KEVIN ROWE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : MAY 24, 2007
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2006-SC-000356-MR
KEVIN ROWE
V
10A'T[(1
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 05-CR-00116
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
M EMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A circuit court jury convicted Kevin Allen Rowe of the murder of Tammy
Hylton and the attempted murder of Robin Hylton . Rowe was sentenced to life in prison
for the murder and to a concurrent twenty years for the attempted murder.
Rowe appeals as a matter of right, arguing four errors committed by the
trial court: (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence seized in the search of an
outbuilding located on property adjoining the property identified by street address in the
search warrant, (2) refusing to allow jurors to read his prepared transcripts of the
911 call placed by Robin Hylton that interpreted inaudible portions of the call,
(3) denying his motion for a continuance to allow his DNA expert time to review
materials produced in the Commonwealth's expert's DNA analysis, and (4) denying his
motions for mistrial prompted by the Commonwealth's alleged failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence and to disclose a tape-recording of his telephone conversation
with his parents from jail.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
1. FACTS .
Robin and Tammy Hylton, husband and wife, were shot while riding their
four-wheeler on a road in a remote area in the Eastern Kentucky mountains . According
to Robin, the assailant, who was riding an all-terrain vehicle (ATV), opened fire on them
with an assault rifle . Although Robin reached for his own handgun to defend himself,
Tammy accidentally knocked the gun from his hand in the melee. Robin fell wounded to
the ground and remained motionless as if dead. The assailant walked up to Tammy,
who was lying across the four-wheeler, and delivered a single shot into her body.
After the assailant fled, Robin discovered that Tammy was dead . He
called 911 on his cell phone and reported that he and_ his wife had been shot by a young
man approximately twenty or twenty-one years old riding a Polaris ATV. While still on
the phone, he exclaimed, "Oh, God, he's coming back." Robin tried to flee, but the
assailant shot at him again several times and then began beating him on the head with
a pistol . The two men wrestled . The assailant pressed the end of the gun barrel to the
back of Robin's head and pulled the trigger. Fortunately, the gun was out of bullets.
The assailant then fled on an ATV.
According to the police report, four persons who passed the scene shortly
after the attacks saw the Hyltons and tried to help them. They were Ricky Rose, David
Walker, Josh Anderson, and Pamela Perkins . According to his statement to police,
Anderson retrieved Robin's pistol, removed the clip, cleared the chamber, and laid it
back down .
Kentucky State Police (KSP) Trooper Jason Merlo was the first law
enforcement official to arrive at the scene. According to Trooper Merlo's report, he
found Tammy lying dead across the four-wheeler, Robin lying wounded on the ground,
and Anderson standing near Robin. According to Trooper Merlo's trial testimony, Robin
told Trooper Merlo that the assailant was a thin young man-whom Robin did not
know-driving a red Kawasaki ATV (in contrast to the Polaris as Robin described in the
911 call) and that the assailant had stated, "Y'all killed my brother ." Trooper Merlo also
interviewed Rose, Walker, Anderson, and Perkins .
Trooper Derek Sturgill arrived next at the scene . He reportedly
interviewed ten to fifteen people who were already at or had come to the scene on
ATVs within an hour of Robin's 911 call . Apparently, none of these persons reported
seeing anything of relevance . Although Trooper Sturgill gave the names and addresses
of these interviewees to primary investigator Detective Stewart "Joey" Howard, Trooper
Sturgill did not make a supplemental report with details concerning the content of these
interviews. And the Commonwealth provided no information concerning these
interviewees to the defense in pretrial discovery .
While the investigation proceeded at the scene, according to the police
report, William Younce reported that he passed Kevin Allen Rowe, who was traveling
along a road down the side of the mountain leading away from the location of the scene
of the crime . Younce recalled that Rowe wore
a dark shirt and jeans and drove a red
Kawasaki 700 ATV. He also noticed a dark box or duffle bag strapped to Rowe's ATV .
A short time later, according to the police report, Rowe appeared at the
home of Phillip and A .J. Silcox offering to sell them firearms and a cell phone . Phillip
Silcox testified that Rowe wanted to sell these items because Rowe wanted money to
get out of town for a while . Phillip declined to buy the guns, but A.J . bought the cell
phone . A.J. testified at trial that Rowe was wearing coveralls.
Rowe then appeared at the home of his girlfriend, Joanna Trump,
according to her trial testimony. She testified that Rowe removed his coveralls at her
house . She noticed that he had blood all over him and that his pants and underwear
were soaked with blood . Trump gave him a change of clothes and patched up
scratches and cuts over Rowe's arms and one of his legs . According to her, Rowe
rinsed hair from a pistol at her house. Trump's mother also testified to seeing Rowe
wash hair and blood from the pistol . Rowe told Joanna that he had been attacked by
two men riding four wheelers and that he had fought with them, during which time his
gun fell out of his pants onto the ground . Rowe told her that one attacker pulled a knife
on him and that Rowe had fired a shot, which grazed one attacker's legs.
The next day, Detective Howard interviewed Robin at the hospital . Robin
described the assailant as a male, nineteen to twenty years old, tall, and slim, with short
dark hair, and driving a red Kawasaki 700. Robin thought the attacker's assault rifle
was fully automatic and described the pistol used by the attacker as dark with brown
grips . Robin was confident he would be able to identify the shooter if he saw him again .
The detective retuned to the crime scene. While there, several ATV riders
drove by. Detective Howard advised them of Robin's description of the shooter and the
shooter's ATV. One rider advised Detective Howard that he knew of a young man
named Rowe who matched the description of the shooter and who often rode a red
Kawasaki . According to the rider, Rowe lived on Harless Creek Road. Further
investigation focused on Rowe, and Robin ultimately identified Rowe from a photo
lineup .
KSP obtained an arrest warrant for Rowe and a search warrant for
390 Harless Creek Road, the house where Rowe lived with his father, Kenneth Rowe .
The search warrant also explicitly authorized the search for and seizure of a red
Kawasaki ATV, as well as any other vehicles used by Rowe . KSP seized several guns
from the Rowes' residence, although none matched the descriptions of those used in
the Hylton shooting . KSP also seized ammunition that matched the types of casings
retrieved from the crime scene.
During the search, KSP found an ATV in a shed on adjoining property,
known as 358 Harless Creek Road . The address for the adjoining location was different
from the address of the location to be searched as described in the warrant . The
different address was visibly posted on the road, according to Rowe . KSP seized the
ATV and took it to the KSP post .
KSP performed various tests on the ATV, finding the presence of human
blood on the left brake handle.
DNA testing revealed that the blood was that of Robin
Hylton . Blood was also found on other parts of the ATV; and although tests could not
conclusively show that either Rowe or Robin were contributors, the DNA profile was
consistent with the blood being a mixture of that from Robin and from Rowe .
Appellant was arrested and indicted for Tammy's murder and the
attempted murder of Robin. While in jail, Rowe called his parents. His mother asked
Rowe if he and his girlfriend, Joanna, were having problems. Both parents urged Rowe
to "keep her happy" because they "needed" Joanna .
Following nine days of trial, the jury found Rowe guilty of both the murder
and the attempted murder. The
jury recommended a sentence of life in
prison for
Tammy's murder and twenty years' imprisonment for Robin's attempted murder, to be
served concurrently. The trial court sentenced appellant in accordance with the jury's
recommendations . This appeal followed .
11. ANALYSIS.
A. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Motion to Suppress.
Rowe contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence of the ATV, including the results of the DNA tests of substances found on the
ATV. He argues that KSP illegally seized the ATV because KSP found it at a different
address than the address listed to be searched on the warrant .'
As Rowe contends, the warrant authorized police to search 390 Harless
Creek Road, which was property owned by Rowe's father, Kenneth Rowe . Rowe lived
with his father. The ATV was found in a shed on property at 358 Harless Creek Road,
which was property owned by Kenneth Irvine . But the warrant also plainly authorized
the search of "ANY AND ALL VEHICLES ON PROPERTY, AS WELL AS VEHICLE
Appellant argues that police were only authorized to search based on the "four corners" of
the warrant, citing United States v. Laughton , 409 F .3d 744, 751 (6th Cir. 2005) . But in
United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 534-35 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit
distinguished Laughton and stated that consistent with the purpose of the exclusionary rule,
information outside the warrant can be relied upon if the information was known to the
officers and relayed to the magistrate authorizing the warrant. In any event, the search
warrant in the instant case particularly authorized the seizure of the red Kawasaki ATV and
the search of all vehicles normally used by appellant even if not located on the property at
the listed address .
NORMALLY OPERATED BY KEVIN ROWE IF NOT LOCATED ON PROPERTY[ .]
ALSO ANY AND ALL STORAGE AND OUTBUILDINGS LOCATED ON THE
PROPERTY[,]" as well as the search and seizure of a "KAWASAKI PRAIRIE ATV, RED
IN COLOR[ .]"
Testimony also showed that Rowe's father consented to the search of
Irvine's shed . In fact, he led KSP to the ATV in the shed on Irvine's property . Even
though Irvine apparently held legal title to the property where the shed was located,
Irvine testified that he gave permission to Kenneth Rowe and to Kevin Rowe to use the
shed for storage. So Kenneth Rowe had valid authority to consent to the search
because of his relationship with the premises and his common control of the shed.2
Even if Rowe lacked actual authority to consent to search, there was no
apparent reason for the police to think he lacked authority, making this search valid.3
And even though KSP later discovered that the shed was located at the 358 Harless
Creek Road address rather than 390 Harless Creek Road, the officer who executed the
search testified to being unaware at the time that the shed was located at a different
address. In light of ample testimony from several witnesses that there was no obvious
marker of the line dividing Irvine's property from Kenneth Rowe's and Rowe's failure to
identify any evidence showing that anyone made KSP aware of the different address
See, e.g., McQueen v. Commonwealth , 669 S.W .2d 519, 523 (Ky. 1984) ("Consent may be
given by anyone who has `common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the
premises . . . sought to be inspected."') .
Commonwealth v. Nourse, 177 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Ky. 2005) ("The test for whether thirdparty consent is valid is whether a reasonable police officer faced with the prevailing facts
reasonably believed that the consenting party had common authority over the premises to
be searched .").
and ownership of the shed at the time of the search, the trial court did not err in holding
that KSP acted in good faith in searching the shed .
Because the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence,
we find no error in its denial of Rowe's motion to suppress evidence of his ATV and any
evidence retrieved from the ATV.4
B.
The Trial Court Properly Refused to Allow the Jury to
Use an "Enhanced" Transcript which "Interpreted"
Inaudible Portions of Robin Hylton's 911 Call.
Rowe contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to
allow him to give the jury an "enhanced" transcript of Robin's 911 call . Rowe requested
that the jury be allowed to "read a transcript made by the Appellant in which the
inaudible parts of the call were transcribed" while it listened to the recording of the
911 call . He points out that a licensed court reporter, who was willing to testify to its
accuracy, prepared the transcript . He argues that he did not ask that the transcript be
admitted as an exhibit but wanted only to offer it "to prove that you could hear more than
the victim speaking on the call and to support the Appellant's theory that more than one
person was present at the shooting and to prove that the Appellant was not the shooter
of Robin Hylton ."
Rowe urges that the trial court should have utilized a procedure used in
federal court in which both prosecution and defense try to produce an "official" or
"stipulated" transcript and both parties are able to present its own version of disputed
portions of a recording . But Rowe did not actually ask the trial court to use this
RCr 9.78.
procedure. And since he did not raise this issue before the trial court, we will not
consider this issue on appeal .'
In any event, Rowe has failed to show us that he was entitled to provide
the jury with a transcript interpreting inaudible portions of the tape . The original
recording of the 911 call was played to the jury, as well as an enhanced recording
presented by the defense . We have reviewed these recordings from the trial
videotapes, as well as the avowal exhibit of the transcript; and we agree with the trial
court that the transcript was unnecessary. As the finder of fact, the jurors were capable
of listening for themselves and determining the content of the recording-such as
whether Hylton referred to "Josh" rather than "gosh" in his 911 call . Rowe was not
entitled to present a transcript that interpreted the recording in a manner favorable to
him.
Our precedent on this subject holds that parties are not entitled to interpret
inaudible portions of recordings through self-prepared, less than fully accurate
transcripts .6 To the extent that Kentucky courts have approved of parties using such
transcripts to aid the jury in following a recording, it has been in situations in which the
transcripts affirmatively disclose that portions of the recordings are inaudible rather than
attempting to interpret such inaudible portions .' Rowe simply was not entitled to show
5
Wilson v. Commonwealth , 601 S .W .2d 280,283-84 (Ky. 1980) .
s
Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 754 S .W.2d 534, 540 (Ky . 1988) (holding that trial court abused
its discretion in admitting prosecution's self-prepared, partially inaccurate transcript of
recording of alleged confession.).
See Norton v. Commonwealth , 890 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Ky.App. 1994) (holding that no error
occurred in trial court's permitting jurors to read transcript of audio taped narcotics
transaction as accuracy of transcript was not at issue, the transcript was not admitted as
the jury a transcript that usurped the jury's fact-finding function . As the trial court found,
the jury needed no "expert listener" to interpret the content of the 911 call . The jurors
were capable of resolving for themselves any disputes concerning what was said and
by whom .
C. Trial Court's Denial of Continuance Was Not Error.
Rowe contends that he was denied a fair trial by the trial court's denial of
his motion for a continuance to allow his expert time to obtain and review materials
related to the Commonwealth's DNA testing. Specifically, Rowe's expert had requested
such items as lab notes, images, and photographs used in DNA testing, as well as
control data from DNA testing and quality assurance data . She requested this
additional information so that she could assess whether the DNA evidence had been
properly collected by the Commonwealth's experts and whether those who performed
tests had used scientifically acceptable methodology to assure accuracy and reliability.
The Commonwealth had already provided at least some of these
requested items ; however, some items were provided to the defense expert on a CD
just a few days before the scheduled trial date . And just a few days before trial, the
defense expert expressed a need for missing "quality assurance data," which had not
been specifically requested before, allegedly because such data is normally found in lab
notes.
The trial court properly found that the defense was entitled to discovery of
results and reports of scientific tests under RCr 7.24 and that the results and reports
had been provided by the Commonwealth several months before trial. Under RCr 7.24,
exhibit or used by jury in deliberations, and transcript accurately noted inaudible portions of
tape rather than trying to interpret inaudible parts) .
- 1 0-
the defense was not entitled to discovery of such additional items as lab notes, images,
photographs, control data, or quality assurance data used or produced in the testing.
The Commonwealth's voluntary disclosure of many of these items did not create a right
for Rowe to obtain and review additional items. Since Rowe had no right to obtain
these additional items in discovery, he did not show "sufficient cause" to obtain a
continuance on this ground .$
We see no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying a continuance
of the trial based on the unique facts and circumstances of this case . 9 We have
identified the following factors as relevant to whether a continuance is warranted:
(1) length of delay; (2) previous continuances ; (3) inconvenience to litigants, witnesses,
counsel, and the court ; (4) whether the delay is purposeful or is caused by the accused ;
(5) availability of other competent counsel ; (6) complexity of the case; and (7) prejudicial
effect of denying the continuance .'°
Rowe did not specify the amount of time needed for the continuance of the
trial, although his expert admitted that she would not be able to review data until several
weeks after the scheduled trial date . We have no specific information regarding
inconveniences arising from the requested delay; but, presumably, the delay would
inevitably cause some level of inconvenience to witnesses, counsel or the court since
the motion for continuance arose on the eve of the scheduled trial. And even though
the case must have been somewhat complex as evidenced by the length of the trial and
RCr 9.04.
9
Eldred v. Commonwealth , 906 S .W.2d 694, 699 (Ky. 1994) ("The decision as to whether to
grant a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court based upon the unique
facts and circumstances of the case.").
10
Snodgrass v. Commonwealth , 814 S.W.2d 579,581 (Ky. 1991).
even though it does not appear that Rowe had engaged in a pattern of delay, we
conclude that the trial court properly denied the continuance due to Rowe's failure to
identify any specific prejudice he would suffer" other than his expert's not obtaining and
reviewing materials that Rowe was not entitled to receive in discovery anyway .
Rowe's trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined the Commonwealth's
DNA expert concerning her qualifications, methodology, quality control, maintenance of
equipment, and use of reagents . So it appears to us that defense counsel was able
effectively to cross-examine the Commonwealth's expert on the potential deficiencies in
methodology raised by the defense expert to achieve the defense's goal of casting
doubt on the validity of the Commonwealth's expert's opinions . We also note that Rowe
cites to no evidence showing that another lab obtained different results. We find no
error on this issue.
D. The Trial Court Properly Denied Rowe's Motion for Mistrial .
Rowe contends that he was entitled to a mistrial due to the
Commonwealth's failure to provide discovery of (1) the identity and other information
relating to the ten to fifteen persons interviewed by Trooper Sturgill and (2) a recorded
telephone conversation from the jail between Rowe and his parents. Again, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial based on
these assertions .
Hudson v. Commonwealth , 202 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Ky. 2006) (rejecting appellant's argument
that trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion for continuance, noting that
appellant failed to specifically identify how he was prejudiced by this denial) .
- 1 2-
In regard to information about the ten or fifteen individuals interviewed by
Trooper Sturgill, which appellant contends to be exculpatory Brady ' 2 evidence, we find
that our precedent indicates that no such violation meriting relief occurred in the instant
case :
As a general rule "[t]here is no general constitutional right to
discovery in a criminal case and Brady did not create
one. . . ." Rather, Brady concerns those cases in which the
government possesses information that the defense does
not and the government's failure to disclose the information
deprives the defendant of a fair trial . Therefore, reversal is
required only where "there is a `reasonable probability' that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different . A reasonable
probability is the probability sufficient to undermine the
confidence in the outcome." Moreover, Brady only applies to
"the discovery, after trial, of information which had been
known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense." 13
At trial, Trooper Sturgill testified to having interviewed ten to fifteen individuals who had
arrived on the scene for three to five minutes apiece. According to Trooper Sturgill,
none of these people had witnessed the shooting or professed to know of any other
relevant information . Nonetheless, he recorded their names and contact information in
case other investigating officers saw a need to follow up with them. He gave his own
contact information to these individuals in case they thought of anything else later.
Although Trooper Sturgill apparently presented this list of names to other
investigating officers, he apparently never memorialized this information in a
supplement to the official KSP investigative report. Nonetheless, the lead investigating
officer noted in his report, which was provided in discovery at an early date, that
12
Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct . 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (holding that
prosecution has a duty to disclose exculpatory information to the defense) .
'3
Bowling v. Commonwealth , 80 S.W.3d 405, 410 (Ky. 2002) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original) .
- 1 3-
Trooper Sturgill had interviewed passers-by . So the defense was on notice that Trooper
Sturgill had interviewed people, and the defense could have contacted Trooper Sturgill
to find out what he had learned from those he interviewed and followed up with these
individuals to obtain further information . Clearly, this information was not truly unknown
to the defense, especially since defense counsel noted in his opening statement that
there appeared to be thirteen to nineteen witnesses based on radio traffic.
Furthermore, the defense definitely became aware of this information during trial when
Trooper Sturgill testified, rather than after trial . Brady is not applicable .
There also appears to be no reasonable probability that this previously
undisclosed information would have affected the outcome of the trial . Trooper Sturgill
testified that these people who had happened to pass by the scene knew of no relevant
information . And there is no suggestion in the record that any of these individuals had
exculpatory information to impart .
As for the failure to disclose the recorded conversation in which Rowe's
parents encouraged him to keep his girlfriend happy, Rowe fails to identify any prejudice
resulting from the Commonwealth's failure to disclose this statement to the defense at
least forty-eight hours before trial, as required by RCr 7.26. So no relief is warranted
despite the violation of RCr 7 .26.'4 Naturally, the effect of the keep-her-happy
admonition was prejudicial to Rowe, especially in light of Joanna Trump's testimony
describing Rowe's bloody clothing and his efforts to cleanse the handgun of blood and
hair. Nonetheless, Rowe fails to show how he could have minimized the prejudicial
effect of that statement by knowing of it beforehand . We also note that defense counsel
thoroughly cross-examined Joanna Trump and her mother concerning the fact that they
'4
Beaty v. Commonwealth , 125 S.W.3d 196,202 (Ky. 2003) .
-14-
did not report the washing of hair or blood off the pistol when initially contacted by
police .
Given the overwhelming evidence presented against him, which included
the victim's positive identification and the Trumps' testimony concerning his washing
hair and blood off the pistol, any error in not meeting the time constraints of RCr 7.26 is
harmless. 'S
III . CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the circuit court's judgment.
All concur. Scott, J., not sitting.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Stephen W. Owens
237 Second Street, Suite One
P . O. Box 1426
Pikeville, KY 41502
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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