for May, 2005 .
The parties attempted yet again to negotiate a settlement but were not successful ;
thus, the claimant requested a final hearing which was held on September 15, 2005.
After being questioned by his attorney at the hearing, the claimant requested and
received permission from the AU to speak. He .indicated that he and his attorney
disagreed regarding the maximum income benefit that he could receive without
experiencing an offset in his social security disability benefit . The AU interpreted these
comments as questioning the attorney's veracity and indicated that the attorney might
wish to withdraw from the representation . The claimant then apologized for any
misunderstanding, and counsel moved to strike the entire exchange as being irrelevant
to the matters at issue. The ALJ denied the motion and granted the claimant's request
to submit a copy of a letter that indicated he could receive the maximum income benefit
without incurring an offset in his social security disability benefit. The parties received
additional time to file briefs, after which the AU took the claim under submission.
After reviewing the medical records from the initial claim, particularly the
myelographic studies, and after noting that the disc defect was on the right side but that
the claimant's complaints were consistently on the left side, the AU noted that the
actual injury appeared to have been a strain or sprain that had aroused pre-existing
degenerative changes . Although there was no post-award evidence of instability, nerve
root impingement, or neurological deficits, the claimant's physicians had recommended
fusion surgery. The procedure was successful, technically, but failed to relieve his
symptoms . He had been physically inactive in the 22 years since the injury, which had
hastened the natural aging process, and had taken increasingly larger amounts of
narcotic and other medication . Moreover, he had neither worked nor looked for another
job . The AU concluded that the claimant's occupational disability was no greater at
reopening than it had been at the time of the initial claim and dismissed the claim for
additional income benefits . Because neither the "old" Board's decision nor the medical
evidence indicated that the claimant injured anything but his lower back in 1984, the
AU found that his cervical and thoracic complaints were not work-related . Relying on
Dr. Shraberg, the AU found that his psychological problems were not work-related .
The AU overruled the claimant's petition for reconsideration, after which counsel
terminated the representation . Acting pro-se, the claimant requested another hearing,
asserting that the AU denied him due process by refusing to permit him to present all
relevant evidence and by prejudging the merits ; that the AU pressured him to settle
his claim for an inadequate amount of compensation and became angry when he
refused to comply; that the AU erred by questioning him at the hearing ; and that the
AU abused her discretion by dismissing his claim out of vindictiveness. While the
motion was pending, he also filed a notice of appeal to the Board . The Chief AU
considered the claimant's motion and denied it, noting that neither Chapter 342 nor the
regulations provided for such a rehearing .
The claimant continues to argue that he was denied due process and did not
receive a fair and impartial hearing due to the ALJ's anger at his failure to settle his
claim . The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits a state
from denying a person of property without due process of law. The term due process
refers to the right to reasonable notice of the matter at issue and an opportunity to be
heard according to regular and established rules of procedure. Parrish v. Claxon Truck
Lines , 286 S .W.2d 508, 512 (Ky. 1956). The Second Amendment of the Kentucky
Constitution prohibits the state from action that is arbitrary, a concept that the courts
have found to be broad enough to embrace due process and equal protection,
fundamental fairness and impartiality. Commonwealth Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Kentec Coal Co .. Inc ., 177 S .W.3d 718 (Ky. 2005).
Contrary to the claimant's assertions, the reopening proceedings complied with
both provisions . The claimant has pointed to no evidence that the ALJ refused to
permit him to submit. He testified multiple times and presented testimony from a
number of expert witnesses . The ALJ held a pre-hearing conference on August 3,
1999, and held hearings on August 16, 1999; September 23, 2002 ; July 1, 2003 ; and
September 14, 2005. At the final hearing, she gave the claimant permission to submit a
letter regarding his eligibility to receive the maximum income benefit without subjecting
his social security disability benefit to offset. Mindful that the time for taking proof had
long expired, we are not convinced that a comment about the delay submitting the letter
revealed prejudice . The parties received three weeks after the final hearing to file
briefs, and ALJ rendered a decision on November 11, 2005. At no time did the claimant
complain of a delay in resolving the claim, and the delays that did occur were largely
due to his physical complaints and the unsuccessful settlement attempts . Thus, we find
no merit in his assertion that the decision was not rendered "a meaningful time after the
case was assigned to [the ALJ] ."
The record indicates that the AU conducted the hearing properly and engaged
in a reasoned and impartial consideration of the evidence . Among other things, KRS
342.275(1) requires the parties and AU to hold a pre-hearing benefit review conference
(BRC), the purpose of which is to define and narrow issues, to discuss settlement, and
to consider other relevant matters that may aid in the disposition of the case.
Consistent with KRS 342 .275(1), 803 KAR 25 :010, ยง 13 states that the purpose of the
BRC is to "expedite the processing of the claim and to avoid if possible the need for a
hearing." Thus, it would be unreasonable to assume that comments allegedly made ata BRC about the state of the evidence reveal bias .
Nothing prevents an AU from questioning a worker in an attempt to better
understand the evidence so long as the AU remains impartial . In fact, questions that
the AU posed to the claimant during the August 16, 1999, hearing led her to conclude
that the surgery he requested was reasonable, necessary, and related to his injury.
However, the claimant complains that the AU had become hostile by the September,
2005, hearing and asserts that her comments after his testimony concerning social
security benefits reveal bias. Having reviewed the entire hearing transcript, we find
nothing in the ALJ's questioning that was improper.
It was within the ALJ's discretion to grant the claimant's request to speak after
counsel finished questioning him at the final hearing . At that time, he asserted that he
and his attorney disagreed over whether his social security benefit would be subject to
offset. Although the possibility of a social security offset might have affected the terms
of a settlement had one been reached, it was irrelevant to his right to receive additional
income benefits in the reopening. Contrary to the claimant's assertions, the record
reveals the ALA questions to be an attempt to determine the truth of the matter and to
discern whether the disagreement jeopardized the attorney-client relationship .
It was the claimant's burden to prove every element of his claim at reopening .
Because he failed to convince the AU that he was entitled to additional income benefits
or that his cervical, thoracic, or psychological complaints resulted from the injury, which
would have entitled him to medical benefits for the conditions, it is his burden on appeal
to demonstrate that overwhelming evidence compelled a favorable result. Special Fund
v. Francis, 708 S.W .2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986). He has failed to meet that burden.
In order to receive additional income benefits at reopening, the 1998 version of
Chapter 342 required the claimant to prove : 1 .) a post-award increase in his
occupational disability under the Osborne v. Johnson , supra, standard ; and 2.) that the
increase was due to a worsening of his condition due to the injury. In view of the
claimant's testimony that he had neither worked nor looked for another job since the
initial injury, the evidence clearly did not compel a finding that his occupational disability
was any greater at reopening than it had been at the time of the initial claim .
Therefore, he was not entitled to greater income benefits, regardless of what caused
his physical condition to worsen.
Contrary to the claimant's assertions, we find no error in the ALA consideration
of the evidence. The medical evidence in the initial claim was conflicting, and at no
time did the "old" Board make a specific finding that the back injury caused a herniated
disc. Therefore, a statement in the decision at reopening that the injury appeared to
have caused only a sprain/strain did not contradict the initial decision . Likewise,
although the ALJ summarized the medical evidence s presented, including Dr.
Goodman's testimony paraphrasing the inaccurate history recorded by Dr. Templin,
nothing in the decision indicates that she attributed any portion of the claimant's
condition to a motor vehicle accident . In fact, she noted that Dr. Templin attributed the
claimant's entire condition and impairment to the work-related injury but that Dr.
Goodman attributed the cervical and thoracic complaints and the worsening lumbar
complaints to the combined effects of the natural aging process and claimant's total
physical inactivity . While a statement acknowledging Dr. Templin's correction of his
earlier mistake would have precluded any question that the ALJ understood the
evidence accurately, such a statement was unnecessary.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
Lambert, CJ, and Cunningham, Minton, Noble, Schroder, and Scott, JJ .,
concur. Abramson, J., not sitting .
LARRY BROCK, PRO-SE
P.O. BOX 401
EAST BERNSTADT, KY 40729
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
MANALAPAN MINING COMPANY :
GAYLE G. HUFF
HUFF LAW OFFICE
417 E . MOUND STREET
P.O. BOX 151
HARLAN, KY 40831
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