PAUL DAVID GOINS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 22, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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PAUL DAVID GOINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PENDLETON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT MCGINNIS, JUDGE
NO . 05-CR-00019
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirming
Appellant, Paul David Goins, was convicted by a Pendleton Circuit Court
jury in February 2006, of first degree assault and sentenced to twenty years in
prison . Goins now appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const.
ยง110(2)(b), asserting three arguments in his appeal: 1) that the trial court's failure
to excuse sua ssponte a juror who was also the assistant county attorney for
cause was palpable error ; 2) that the trial court's failure to give an instruction on
lesser-included offenses was palpable error; and 3) that the defense counsel's
failure to put on mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of defendant's
trial amounted to palpable error. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm
Goins's conviction.
.D C--
In the early morning hours of December 24, 2004, Goins shot and stabbed
his daughter's boyfriend, Mark Grieg, numerous times . Goins argues that he
"freaked out" when he thought he saw Grieg with a knife and acted out of self
defense while Grieg contends that the attack was unprovoked . After the attack,
Goins drove Grieg to a hospital . Goins was subsequently arrested and charged
with assault.
During the voir dire phase of Goins's trial, a potential juror was identified
as an assistant county attorney for Pendleton County. The court, however,
determined that the juror was qualified to sit on the jury. Goins's counsel made
no objection but used one of his peremptory strikes to remove him from the
panel .
Following the trial, the jury was instructed on assault in the first degree,
self-defense, and presumption of innocence. Goins's counsel made no objection
to the instructions as offered and suggested no instructions on lesser-included
offenses . Goins was convicted of assault in the first degree.
During the sentencing phase Goins's counsel presented no mitigating
evidence in his favor, despite the presence of several family members . However,
no record exists as to what evidence could have been presented in mitigation.
Goins was sentenced to twenty years incarceration .
I . The trial court's failure to sua s onte excuse for cause the assistant
county attorney from the jury was not palpable error
Goins first alleges that the trial judge's failure to excuse the assistant
county attorney for cause was palpable error. It is generally accepted that a
party must request a juror be removed for cause before the beginning of trial .
Pelfey v. Commonwealth , 842 S .W.2d 524, 526 (Ky. 1993) . Since Goins's
counsel failed to make such a request, he technically waived his right to
challenge the composition of the jury. Id . Therefore, the error, if any, may only
be considered under the palpable error standard . A palpable error is one which
affects the substantial rights of a party and may be considered by an appellate
court despite improper preservation . RCr 10.26. Upon a showing that the error
created manifest injustice, relief may be granted to the party. Id .
In this case, we find no palpable error because Goins used one of his
peremptory strikes to remove the assistant county attorney from the jury. Since
the disputed juror didn't sit on the final jury, Goins's right to a fair trial was not
violated . Morgan v. Commonwealth , 189 S.W.3d 99,104 (Ky. 2006) .
Goins
used his peremptory strikes in a manner in which they were supposed to be used
-- to remove at his discretion jurors that he doesn't want sitting on the jury. Id .
While Goins contends that being forced to use one of his peremptory strikes to
remove the assistant county attorney prevented him from removing two other
jurors', he fails to show that these jurors had actual bias toward him or that they
could not decide the case in a fair manner. Watson v. Commonwealth, 433
S .W .2d 884 (Ky. 1968) (holding that the existence of jury bias is a matter of fact
and is not to be presumed) . See also Key v. Commonwealth , 840 S.W.2d 827,
830 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that there is no proof of juror bias when
' The two jurors that Goins believed could have been removed had he not used
his peremptory strike for the assistant county attorney are the aunt by marriage
to the mother of Grieg's only child and a former neighbor whose spouse had a
conflict once with Goins.
defendant failed to elicit testimony from juror in question and only evidence
offered showed nothing more than speculation that juror was biased) ; Polk v.
Commonwealth , 574 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Ky. App. 1978) (holding that the party
claiming juror bias or prejudice must actually prove the point).
Finding no manifest injustice, we find no palpable error.
11. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses
was not palpable error
Goins's next allegation is that the trial court committed palpable error in
not instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses such as assault in the second
degree or assault in the first degree under extreme emotional disturbance . Since
Goins's trial counsel failed to object to the jury instructions given and no evidence
exists on the record that he suggested, or tendered, alternative jury instructions,
this issue is unpreserved . Lynem v. Commonwealth , 565 S .W .2d 141, 144 (Ky.
1978) . Thus, for Goins to prevail on this issue he must show that the failure to
provide an instruction on lesser-included offenses is palpable error under RCr
10.26.
There is no authority in Kentucky to indicate that a trial court's failure to
instruct on a lesser-included offense is palpable error, when no objection is
made, or instruction offered. C lifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W .3d 371, 376 (Ky.
2000) . Regardless, "an instruction on a lesser-included offense is appropriate if
and only if on the given evidence a reasonable juror could entertain beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense ." Skinner v.
Commonwealth , 864 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Ky. 1993). In which case, the lesserincluded offense instruction should be given .
Here, Goins argues that a jury could have found him guilty of assault in
the second degree because it would have been reasonable for the jury to believe
that Goins wantonly disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
victim would be seriously injured by his actions . KRS 508 .020(1)(c) . We
disagree . Not only was Grieg shot and stabbed multiple times, but Goins argued
at trial that he attacked him out of self defense. 2 Goins's only real argument that
a jury could have reasonably found him guilty of assault in the second degree is
that he "freaked out" when he thought Grieg was going to attack him and began
to shoot Grieg at a range of three to four feet. Claiming that he "freaked out" and
then testifying that he performed the act out of self-defense does not show that
Goins wantonly disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Plus the fact that
Goins took Grieg to the hospital after the assault shows remorse, not lack of
intent. Accordingly, it was not reasonable to believe that the assault in the case
was anything but intentional .
Goins further argues that it is possible that he could have been convicted
of first degree assault under an extreme emotional disturbance standard because
he was upset that his daughter wanted to move with Grieg to Florida . An
extreme emotional disturbance is "a temporary state of mind so enraged,
inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act
uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance,
2 During the trial Goins testified that "[Grieg] was going to kill me" and "I was not
taking-any chances ." This testimony implies that Goins intentionally shot and
stabbed Grieg .
rather than from evil or malicious purposes ." McClellan v. Commonwealth , 715
S .W .2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986). Extreme emotional disturbance is only shown
by some dramatic event which creates a temporary emotional disturbance .
Schrimsher v. Commonwealth, 190 S.W.3d 318, 332 (Ky. 2006) . Here, Goins
failed to present evidence sufficient to support an instruction on extreme
emotional disturbance . While it is true that the night before the assault Goins
and Grieg argued about the planned move to Florida, there is no evidence that
the argument was contentious enough to create extreme emotional disturbance .
Goins presents no evidence that he was so enraged by the news of his daughter
moving away that he was uncontrollably compelled to commit assault a day later.
In fact, according to the trial record, Goins was not against allowing his daughter
to move to Florida with Grieg as soon as he had found a job . Grieg even testified
that Goins had offered to help him with the move and to find employment. The
events surrounding the argument about Grieg's impending move to Florida
simply did not support an instruction on first degree assault under an extreme
emotional disturbance standard . In addition, the fact that Goins believed Grieg
was high and was going to attack him goes more to his argument that he acted in
self-defense than blind rage, especially in light of his testimony. Therefore, we
find no palpable error from the court's failure to instruct on lesser-included
offenses .
1111. The trial coat is not guilty of palpable error when defense counsel fails
to present mitigating evidence
Goins's final allegation is that his trial counsel's failure to present
mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of his trial was palpable error.
However, Goins's allegations fail to competently state anything that the trial court
actually did incorrectly. The trial court cannot force Goins's counsel to present
mitigating evidence. See generally Hodge v. Commonwealth , 68 S .W.3d 338,
344-45 (Ky. 2001) (stating that the determination of what mitigating evidence to
present is the responsibility of the trial counsel) . Failing to present mitigating
evidence is not palpable error on behalf of the trial court.
Goins is essentially alleging that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel . "As a general rule, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will not
be reviewed on direct appeal from the trial court's judgment because there is
usually no record or trial court ruling on which such a claim can be properly
considered ." Humphrey v. Commonwealth , 962 S .W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1998) .
This is the case here . Accordingly, we will not consider this issue other than to
note we find no palpable error committed on behalf of the trial court from the
existing record .
For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment and sentence of the
Pendleton Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Raymond S. Bogucki
218 Stanley Reed Court
P.O. Box 277
Maysville, KY 41056
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Charles David Yates
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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