GLENN ANTHONY HUDSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : MARCH 22, 2007
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ixyxrutr Courf of
NO. 2006-SC-000269-MR
GLENN ANTHONY HUDSON
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA GOODWINE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-01035
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Glenn Anthony Hudson entered a conditional guilty plea to the wanton
murder of a two-year-old girl and received a sentence of life in prison . At the time of the
guilty plea, Hudson reserved the right to appeal the trial court's rulings denying (1) his
motion to suppress incriminating statements, arguing that these statements were
coerced from him by detectives; and (2) denying his motion in limine to exclude
evidence of the girl's vaginal injuries, arguing that the highly prejudicial nature of this
evidence outweighed its marginal relevance. Finding no error in the trial court's rulings
on either of these issues, we affirm.
1. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
IN CIRCUIT COURT.
This case arose out of the tragic death of A.G ., who was the daughter of
Hudson's girlfriend . An autopsy of the child's body revealed that she died of
hemoperitoneum' due to liver lacerations and blunt impacts to the head, trunk, and
extremities . The medical examiner reported that the blunt impact injuries pointed to
child abuse. Since this case was resolved by Hudson's conditional guilty plea rather
than by trial, most of the factual background for our analysis derives from the record of a
hearing on Hudson's motion to suppress the incriminating statements he made to
detectives .
Police and firefighters responded to a residential 911 call reporting an
unresponsive child . Upon arrival, firefighters performed CPR on the child, A.G., who
was then transported-accompanied by her mother-to the hospital where she died .
The responding police officer noticed that Hudson, who remained at the residence, was
nervously repeating, "I didn't do anything wrong, I wouldn't hurt a kid ." These
statements aroused the officer's suspicion, so he read Miranda2 warnings to Hudson
before questioning him about what had happened to A .G. According to the officer,
Hudson was "tearful" and "remorseful" at that time . Hudson told the officer that A .G.
had been sick and had been taken to the hospital a few days earlier because her
stomach had been hurting . He said that he gave A.G. medication earlier that day, took
Hemoperitoneum signifies "blood in the peritoneal cavity." MedLine Plus: Merriam-Webster
Medical Dictionary, http ://www.nlm .nih .gov/medlineolus/mplusdictionar y html (last visited
February 28, 2007). In lay terms, this means internal bleeding .
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U .S. 436, 86 S .Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) .
her to the bedroom to let her rest, and later found her unresponsive. He repeated that
he would never hurt a baby, but he made no incriminating statements to this officer.
Hudson was taken to police headquarters for further questioning, where
he was interviewed by Detectives Shearer3 and Schoonover . Hudson again made no
incriminating statements to them, and the detectives did not record the interview.
Following this interview, Hudson was arrested on an unrelated warrant.
The next day, Detectives Shearer and Schoonover had a second interview
with Hudson after giving Miranda warnings . This time, they videotaped the interview,
which lasted approximately two to two-and-a-half hours . And this time, Hudson made
incriminating statements concerning A.G .'s death. He was later indicted for A.G .'s
murder.
During pretrial proceedings, Hudson moved to suppress the statements he
made to the detectives at the second interview, alleging that his statements were
involuntary because he was coerced by implied promises of leniency and distracted by
physical and emotional pain from his own recent surgery, his brother's recent murder,
and the recent death of his grandmother.
The trial court held a suppression hearing at which Detective Shearer read
from a written transcript of the second interview, and he answered questions from the
Commonwealth and defense counsel . Hudson argues that the detective's testimony
proved the improperly coercive nature of the interview. According to Hudson's recitation
of facts surrounding the interview,
The parties sometimes refer to "Detective Shearer" and sometimes to "Detective Sheer ." It
appears from the record that this is Detective Martin Shearer.
The police made implied promises of leniency . At one
point, Detective Schoonover told Mr . Hudson : "If they
[impliedly referring to Mr. Hudson] don't confess, I guarantee
you I'm not going to settle for any damn plea agreement . If
you make me work, I'm gonna make you work. If you want a
plea agreement, I'm gonna make you work for it." When
Mr. Hudson asked what would happen to him if he
confessed, Detective Schoonover replied that whomever
[sic] caused [A.G J's death would probably be evaluated .
Schoonover also told Mr. Hudson of a defendant who shot a
firefighter that had received mental evaluation rather than
being sent to prison .
Detective Schoonover then told Mr. Hudson : "If you
did something just let us know and we will help you . We'll
deal with it and tell you what to do." Schoonover continued :
"We'll give you time to write down what happened to her. If
you hit it on the money, then we will work something out."
Naturally, Mr. Hudson wanted to know what would be
worked out . Detective Schoonover's answer was:
"Whatever you write down, we'll talk about it." He then told
Mr. Hudson that other people charged with killing someone
were charged with manslaughter rather than murder.
Mr. Hudson then expressed his belief that most
people have their lawyers present when speaking to the
police . To this the officer responded : "No they don't, not the
ones that have remorse." Officer Schoonover then went into
detail about how he grabbed his daughter, illustrating to
Mr. Hudson that everyone loses control from time to time.
When Mr. Hudson again expressed concern about
what would happen to him, he was told that the officers
would tell their boss and the Commonwealth that
Mr. Hudson was cooperative and take their advice and see
what happened . He told Mr. Hudson that if a person
cooperates, he bends over backwards to help them .
Detective Sheer [sic] at that point chimed in, assuring
Mr. Hudson that Detective Schoonover did bend over
backwards for defendants that cooperate.
In short, it was demonstrated for the court that
Mr. Hudson was told that he would receive help, that he
would not necessarily be charged with murder and that he
could be sent to a mental institution rather than prison .
Defense counsel also brought to the court's attention that the
Detectives were aware that Mr. Hudson was in physical pain
and that he was still in the process of grieving his brother's
recent murder and his grandmother's death . Counsel
communicated to the court that Mr. Hudson told the officers
that he wished someone would kill him . The point was,
defense counsel argued, the police made promises to a man
that was emotional and was crying out for help.4
In response to the Commonwealth's questioning at the suppression
hearing, the detective denied making promises to Hudson concerning his treatment in
the legal system or the ultimate outcome of his case. He also quoted excerpts from the
transcript of the interview in which the detectives informed Hudson that he would be
appointed an attorney, that the ultimate outcome of his case would be determined by
the court system, and that the detectives did not control what happened to him in the
court system. The detective testified that mental health treatment was the kind of help
that he and his cohort had in mind for Hudson and that they made good on their
promise to help by calling the jail to request a mental health counselor for Hudson .
The trial court denied the motion to suppress . The court found that the
detectives gave Hudson Miranda warnings and that Hudson understood them . Hudson
does not challenge this finding. The court noted that Hudson never invoked his Miranda
rights by telling police he wanted to stop talking to them or wanted to talk to an attorney .
The court also found that the interview was not unduly lengthy and noted that Hudson
never said he needed to stop because he was in pain, needed to take medication, or
needed to rest. The court also stated that the fact that Hudson cried did not necessarily
make his statement involuntary, especially in light of the fact that anyone would find this
event emotional and traumatic whether or not they were guilty .
We quote this summary verbatim from pages 2 and 3 of the appellant's brief, omitting
.citations to the record. Having examined the record of the suppression hearing, appellant's
summary appears to summarize the testimony favoring suppression accurately.
Hudson followed the suppression motion with a motion in limine to exclude
evidence of the victim's vaginal injuries as being unduly inflammatory and of limited
probative value since the child did not die of these injuries. The Commonwealth argued
that evidence of these injuries was admissible, both to show intent and to show an injury
that was just as relevant as any of the other injuries . The trial court denied the motion
in limine, finding that any and all injuries sustained by the victim at or near the time of
death were admissible to show the extent of the victim's injuries and the intent of the
perpetrator .
Immediately after the trial court denied the motion in limine, defense
counsel requested time to confer with Hudson. About an hour later, defense counsel
announced Hudson's desire to plead guilty conditionally to wanton murder, reserving an
appeal on the trial court's denial of the suppression motion and the motion in limine.
The Commonwealth did not object to a conditional guilty plea to the charge of wanton
murder . The Commonwealth further indicated that this was an open plea, meaning that
it had not offered to plea bargain. Upon an open plea of guilty, the Commonwealth
would seek the maximum punishment of life imprisonment. Hudson proceeded to enter
a conditional plea of guilty; and he informed the court during the Boykin colloquy6 that
he had thrown A.G . into her crib and had hit her in the stomach, knowing these actions
In response to the trial court's questioning, the Commonwealth stated that it had elected not
to seek Hudson's indictment for sex offenses because of the difficulty in proving the
elements of sexual gratification and because its expert could not state with certainty that the
vaginal tear could not have been caused accidentally. But the Commonwealth indicated
that if the trial court ruled the vaginal injuries were relevant only if sex offenses were
charged, it would seek Hudson's indictment for sex offenses .
Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U .S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709,23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
could cause her death . The trial court accepted his guilty plea and ultimately imposed
the maximum sentence of life . Hudson then filed this appeal as a matter of right.
I1. ANALYSIS.
A. The Trial Court's Finding that Hudson's Statement to Detectives
was Voluntary is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78, which governs motions
to suppress confessions and other incriminatory statements, states that "[i]f supported
by substantial evidence[,] the factual findings of the trial court shall be conclusive."
Specifically, a trial court's finding that a statement is voluntary must not be disturbed on
appeal unless this finding is clearly erroneous.' Applying this highly deferential
standard of review to the record provided to us,8 we find no reason to reverse on the
basis of the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress Hudson's statements to police
in the recorded interview.
While appellate courts prefer that trial courts make written findings of fact
on suppression motions, the trial court's findings on the videotaped record were
sufficiently enunciated to allow meaningful review on appeal . So the trial court complied
with the requirement of findings in RCr 9 .78 .9
Henson v. Commonwealth , 20 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Ky. 1999).
Since Hudson failed to ensure that either the videotape of the second interview or the
transcript of the interview, which was quoted extensively at the suppression hearing, was
included in the record on appeal, we have only the videotape of the suppression hearing to
review to determine this issue. We must assume that the videotape or transcript of the
interview at issue would not provide any additional support for Hudson's contentions . See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Thompson , 697 S .W.2d 143,145 (Ky. 1985).
Coleman v. Commonwealth , 100 S.W. 3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2002).
In determining whether a confession was made voluntarily, we must
examine the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the confession .' ° Hudson
argues that the trial court failed to consider the "totality of the circumstances" but
instead focused narrowly on his receiving and understanding his Miranda rights. He
argues that his statement. was involuntary in light of the detectives' "implied promises of
leniency" and his physical and emotional vulnerability at the time of the interview . But
having examined the record of the suppression hearing and applicable case law on
these points, we find no reason to disturb the trial court's ruling.
Regarding the "implied promises of leniency," Detective Shearer testified
at the suppression hearing that neither he nor Detective Schoonover made any
promises as to the crime with which Hudson would be charged, the sentence he would
ultimately receive, or any leniency he might receive in the court system . And Hudson
fails to identify any promise made-except for vague promises to get him help and to
inform superiors in the police department and the Commonwealth's Attorney's office of
his cooperation-or any threat made--except for a vague threat that the detectives
would not accept a plea agreement if he did not confess . Naturally, the detectives were
not ultimately responsible for whether Hudson received a favorable plea offer. But the
record also shows attempts by the detectives to clarify for Hudson that the court system,
not they, would determine the outcome of the case .
In essence, Hudson points to no explicit promises of lenient treatment for
his confession . He does point to the detectives mentioning in the interview several
examples of killers being charged with crimes less than murder or being treated
psychiatrically without being convicted. Apparently, as a result of hearing these
10
Soto v. Commonwealth , 139 S .W .3d 827,847 (Ky. 2004) .
examples, he alleges he "understood the police to tell him that if he confessed to the
crime, he would be evaluated and most likely charged with manslaughter rather than
murder." Even if the detective's discussion of these examples led Hudson to believe
that he would be more likely to receive a lesser charge or sentence if he confessed, this
did not render his statement involuntary .' 1
Regarding Hudson's claim of physical and emotional vulnerability, he fails
to demonstrate that the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous. While the physical and
emotional state of the accused can and should be taken into account when weighing the
totality of the circumstances, Hudson has not demonstrated a level of physical and
emotional stress that would render him unable to make a voluntary decision .
He points
to no specific evidence that he told the detectives he was in pain during the interview.
And he has not provided us with a copy of the recorded interview itself to see if there is
some other indicator of his being in pain. So even assuming that he was in some pain
from a recent surgery, this would not necessarily make his statement involuntary .
This case is distinguishable from Mincey v. Arizona, 12 in which the United
States Supreme Court deemed involuntary the statement made by a barely conscious
defendant, who was suffering in an intensive care unit from a gunshot wound . The
Peak v. Commonwealth , 197 S.W.3d 536, 542 (Ky. 2006) (holding that a promise to tell
prosecuting authorities of cooperation does not render statement involuntary). See also
U.S . v. Nash , 910 F.2d 749, 752-53 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that law enforcement officer's
statement that cooperating defendants generally fared better in terms of sentence did not
render confession involuntary as this merely allowed defendant to make an informed
decision as to whether to cooperate with the government) ; U.S. v. Roman-Zarate , 115 F.3d
778,781 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that defendant's statement not rendered involuntary by
agents' promises that cooperation would be "helpful" to defendant because no promises
were made that defendant's statements would not be used against him and Miranda
warnings had been read) .
12
437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) .
police persisted in questioning the defendant despite his repeated requests to end the
questioning and allow him to speak to a lawyer. 13 Far from requiring that the accused
be in an ideal physical condition, our courts have often held that statements from an
accused suffering some injury or illness at the time were voluntary so long as the
accused was in "sufficient possession of his faculties" to make a reliable statement. 14
For instance, we have ruled that a statement taken from a defendant in the hospital was
voluntary because he was alert and spoke of his own free will .' 5
Hudson similarly fails to demonstrate that he was entitled to suppression
of his statement due to his depressed mental state after having recently lost his
grandmother and his brother. While Hudson would naturally grieve over these losses,
his emotional state did not necessarily render his statement involuntary so long as he
was in sufficient possession of his faculties to give a reliable statement. As the trial
court noted, most defendants would be upset knowing that the victim had been killed or
injured ; and merely being emotional or upset does not render a statement involuntary . 16
13
Id. at 396.
14
Mills v. Commonwealth , 996 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Ky. 1999) .
15
Simmons v. Commonwealth , 746 S.W.2d 393, 400 (Ky. 1988) (holding that statement of
hospitalized defendant was voluntary where defendant was only suffering from superficial
wounds and admitted for observation because defendant was alert, advised of his rights,
was not suffering from a substantial injury, and understood what was going on). See also
Mills, 996 S .W.2d at 479-81 . In Mills , the defendant had been "bleeding profusely" from one
wrist and was lying on the ground with blood all over him when questioned by police while
being treated by medical personnel . Id. at 479 . Nonetheless, we affirmed the trial court's
finding that this statement was voluntary since the accused was not sufficiently intoxicated
or injured to render his statement unreliable; and there was no evidence of police coercion
such as physical force or other means to overcome the defendant's will . Id. at 480-81 .
16
See Bell v. Commonwealth , 684 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Ky.App. 1984) (upholding the trial court's
finding that a statement was voluntary despite the accused's being emotionally distressed,
based upon scarcity of evidence to indicate that emotional distress was so severe as to
make the statement involuntary) .
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The record reveals no indication that emotional strain rendered Hudson incapable of
making a statement. Even the facts as characterized by Hudson himself show him
rationally weighing his options and asking the detectives questions to determine if
confession would be in his best interest.
We have identified the three main factors in assessing the voluntariness of
a defendant's incriminating statements as follows :
1) whether the police activity was "objectively coercive[" ;]
2) whether the coercion overbore the will of the defendant;
and 3) whether the defendant showed that the coercive
police activity was the "crucial motivating factor" behind the
defendant's confession ."
In the instant case, substantial evidence supports a finding that the police
activity was not objectively coercive . After reading Hudson his rights, the interviewing
detectives stated that if Hudson had something to do with A .G.'s injuries or death, they
could work with him or help him if he told them what happened. Their vague promises
to get him "help" and their suggestions that cooperation might yield a better outcome
were not objectively coercive, especially in light of their repeated statements that they
were not in control of the punishment he might ultimately receive . Hudson has pointed
to no threats of physical violence or other means of duress to overbear his will .
Even
with any emotional or physical difficulties suffered by Hudson at the time, there is
substantial evidence that they did not overbear his will because Hudson and the
detectives engaged in a give-and-take in which he freely asked about his various
options and what might happen if he confessed . Furthermore, the evidence does not
compel a finding that Hudson demonstrated that the crucial motivating factor behind his
"
Henson , 20 S.W.3d at 470, quoting Morgan v. Commonwealth , 809 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Ky.
1991) .
confession was police coercion, in light of substantial evidence indicating that no
"objectively coercive" police activity took place.
In short, we cannot find clear error in the trial court's finding that Hudson's
statement to police was voluntary .
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion
in Admitting Evidence of Vaginal Injuries .
Hudson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine
to exclude evidence of A .G .'s vaginal injuries, claiming that these injuries did not lead to
A .G.'s death. So he argues that evidence of vaginal injuries has little probative value
but is highly inflammatory and unduly prejudicial . We disagree .
Since the indictment was disposed of before trial, the record does not
definitively show whether and to what degree any of A .G.'s vaginal injuries led to her
death . The medical examiner's one-page report lists the cause of death as
hemoperitoneum due to "liver lacerations" and "blunt impacts of head, trunk and
extremities--child abuse ." The report also lists a number of indications of injury under
the heading of "Blunt Impacts of Head, Trunk and Extremities" without indicating when
each injury was believed to have occurred . The report does not explain specifically
whether or how the various individual injuries, including the vaginal injuries, led to the
child's death . We have no expert testimony to explain how various injuries may or may
not have ultimately led to the child's demise.
Other than the autopsy report, all we have to review is the
Commonwealth's and defense counsel's arguments in pleadings or at hearings
concerning the relation of the vaginal injuries to death. Defense counsel argued to the
trial court that the vaginal injuries did not cause the victim's death. And Hudson's
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appellate counsel now argues that the Commonwealth's expert could not rule out an
accidental vaginal tear resulting from mere "fingers," meaning that it is possible that an
adult caused the tear while changing the child's diaper. The Commonwealth stated in
pleadings that the victim had older, healing injuries as well as new, fresh injuries to the
vagina and other areas and that all of these injuries were part of the manner of death
and contributed to the death. We cannot pass judgment on the merits of any of these
contentions since we have no evidence but only arguments on this issue. If a trial had
occurred, defense counsel could have cross-examined the medical examiner as to
whether the vaginal injuries actually contributed to the death and how these injuries
might have been inflicted, even whether they might have been accidentally inflicted
through diaper changes .
But evidence of vaginal injuries was admissible whether or not these
injuries actually contributed to the cause of death . "Proof of intent in a homicide case
may be inferred from the character and extent of the victim's injuries." 18 Injuries that
were not life-threatening in and of themselves or did not directly cause the death can,
nonetheless, be admitted in homicide cases for the purpose of showing intent or lack of
accident or mistake .' 9 Although Hudson attempts to distinguish his case from Parker
and its progeny by pointing out that he admitted to doing something that led or
contributed to the victim's death rather than denying any involvement, the evidence of
1s
Parker v. Commonwealth , 952 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Ky. 1997).
19
See, e.g., id. at 213 (concluding that the trial court properly admitted evidence of prior
injuries including facial bruises and broken leg to show intent); Ratliff v. Commonwealth ,
194 S.W.3d 258, 268 (Ky. 2006) (holding that evidence of cigarette burns was admissible,
although victim actually died of suffocation, since all injuries sustained at or near the time of
death were admissible to show intent).
- 1 3-
all of the victim's recent injuries, including vaginal ones, was still admissible to show
intent, which was clearly still at issue because Hudson sought to be convicted of
manslaughter rather than murder.
And the fact that the vaginal injuries might suggest that an additional,
uncharged crime had occurred does not make such evidence inadmissible . "Relevant
evidence which is probative of an element of the charged crime is admissible, even
though the evidence may also prove commission of other crimes. ,21
The evidence of vaginal injuries-as well as the other injuries suffered at
or near the time of death--was relevant evidence of intent under Kentucky Rules of
Evidence (KRE) 401 .22 We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the probative value of this relevant evidence was not outweighed by
undue prejudice and, thus, that exclusion of the evidence was not authorized by
20
We do not distinguish between injuries that allegedly occurred on the day of death (or fatal
injury) versus those injuries that may have occurred a few days earlier since there is no
actual evidence of this distinction before us and since Hudson did not raise this issue in the
motion in limine . We note that the trial court expressed some concern about admitting
evidence of injuries inflicted a few days before since Hudson had only confessed to the one
incident of throwing the child into her crib and hitting her. The trial court was unaware of
evidence linking Hudson to earlier injuries . The Commonwealth told the court that it would
prove at trial that Hudson had caused these earlier injuries and that the prior injuries were
also admissible to refute Hudson's statements to police that he had never "touched" the
child [apparently, meaning in a sexual manner] after recounting that she had been taken to
the hospital a few days before due to problems including her bleeding in her diaper . Hudson
did not respond or otherwise follow up on this point to the trial court . In any event, Hudson
would have been free to introduce evidence or cross-examine Commonwealth's witnesses
about any facts showing that he had abused the child in the past .
21
Major v. Commonwealth , 177 S.W.3d 700, 706 (Ky. 2005) (holding that evidence of sexual
abuse of children was admissible in case where the defendant was charged with the
homicide of his wife) .
22
KRE 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence ." KRE 402 states that "[a]II
relevant evidence is admissible," subject to any exceptions provided by constitution, statute,
or court rule .
- 1 4-
KRE 403 .23 Furthermore, since the vaginal injuries did not relate to extrinsic "bad acts"
but to the homicide itself and the manner of death, KRE 404(b)24 is not relevant to this
issue.
Because we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's allowing
evidence of the victim's vaginal injuries, Hudson is not entitled to relief on this issue.
Ill. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is
hereby affirmed .
All concur.
23
KRE 403 states, in pertinent part, that "[a]Ithough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice[.]" A trial
court's determination of whether evidence should be admitted or excluded pursuant to
KRE 403 is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Simpson v.
Commonwealth , 889 S .W.2d 781, 783 (Ky. 1994) .
24
KRE 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts" is not admissible to
show character. Such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, however, such as
"proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident[.]" KRE 404(b)(1).
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
Angela Johnson
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELANTS :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Assistant Attorney General
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Attorney General's Office
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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