DANIEL LEE FORTNER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 23, 2007
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;VuPrmur Courf of ~fi~
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2006-SC-000002-MR
DANIEL LEE FORTNER
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
NO. 03-CR-00073-004
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
2006-SC-000020-MR
JOSHUA CYRUS FORTNER
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
NO. 03-CR-00073-003
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Daniel Fortner and Joshua Fortner appeal as a matter of right' from judgments
convicting each of second-degree manslaughter, first-degree robbery, and first-degree
1
KY. CONST . § 110(2)(b) .
burglary and sentencing each to thirty years' imprisonment. Because the Fortners were
tried together and their appeals involve common facts and issues, we elect to issue a
single opinion resolving both cases. Although the Fortners raise several issues on
appeal, we find no reversible error and affirm both judgments .
I . FACTUAL BACKGROUND .
Joshua and Daniel Fortner, who are brothers, engaged in a fateful meeting with
several other men in a Carter County barn in July 2003. The other men present
included Shane Phillips, the owner of the barn ; brothers Tommy and David Fritz, Carter
County residents acquainted with the Fortners ; and Derek Lemon 2 and Randall Miller,
South Carolina residents traveling through Kentucky to visit Miller's relatives . Joshua
had recently bought a bag of marijuana from Brian Keith Waugh and became angry
when he found that the marijuana was wet. According to others present, Joshua vowed
to get his money back "no matter what it took ." The men then hatched a plan for some
of them to go to Waugh's trailer to take money or marijuana. They later denied any
intent to kill Waugh.
Waugh died of brain injury caused by blunt force trauma to the head after the
group invaded his home and beat him while stealing money and marijuana. The grand
jury returned an indictment charging Joshua and Daniel Fortner, Tommy Fritz, and
Derek Lemon with capital murder, first-degree robbery, and first degree burglary and
charging David Fritz with complicity to commit capital murder, first-degree robbery, and
Lemon is sometimes referred to as "David Lemon" or "Derrick Lemon" in the parties' briefs ;
however, the indictment refers to him as "Derek Lemon."
first-degree burglary . Apparently, no one disputes that David Fritz participated in
planning the attack; but he was not present for the attack .
As the Commonwealth's cases against Joshua and Daniel proceeded to trial, the
Fritz brothers entered pleas to lesser crimes and received reduced sentences in
exchange for testifying against the Fortners . Miller, who had been seventeen years old
at the time of the crime, was treated as a juvenile in exchange for testifying against the
Fortners . Phillips and Lemon, whose indictments were pending, did not testify at the
Fortners' trial . Neither Joshua nor Daniel testified .
Police officers testified concerning their investigation and the content of each
Fortner's statements to police during the investigation . In his statement to police,
Joshua admitted to buying marijuana from Waugh and to confronting Waugh on the
evening in question about the condition of the marijuana. Joshua admitted to being
present when the men planned to enter Waugh's house, but he denied being present at
or participating in the attack . Daniel also denied participating in the attack when
interviewed by police, stating that he had returned home early after going to Shane
Phillips's house earlier in the evening.
Others present at the planning session and attack told a different story. They
identified Joshua and Daniel as active participants in the attack. Miller testified that
Daniel was the first one to hit Waugh and that Daniel hit Waugh the most . Miller further
testified that Joshua ran back and put his full body weight into a "leverage" hit against
Waugh.
He also testified that the group took Waugh's money and marijuana and later
divided both among themselves .
Shortly before the close of the Commonwealth's case, the trial judge was called
away on a family emergency, and a substitute judge came in to preside over the
remainder of the trial. The parties did not object to the substitute judge presiding ;
although, the Fortners expressed concern about the substitute judge's ruling on key
issues such as the admissibility of the posed photographs without reviewing the record .
When both Joshua and Daniel moved for directed verdicts on all charges, the substitute
judge admitted that he had not been able to review the record ; and Joshua and Daniel
objected to his ruling on their directed verdict motions without doing so. The judge then
asked the parties to summarize the evidence. Finding "no big disagreement" in their
summaries, he then denied the directed verdict motion without reviewing the record,
stating the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find guilt.
Following deliberations, the jury acquitted the Fortners of murder but found both
guilty of second-degree manslaughter, first-degree robbery, and first-degree burglary .
The trial court sentenced both in accordance with the jury's recommended sentence of
ten years for second-degree manslaughter, to run consecutively with 20 years for firstdegree robbery, to run concurrently with twenty years for first-degree burglary, for a total
of thirty years' imprisonment for each . Further facts will be developed as necessary in
the opinion .
II . ANALYSIS .
A . Substitute Judge's Ruling on Directed Verdict Motion
Without Reviewing-Record Was_Harmless Error.
Both Fortners claim that their convictions must be reversed as a result of the midtrial substitution of judges, particularly the substitute judge's ruling on the directed
verdict motions without reviewing the evidence. They contend that this constitutes a
"structural error," which mandates retrial and is not subject to harmless error analysis .
But they notably fail to cite any authority stating that the mid-trial substitution of a judge
by itself or the substitute judge's ruling on key issues without reviewing the record
constitutes a structural error. In fact, many courts have arguably implicitly found any
errors relating to substitution of judges not to be structural in subjecting these issues to
harmless error analysis .
The United States Supreme Court has defined "structural errors" rather narrowly
as errors that affect "[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end" such as
"absence of counsel for a criminal defendant" or "presence on the bench of a judge who
is not impartial ."4. It has excluded from this definition errors which do not "transcend[]
the criminal process[,]" such as the admission of involuntary confessions . In light of the
lack of authority to indicate that such substitution issues constitute structural error, we
decline to expand the definition of "structural error" to include such issues .
We recognize that ideally, "the judge who hears the testimony as to the facts also
applies the law thereto." s But courts have generally not found reversible error where the
3
See, e.g., United States v. Lane , 708 F.2d 1394, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding harmless
error in substitute judge's failure to certify familiarity with record as required by
FED. R. CRIM. P. 25(a)); McIntyre v. State, 463 S .E .2d 476, 479 (Ga. 1995) (stating that
substitution of judges over defendant's objection did not entitle him to retrial unless he could
show actual prejudice) . See also Hood v. State, 637 A .2d 1208, 1213 (Md. 1994) (holding
that due to substitute judge's failure to become thoroughly familiar with record, as required
by Maryland state rule, "prejudice to the defendant must be presumed and a new trial
awarded unless the State can rebut the presumption of prejudice or demonstrate beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error was harmless .") .
Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S . 279, 309-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed2d 302 (1991).
/d. at 311
Tracey A . Bateman, Annotation, Substitution of Judge in State Criminal Trial, 45 A.L.R.5th
591 § 2(a) (1997) (explaining premise of early case law against substitution, as well as
general rule that substitution before introduction of evidence does not constitute reversible
error) .
defendant, as here, consented or failed to object to the substitution of judges during the
presentation of proof.' This general rule is premised on a "finding that any right the
defendant might have to a trial with the same judge was not so fundamental that it could
not be waived."8 So we clearly find no reversible error in the mid-trial substitution of the
judge in the instant cases because of the defendants' failure to object to substitution or
request a mistrial .
The Fortners did object to the substitute judge's ruling on their directed verdict
motions without reviewing the evidence . This is an issue we find more troubling,
although, ultimately, not a reversible error under the facts of this case . We note that the
federal courts and some state courts have adopted rules governing the mid-trial
substitution of judges. And these rules generally require that the substitute judge certify
that he/she has reviewed the record of the case .9 Kentucky has no court rule governing
the mid-trial substitution of judges.' °
Id. a t §§ 2 and 4.
s
s
Id. at § 2(a) . See also Randel v. State, 219 S.W.2d 689, 693-95 (Tex. Crim . App. 1949)
(holding that as defendant could waive trial by jury under Texas statutes, any right to have
the same judge throughout trial was not so fundamental that it could not be waived; and,
thus, mid-trial substitution of judges with defendant's consent was not reversible error) .
See Fed .R .Crim.P . 25(a) ("Any judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the court may
complete a jury trial if: (1) the judge before whom the trial began cannot proceed because
of death, sickness, or other disability ; and (2) the judge completing the trial certifies
familiarity with the trial record ."); Hood , 637 A.2d at 1211 (citing Maryland Rule 4-361(b)) ;
State v. Young , 196 S.W.3d 85,103-05 (Tenn . 2006) (discussing Tennessee Rules of
Criminal Procedure 25, which mimics FED.R .CRIM.P . 25, and holding that a death in the
original trial judge's family qualified as an "other disability" under Rule 25(a) such that a midtrial substitution of judges for that reason was proper so long as the substitute judge certified
familiarity with the record as required by the rule).
10
RCr 11 .32 governs only post-verdict substitution of judges:
"If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge before whom the defendant has
been tried is unable to perform the duties to be performed by the court after a verdict or
finding of guilty, any successor or special judge sitting in or assigned to the court in which
the case was tried may perform those duties ; but if such other judge is satisfied that he or
After hearing the parties argue their summaries of the evidence, the trial court
attempted to recapitulate their summaries in ruling on the directed verdict motion,
stating that
Somebody went in, took the money, took the marijuana, and this
gentleman's dead . It sounds to me that there's been sufficient evidence
shown where a reasonable jury could reach a reasonable conclusion as to
whether these two individuals committed the offense of burglary, robbery[,]
or murder . Motions are overruled .
Since we affirm based on the harmlessness of the error due to the sufficiency of the
evidence of record to withstand the directed verdict motions and not based on any
alleged similarity in the summaries, we decline to describe in detail how the parties
summarized the evidence. And we do not evaluate whether the trial court was correct
in stating that there was "no big disagreement in their summaries" because we cannot
approve of resolving a directed verdict motion on summaries rather than evidence.
Apparently due to the lack of an explicit requirement that a substitute judge
certify familiarity with the record, the Commonwealth argues that:
the rule of law in Kentucky should be that a substitute judge may lawfully
consider the parties' respective summaries of the evidence and then rule
upon a motion for directed verdict of acquittal based upon these
summaries, unless there is a substantial difference in the parties'
summaries, in which case the substitute judge should review the
videotapes of the trial conducted prior to his appearance as judge.
We decline to embrace this as the proper procedure on substitution of judges.
Despite the lack of court rule explicitly requiring certification of familiarity with the record
when a mid-trial substitution of judges takes place, our case law has consistently
required that a trial court review the evidence when ruling upon a motion for a directed
she cannot perform those duties because he or she did not preside at the trial or for any
other reason, such judge may in his or her discretion grant a new trial ."
verdict of acquittal." The parties' summaries of the evidence are simply not evidence .
So a substitute judge cannot simply review summaries of the evidence but must review
the evidence in the record to the extent necessary to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient that a reasonable juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to rule
properly upon a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal . While a substitute judge may
not necessarily need to review the whole record or watch all of the videotapes, the
substitute judge must review enough evidence to make sure that it is sufficient for a
reasonable finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including satisfaction of all
required elements of the crime, before denying a motion for directed verdict.
In the instant cases, we find the substitute judge's error in ruling upon the
directed verdict motions without reviewing the evidence was harmless . Our review of
the record indicates that the evidence was sufficient to withstand the Fortners' motions
for directed verdicts of acquittal . "On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if
under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt,
only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal . 02 Furthermore,
RCr 9.24 constrains us to deem harmless any "error or defect in any ruling" unless that
error affected the "substantial. rights of the parties." Given the evidence presented by
the Commonwealth in this case, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find
12
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186,187 (Ky. 1991):
"On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth . If the evidence is
sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling
on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth
is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given
to such testimony ."
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill , 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983)).
Joshua and Daniel guilty of the crimes for which they were convicted, meaning that the
trial judge's failure to review the record before ruling on the Fortners' motions for
directed verdicts was a harmless error. 13
B.
Proof Was Sufficient to Deny Directed Verdict on
Second-Degree Manslaughter Charges .
KRS 507 .040(1) states that: "A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second
degree when he wantonly causes the death of another person[ .]" KRS 501 .020(3)
states that:
A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or circumstance described
by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or
that the circumstance exists . The risk must be of such nature and degree
that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation .
David Fritz and Randall Miller testified to the Fortners' involvement in the plan to
break into Waugh's residence for money and marijuana. As the Fortners point out,
there was apparently no testimony stating explicitly that those who met in the barn
intended to "beat up" or "attack" Waugh . But a jury could reasonably infer that the
participants intended such based on the testimony that they would obtain money or
marijuana "no matter what it took" and from the fact that Waugh was, in fact, beaten up,
in the course of the participants taking his money and marijuana.
Miller testified to seeing both Fortners beat Waugh . Although Miller and Lemon
also took part in the beating, Miller testified that Daniel was the first to strike Waugh and
that Daniel threw the most punches . Miller also testified that Joshua hit Waugh the
13
We note that, apparently, there was no DNA evidence linking Joshua to the crimes ; but,
apparently, Daniel's DNA was found on some camouflage clothing that was allegedly worn
during the commissions of the crimes . But our resolution of this case does not turn on the
DNA evidence .
hardest with a single, running blow -a "leverage hit" that he put his weight into .
Dr. Roth, Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, testified that Waugh suffered multiple blows
to the head and died as a result of brain injury caused by blunt impact head injuries.
Given this evidence, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find both Fortners
guilty of wantonly causing Waugh's death by beating him in the head and clearly
disregarding a generally known risk that their blows to Waugh's head could cause
serious injury or even death . Furthermore, despite the Fortners' arguments to the trial
court that there was no proof that either inflicted the fatal blow, Dr. Roth testified to
Waugh's dying as a result of multiple blows to the head. Since the jury could
reasonably have found that the blows inflicted by Joshua and Daniel both contributed to
the victim's death, 14 or that the blows inflicted by both were each sufficient to cause
death, we find no error in the trial court's denial of their motions for directed verdict of
acquittal on homicide charges.
As for the Fortners' arguments that Fritz's and Miller's testimony was suspect
due to discrepancies in their statements and their making deals with the
Commonwealth, questions regarding these witnesses' creditability and the weight to be
given to their testimony were reserved to the jury .15 Given the evidence supporting
guilt, the trial court's denial of their directed verdict motion was not in error.
C, Proof Was Sufficient to Deny Directed Verdict
on First-Degree Robbery Charges .
KRS 515 .020(1) provides, in pertinent part, that:
14
15
Bennett v. Commonwealth , 150 Ky. 604, 150 S .W. 806 (1912) (holding that if two people
both caused injuries which contributed to the victim's death, then both are liable for
homicide).
Benham , 816 S.W.2d at 187.
10
A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of
committing theft, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force
upon another person with intent to accomplish the theft and when he:
(a)
Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the
crime[ .)
Obviously, Miller's and Fritz's testimony that Joshua and Daniel acted with others
in taking Waugh's property and beating him, coupled with the medical examiner's
testimony that Waugh had suffered head injuries resulting in brain injury and death, is
sufficient evidence that the jury's finding of guilt is not unreasonable . Again, any
conflicts in testimony and any issues regarding the creditability of witnesses or the
weight to be accorded their testimony were properly left to the jury. Neither Fortner was
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on first-degree robbery charges.
D. Proof Was Sufficient to Deny Directed Verdict
on First-Degree Burglary Charges .
KRS 511 .020(1) provides, in pertinent part, that:
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when, with the intent to
commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building,
and when in effecting entry or while in the building or in the immediate
flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime :
(b)
Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the
crime[ .]
The jury's finding both Fortners guilty of this offense was clearly not
unreasonable in light of the evidence presented. Miller and Fritz testified that the
Fortners were involved in planning the unauthorized entry into Waugh's home for the
purpose of taking marijuana and money . Miller also testified that the Fortners beat the
victim, and the medical examiner testified to the injuries suffered by the victim due to the
beating . Again, any conflicts in testimony and questions regarding creditability of
witnesses and the weight accorded to their testimony were left to the jury. Neither
Fortner was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal for the offense of first-degree
burglary .
E. Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Allowing
the Commonwealth to Display Enlarged Photographs
of the Victim and the Crime Scene.
The Fortners claim that reversible error resulted from the original trial judge's
decision to allow the Commonwealth to display enlarged photographs of the victim and
the crime scene in the courtroom . Although they hyperbolically characterize the
enlargements as being the size of "billboards," they also state that the enlargements
were approximately four feet by four feet in size. More accurately, these enlargements
were poster-sized . We note that the trial court did not allow these poster-sized
enlargements to go back to the jury room but permitted them to be displayed to the jury
in the courtroom on easels.
The Fortners claim that due to the enlargement of these somewhat gruesome
photos, the photos should have been excluded under KRE 403 because undue
prejudice outweighed the photo's probative effects . But these photographs of the
victim's body were relevant to show the extent of his injuries and to refute the defense
that the Fortners had no intention to kill or seriously injure the victim in beating him .
Generally, photographs that show the nature and extent of the victim's injuries are
admissible even though they may be gruesome . 16 Kentucky courts have generally
found error in admitting such photographs only where the photograph has not been a
'6
Adkins v. Commonwealth , 96 S .W .3d 779, 794 (Ky. 2003).
12
fair and accurate depiction of the injuries received from the perpetrator, such as where
lighting or angle was manipulated to make injuries appear more prominent" or where a
victim's body has decomposed or been mutilated by animals after the commission of the
crime. 18
We are not aware of any authority that prohibits the enlargement of these
photographs, which are otherwise fair and accurate depictions of relevant matters . The
Fortners have not alleged that the photographs were not fair and accurate . In fact,
defense counsel specifically objected only to the enlargements and not to the
photographs themselves . Since the photographs were fair and accurate depictions of
the victim's injuries and the crime scene, we find no fault in the display of the
photographs enlarged to a size that permitted easier viewing by the jury.
Furthermore, the fact that the medical examiner's testimony and other witness
testimony may have independently established the fact of the victim's head injuries,
does not preclude the display of a photograph fairly and accurately depicting the
injuries. We have recognized the probative effectiveness of photographic evidence and
approved its admission where the photographs fairly and accurately depict the matter
17
Haddad v. Kuriger, 437 S.W .2d 524, 525 (Ky. 1968) (finding abuse of discretion in
admission of photograph of child's automobile accident injuries in civil case based on
photograph not being fair and accurate depiction of injuries) : "The photograph is an extreme
close-up, so much so as to present a distorted perspective . It appears to have been
designed purposely to depict the child's injuries in the worst possible light ; to emphasize
them by presenting a view such as would be had only by a person putting his face within a
few inches of the child's. Thus the gruesome appearance is enhanced. The lighting and
coloring do not appear normal . After examining and re-examining, considering and
reconsidering this photograph, we are constrained to conclude that it has such a gruesome
appearance that its inflammatory and prejudicial effect on the jury would far outweigh its
evidentiary or probative value and therefore the trial court should have excluded it."
18
See, e.g., Funk v. Commonwealth , 842 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Ky. 1992); Holland v.
Commonwealth , 703 S.W.2d 876, 879-80 (Ky. 1985); Clark v. Commonwealth , 833 S.W.2d
793, 794-95 (Ky. 1991).
13
portrayed even where other evidence might independently establish the same relevant
matter:
Photographs of a victim of a homicide or the scene of a crime constitute
demonstrative evidence which is often an aid to the jury in the trial of a
case . It is true that "one picture is worth more than 10,000 words." A
famous author phrased it in this fashion, "[a] picture shows me at a glance
what it takes dozens of pages of a book to expound ."19
We find no error in displaying this demonstrative evidence even though other
evidence also established the fact of the victim's injuries. As for the Fortners'
contention that this display lasted too long, we find no indication on the record that they
requested earlier removal of the display; and, thus, this sub-issue is un-preserved for
our review.
F. Any Error in Admitting Posed Photographs
of Joshua and Daniel Was Harmless.
Joshua contends that the substitute judge violated his due process rights by
allowing the Commonwealth to exhibit posed photographs of Daniel and himself . He
contends that the trial court's lack of familiarity with the record left it at a loss to evaluate
the admissibility of this evidence in the context of the trial as a whole and argues that
these photographs were not provided in advance to the defense in violation of the trial
court's discovery order, which he contends mandated discovery of all photographs.
19
20
Brown v. Commonwealth , 558 S.W.2d 599, 604 (Ky. 1977) (footnotes omitted).
Although the trial court's discovery order does not specifically mention providing all
photographs, the Commonwealth's answer to the discovery order stated that the defense
could inspect all photographs by contacting the investigating agency. Apparently, defense
counsel went to Kentucky State Police headquarters to inspect all photographs taken in the
case. The Commonwealth then directed Sergeant Taylor to send copies of "all
photographs" to defense counsel . Sergeant Taylor apparently sent the photographs which
he had taken to defense counsel but, for whatever reason, did not send photographs taken
by Detective Garnes-including the posed photographs of the defendants taken by
Detective Garnes.
14
The substitute judge allowed these posed photographs to be displayed poster-size on
easels but stated that such reproductions were not to be admitted as exhibits.
The prosecutor stated that these photographs were listed on a log of those
provided for defense inspection when visiting the state police post; however, these
particular photographs taken by Detective Garnes must have been omitted from the file
of photographs sent to the defense
by Sergeant Taylor, who apparently only sent the
photographs that he took himself. Defense counsel acknowledged being aware that
"mug shots" were generally taken upon arrest; although, they stated that they did not
know that such "mug shot" photographs had been properly developed in this case . The
substitute judge permitted display of the posed photographs, stating that they showed
the defendants at the time of their arrest, that there was at least a jury issue as to
whether the photographs showed injuries, and that the defense had notice that "mug
shots" would be taken and should have made inquiries to obtain them .
Although Joshua correctly notes that posed photographs have at least
sometimes been viewed with some suspicion, a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of
such posed photographs, nonetheless, must not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion . Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we find no such abuse of
discretion in the trial court's allowing these photographs to be displayed .
Furthermore, even if a discovery violation had occurred and the posed pictures
were of little probative value, we find any error in their display harmless. Although
Joshua complains that his photo provided the most damning proof that he had an injury
21
See Gorman v. Hunt , 19 S.W.3d 662, 665-69 (Ky. 2000) (ultimately upholding trial court's
admission of posed photograph to show location of parties at time of accident at issue in
civil case as not abuse of discretion, after noting that posed photographs had often been
criticized or excluded as incompetent or self-serving).
15
to his hand, the copy of this photograph provided to us from the record does not
obviously show any injuries . Although the photograph does show him holding onto one
arm, which Joshua argues definitively shows his injury, the effect is doubtful at best--in
fact, the picture seems to spotlight his tattoo rather than accomplishing any other
significant purpose .
Furthermore, Joshua admits that other evidence of his hand being injured was
provided in Miller's testimony and the testimony of Detective Garnes-both of whom
recalled observing that Joshua's hand was injured. Since two witnesses independently
testified to the injury and to the dubious evidence of injury in the copy of the photo
provided to us, the display of this photograph almost certainly had no effect on the jury's
verdict . As for Joshua's argument that he might have investigated further to obtain
evidence that his hand was, in fact, injured while fixing a vehicle, as he now contends,
we do not see how he was prevented from doing so by not being provided with this
photograph . He was surely aware of his own injury .
Joshua contends that he was also prejudiced by association due to the display of
his brother Daniel's posed photograph depicting Daniel's allegedly frightening
appearance wearing a "wife-beater' tank top inexplicably lifted to reveal his ribs.
Apparently the Commonwealth contends that Daniel's photograph was admitted to
show injuries as well . As with Joshua's own photograph, however, the copy of Daniel's
photograph provided to us in the record does not show an obvious injury. Again,
although this photograph may be of dubious probative value, we cannot see how it
could have had much prejudicial effect either. The brothers' allegedly dangerous or
scary appearance in these photographs would seem to have little prejudicial effect in
light of the testimony indicating their participation in the frightening attack on the victim .
Furthermore, Joshua did not explicitly argue to the trial court that the photographs
should be excluded based upon them making the brothers look scary or dangerous .
Since the display of these posed photographs did not affect substantial rights and
there is no substantial possibility that any error in their admission had an impact on the
outcome of the trial, we find any error in the admission of such evidence to be
harmless.22
Ill . CONCLUSION .
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the circuit court are hereby
AFFIRMED .
All sitting . Lambert, C.J . ; Cunningham, Minton, Noble, Schroder, and Scott, JJ .,
concur .
22
RCr 9.24; Thacker v. Commonwealth , 194 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Ky. 2006) ("The test for
harmless error is whether there is any substantial possibility that the outcome of the case
would have been different without the presence of that error.") .
17
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
DANIEL LEE FORTNER :
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
JOSHUA CYRUS FORTNER:
Susan Jackson Balliet
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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