DEREK FARRIS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : APRIL 19, 2007
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NO. 2005-SC-000994-MR
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DEREK FARRIS
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-01232
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORAN DUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Derek Farris was convicted of murdering his neighbor, Lloyd Cumbers,
and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. He appeals to this Court as a matter of
right,' raising five issues. He contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his
motion for a directed verdict, (2) refusing to admonish the jury regarding the
Commonwealth's questioning a defense witness about Farris's possible background as
a gunsmith, (3) by permitting the investigating detective to testify about alleged misfires
from the murder weapon, (4) by allowing the Commonwealth in closing argument to shift
the burden of proof, and (5) by failing to include language regarding extreme emotional
disturbance (EED) in the jury instruction regarding first-degree manslaughter. We find
no merit in any of these arguments and affirm.
1
See Ky. Const . § 110(2)(b) .
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .
Farris lived in an apartment at the rear of a house where Cumbers lived.
Farris and Cumbers, who were both 65 years old, were friends . But one day Farris
called 911 and told the operator that he had just shot his neighbor . When the operator
asked Farris why he had shot his neighbor, Farris simply replied that Cumbers had
been lying about him and that he was "fed up" with it .
The police went immediately to the scene and arrested Farris without
incident on the same front porch where he had shot Cumbers. Farris told the arresting
officer that he had not meant to shoot Cumbers but that he guessed that he had. The
arresting officer testified that Farris's demeanor was calm . Several weeks later, Farris
was indicted for murder.
The case progressed to trial at which Detective David Day testified on
behalf of the Commonwealth . Before Day testified, Farris's counsel asked the trial court
to prohibit Day from stating an opinion that the murder weapon had misfired, arguing
that Day was not a firearms expert . The Commonwealth acknowledged that Day was
not a firearms expert, and the trial court ruled that Day should limit his testimony to the
actions he undertook at the scene and the observations he made .
Day testified that he had collected the murder weapon, a revolver, from
the crime scene and had examined it. Day testified that his examination of the revolver
showed that it contained one empty chamber, two expended cartridges, and three live
rounds . When asked if he made any observations about the live rounds he removed
from the revolver, Day testified that the markings on the rounds indicated that they were
misfires . Farris's counsel objected, and the Commonwealth stated that the misfire-
related testimony would be properly presented later through the testimony of its firearms
expert. The Commonwealth offered to move on to other areas of inquiry unless Farris's
counsel wanted the Commonwealth to elicit testimony from Day that he had not
performed further testing on the revolver . Farris's counsel agreed to that proposal, so
the Commonwealth established from Day that he did not perform further testing on the
revolver. Farris's counsel did not further object or request an admonition or any
additional relief.
The Commonwealth later called Warren Mitchell to testify. Mitchell was an
expert firearms examiner who examined the murder weapon and testified that three
rounds removed from it had marks on them showing that they had been misfired . The
defense made no objection to Mitchell's testimony.
Farris did not testify in his own defense . The defense called several
witnesses in an attempt to show that Farris had shot Cumbers under EED. Among
those witnesses was James Atkerson, Sr., who had known Farris for over twenty years .
On cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked Atkerson if he was aware that Farris
had been a gunsmith in the Army. Atkerson responded in the negative . The
Commonwealth further asked Atkerson if he had seen a diploma hanging on Farris's
wall showing that Farris had been a gunsmith . Atkerson responded in the negative .
Sometime later, defense counsel objected to the gunsmith-related questions because
Farris had told defense counsel that he was not a gunsmith and did not have a
gunsmith diploma . The Commonwealth responded by saying that it had asked the
question based on what a detective had seen in Farris's home . The trial court found
that the Commonwealth had a good faith basis for asking the question and denied
Farris's motion for a mistrial and declined to admonish the
jury.
After a two-day trial, the jury found Farris guilty of murder and
recommended a thirty-year sentence. The trial court sentenced Farris in accordance
with the jury's recommendation and denied Farris's motion for a new trial, after which
Farris filed this appeal .
11. ANALYSIS.
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying
Farris's Motion for Directed Verdict.
Farris contends that the Commonwealth bore the burden of proving the
absence of EED beyond a reasonable doubt . Because Farris further contends that the
Commonwealth did not meet that burden, Farris contends that he was entitled to a
directed verdict from the trial court on the murder charge .
We agree that the Commonwealth must prove every element of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. And in order to prove murder, the Commonwealth
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Farris intentionally killed
Cumbers. But if Farris was acting under EED, then he may be guilty of manslaughter,
See, e.g., Greene v. Commonwealth , 197 S.W.3d 76, 80 (Ky. 2006), cert. denied
127 S .Ct. 1157 (2007) .
s
U.S .
See Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 507.020(1)(a) ("(1) A person is guilty of murder
when:
(a) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person
or of a third person . . . ").
not murder. Accordingly, though some of our decisions on this point may have been
inconsistent, we recently have clarified this area.of the law by definitively stating that if
evidence is introduced to prove the existence of EED, its absence becomes an element
of the offense of murder.
"Although the Commonwealth must prove every element of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth need not affirmatively disprove EED
unless the evidence of EED is so overwhelming that it necessitates acquittal on the
charge of murder. ,7 Stated another way, "where proof is presented that would support
the finding of EED, and the absence of EED is then a statutory element, then the
burden switches to the Commonwealth to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. But
that does not mean that it has to affirmatively introduce proof of the non-existence of
EED, if such proof is already present. The Commonwealth loses if no such proof is
present, but where, as here, the proof, when taken in a light most favorable to the
Id. ("except that in any prosecution [for murder] a person shall not be guilty under this
subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there
was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be. However, nothing contained in this section shall constitute a
defense to a prosecution for or preclude a conviction of manslaughter in the first degree or
any other crime[.]").
Greene , 197 S .W .3d at 80-81 ("Thus, the same act, or series of acts, may be murder or
manslaughter 'in the first degree depending on a finding of EED. Admittedly, there have
been some inconsistencies in our prior decisions concerning which party is properly
encumbered with the burden of proof.") .
Coffey v. Messer, 945 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Ky. 1997) ("Once evidence is introduced to prove
the presence of EED, its absence becomes an element of the offense of murder ."); Greene ,
197 S .W.3d at 81 ("However, our more recent opinions have categorized EED, or more
properly, the absence of it, as an element of the substantive offense, rather than as a
defense .").
Spears v. Commonwealth , 30 S.W.3d 152,154 (Ky. 2000) .
Commonwealth, meets this burden, it is then a jury question." s As an appellate court,
our task is to determine if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence presented to meet all the elements of
murder, including the absence of EED .9
Two factors in the evidence militate against EED. First, the record
contains evidence that Farris was armed when he arrived onto Cumbers's front porch,
which suggests Farris came to shoot Cumbers. Second, the record lacks evidence of
the requisite triggering event, which is suggested by the fact that Farris did not
remember any lie that Cumbers told or other action that Cumbers took that triggered
EED.'° So whatever evidence there was to support Farris's contention that he was
impelled into action by EED when he killed Cumbers, it was not such compelling
evidence to have resulted in a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charge. The
Greene, 197 S.W.3d at 81 .
9
10
Id. at 82 ("It must be remembered it is not the court but a jury that must make a factual
determination of whether a particular defendant acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance . The courts will test the sufficiency of the evidence, and we have to
view it in a light most favorable to the prosecution; however, once found sufficient, it is for
the jury to find the facts, and they are not bound to view it in a light most favorable to the
prosecution.") (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted) .
Id. at 81-82 ("Although EED is essentially a restructuring of the old common law concept of
`heat of passion,' the evidence needed to prove EED is different. There must be evidence
that the defendant suffered 'a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as
to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force
of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes .'
McClellan v. Commonwealth , 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986). '[T]he event which
triggers the explosion of violence on the part of the criminal defendant must be sudden and
uninterrupted . It is not a mental disease or illness. . . . Thus, it is wholly insufficient for the
accused defendant to claim the defense of extreme emotional disturbance based on a
gradual victimization from his or her environment, unless the additional proof of a triggering
event is sufficiently shown.' Foster v. Commonwealth , 827 S .W.2d 670, 678 (Ky. 1991)
(citations omitted) . And the `extreme emotional disturbance . . . [must have a] reasonable
explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint
of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed
them to be .' Sears, 30 S.W.3d at 155.") .
question of EED was properly submitted -to the jury. Or, as we stated under similar
circumstances in Greene, "[a]Ithough there certainly was evidence from which a jury
could have found the presence of EED, in this instance-the same evidence also
supported the contrary conclusion. Thus, we cannot say the jury was wrong when, after
hearing all the evidence, it returned a verdict convicting Appellant of murder . Under the
evidence presented, it was clearly not unreasonable for the jury to do so.""
B.
The Trial Court Did Not Err by Refusing to Admonish the
Jury Regarding Atkerson's Gunsmith-Related Testimony.
Normally, an admonition to the jury suffices to cure improper evidence . 12
But if the evidence was not improperly admitted, then no admonition is needed.
Farris has offered nothing firm to show that the Commonwealth acted in bad faith when
it asked Atkerson about Farris being a gunsmith . Indeed, there is nothing to contradict
the Commonwealth's assertion that it asked these questions based on a detective's
recollection . We have been cited to no authority, nor are we aware of any, requiring the
Commonwealth to obtain sworn testimony from an officer regarding his recollection of
the area surrounding a crime scene before asking questions of a witness based on that
officer's recollection . So the fact that the basis for the Commonwealth's questions was
the unsworn recollection of an officer does not show that the Commonwealth acted in
bad faith by using that recollection to frame its cross-examination of a witness.
The Commonwealth did not dwell on this gunsmith issue during its closing
argument, and Farris did not make his request for an admonition or mistrial until well
after the completion of Atkerson's gunsmith-related testimony. So Farris seeks
/d. at 82.
12
See, e.g.,
Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 17 (Ky. 2005).
appellate relief on an issue for which he did not contemporaneously request any type of
curative action from the trial court . And he has not shown there is a reasonable
possibility that the brief gunsmith-related questioning by the Commonwealth affected
the jury's verdict . The gunsmith-related testimony was tangential, at best, to the
ultimate question of whether Farris was suffering from EED when he killed Cumbers .
So even if we presumed for argument's sake that the gunsmith-related inquiry by the
Commonwealth was erroneous, that error was certainly harmless. 13
Taking into account all the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its "broad discretion to regulate cross-examination "14
when it refused to admonish the jury regarding the Commonwealth's gunsmith-related
questions to Atkerson.
C.
Farris Received All the Relief He Requested
When Day Testified about Misfires.
As previously noted, Farris objected when Detective Day testified that his
observations indicated that the revolver had misfired . That objection prompted the
Commonwealth to offer to move on to other areas of inquiry unless Farris wanted the
Commonwealth to establish that Day had not performed further testing on the revolver .
Farris agreed to that proposed solution, and the Commonwealth elicited testimony from
Day that he had not performed further testing on the revolver. Farris's counsel did not
further object to this remedial action, nor did he request an admonition or other curative
relief. But, on appeal, Farris now argues that the trial court should have admonished
the jury to disregard Day's testimony regarding alleged misfires. And Farris asks us to
13
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.24.
14
Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1997).
reverse his conviction because the trial court failed on its own volition to admonish the
jury spontaneously. We reject this argument .
"The law is well settled that a defendant waives his right to an admonition
or a discharge of the jury by not promptly asking for it."' 5 So "[i]n the absence of a
request for further relief, it must be assumed that appellant was satisfied with the relief
granted [by the trial court], and he cannot now be heard to complain . 06 We hold that
the trial court did not err in failing to admonish the jury sua sponte .
Additionally, even if we concluded for the sake of argument that Day's
testimony regarding misfires was improper, we reject Farris's contention that the
admission of Day's testimony and the concomitant lack of a spontaneous
admonishment by the trial court is palpable error under RCr 10.26. Farris did not object
to Mitchell's similar testimony that his examination revealed that the revolver had
misfired . Thus, Day's testimony on this point was merely cumulative, meaning that its
admission was, at most, harmless error, not palpable error."
15
Clements v. Commonwealth , 384 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Ky. 1964) .
16
Baker v. Commonwealth , 973 S.W .2d 54, 56 (Ky. 1998).
17
See, e.g., Combs v. Commonwealth , 965 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Ky. 1998) ("it is the holding of
this Court that the admission of the results of a blood test in a DUI case not involving death
or physical injury is improper. However, due to the overwhelming evidence of Combs'
intoxication at the time of his arrest, the blood test evidence was merely cumulative and,
thus, harmless error in this case .") ; Patterson v. Commonwealth , 555 S .W .2d 607, 609
(Ky.App. 1977) ("A review of the evidence in this trial convinces us that Morrow's testimony
was merely cumulative to the testimony of two other witnesses, Ronnie Bartleston and Allen
Duncan . These two witnesses testified they saw Charles Gilmore driving down Morris Hill
Road the afternoon of the rape. In light of this evidence, we hold the court's ruling not to be
prejudicial. RCr 9.24.") .
D.
The Commonwealth's Closing Argument Did Not
Impermissibly Shift the Burden of Proof.
Farris contended that he was suffering from EED because of Cumbers's
lies allegedly told about him. In its closing argument, the Commonwealth argued that
EED was inapplicable because there was no evidence that Cumbers had told lies about
Farris. Farris contends that this statement shifted the burden of proof in the minds of
the jury, offending the twin principles that (1) the Commonwealth bears the burden of
proof on every element of the offense ; and (2) that the absence of EED is an element of
the offense .
When we review claims that the Commonwealth's closing argument was
so improper as to require reversal, we must "focus on the overall fairness of the trial,
and not the culpability of the prosecutor[,]" bearing in mind that counsel has "great
leeway" in closing argument to "comment on [the] evidence, and . . . the falsity of a
defense position . "18 Thus, we may reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct
only if "the misconduct of the prosecutor [was] . . . so serious as to render the entire trial
fundamentally unfair." 19
As previously stated, the Commonwealth bore the burden of showing the
absence of EED in order to convict Farris of murder . Farris argued that some
unspecified lie(s) told by Cumbers caused him to shoot Cumbers while overcome by
EED . Thus, the Commonwealth's comment in closing argument that the jury had not
seen specific evidence of what lies Cumbers told was a comment on the lack of
evidence Farris mustered to support his EED claim. Since the Commonwealth was
18
Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 744 S.W.2d 407, 411-12 (Ky. 1987).
19
Partin v. Commonwealth , 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Ky. 1996).
-10-
required to disprove the existence of EED, it had the leeway to argue that there was
insufficient evidence to support Farris's EED claim. Accordingly, we reject Farris's
argument that the Commonwealth's comment regarding the lack of specific evidence of
the lies allegedly told by Cumbers was an attempt to cajole the jury into rendering a
guilty verdict on the murder charge or was an impermissible comment on Farris's
decision to not testify .
As previously stated, we have recently clarified the law regarding EED and
have expressly held that EED is not a defense in a prosecution for murder .20 Thus, the
Commonwealth erred when it referred to EED in its closing argument as a defense . But
this trial occurred before Greene was decided. In any event, we do not believe that an
isolated reference to EED as being a defense in closing argument was an error so
egregious as to cause Farris's entire trial to be fundamentally unfair. Thus, we caution
the Commonwealth to avoid future references to EED as a defense in a murder
prosecution, but, under the facts of the case at hand, find that an isolated reference in
closing argument as to EED being a defense is insufficient to warrant reversal .
E.
The Trial Court Did Not Err By Refusing to Include the Presence
of EED in the First-Degree Manslaughter Instruction .
Farris contends that the trial court erred when it refused his request to
include language in the first-degree manslaughter instruction that would have required
the jury to find that he was acting under the presence of EED. Though Farris
20
Greene , 197 S.W .3d at 81 ("However, our more recent opinions have categorized EED, or
more properly, the absence of it, as an element of the substantive offense, rather than as a
defense .").
inexplicably does not mention it in his brief, we rejected the same argument in
Sherroan v. Commonwealth .
In Sherroan, we explained as follows :
Appellant asserts error in the trial court's failure to include
the presence of EED as an element of the lesser included
offense of manslaughter in the first degree . We note at the
outset that the murder instructions properly included the
absence of EED as an element of that offense . . . .
Appellant premises his argument on the following language
in KRS 507.030(1) :
(1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree
when :
(b) With the intent to cause the death of another
person, he causes the death of such person under
circumstances which do not constitute murder
because he acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance, as defined in subsection (1)(a) of KRS 507.020.
(Emphasis added .)
Appellant's reliance on [Haight v. Commonwealth ,
938 S .W.2d 243 (Ky. 1996)], is misplaced . Haight only held
that giving an instruction that included the presence of EED
as an element of manslaughter in the first degree was
harmless at worst, because the jurors found the absence of
EED beyond a reasonable doubt when they convicted the
defendant of murder. Id. at 248. In Maze v.
Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1997)], we held that it
was error to require the Commonwealth to prove the
presence of extreme emotional disturbance as an element of
the offense of manslaughter in the first degree .
The inclusion of this additional element required the
Commonwealth to prove the absence of extreme emotional
disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a
conviction of murder . . . and to prove the presence of
2'
142 S.W .3d 7 (Ky. 2004).
- 1 2-
extreme emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt
in order to obtain a conviction of first-degree manslaughter.
Theoretically, the jury could have found by a preponderance
of evidence, but not beyond a reasonable doubt, that Baze
was or was not acting under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance . If so, the jury would have been
required to acquit Baze of both charges.
Id. at 823 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court's
instructions on manslaughter in the first degree correctly
stated the law.22
Finding no reason to abandon Sherroan , we reject Farris's argument.
111 . CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and
sentence imposed by the circuit court.
All sitting . All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
22
Id. at 142 S.W.3d 22.
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