JASON RICHARDS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : DECEMBER 20, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,$uyrrm.r Courf of ~i~"
f
2006-SC-000733-MR
JASON RICHARDS
V.
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA GOODWINE, JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-00204
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Jason Richards appeals as a matter of right' from a judgment convicting him of
third-degree burglary and sentencing him to an enhanced term of twenty years'
imprisonment as a first-degree persistent felony offender (PF01) . We find no reversible
error and affirm the judgment.
I . FACTS .
Responding to a security alarm after normal business hours, a police officer
arrived at a day care center to see a white male inside the center's perimeter fence .
Seeing the officer, the man entered the center's building, exited on the opposite side of
the building, and ran through a hole in the perimeter fence . With other officers
assisting, the man was quickly arrested . Richards admits that he was the man arrested .
1
Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
Police found that the center's door through which the officer saw Richards exit
was still halfway open . Police also found a broken window in the area where the firstresponding officer first saw Richards and saw a tire iron on the ground outside directly
beneath the window . Inside, they found muddy shoeprints on construction paper on a
table underneath the broken window. Tests later revealed that fingerprints left on the
broken window were Richards's, but the tire iron produced no identifying prints. Tests
of the muddy shoeprints were inconclusive .
Police discovered that Richards lived in the neighborhood . They noted on their
reports that Richards was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of arrest
because he told them that he had been using drugs and drinking .
Richards was indicted on charges of third-degree burglary and of being a PF01 .
His defense at the jury trial was voluntary intoxication . At trial, he testified that he had
drunk a bottle of brandy and taken two methadone pills at his home that night. Richards
said that he started to hallucinate and remembered going out to the porch of the home.
That is the last thing he remembered, he said, before being at the police station after his
arrest .
The jury rejected Richards's voluntary intoxication defense and found him guilty
of third-degree burglary and PF01 . The trial court followed the jury's recommendation
and sentenced Richards to three years' imprisonment on the burglary charge, enhanced
to twenty years as a PF01 .
Richards raises three issues on appeal.
II. ANALYSIS .
A.
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Grant
a Mistrial for Officer Offering His Opinion that
Shoeprint Came from Richards .
The first-responding police officer testified to finding a fresh, muddy shoeprint on
construction paper inside and beneath the broken window. In an apparent attempt to
introduce into evidence the paper containing the shoeprint, the Commonwealth showed
it to the officer and asked him if he was sure that the paper was the evidence he had
collected at the scene . In a non-responsive answer, the officer volunteered that he
thought the prints were made by Richards's boots because of the distinctive triangle
shape and ridges of the muddy print. Richards's counsel objected, alleging that the
officer did not have a basis for, or the expertise to draw, this conclusion and that this
amounted to the officer stating his belief in Richards's guilt.
The Commonwealth responded that it was simply trying to authenticate the item
for evidentiary purposes and agreed that the court could give the jury a curative
admonition . But Richards's counsel declined the admonition, contending that an
admonition would not cure the error. Richards moved for a mistrial. The trial court
denied this motion, stating that the officer was explaining why he thought it wise to
collect the paper at the scene . The trial court assured Richards's counsel that he could
thoroughly cross-examine the officer as to this matter . Upon further questioning, the
officer admitted that the crime laboratory was unable to match the muddy print to the
boots that Richards had been wearing on the night of the arrest and conceded that he
had no formal training in identifying shoeprints .
Richards contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial .
We disagree . A mistrial is an extraordinary remedy that is only warranted in cases of
manifest necessity .2 Although not directly argued to the trial court, it appears that the
testimony at issue may well have qualified as proper lay witness testimony under
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 701 .3 In essence, the witness related that he
believed the fresh muddy shoeprints were left by Richards because he saw Richards
wearing muddy boots at the scene. The officer's testimony on this issue did not
establish all elements of the offense but simply indicated his belief that the shoeprints
belonged to Richards . And any prejudicial effect was tempered by the officer's
admission that he was not an expert on identifying shoeprints and that the crime
laboratory had been unable to establish conclusively that the prints came from
Richards's boots . More importantly, any prejudicial effect could have been cured by an
admonition . Since Richards did not deny being in the building but, rather, defended on
a lack of memory and lack of criminal intent brought on by voluntary intoxication, any
error was harmless- 5
Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Ky. 2002).
The version of KRE 701 in effect at the time of trial allowed lay witnesses to testify to their
opinions so long as these opinions are "(a) [r]ationally based on the perception of the
witness; and (b) [h]elpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue." The current version of KRE 701 further requires that the
lay witness's opinion be "[n]ot based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702" (which allows expert testimony on matters of "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge") . Since the officer observed Richards wearing
muddy boots at the time he was apprehended, he properly testified to his belief that the
muddy prints found inside the building were those of Richards . Such opinion was rationally
based on his own perceptions and possibly helpful to the jury's understanding of the facts at
issue so it was probably permissible under the then-effective version of KRE 701 .
Bray v. Commonwealth , 177 S.W.3d 741, 752 (Ky. 2005) (since an admonition would have
easily cured any error in admission of that particular type of evidence, there was no manifest
necessity for a mistrial) .
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.24.
B . The Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting Numerous
Photographs of Crime Scene .
Richards contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the
admission of approximately twenty photographs of the day care center . Even if such
evidence were cumulative, we could not grant relief for this on appeal unless it
constituted error that affected Richards's substantial rights in some manner. We note
Richards does not even allege or argue any prejudicial effect to his rights other than his
assertion that the evidence was cumulative. Since these photographs were not
sensational or gruesome or otherwise inflammatory,' we find no indication that their
introduction into evidence would have abridged Richards's substantial rights.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of these
photographs .$ Although they were numerous, the photographs showed various areas of
the center at various angles. Presumably, these photos helped the jury envision the
witnesses' reported observations of the crime scene9 and Richards's entrances into and
exits from various points on the premises .
s
RCr 9.24.
Although Richards does not assert this argument on appeal, we note that his trial counsel
argued to the trial court that the appearance of children's toys in the photographs might elicit
an emotional reaction in jurors . But, as the Commonwealth argued to the trial court, the
presence of toys was simply due to the nature of the building as a day care center. We find
no abuse of discretion in allowing in photographs showing toys in the center.
Johnson v. Commonwealth , 184 S.W .3d 544, 551 (Ky. 2005) (trial court's decision to admit
evidence subject to abuse of discretion standard of review) .
We note that these photographs were not taken on the evening in question but, rather, were
taken during daylight hours a few days before trial-apparently, in a different season of the
year. Nonetheless, the photographs would enable the jury to visualize the general layout of
the premises .
C. Any Error in Allowing Officer to Testify About Richards's
Statement at the Crime Scene was Harmless.
A few days before trial, the first-responding officer gave the Commonwealth's
attorney a memorandum recounting a statement allegedly made to him by Roberts at
the arrest scene. The statement was not audiotaped or videotaped, nor did Richards
sign a written statement. Rather, the officer's memorandum simply recounted his
recollections of Richards's oral statement to him on the night in question . The
statement was then furnished to the defense in discovery .
At a hearing before the trial court, both sides agreed that the Commonwealth
would not attempt to introduce the statement during its case-in-chief because the
statement was disclosed late. But the Commonwealth argued that it should be allowed
to use the statement to impeach Richards . The defense countered that the statement
should not be used at all. The trial court ruled that the Commonwealth could use
Richards's statement if Richards testified at trial and his testimony was inconsistent with
this statement.
During Richards's testimony, the Commonwealth asked him if he remembered
making a statement to the first-responding officer . Richards replied that he did not
remember making a statement.
Accepting the Commonwealth's argument that Richards's lack of memory of the
statement was enough to trigger its use, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth, in its
rebuttal, to bring the first responding officer back to the stand for the purpose of
introducing Richards's statement.
The officer testified that Richards said he was upset about something on the day
of his arrest. He had been drinking that day, and he was heading home . He used a
shortcut through the premises of a nearby fire station . The officer then testified about
why he did not believe Richards's story, citing neighboring high school students' habit of
cutting through the center's parking lot to get to school and certain geographic features
of the surroundings . The officer stated that he did not notice any signs of Richards
being intoxicated at the scene even though the officer had checked "under the
influence" on his report after Richards reported drinking and drug use. On crossexamination, the officer admitted that people who had been using drugs or drinking
often did not remember things correctly and that he did not investigate all the
geographic features of the surroundings that night.
Although we may question whether Richards's claimed lack of memory rose to
the level of an inconsistent statement under the trial court's earlier ruling, we cannot say
that the ruling was an abuse of discretion . More importantly, we find that the effect of
admitting this testimony was, at most, a harmless error. This statement did not amount
to an admission of actually entering the building without authorization or of intending to
commit a further crime,'° and the officer was thoroughly cross-examined about his belief
that Richards's statement "didn't add up."
Furthermore, in light of the overwhelming
evidence of Richards's guilt, any error in the admission of statements made to the firstresponding officer was certainly harmless."
10
"A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building." KRS 511 .040(1) .
RCr 9.24.
Ill. CONCLUSION .
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
All sitting . Lambert, C.J . ; Abramson, Cunningham, Minton, Schroder, and Scott,
JJ ., concur. Noble, J., concurs in result only because appellant's prior statement, which
was disclosed late and under court order to be used in rebuttal only, was improperly
admitted in the Commonwealth's case in chief; but it is harmless error because there
was no reasonable probability that it affected the verdict.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Euva D. May
Assistant Public Advocate
Appellate Division
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.