MITCHELL CHILDERS V. ADELPHIA COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL.
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUB LISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76 .28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
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UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
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BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
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ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
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RENDERED: MARCH 22, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2006-SC-0433-WC
APPELLANT
MITCHELL CHILDERS
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2005-CA-1959-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 00-90263
ADELPHIA COMMUNICATIONS ;
HON . SHEILA C. LOWTHER,
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the claimant agreed to waive
any right to reopen his claim and overruled his subsequent motion to reopen .
Convinced that substantial evidence supported the decision, the Workers'
Compensation Board affirmed . The Court of Appeals affirmed on that issue but
vacated and remanded for further consideration on other grounds. Having concluded
that the ALJ's interpretation of the agreement was reasonable and consistent with fluff
Contracting v. Sark, 12 S .W.3d 704 (Ky. App. 2000), we affirm.
The claimant worked for the defendant-employer as a cable television lineman.
On February 2, 2000, he slipped and fell while carrying a 60-pound extension ladder,
injuring his neck, left shoulder, and spine . After conservative treatment failed, he was
referred to Dr. Tibbs, who diagnosed a cervical disc herniation at C6-7, congenital
cervical stenosis, lumbar/thoracic sprain/strain, and left shoulder sprain/strain . Dr.
Tibbs performed an anterior cervical diskectomy and fusion . On June 28, 2000, he
assigned a permanent impairment rating of 10%, attributing 50% to the injury and 50%
to "pre-existing conditions ." On July 5, 2000, the claimant returned to work without
restrictions, earning the same or a greater wage .
Acting pro-se, the claimant negotiated settlement terms with an adjuster for the
employer's insurance carrier in March, 2001 . The carrier's legal counsel completed an
Office of Workers' Claims Form 110-I to memorialize the terms, which the claimant and
the adjuster signed . The "MEDICAL INFORMATION" section of the completed form
indicated that the employer had paid $34,559.68 in medical expenses; that none
remained contested or unpaid; and that Dr . Tibbs had assigned a 5% impairment rating .
The "BENEFIT AND SETTLEMENT INFORMATION" section listed the amount of
temporary total disability (TTD) benefits that the employer had paid. It also stated that
the settlement amount was $40,000 .00 ; that the percent of permanent disability was
5%; that the settlement amount included a waiver of past and future medical expenses;
and that the amount for waiver or buyout was $37,527.07. However, the "OTHER
INFORMATION" section stated as follows :
Claimant herein agrees to accept a total amount of $40,000.00,
payable in a lump sum, in consideration for a complete dismissal of
this claim with prejudice, including but not limited to, a waiver or
buyout of future medical expenses . All parties to this agreement
herein agree to settle this claim based upon a 5% permanent
partial impairment . . . . The weekly income benefit of $7.16
commutes to a present value lump sum of $2,472 .93. Claimant
herein agrees to accept an additional lump sum of $37,527.07 in
consideration for a full and final waiver of any and all rights to
compensation for future medical expenses that may result from the
work-related injuries that are the subject of this claim. All parties to
this agreement understand that a dismissal with prejudice means a
full and final waiver of : past and future income benefits ; future
medical expenses; any past medical expenses that are
outstanding ; past and future vocational benefits; past and future
rehabilitation benefits ; all other compensation benefits; and,
including but not limited to, a full and final waiver of any right to
reopen this claim for any reason whatsoever. Claimant states
herein that he has read and understands the terms of this
agreement; that he is aware of his right to have said agreement
reviewed by counsel of his choice; that he understands that he will
not be entitled to payment of any future medical expenses by the
employer and/or its insurance carrier ; and that he settles this claim
on the basis that this agreement serves his best interests . This
agreement is approved in its entirety.
An ALJ approved the agreement on March 20, 2001 .
In August, 2001, the claimant sustained a second work-related injury and quit
working. He filed a claim for the second injury, alleging both a new injury to his low
back and a re-injury to his neck and left arm . He also filed a motion to reopen the
settled claim, asserting that the settlement agreement should be set aside for two
reasons : 1 .) that he received no separate consideration for waiving his right to reopen ;
and 2 .) that the 5% impairment rating was the product of mutual mistake or constructive
fraud . As grounds for reopening, the motion asserted that the claimant's impairment
had increased since the settlement and that his present inability to work entitled him to
an automatic adjustment of his income benefit under KRS 342.730(1)(c)3 .
Pointing to the "explicit language in the settlement agreement" and to the
consideration paid for the waiver, the ALJ overruled the motion to reopen without
addressing the second argument. The Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
ALJ's construction of the agreement ; however, the court vacated the decision and
remanded to the ALJ to consider whether the agreement should be set aside on the
basis of mutual mistake/constructive fraud . Because the employer has not appealed,
the sole matter at issue is whether the contract contained an enforceable waiver of the
right to reopen .
The claimant asserts that Huff Contracting v. Sark, supra, requires explicit
consideration for a waiver of the right to reopen . He argues that the settlement
allocated the entire $40,000 .00 to income benefits for a 5% impairment rating and to a
waiver of his right to future medical benefits, leaving nothing for a waiver of his right to
reopen . Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that he received sufficient
consideration for the waiver.
An agreement to settle a workers' compensation claim is a contract between the
parties. Whittaker v. Pollard , 25 S .W.3d 466, 469 (Ky. 2000). Questions regarding the
construction or interpretation of a contract are legal in nature as are questions regarding
the existence of ambiguity in a contract . 3D Enterprises Contracting Corp . v. Louisville
and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, 174 S .W.3d 440 (Ky. 2005). An
ambiguous contract is one that is capable of multiple, reasonable interpretations .
Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Kincaid, 617 S.W .2d 32, 33 (Ky. 1981). Only the four
corners of a contract may be considered if its terms are not ambiguous . Hoheimer v.
Hoheimer , 30 S .W .3d 176, 178 (Ky. 2000). The primary rule for construing an
ambiguous or inconsistent contract is to discern the parties' intent from the entire
document and to reconcile inconsistent terms where possible . Black Star Coal Corp. v.
Napier, 303 Ky. 778, 199 S.W .2d 449 (1947) ; Bullock v. Young , 252 Ky. 640, 67
S.W .2d 941 (1933). The court may also consider relevant extrinsic evidence such as
the situation of the parties, the purpose of the agreement, and the circumstances under
which it was executed . Frear v. P.T.A. Industries, Inc. , 103 S.W .3d 99, 107 (Ky. 2003).
As a last resort, when other rules of construction fail to establish the parties' intent, a
contract is construed more strongly against the party that drafted it. Elliott v. Pikeville
National Bank & Trust Co., 278 Ky. 325, 128 S .W.2d 756, 760 (1939).
Huff Contracting v. Sark, supra , concerned an agreement, drafted by the
employer's counsel, in which the worker received "[a] lump sum settlement of 3%,
discounted at 6%, Total to be paid by the employer is $2,685.20." The agreement
noted the amounts of TTD and medical benefits that the employer had paid and
indicated that the settlement was "inclusive of all attorney fees and also includes all
future medical expenses beyond that already paid . . . ." Sometime thereafter, the
worker moved to set aside the agreement or, in the alternative, to reopen based on
mistake or constructive fraud, stating that it had not been his intent to waive his right to
future medical expenses. The court determined that the purported waiver was invalid
because no substantial evidence in the record indicated that it was supported by
consideration . The decision did not address whether specific consideration must be
allocated to each type benefit that is waived because only a waiver of future medical
expenses was at issue . It stands for the principle that a waiver of future rights must be
supported by consideration in addition to that provided for income benefits.
The agreement at issue allocated no consideration specifically to the waiver of
the right to reopen. But, unlike the situation in Huff Contracting v. Sark, supra, the
claimant received substantial consideration in addition to the amount for income
benefits . Although the agreement indicated that $37,527 .07 was consideration for a
waiver of future medical benefits, no contemporaneous evidence indicated that the
cervical injury was expected to require future surgery or other expensive medical care.
Moreover, the agreement provided that the claimant accepted $40,000 .00 "in
consideration for a complete dismissal of this claim with prejudice, including but not
limited to, a waiver or buyout of future medical expenses." It also explained that "a
dismissal with prejudice means a full and final waiver of: past and future income
benefits ; future medical expenses; any past medical expenses that are outstanding ;
past and future vocational benefits ; past and future rehabilitation benefits ; all other
compensation benefits ; and, including but not limited to, a full and final waiver of any
right to reopen this claim for any reason whatsoever." Under the circumstances, the
ALJ concluded reasonably that the parties clearly intended for the $37,527 .07 not
specifically allocated to the 5% impairment to be consideration for the waiver of future
medical benefits as well as the other types of benefits that were listed, including the
right to reopen for any reason .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
MITCHELL CHILDERS:
THOMAS G. POLITES
WILSON, POLITES & MCQUEEN
444 EAST MAIN STREET, SUITE 201
LEXINGTON, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
ADELPHIA COMMUNICATIONS :
KIMBERLY NEWMAN
ALLEN, KOPET & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P.O. BOX 34048
LEXINGTON, KY 40588
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