JENEEKA NELLUM V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : AUGUST 23, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-000986-MR
APPELLANT
JENEEKA NELLUM
V.
ON APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA R. WARD, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-000068
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Janeeka Nellum, was convicted of First-Degree Robbery and
Persistent Felony Offender in the Second Degree (PFO II) for robbing a cab driver.
Nellum assigns as error : the indictment contained the wrong date of the offense ; the
indictment was constructively amended at trial to include an element of the offense for
which she was not indicted ; the trial court erred in allowing a police witness to bolster
the victim's testimony; and the trial court improperly allowed a lay opinion that invaded
the province of the jury. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we rule that
it was error under KRE 701 and KRE 602 to allow the police witness to testify that
Nellum's face contained a discoloration . However, because this was a fact that jurors
could see for themselves at trial, we adjudge said error to be harmless . Finding no
other error, we affirm.
At around 5:18 a.m. on December 31, 2004, cab driver Joshua Martin received a
dispatch call to pick up a passenger at the Carryout Restaurant at 7th and Central in
Newport. When Martin arrived at the location, his passenger walked in front of the cab
to the passenger side of the vehicle and got into the back seat. Martin asked if the
passenger was going to 532 Brighton Street . When the passenger answered in the
affirmative, Martin proceeded to Brighton Street, six or seven blocks away. At 532
Brighton Street, the passenger directed Martin a little further down the street to 515
Brighton Street. As Martin moved the cab forward, the passenger slid over behind
Martin in the back seat, put an arm around Martin's head and a knife to his throat,
saying, "Give me all your money or I'm going to fucking kill you ." Martin grabbed some
money from his shirt pocket and threw it in the back seat. At that point, Martin grabbed
the knife by the blade and pushed it away from his neck toward the back seat . When
Martin let go of the knife, the passenger jabbed Martin in the shoulder with the knife and
then fled the cab. Martin then saw the passenger go to 526 Brighton Street and knock
on the door. When no one answered, the person ran across the street and disappeared
down a walkway between two apartment buildings.
The Newport Police responded and Martin went with them to the Newport Police
station where he gave a statement to Detective James Boyers . Martin then sought
treatment at the hospital for his injuries. Martin sustained a small cut on his finger from
grabbing the knife, and the jab wound in his shoulder required a butterfly bandage .
Newport Police questioned the residents of 526 Brighton Street, the apartment
whose door the robber had knocked on after fleeing the cab . Misty Ewing, who lived in
the apartment, testified at that around four or five o'clock in the morning or later, her
uncle, David Elstock, who was staying with her, decided to go to White Castle . When
he opened the door to go outside, Nellum, whom Ewing knew from the neighborhood,
was standing there and asked if she could use the telephone. After using the phone,
Nellum asked for a ride home. Elstock agreed to drive her and took her to 7th Street by
the jail, which was the same area where the robbery suspect had been picked up by the
cab. Elstock testified that around four or five o'clock in the morning, prior to leaving to
go to White Castle, someone had knocked on the door, but by the time he got to the
door, no one was there.
Based on their investigation, Newport Police assembled a photographic lineup of
six black females containing Nellum's picture. Martin picked out Nellum's photo as
being the robber. Misty Ewing also picked out Nellum's photo as the person who came
to her apartment on the night of the robbery. Following Nellum's arrest on January 4,
2005, Newport Police contacted Martin and asked him to observe the suspect through a
two-way mirror. Martin again identified Nellum as the robber.
Nellum was indicted on charges of First-Degree Robbery and PFO II . At the jury
trial on October 25, 2005, Nellum was found guilty of First-Degree Robbery and PFO II
and sentenced to ten (10) years on the Robbery charge, enhanced to twenty (20) years
for the PFO Il . This matter of right appeal
followed .
Nellum's first argument is that the indictment failed to charge a public offense
because the indictment was returned before the date of the offense in the indictment .
The indictment in this case was returned on February 10, 2005, and the date
of
the
offense listed on the indictment was December 31, 2005. It is clear from the record that
the year listed in the indictment was a clerical mistake . The police report and jury
instructions both listed the date of the offense as December 31, 2004. And the
witnesses at trial testified that the date of the robbery was December 31, 2004 .
RCr 8 .18 provides :
Defenses and objections based on defects in the . . .
indictment or information other than it fails to show
jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense may be
raised only by motion before trial . . . . Failure to present any
such defense -or objection as herein provided constitutes a
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant
relief from the waiver . Lack of jurisdiction or the failure of the
indictment or information to charge an offense shall be
noticed by the court at any time during the proceedings .
Contrary to Nellum's position, listing the wrong date of the offense on the
indictment does not constitute failure to charge an offense . See Stephens v.
Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 157,158 (Ky. 1965) (amending indictment to show
different date of offense is not substantive change in indictment and does not state an
additional or different offense) ; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 63 S .W.3d 135, 140 (Ky.
2001). The indictment clearly charged Nellum with First-Degree Robbery and PFO 11 .
Because Nellum did not raise this claim of defective indictment prior to trial, it was
waived . V ickers v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1971).
We next address Nellum's argument that the indictment was constructively
amended at trial to include an element of the offense for which she was not indicted .
Relative to the First-Degree Robbery charge, the indictment stated, "the above named
defendant robbed Joshua Martin by using a dangerous weapon, a knife ." The FirstDegree Robbery instruction given at trial provided :
You will find her guilty of First Degree Robbery under
this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following :
A. That in this County on or about December
31, 2004, the Defendant stole or attempted to steal property
from Joshua Martin ; AND
B. That in the course of so doing, and with
intent to accomplish the theft, she used or threatened the
immediate use of physical force upon Joshua Martin . AND
C. That in the course of so doing, and with
intent to accomplish the theft, she EITHER:
1 . Caused physical injury to Joshua Martin,
OR
2 . Was armed with a deadly weapon .
Nellum asserts that because the indictment did not include the element of
causing physical injury to Martin pursuant to KRS 515.020(a) which was in the
instructions, the indictment was constructively amended to include an element of the
offense for which she was not indicted. We note there was no objection to the
indictment or to the robbery instruction in this case.
Under RCr 6.16, an indictment may be amended anytime before the verdict "if no
additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are
not prejudiced ." Here no additional or different offense was charged, only a different
theory of how the robbery was committed was presented in the instructions . In
Wash_ngton v. Commonwealth , 6 S.W.3d 384 (Ky.App. 1999), the Court held that such
variance between the indictment and the instructions would not constitute reversible
error if the defendant was not "'misled, surprised, or thrown off guard"' and the
"defendant's substantial rights were not affected ." Id. at 386 (quoting Robards v.
Commonwealth, 419 S.W.2d 570 (Ky. 1967)) . In the instant case, we do not see how
Nellum could have been surprised or misled by the inclusion of the "causing physical
injury" element in the instructions, nor do we see that her substantial rights were
affected . The record reveals that through pre-trial discovery, Nellum obtained a copy of
the uniform citation, the police report, and the victim's interview, all of which stated that
the defendant stabbed the victim in the shoulder with the knife during the robbery.
Indeed, Nellum does not claim that the alleged constructive amendment prevented her
5
from adequately preparing her defense in this case . See Riley v. Commonwealth , 120
S .W.3d 622, 631 (Ky. 2003).
Further, robbing the victim by the use of a dangerous weapon, as provided by the
indictment, could encompass causing physical injury to the victim .
An indictment is sufficient under Kentucky law if it contains
"a plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts
constituting the specific offense with which the defendant is
charged ." RCr 6.10(2). The indictment need not detail the
essential elements of the charged crime, so long as it fairly
informs the accused of the nature of the charged crime . . .
and if it informs the accused of the specific offense with
which he is charged and does not mislead him.
Ernst v. Commonwealth , 160 S .W.3d 744, 751-52 (Ky. 2005) (internal quotations and
citations omitted) . Here the indictment gave Nellum notice that she was being charged
with robbing Martin with a dangerous weapon, a knife. We do not believe this language
would foreclose a finding that Nellum caused physical injury to Martin with the knife in
the course of the robbery, and we do not believe this language was misleading or
unfairly prejudicial to Nellum .
Nellum also argues that the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to bolster
the testimony of Joshua Martin with his prior consistent statement. On direct, Martin
testified that the person who robbed him was a female and that he told the police it was
a female. On cross-examination, defense counsel impeached Martin with the police
report of the incident which stated that Martin had reported that the suspect was a black
male, six (6) foot tall, and weighing 250 pounds. When defense counsel asked whether
he had made that statement to police, Martin replied, "I don't remember ." Defense
counsel then proceeded to ask Martin if he could explain the statement to police,
whether he was drinking or on drugs on the night of the robbery, whether he thought the
police would "dummy" that up, and whether Martin had any visual impairment at that
time.
On direct examination of Detective James Boyers, who interviewed Martin about
the crime, the prosecution asked about the description of the suspect given by Martin .
Defense counsel objected, arguing that allowing such testimony would permit Boyers to
improperly bolster the testimony of Martin with his prior consistent statement. The trial
court overruled the objection . Boyers then testified that Martin described the person
who robbed him as a black female, 250-300 pounds, unshaven, with shadowing on the
face or a five o'clock shadow. The Commonwealth asked if there was any discussion
between Boyers and Martin about whether the suspect was male or female. Boyers
explained that Martin told him he initially thought the person was a female, and at some
point during the events referred to her as "ma'am" . In response to that, the person said
"I'm not a ma'am, I'm a sir."
Nellum argues that permitting Boyers to testify that Martin described the suspect
as a female bolstered Martin's earlier testimony identifying the robber as. a female, and
constituted inadmissible hearsay. KRE 802. The Commonwealth counters that the
testimony was proper under KRE 801 A(a)(2) as a statement "offered to rebut an
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive." The Commonwealth points to the defense questioning of Martin
regarding his in-court identification of the suspect as a female as an implied charge of
recent fabrication .
Defense counsel's argumentative line of questioning (whether Martin thought
police would "dummy" the report up and whether Martin was drinking, on drugs or
visually impaired at the time) was clearly intended to imply that Martin's trial testimony
that the robber was a female and that he told police the robber was a female was
fabricated. See Woodall v. Commonwealth , 63 S.W.3d 104,131 (Ky. 2001), cert.
denied , 537 U.S. 835,123 S. Ct. 145,154 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2002). Accordingly, we believe
that the prior consistent statement that Martin had previously identified the robber as a
female to Boyers was admissible under KRE 801 A(a)(2) as a statement offered to rebut
the implied charge of recent fabrication .
Nellum's remaining argument is that the trial court erred in allowing Detective
Boyers to give lay opinion testimony that invaded the province of the
jury.
After Boyers
testified on direct that Martin had described the robber as having a five o'clock shadow
or some shadowing on the face, the prosecution asked Boyers to look at the defendant
and tell the jury if he thought there was any discoloration to the right side of her face .
Defense counsel immediately objected, arguing that it was a determination for the
jury
to make. The objection was overruled . Detective Boyers then testified, "I see some
darkness on the right side of her face, yes."
KRE 701 provides :
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the
witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is
limited to those opinions or inferences which are :
(a) Rationally based on the perception of the witness ;
and
(b) Helpful to a clear understanding of the witness'
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
It is Nellum's position that allowing Detective Boyers to testify that Nellum had
darkness on her face was violative of KRE 701 because the jurors could see Nellum
and decide for themselves if her face contained any discoloration . "KRE 701 must be
read in conjunction with KRE 602, which limits a lay witness' testimony to matters to
which he has personal knowledge ." Mills v. Commonwealth , 996 S .W.2d 473, 488 (Ky.
1999), cert . denied, 528 U .S. 1164, 120 S. Ct. 1182, 145 L . Ed . 2d 1088 (2000) . Here,
there was no evidence that Detective Boyers had any personal knowledge of Nellum or
the coloring on her face . Although the testimony was rationally based on Boyers'
perception of Nellum's face, Boyers was in no better position than the jurors to
determine whether it contained any discoloration . Thus, it was error to allow Boyers to
so testify . "An error is harmless where, considering the entire case, the substantial
rights of the defendant are not affected or there appears to be no likely possibility that
the result would have been different had the error not occurred ." Greene v.
Commonwealth , 197 S .W.3d 76, 84 (Ky. 2006), cert . denied, __ U .S. __, 127 S. Ct.
1157 (2007). Nevertheless, given that the jurors could see for themselves in court
whether Nellum's face contained any discoloration, we do not see that Nellum's
substantial rights were affected by the offending testimony. Hence, it was harmless
error to allow Boyers to testify that Nellum's face contained discoloration.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court is
affirmed .
All sitting . Lambert, C.J ., Minton, Noble, Schroder, JJ ., concur. Cunningham, J.,
concurs in result, in which Scott, J ., joins, and sees no error in the testimony of
Detective Boyers. It was simply an acceptable trial technique to emphasize to the jury
the importance of the physical features of the defendant. There was nothing wrong with
this type of demonstrative evidence .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Thomas M. Ransdell
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Samuel J. Floyd Jr .
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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