JAMES A. ELLIS, ET AL. V. HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, SPECIAL JUDGE, PIKE CIRCUIT COURT, ET AL.
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : JUNE 21, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2006-SC-000660-MR
JAMES A . ELLIS, JAMES A. ELLIS AND
ASSOCIATES, ARCHITECT, PSC
V.
IDA
APPELLANTS
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2006-CA-000969-OA
PIKE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 98-CI-000645
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, SPECIAL
JUDGE, PIKE CIRCUIT COURT; BOWLES RICE
MCDAVID GRAFF & LOVE, PLLC, A/K/A BOWLES
RICE MCDAVID GRAFF LOVE & GETTY, PLLC ;
GETTY, KEYSEE & MAYO, LLP; RICHARD A . GETTY; AND
MICHAEL CARYL, (REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST)
APPELANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I. Introduction
This is a matter of right appeal from an original action in the Court of Appeals . In
that action, James A. Ellis and a company owned by him, James A. Ellis & Associates
Architects, PSC (Ellis) sought a writ of prohibition against Special Judge John David
Caudill of the Pike Circuit Court from enforcing an order in a legal malpractice action
that (1) denied Ellis's motion to dismiss as settled and (2) granted attorney Richard
Getty's and his law firm's (along with Michael E. Caryl, the real parties in interest)
motions to set aside the jury verdict and the parties' settlement agreement and for a
new trial . The Court of Appeals denied the petition for a writ. Upon review, we
conclude that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Ellis's petition
for a writ of prohibition because Ellis did not demonstrate that he has no adequate
remedy by appeal. Thus, we affirm .
ll . Underlying facts and procedural history
As stated above, the underlying action is a legal malpractice action filed by Ellis
against Richard Getty, Michael Caryl, and the law firms of Getty, Keyser & Mayo, LLP,
and Bowles Rice McDavid Graff Love & Getty, n/k/a Bowles Rice McDavid Graff &
Love, PLLC (collectively, Getty) . In the lawsuit, Ellis sought money damages for Getty's
alleged failure to file and pursue various causes of action .
The first trial judge to preside over the action was Judge Eddie Coleman . Judge
Coleman withdrew, however, and Joseph F. Bamberger, then a senior status special
judge, was appointed to preside . Judge Bamberger divided the case into three
separate cases and further divided the three separate cases into two phases: (1)
whether Ellis would have obtained a favorable verdict if Getty had pursued his claims
and (2) whether Getty was negligent in failing to pursue the claims.
In the first hearing before Judge Bamberger (which occurred in June of 2004),
Judge Bamberger recognized someone sitting with Ellis as being a possible business
associate of Mark Modlin, a trial consultant . Judge Bamberger informed defense
counsel that Mark Modlin was a good friend of his . Despite his friendship with Modlin,
he told defense counsel that he would not recuse himself from the case on that basis
as he had good friends in 95 percent of the cases over which he presided . On that
information, the two defense attorneys present at the hearing stated that they had no
objection to Judge Bamberger presiding .
Shortly after that first hearing, the trial on the first of the three cases began .
Before its conclusion, the parties settled that claim for $108,000.00 .
Four months after the first case settled, the first phase of the second case
proceeded to a jury verdict in favor of Ellis . Specifically, the jury found that if the case
had been filed and litigated, Ellis could have achieved a verdict of in excess of three
million dollars.
After the verdict for the plaintiffs in the first phase but before the legal
malpractice phase, defense counsel made a motion for a new trial and petitioned for
Judge Bamberger's recusal. In support of their motion, they cited recent developments
in another unrelated case over which Judge Bamberger presided that tended to show
that Judge Bamberger and Mark Modlin were more than just "good friends," although
the full extent of their relationship was not yet known.
Eventually, Judge Bamberger voluntarily recused himself from the case, and
John Potter, another senior status special judge, was appointed to preside over the
matter. As to Getty's pending motion for a new trial, Judge Potter denied the motion
and assigned the legal malpractice phase for trial.
Several days into the legal malpractice phase of the trial, the parties informed
the court that they had settled all matters and the trial court discharged the jury. Mark
Modlin participated in the settlement negotiations . In the months following, the parties
signed releases and Getty's insurer, DPIC Insurance Companies, Inc. (DPIC),
distributed the settlement monies.
Before the trial court issued an order dismissing the matter as settled, however, it
voluntarily sent out a notice to all parties that directed the parties to inspect filings in a
Boone Circuit Court case. Discovery filings in that case revealed that, while presiding
over this case, Judge Bamberger was on the board of the Kentucky Fund for Healthy
Living, Inc . (KFHL), a non-profit corporation created to administer a charitable fund .
The charitable fund was established as part of the settlement reached in an action
involving a diet drug (commonly known as Phen-fen). Modlin was one of the directors
of KFHL. In responding to evidence of this relationship, Modlin's counsel advised the
trial court that Modlin and Bamberger were also co-owners of a piece of real estate .
On Ellis's motion, Judge Potter recused himself from the case, and Judge John
David Caudill was appointed to preside over the matter.
Based on this undisclosed relationship between Bamberger and Modlin, Getty
filed a motion for relief under CR 60.02, a renewed motion for a mistrial and a motion to
set aside the settlement. The trial court held the case and all pending matters before
the court in abeyance pending a decision by the Judicial Conduct Commission on five
counts of Bamberger's alleged misconduct, one of which stemmed directly from his
failure in this case to adequately disclose the full extent of his business relationships
with Modlin . Ultimately, Bamberger resigned as a senior status special judge and
received a public reprimand for-- among other instances of misconduct -- his failure to
disqualify himself in proceedings in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned because of his friendship with Modlin .
Following the issuance of the public reprimand, the trial court granted Getty's
motion. In its order, the trial court determined that the integrity of the judicial process
required that the settlement agreement be set aside and that the jury verdict reached in
the first phase of the second trial be set aside . Accordingly, the trial court granted
Getty's motion for a new trial.
Ellis filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals, which the
Court of Appeals denied . In its order, the Court of Appeals held that Ellis had not made
the requisite threshold showing of irreparable injury and lack of an adequate remedy by
appeal . And the Court of Appeals determined that this matter did not qualify as one of
those special cases, as identified in Grange Mut. Ins . Co . v. Trude, 151 S .W.3d 803,
808 (Ky. 2004), where the Court of Appeals may look beyond the petitioner's failure to
meet the irreparable injury test and analyze the merits of petitioner's claim of error by
the lower court.
III. Standard of review
"A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and should only be granted in
exceptional circumstances ." James v. Shadoan , 58 S.W.3d 884, 885 (Ky. 2001) (citing
Bender v. Eaton , 343 S.W .2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961)) "This careful approach is necessary
to prevent short-circuiting normal appeal procedure and to limit so far as possible
interference with the proper and efficient operation of our circuit and other courts . If this
avenue of relief were open to all who considered themselves aggrieved by an
interlocutory court order, we would face an impossible burden of nonappellate matters ."
Bender, 343 S .W .2d at 800 .
This Court recently reviewed Kentucky case law pertaining to writs and
formulated a precise statement of the rule entitling a party to such relief:
A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1)
the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside
of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an
application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower
court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within
its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by
appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury
will result if the petition is not granted .
Hoskins v. Maricle , 150 S.W .3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004) (emphasis in original) . In this case,
the parties seem to agree that the circuit court was acting within its jurisdiction in
granting relief under CR 60 .02 . Accordingly, the analysis that follows will focus on the
second class of writs .
In any case, "whether to grant or deny a petition for a writ is not a question of
jurisdiction, but of discretion ." Id . at 5 . Thus, we will review the decision of the Court of
Appeals to deny the writ of prohibition for abuse of discretion .
We reject Ellis's argument that de novo review, not abuse of discretion, is the
appropriate standard of review in this case. De novo review is generally the standard in
the first class of writs and in the second class of writs (1) when the alleged error
involves a question of law or (2) in certain special cases in which a showing of great
and irreparable injury is not an absolute prerequisite for the issuance of the writ
because "a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is proceeding
erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of
orderly judicial administration ." Bender, 343 S .W.2d at 801 (emphasis in original) . See
Grange Mut., 151 S .W.3d at 810 (holding that de novo review is applicable for cases
falling under the certain special case exception) . We agree with the Court of Appeals
that Ellis has not demonstrated that a substantial miscarriage of justice will result in this
case.
IV. Analysis of the issue : Did the Court of Appeals abuse its discretion in
denying Ellis's petition for a writ of prohibition?
The Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Ellis's petition for a
writ of prohibition in this case because Ellis did not demonstrate that he has no
adequate remedy by appeal, which is, under Bender, an absolute prerequisite for the
issuance of such an extraordinary remedy. See id. at 801 .
Once this case proceeds through its various trial phases and the trial court
enters a final judgment, Ellis may appeal any order of the trial court, including its
decisions to (1) deny Ellis's motion to dismiss as settled and (2) grant Getty's motions
to set aside the jury verdict and the parties' settlement agreement and for a new trial.
Ellis contends that his remedy by appeal is inadequate because he cannot
appeal the trial court's order granting relief under CR 60.02 until the case is fully and
finally adjudicated . And the case will not be fully and finally adjudicated until the trial
court has conducted six jury trials. If, on the merits, the Court of Appeals upholds the
settlement as valid, then those six jury trials will be rendered meaningless.
Returning to the standard enunciated above, however, we cannot agree this is
one of those exceptional circumstances requiring interference from this Court . Ellis is in
no different position than any other plaintiff who is put to the expense of proving his
claim. It makes no difference that the litigation is complex . See Indep. Order of
Foresters v. Chauvin , 175 S.W .3d 610, 615 (Ky. 2005) (citing Nat'l Gypsum Co . v.
Corns , 763 S.W .2d 325, 327 (Ky. 1987)) In essence, Ellis is arguing that the normal
appeal procedure is inadequate. And that argument warrants no further discussion .
As Ellis failed to show that he does not have an adequate remedy by appeal, we
need not reach the merits of his assignment of error.
V. Real party in interest argument by Ellis
Ellis argues that the trial court's order should be overturned because Getty is not
the real party in interest with standing to seek to have the settlement set aside . This
argument is premised on the fact that Getty's insurer, DPIC, paid the settlement
proceeds to Ellis .
This argument fails, however, because it is not supported by the law. "The real
party in interest is the one who is actually and substantially interested in the subject-
Commonwealth v. Farmers' Bank of Kentucky , 191 Ky. 547, 231 S .W . 25, 26 (1921)
(citing Taylor v. Hurst, 186 Ky. 71, 216 S .W . 95, 96 (1919)) See CR 17.01 . Getty had
and still has a substantial interest in the subject matter of this case, Getty's alleged
legal malpractice . Getty is a named party to this lawsuit . Getty is as much a real party
in interest as is Ellis .
As applied to cases involving an insured and insurer, the liability insurance
company of a defendant tortfeasor is not a real party in interest to a lawsuit over the
tortfeasor's liability . See Mater v. Dickerson, 321 S .W .2d 56, 58 (Ky. 1959). This case
involves a legal malpractice lawsuit filed by Ellis against Getty. Getty's liability is still
very much at issue . Thus, Getty's liability insurer is not a real party in interest .
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
All sitting except Scott, J . All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS :
Kathryn Burke
P.O . Box 1544
Pikeville, Kentucky 41502
Gregg Neal
Neal & Davis, PLLC
931 Main Street
P.O. Box 40
Shelbyville, Kentucky 40066-0040
APPELLEE, JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, SPECIAL JUDGE:
Hon. John David Caudill
P.O. Box 823
Prestonsburg, Kentucky 41653-0823
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE MICHAEL CARYL:
Bryce D. Franklin
175 E . Main Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES GETTY KEYSEE & MAYO, LLP . ;
AND RICHARD A. GETTY :
Bernard Pafunda
175 East Main Street
Suite 600
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES BOWLES RICE MCDAVID
GRAFF & LOVE, PLLC, A/KA/ BOWLES RICE
MCDAVID GRAFF LOVE & GETTY, PLLC :
Mark A. Swartz
Swartz & Stump
P.O . Box 673
Charleston, W . Virginia 25323
Max K. Thompson
Smith, Atkins & Thompson Law Offices
140 Scott Avenue
Pikeville, Kentucky 41502
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