COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. RONNIE LEE COKER
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 20, 2007
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-000981-DG
APPELLANT
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NOS. 2004-CA-000398-MR AND 2004-CA-000428-MR
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT NOS. 03-CR-00142-001 AND 03-CR-00157
RONNIE LEE COKER
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE MINTON
REVERSING
A circuit court jury convicted Ronnie Coker of theft by extortion and being a
persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO II) . The trial court sentenced
Coker to two years' imprisonment for the theft conviction, which was enhanced to seven
years' imprisonment under the PFO II conviction .
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed Coker's convictions on appeal
because it found that the trial court erred when it denied Coker's Batson ' challenges to
an African-American veniremember against whom the Commonwealth had exercised
one of its peremptory challenges . We granted discretionary review; and, having
considered the applicable law, we conclude that the Court of Appeals did not show
Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U .S. 79,106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) .
proper deference to the wide latitude afforded trial courts in ruling on Batson challenges.
Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate Coker's conviction
and sentence .
The sole issue before us involves the Commonwealth's exercise of a peremptory
challenge during jury selection in Coker's trial on charges that he extorted, or attempted
to extort, his former employer .
During voir dire, defense counsel asked the venire if they recalled some of the
rights protected by the Bill of Rights . After other veniremembers had mentioned other
rights, an African-American veniremember volunteered "due process ." Defense counsel
complimented this veniremember and made a few brief remarks about due process .
Later in voir dire, defense counsel asked the venire what verdict it should return if it
found that the Commonwealth had not proven each element of the charges against
Coker beyond a reasonable doubt . The same African-American venireman who had
been complimented for his knowledge of due process responded, "Not guilty ."
The Commonwealth later struck the African-American veniremember, prompting
defense counsel to lodge a Batson challenge. Defense counsel stated that during an
earlier conversation involving the exercise of peremptory strikes, the Commonwealth
had expressed surprise that there had been two African-Americans in the venire .
Defense counsel pointed out to the trial court that the veniremember in question did not
have any disqualifying problems and that the Commonwealth's Attorney had a history
on this issue because he was involved in a case where a conviction was overturned on
appeal under the auspices of Batson.
The Commonwealth responded by stating that it had struck the veniremember in
question because he had volunteered information and spoke up regarding constitutional
issues, including due process and presumption of innocence. So the Commonwealth
believed that this potential juror was "aligning himself with the defendant." The
Commonwealth also argued that it had exercised peremptory challenges on three other
potential jurors who had volunteered answers to defense counsel's voir dire questions,
none of whom were African-American .
The trial court ruled without elaboration that there had been no Batson violation .
Defense counsel chose not to argue the matter further.
The Equal Protection Clause is violated when a potential juror is struck from a
venire solely on the basis of race . When a litigant believes that a potential juror has
been impermissibly struck for racial reasons, the complaining litigant's objection is
governed by the three-step process the United States Supreme Court set forth in
Batson .3 The Batson framework is designed to be efficient in order for jury selection to
be as uninterrupted as possible .
Step one required Coker to make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial
discrimination by the Commonwealth in its strike of the African-American
veniremember.5 The Commonwealth was not required to respond to Coker's challenge
Washington v. Commonwealth , 34 S.W.3d 376,378-79 (Ky. 2000) ("Challenging
prospective jurors on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause.").
Id. at 379 ("In Batson , supra, the United States Supreme Court outlined a three-step process
for evaluating such claims.").
Hernandez v. New York , 500 U .S. 352, 358,111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) ("The
analysis set forth in Batson permits prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges
without substantial disruption of the jury selection process.") (plurality opinion).
Washington , 34 S.W.3d at 379; see also Gray v. Commonwealth , 203 S.W.3d 679, 690 (Ky.
2006).
unless the trial court found that Coker had satisfied his burden of making a prima facie
showing . But whether Coker actually made a sufficient prima facie showing is moot
since the Commonwealth responded to Coker's Batson objection s So the parties
proceeded to step two of the Batson framework.
Under step two, the burden shifted to the Commonwealth to demonstrate a
racially neutral reason for exercising its peremptory challenge .' At this step, all that is
required is that a prosecutor's articulated reason for exercising a peremptory challenge
be race-neutral on its face .$ As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he
second step of this [Batson process does not demand an explanation that is
persuasive, or even plausible."9 There is nothing inherently racially-oriented about the
Commonwealth's proffered reason-its belief that the veniremember's volunteered
answers evidenced a bias in favor of the defendant. And the fact that the
Commonwealth did not directly engage in a colloquy with the veniremember in question
before striking him does not negate the facially race-neutral reason given by the
Commonwealth for exercising its peremptory challenge . After all, the exercise of
peremptory challenges is much more of an art than a science ; and an attorney does not
Commonwealth v. Snodgrass, 831 S.W .2d 176,179 (Ky. 1992) ("But since the prosecutor
offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge and the trial court has ruled
on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the
defendant had made a prima facie showing also becomes moot.").
G rav, 203 S.W.3d at 690 .
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 ("At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the
prosecutor's explanation . Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral .") .
Purkett v. Elam , 514 U.S . 765, 767-68,115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed .2d 834 (1995) .
necessarily violate the Constitution by following the attorney's hunches when exercising
peremptory challenges .'° So the proceedings properly moved to step three.
Step three of the Batson framework required the trial court to determine if Coker
had met his burden of proving "purposeful discrimination ."" In other words, having
properly found that the Commonwealth's proffered reason was, on its face, race-neutral,
the final step was for the trial court to determine if the Commonwealth's race-neutral
reason was actually a pretext for racial discrimination . Because the trial court's decision
on this point requires it to assess the credibility and demeanor of the attorneys before
it, 12 the trial court's ultimate decision
on a Batson challenge is like a finding of fact that
must be given great deference by an appellate court. 13
Coker relies upon the fact that the Commonwealth allegedly expressed surprise
that another African-American was in the venire in an effort to show that the
10
13
See, e.g., State v. Brinkley, 753 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Mo. 1988) ("The exercise of peremptory
challenges is the product of the subjective analyses of a variety of character and personality
traits perceived by counsel. Batson does not prohibit "hunch" challenges so long as racial
animus is not the motive .") ; J.E .B. v. Alabam a ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148, 114 S.Ct.
1419, 1431, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Indeed, often a reason for it
[the exercise of a peremptory challenge] cannot be stated, for a trial lawyer's judgments
about a juror's sympathies are sometimes based on experienced hunches and educated
guesses, derived from a juror's responses at voir dire or a juror's bare looks and gestures .
That a trial lawyer's instinctive assessment of a juror's predisposition cannot meet the high
standards of a challenge for cause does not mean that the lawyer's instinct is erroneous .")
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. at 1866 .
See, e.g., id., 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S .Ct. at 1869 ("In the typical peremptory challenge
inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a
peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on
that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises
the challenge . As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor's state of
mind based on demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge's province.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Washington, 34 S.W.3d at 380 ("A trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge will not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous .").
Commonwealth was seeking to limit, or eliminate, the number of African-American
jurors. But the Commonwealth's comment could just as easily be interpreted to mean
that the Commonwealth was truly blind to the race of the veniremembers and,
consequently, was unaware that there was another African-American in the venire .
Coker also relies upon the fact that the Commonwealth's Attorney was the
prosecutor who was involved in a case in which this Court reversed a conviction due to
a Batson violation .' 4 We agree, of course, that the trial court was permitted to take the
Commonwealth Attorney's earlier conduct into account in assessing his credibility. But
we do not believe that the fact that an attorney was involved in a case in which a Batson
violation was found to exist automatically means that the attorney cannot be believed in
a later Batson hearing . As we stated previously, the evaluation of a prosecutor's state
of mind is an area peculiarly within the province of the trial court judge . 15 So we reject
any implication that the trial court erred by not finding the Commonwealth's Attorney to
have violated Batson in this case merely because that same attorney had run afoul of
Batson before .
Similarly, we disagree with Coker and the Court of Appeals that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Hill mandates reversal
of Coker's conviction . In Hill, the prosecutor was unable to offer any reason why he
exercised a peremptory challenge on the only African-American veniremember . In the
case at hand, the Commonwealth offered a facially race-neutral reason for exercising its
14
15
16
Washington , 34 S .W.3d at 376.
Snodgrass , 831 S.W.2d at 179, quoting Hernandez , 500 U .S. at 365.
146 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1998).
peremptory challenge on an African-American veniremember . So Hill is readily
distinguishable from the case at hand.
We reject any implication in Hill that an otherwise valid conviction must be
reversed if a trial court fails to articulate its reasons for denying a Batson challenge . We
believe that the fact that the trial court denied the Batson challenge inherently and
obviously contains an implicit finding that it accepted the Commonwealth's reason for
striking the African-American veniremember as being sufficiently race-neutral and nonpretextual.
Because the Batson framework is intended to minimize delay in jury selection,
we reject Hill and the Court of Appeals' seeming requirement that a trial court make
detailed Batson -related findings under the facts of this case. This conclusion is
reinforced by the fact that there is no indication that Coker asked the trial court for any
further findings ."
In short, the trial court was faced with a situation where the Commonwealth's
proffered reason for striking a potential juror was facially race-neutral ; and the defense
offered nothing to rebut the Commonwealth's facially race-neutral reason. The
Commonwealth asserts that it also struck three white veniremembers who volunteered
answers to defense counsel's voir dire questions . Coker responds that the appellate
record does not disclose the race of the other potential jurors the Commonwealth
struck . And the videotape of the trial proceedings does not show the faces of the
17
Cf. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.04 (providing that a judgment may not be
reversed due to a trial court's failure to make essential findings unless the lack of findings is
brought to the trial court's attention) ; Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 13.04
(providing that the Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to criminal cases, unless the Civil
Rule is inconsistent with the Rules of Criminal Procedure) .
venire, meaning that we are unable to see which prospective jurors answered defense
counsel's voir dire questions. But the fact that the record before us does not disclose all
of the sensory information available to the trial court only underscores the trial court's
unique position to evaluate completely all of the circumstances of a case before ruling
on a Batson challenge . Also, it should be noted that Coker bore the burden to prove
discrimination at all times .'$
Reasonable minds could differ as to whether the Commonwealth's stated reason
for striking the potential juror in question was a pretext for racial discrimination . The
veniremember spoke only four words during voir dire . But our job is not to determine
whether we find a proffered reason to be a mere pretext for discrimination ; our job is to
determine whether the trial court's acceptance of the validity of the race-neutral reason
is clearly erroneous. Under the facts of the case at hand, we do not agree with the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that the trial court's decision on this point was clearly
erroneous .
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby reversed ; and Ronnie Coker's conviction and sentence are hereby reinstated as
imposed by the Franklin Circuit Court .
Lambert, CJ; Cunningham, Minton, Noble, Schroder, and Scott, JJ., concur.
Lambert, C.J., also concurs by separate opinion in which Noble, J., joins. Abramson, J .,
not sitting .
18
See Purkett , 514 U.S. at 768 ("the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation
rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike .").
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
William Robert Long, Jr .
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 301, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 20, 2007
TO BE PUBLISHED
"Suprrmt Courf of ltrufurhv
2005-SC-000981-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NOS . 2004-CA-000398-MR AND 2004-CA-000428-MR
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT NOS . 03-CR-00142-001 AND 03-CR-00157
RONNIE LEE COKER
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT
While I have concurred with the majority, I harbor reservations about this case
because the record fails to reveal the trial court's view of the "race-neutral reason"
offered by the prosecutor. When a party has used a peremptory strike to excuse an
African-American juror, it takes little or no imagination to formulate a facially raceneutral reason in response to a Batson challenge. It is for the trial court to determine
whether the reason given is pretextual or legitimate . Appellate courts cannot discharge
their duty of review without knowing what the trial court thought of the controversy .
I have no desire to impose greater burdens on trial courts, but with the ease of
evasion inherent in the Batson rule, trial court vigilance is necessary, and appellate
courts need at least a few words from the trial court as to its reason for sustaining or
overruling the objection .
Noble, J ., joins this concurring opinion .
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