BLUEGRASS COOPERAGE V. MICHAEL JOHNSON, ET AL.
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THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
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RENDERED : March 22, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2006-SC-0340-WC
[DAY
MICHAEL JOHNSON
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2005-CA-1622-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 03-1462 AND 98-85673
BLUEGRASS COOPERAGE
HON. LAWRENCE F. SMITH
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
AND WORKER COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
AND
2006-SC-0398-WC
BLUEGRASS COOPERAGE
V.
CROSS-APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2005-CA-1622-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 03-1462 AND 98-85673
MICHAEL JOHNSON
HON. LAWRENCE F. SMITH
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
CROSS-APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING_ IN PART, AND REMANDING
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the claimant's 2001 and 2003
applications for benefits after determining that he sustained gradual, bilateral elbow
injuries; that the 2003 claim involved the same left elbow injury that was alleged in
2001 ; and that both applications were barred by the statute of limitations. In a decision
that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Workers' Compensation Board (Board)
vacated and remanded for further consideration of the date that the right elbow injury
became manifest but affirmed otherwise . This appeal and cross-appeal followed .
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further consideration . In
addition to determining the date on which the right elbow injury became manifest, the
AU must consider the effect of work performed within the two-year period before each
claim was filed. In other words, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant
sustained repetitive or cumulative trauma from work performed within the two-year
period before each application was filed ; whether it caused a harmful change in either
or both of his elbows ; and whether such a change entitled him to any benefits . See
Brummitt v. Southeastern Kentucky Rehabilitation Industries , 156 S .W.3d 276, 279 (Ky.
2005) ; Special Fund v. Clark, 998 S .W.2d 487, 490 (Ky. 1999).
The claimant began working for the defendant employer in 1977. On May 11,
2001, he filed an application for benefits (Claim No. 98-85673) that alleged two types of
injuries. First, it alleged that he experienced pain his left elbow while riveting iron on
December 5, 1997, and that he "injured or exacerbated the left elbow problem" on
November 23, 1999. Second, it alleged that the "repetitive and/or heavy nature" of his
work as well as his duties as a riveter, caused him to suffer mini-traumas, repetitive
trauma, and/or cumulative trauma had resulted in injuries to both elbows. He first
sought treatment for right elbow problems in June, 1998 ; had right elbow surgery in
September, 1998, and April, 2000; and received temporary total disability (TTD)
benefits when off work. He developed subsequent left elbow problems for which he
first sought treatment in November, 1998 ; had left elbow surgery in July, 2000 ; and
received TTD benefits when off work.
Medical records from Caritas indicated that the claimant was treated after
experiencing pain in his right elbow while carrying barrel hoops in September, 1996 .
Dr. Nunnelley noted that the tip of the olecranon was sore and had some swelling . He
diagnosed right elbow pain with a spur . Dr. Kincaid saw the claimant on September 26,
1996, and diagnosed a right elbow spur and olecranon neuritis.
Dr. Lehmann saw the claimant on December 18, 1997, noting that Dr. Nunnelley
had referred him regarding complaints of left elbow pain following an incident at work on
December 1, 1997. Dr. Nunnelley had placed him on light duty with limited use of the
left hand and instructed him to avoid repetitive motions. Dr. Lehmann diagnosed left
medial epicondylitis .
Dr. Lehmann's associate, Dr. McAllister, assumed treatment . A February 24,
1998, note indicates that the claimant's left elbow had improved but that his right elbow
was injected because it was painful. The note states no cause for the pain. During the
summer of 1998, Dr. McAllister scheduled surgery to remove the right elbow spur, but
left elbow symptoms delayed it until September, 1998. He noted on November 2, 1998,
that the claimant still had some right elbow pain and also had a recurrence of medial
epicondylitis . On November 25, 1998, he noted that the claimant had medial
epicondylitis in the left elbow and lateral epicondylitis in the right elbow. He injected
both elbows in December, 1998. In March, 1999, he assigned a 1-2% impairment to
the elbows with no restrictions .
Dr. McAllister continued to treat bilateral elbow pain throughout 1999. On
November 24, 1999, the claimant reported a recent incident in which his left elbow had
popped while he was working . Dr. McAllister performed a modified Bosworth procedure
on the .right elbow on April 25, 2000. During left elbow surgery on July 25, 2000, Dr .
McAllister discovered a displaced ulnar nerve, which he transposed . His operative
report stated that it was primarily responsible for the symptoms of medial epicondylitis .
On January 8, 2001, he noted that the claimant was slowly improving . On April 25,
2001, he again assigned a 1-2% impairment to each elbow but no permanent
restrictions .
When deposed in December, 2001, the claimant testified that he had left the iron
department. He performed different work presently and hoped that his elbows would
remain alright .
On January 4, 2002, Dr. Gleis performed an independent medical evaluation
(IME) for the employer. He prepared a report and was deposed after examining the
claimant and summarizing the records from Drs. Lehmann and McAllister as well as
IME reports from Drs . Ballard and Gabriel . When examined, the claimant complained
of left elbow symptoms in the region between the lateral epicondyle and olecranon but
of no medial epicondylar pain . In Dr. Gleis's opinion, the right olecranon spur probably
was not work-related if there was no history of trauma to the area; however, the bilateral
epicondylitis was work-related . He noted that left medial epicondylitis had been present
since December, 1997, and that right lateral epicondylitis had been present since
February 24, 1998 . The right lateral epicondylitis reached maximum medical
improvement (MMI) on October 13, 2000, and was a chronic condition that required no
further treatment . The left medial epicondylitis reached MMI on January 8, 2001 .
Neither condition caused permanent impairment or warranted restrictions . Dr. Gleis
concluded that the claimant had subjective complaints of bilateral elbow pain and that
there was no sign of symptom magnification .
On March 4, 2002, Dr. Bilkey performed an IME for the claimant . He determined
that the only impairment permitted by the AMA guides would be a 3% rating for pain.
The record indicates that the parties engaged in settlement negotiations during
2002 and were able to resolve a back injury claim but were unable to resolve the elbow
injuries. On December 13, 2002, the claimant's attorney informed the employer that he
had been experiencing significant problems with his left elbow for the past three weeks
and would not sign the agreement . On December 18, 2002, Dr. McAllister noted that
the claimant complained of bilateral elbow pain due to a rigorous job in which he used
his arms all day. On February 12, 2003, he noted that the claimant had experienced
persistent left elbow pain, had nerve transposition surgery, and had persistent lateral
epicondylitis that had "been refractory to conservative treatment, including physical
therapy, anti-inflammatants, injections, etc." His impression was chronic lateral
epicondylitis, and he recommended a modified Bosworth procedure. Shortly thereafter,
he stated in a letter that the claimant had chronic tendonitis in both elbows, that he had
not responded to treatment, and that he "continued with the same problem ." He
thought that, at a minimum, the condition was aggravated by the claimant's work. In an
April 22, 2003, letter to the claimant's attorney, he also stated that the problem with the
lateral side of the left elbow was totally unrelated to the previous problems on the
medial side . It represented "an entirely new problem."
On July 25, 2003, the claimant filed a second application for a gradual left elbow
injury (Claim No . 03-01462) . He stated that due to the "repetitive and/or heavy nature"
of his work lifting and stacking boards, he had suffered mini-traumas, repetitive trauma,
and/or cumulative trauma. As a result, he had "developed or redeveloped left elbow
problems" for which he first sought treatment in December, 2002. He was informed that
they were work-related in April, 2003.
Dr. Gleis performed a second IME for the employer on December 16, 2003. He
examined the claimant, reviewed the medical evidence since his prior evaluation, and
reviewed the claimant's deposition . He noted that the present complaint was left lateral
elbow pain that had become worse in December, 2002; that the claimant's symptoms
had since improved; and that he did not want to have surgery . He diagnosed left lateral
epicondylitis, mild, and noted that the first report of lateral symptoms was at the IME
that he performed on January 4, 2002. He stated that left lateral epicondylitis was a
different problem from medial epicondylitis and that Dr. McAllister had not treated it
before January 4, 2002 . It the symptoms became severe enough, the Bosworth
procedure that had been successful on the right elbow would be appropriate for the left.
He agreed with Dr. Bilkey that the only impairment rating could be based on pain, i .e.,
tendinopathy, and he thought that 1 % per elbow would be reasonable .
At his second deposition, in December, 2003, the claimant stated that for most of
the past two years he had worked in the header department, building lids for whiskey
barrels . He picked up and stacked boards that weighed two to eight pounds,
approximately 5-6,000 times per day. For about two months he had worked as a stave
joiner, but his elbow pain had worsened on that job . For the past five to six weeks, he
had performed joining in the header department . The claimant acknowledged that Dr.
McAllister did not impose restrictions in December, 2002 . He stated that that he had
not seen him since February, 2003, and that the insurance company had denied the
recommended surgery. He also stated that his elbows were better presently and that
he would not pursue surgery. The 2001 and 2003 claims were consolidated and heard
together in October, 2004, at which point he continued to work about 42 hours weekly .
After summarizing the lay and medical evidence and the pertinent legal authority,
the ALJ determined that the claimant "was made aware that he had bilateral workrelated elbow injuries on December 18, 1997 ." Noting subsequently that the injuries
represented a complex fact pattern, the ALJ concluded that "the evidence is more
persuasive the plaintiffs elbow problems begin in December of 1997." Finding that the
claims filed on May 11, 2001, were barred by the two-year statute of limitations, the ALJ
dismissed them. Addressing the 2003 claim, the ALJ determined that the medical
records and the claimant's testimony were insufficient to show that the elbow problems
alleged therein were any different from those alleged in the 2001 claim. After the
claimant's petition for reconsideration was denied, he appealed.
The Board affirmed regarding the left elbow claim but was convinced that the
AU might have misunderstood the evidence regarding the right elbow claim . Although
the employer asserts that the Board specifically found "from [its] own review of the
evidence that Johnson's right elbow injury manifested on February 24, 1998," the
Board's opinion contains no such statement. Among other things, the Board pointed
out that Dr. Lehmann had reported only left medial epicondylitis on December 18, 1997,
and that perhaps the ALJ had confused his testimony with a December 18, 2002, office
note from Dr. McAllister regarding bilateral elbow problems. It also pointed out that the
claimant did not testify that his right elbow problems began in December, 1997, as the
employer had asserted . "[U]nable to locate support in the record for a finding that
Johnson's right elbow problems began in December of 1997 or that Johnson was made
aware of a right elbow injury in December of 1997," the Board vacated the dismissal of
that portion of the claim and remanded for further consideration of the evidence.
The employer's cross-appeal asserts that the Board and the Court of Appeals
erred in vacating and remanding the decision regarding the right elbow injury. It also
asserts that the ALJ's error, if any, was harmless . We disagree .
No medical evidence linked a gradual, work-related right elbow injury to
December, 1997, and the ALJ expressed no rationale for concluding that the injury
became manifest at that time . Contrary to what the employer would have us believe,
the ALJ did not indicate that the injury became manifest in September, 1996. Mindful
that KRS 342.285 designates the ALJ as the fact-finder, we find no error in the Court of
Appeals' decision to affirm and refuse to speculate regarding what date(s) may or may
not be reasonable .
The claimant's direct appeal emphasizes that his injuries resulted from repetitive
or cumulative trauma rather than a single traumatic event ; that he continued to work
when his claims were heard ; and that he continued to experience aggravations or
exacerbations of his injuries. He asserts that a left elbow claim is not barred by the
statute of limitations and also that the 2003 application alleged a new and distinct injury
from that found to be present in December, 1997.
KRS 342.0011(1) includes cumulative trauma within the definition of "injury;"
therefore, KRS 342.185 provides the applicable statute of limitations . It requires a
claim to be filed within two years of the "date of accident" but tolls the two-year period
for any intervening period in which the employer pays voluntary TTD benefits .
However, voluntary TTD benefits will not revive an expired period of limitations .
American Printinq House for the Blind v. Brown , 142 S .W.3d 145 (Ky. 2004) .
As explained in Brummitt v. Southeastern Kentucky Rehabilitation Industries,
supra , gradual injuries often occur imperceptibly, from numerous instances of minor
workplace trauma or minitrauma ; therefore, the courts have applied a rule of discovery
to establish a date of accident/injury for the purposes of notice and limitations . Under
the rule, a gradual injury becomes manifest when a physician diagnoses a harmful
change and informs the individual that work has caused it. It is immaterial whether the .
harmful change is given a general or specific name . The court pointed out in Brummett
that where an individual continues to perform repetitive work activities after a gradual
injury is manifest, subsequent workplace trauma may cause subsequent harmful
changes, i .e., subsequent gradual injury.
In Special Fund v. Clark, supra at 490, we determined that the statute of
limitations is no longer tolled when a worker discovers a work-related gradual injury and
its cause . If a claim is not filed until more than two years after a gradual injury has
become manifest, KRS 342 .185 bars compensation for harmful changes due to trauma
incurred more than two years before a claim is filed . As the ALJ in Special Fund v.
Clark recognized, harmful changes due to trauma incurred within the two-year period
remain compensable. Id . at 489 .
The claimant's May 11, 2001, application alleged two different types of left elbow
injuries, one due to specific incidents of workplace trauma in 1997 and 1999, and
another due to repetitive and/or cumulative trauma that became manifest in November,
1998 . At the time, he worked in the iron shop as a riveter. His July 25, 2003,
application alleged a subsequent left elbow injury due to repetitive and/or cumulative
trauma . His testimony indicated that he moved to the header department in December,
-9-
2001, and that he continued to work there when his claim was heard . The AU
determined that the claimant sustained a gradual injury and that it became manifest on
December 18, 1997, when Dr. Lehmann diagnosed work-related left medial
epicondylitis . Substantial evidence supported the finding, and we agree with the Court
of Appeals that no overwhelming evidence in this case compelled the AU to view the
incidents that occurred in 1997 and 1999 as being separate from the repetitive or
cumulative trauma that the claimant's work entailed . However, we reverse in part and
remand because the AU misapplied Special Fund v. Clark, supra, and failed to
address the significance of the fact that the claimant continued to work after December
17, 1997, when dismissing both applications in their entirety.
Despite the employer's assertion to the contrary, the ALJ's opinion does not
contain a finding that the claimant's work caused no cumulative trauma "after the
original onset." Robertson v. United Parcel Service, 64 S .W .3d 284 (Ky. 2001),
explains that when work-related trauma aggravates a pre-existing, non-compensable
condition and causes it to symptomatic, an injury has occurred . The nature and extent
of the resulting harm determines what benefits the injury warrants . To the extent that
the claimant experienced a harmful change in the human organism due to work-related
trauma that he incurred within two years before either claim was filed, he sustained an
"injury ." Regardless of whether such trauma resulted in a permanent impairment rating
or warranted income benefits, it may have necessitated medical treatment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and
this matter is remanded to the AU for further consideration.
Lambert, CJ, and Cunningham, McAnulty, Noble, Schroder, and Scott, JJ .,
concur. Minton, J., not sitting.
-1 0-
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
MICHAEL JOHNSON :
WAYNE C. DAUB
600 WEST MAIN STREET
SUITE 300
LOUISVILLE, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
BLUEGRASS COOPERAGE :
LYN A. DOUGLAS
FULTON & DEVLIN
2000 WARRINGTON WAY
SUITE 165
LOUISVILLE, KY 40222
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