KATHY ELLEN WILLIAMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 1, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,$ixyrrxrrr Courf of ~i
2005-SC-000472-MR
KATHY ELLEN WILLIAMS
V
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL T. WRIGHT III, JUDGE
NO. 04-CR-00040
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant challenges her murder conviction for the shooting death of Forrester
Caudill, arguing that the jury instructions on self-protection were in error, certain of the
prosecutor's questioning of Appellant and misrepresentations regarding her testimony
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, and the jury was misled about Appellant's parole
eligibility. From our review of the record and the applicable law, none of the alleged
errors warrants reversal in this case . Thus, we affirm.
In November of 2003, the building where Appellant, Kathy Williams, was living
burned down . Williams suspected that someone in Toby Adams' family had
intentionally set the fire . Also during this period in 2003, gunfire was exchanged in the
area where Williams and her son were living, although the evidence did not establish
exactly who fired the shots . Late in the afternoon of November 30, 2003, Williams saw
a truck pull up next to a sawmill near where she was living after the fire. Williams,
armed with a gun she had taken from Begie Breeding, the owner of the house
she was living in, went out to see who it was and saw that it was Forrester Caudill, a
young man who she knew to be a friend of the Adams family. A heated argument then
ensued between Williams and Caudill .
Loretta Sexton, who lived near the sawmill, testified that she observed the young
man get out of his truck and walk over to a car parked at the sawmill . At that point, she
saw a woman she later identified as Williams walk past the car the young man had
gotten into . When Caudill got out of the car, Williams turned and walked toward Caudill .
According to Sexton, the two then began arguing and Williams pointed the gun at
Caudill. Sexton stated that when she saw the gun raised, she and her daughter and
son-in-law, Edith and Bert Fields, who also witnessed the events, ran behind Sexton's
house . Shortly thereafter, Sexton and the Fields heard gunshots. Edith and Bert Fields'
testimony at trial corroborated Sexton's version of the events just prior to the shooting .
Williams testified that when she saw the truck pull up to the sawmill, she went out
to see who it was because she thought it was Toby Adams and she wanted to talk to
him and end the feud . She stated that she took her gun with her because of all the
shooting that had been going on . Williams testified that when Caudill got out of the car,
she and Caudill got into a loud argument over Toby Adams. Caudill called her son J .J .
a rat and her recently deceased son Stephen a son of a bitch. Williams recounted that
Caudill then began jumping up and down and screaming for her to kill him. According to
Williams, Caudill then lunged at her with a knife and she shot him.
Caudill died minutes later from a single gunshot wound to the chest after getting
back into his truck and driving away.
Caudill was discovered slumped over in his truck
by neighbors after the truck crashed into an outbuilding down the hill from the sawmill .
Police found a black-handled kitchen knife under a pile of trash in the floorboard of the
passenger side of the truck . No blood was found on the knife, despite evidence that
Caudill had large amounts of blood on both hands at the time of his death . Williams
described the knife that Caudill had as having a long jagged blade, a black handle, and
a big red button on the side as for opening and closing the knife .
On January 12, 2004, Williams was indicted for Murder . A five-day jury trial
commenced on April 18, 2005 . The
jury was instructed on
Murder, First-Degree
Manslaughter, Second-Degree Manslaughter, and Reckless Homicide, with allowances
for the defenses of extreme emotional disturbance and self-protection . The selfprotection instruction contained an initial aggressor qualification and wanton or reckless
belief qualification (KRS 503.120(1)) pursuant to the dictates of Commonwealth v.
Hager , 41 S.W.3d 828 (Ky. 2001) . The jury found Williams guilty of Murder and
recommended a sentence of life imprisonment . Williams was sentenced to life
imprisonment, and this matter of right appeal followed .
Williams' first argument is that the jury instructions failed to intelligibly state the
law in the self-protection instruction . Specifically, Williams points to the omission of the
word "not" from the second portion of the wanton or reckless belief qualification which,
in effect, would reduce a Murder or First-Degree Manslaughter conviction to SecondDegree Manslaughter if it was found that Williams acted wantonly in her belief in the
need for self-protection . Halter, 41 S.W.3d at 842. The instructions on the wanton or
reckless belief qualification given by the trial court in the present case stated :
Provided further, however, if you believe from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was mistaken
in her belief that it was necessary to use physical force
against Forrester Caudill in self-protection, or in belief in the
degree of force necessary to protect herself;
AND
(1) That when she killed Forrester Caudill, she failed to
perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that she was
mistaken in that belief, and that her failure to perceive that
risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would have observed in the same
situation, then, if you would otherwise find the Defendant
guilty of Murder under Instruction No . 3, or First Degree
Manslaughter under Instruction No. 4, or Second Degree
Manslaughter under Instruction No. 5, you shall not find her
guilty of that offense, but shall instead find her guilty of
Reckless Homicide under this Instruction No . 713(1) and so
state in your verdict;
OR
(2) That when she killed Forrester Caudill, she was aware of
and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that she was mistaken in that belief, and that her
disregard of that risk constituted a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would have
observed in the same situation, then if you would otherwise
find the Defendant guilty of Murder under Instruction No . 3,
or First Degree Manslaughter under Instruction No . 4, you
shall find her guilty of that offense , but shall instead find her
guilty of Second Degree Manslaughter under this Instruction
No. 713(2) and so state in your verdict .
(emphasis added) . It is clear that subsection (2) of the instruction contained a clerical
error, with the omission of the word "not" in the underlined portion above. See Hager,
41 S.W.3d at 846-47. It must also be pointed out that when the trial judge read these
instructions to the jury, he read them verbatim without inserting the omitted "not" in
subsection (2) . However, this error was never brought to the attention of the trial court,
and the record does not reflect that the defense submitted its own instructions in the
case. Thus, the error was unpreserved and will be reviewed for palpable error only.
RCr 9.54(2); RCr 10.26 . Palpable error will be found only if manifest injustice has
resulted from the error. RCr 10.26 . "To discover manifest injustice, a reviewing court
must plumb the depths of the proceeding . . . to determine whether the defect in the
proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable ." Martin v. Commonwealth, 207
S.W .3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006).
In our view, the omission of the word "not" in subsection (2) of the wanton or
reckless belief qualification did not result in manifest injustice in the present case. From
our reading of the self-protection instruction as a whole, we believe that if the jury was
inclined to find that Williams was wanton in her belief in the need for self-protection,
they could have and would have, despite the clerical error, found Williams guilty of
Second-Degree Manslaughter . The wording of subsection (1) of the wanton or reckless
belief qualification was correct, and in reading subsection (2), the "but instead shall find"
language would not make sense if the jury was to nevertheless find the defendant guilty
of Murder or First-Degree Manslaughter .
Further, there was little evidence that Williams was mistaken (wanton or
reckless) in her belief in the need for self-protection . Williams' claim of self-protection
was based on her unequivocal testimony that Caudill lunged at her with a knife that she
described in great detail - long, jagged blade with a black handle and a red button on
the handle. The Commonwealth presented strong evidence rebutting Williams' claim
that Caudill came at her with a knife . The only knife found at the scene was a blackhandled knife found under a pile of trash on the floorboard of the passenger side of
Caudill's truck . The knife, which was shown to the jury, looked to be an ordinary kitchen
knife, was not a switchblade and had no red button on the side. Besides the fact that
Williams' description of the knife did not match the knife found in Caudill's truck, the
Commonwealth brought out the fact that Caudill was near death at the time he got back
into his truck and would not have had the foresight to place the knife under the pile of
trash. The Commonwealth also presented evidence that the knife found in Caudill's
truck had no blood on it, despite the fact that there was copious blood found on Caudill's
hands, probably as a result of him reflexively grabbing his chest after the gunshot.
Finally, none of the three witnesses who saw the encounter between Williams and
Caudill just before the shooting saw Caudill lunge at Williams. Rather, they all testified
that it was Williams who initially confronted Caudill. If the jury had believed that Caudill
lunged at Williams with a knife, which they clearly did not, her claim of self-protection
would presumably have served as a complete defense to the Murder charge. Ha er, 41
S.W .3d at 843.
Williams next argues that the prosecutor's misrepresentations and improper
questioning of her on cross-examination denied her a fair trial . One of the
Commonwealth's witnesses, Lisa Gibson, testified about an incident which occurred
some days prior to the shooting in this case wherein Williams put a gun to the head of
Dustin Adams. During the questioning of Williams on cross-examination, the
Commonwealth asked Williams about certain testimony she had given on direct about
this alleged incident :
Commonwealth : Yesterday, when you started testifying Mr.
Reynolds asked you about Leslie [sic] Gibson and what she
had testified to, and I believe your answer about putting a
gun to this young boy's head, Dustin Adams, was you said
you weren't denying it, you just couldn't remember it. Is that
correct?
Williams : I didn't do it.
Commonwealth : Well that's not what you said yesterday.
Williams : Well . . .
Commonwealth : Have you changed since yesterday?
Williams : No, no.
Commonwealth : The jury heard you . I'm sure you said,
"I'm not saying I didn't do it. I was on PCP . I don't
remember it." Is that what your answer is?
Williams : No sir.
The defense then objected on the basis that the Commonwealth was misstating
William's prior testimony, that she did not say anything about PCP. The ensuing bench
conference is nearly inaudible on the videotape, and there does not appear to have
been any attempt to play back Williams' testimony . The court ultimately overruled the
objection, but the Commonwealth continued the questioning without making another
reference to PCP until closing argument.
The defense had previously asked Williams during her direct testimony if she
remembered holding a gun to Dustin Adams' head. Williams responded that she did not
remember the incident . Defense counsel then asked Williams why she did not
remember the incident . From our viewing of the questioning, although Williams'
response to this question is hard to discern word for word (her answer is muttered
quickly), what is clear is that Williams uses the word "pieces" and not "PCP". During the
Commonwealth's closing argument, the prosecutor makes another reference to
Williams' alleged PCP testimony, stating in regards to the evidence that she held a gun
to Dustin Adams' head, "She [Williams] first testified yesterday, if you remember . You
can look at your notes - I know a lot of you took notes - `I'm not saying I didn't point
that pistol at his head . I'd taken so much PCP I don't remember."' We would note that
defense counsel did not object to the PCP remark in closing argument, although
counsel may have felt that such an objection would be futile since the court had earlier
overruled his objection to the misstatement of her testimony in their cross-examination
of Williams .
We view the questioning and remark of the Commonwealth in closing argument
misstating Williams' testimony that she had been on PCP as prosecutorial misconduct .
While the testimony was difficult to hear and necessitated multiple listenings by this
7
Court, it is clear that Williams was saying the word "pieces", and not "PCP", and the
prosecution should not have risked misstating the defendant's testimony of such a
potentially prejudicial nature without being sure of the testimony .
A conviction will be reversed on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct in closing
argument only if the misconduct is "flagrant" or if each of the following conditions is met :
1) proof of defendant's guilt is not overwhelming ; 2) defense counsel objected ; and 3)
the trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient admonishment to the jury.
Matheny v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Ky. 2006), cert. denied, - U.S . -,
127 S.Ct. 667, 166 L.Ed .2d 522 (2006) . Regardless of whether we view the error as
being preserved or not because Williams did not object to the offending comment during
the Commonwealth's closing argument, we view the evidence offered against Williams
in this case to have been overwhelming, with Williams' admission that she shot Caudill
and the Commonwealth's strong evidence refuting her claim of self-protection as
discussed above . Thus, we must proceed to an assessment of whether the
prosecutorial misconduct was flagrant in this case .
In Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S .W.3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002), this Court adopted
the approach for resolving claims of prosecutorial misconduct set out in United States v.
Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1994) . In Carroll , 26 F .3d at 1385-87 (citing United
States v. Leon , 534 F.2d 667, 679 (6th Cir. 1976), overruled on other rounds by United
States v. Stone , 748 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1984), and United States v. Bess , 593 F.2d 749
(6th Cir. 1979)), the Court enunciated the following criteria for assessing whether the
prosecutorial misconduct is flagrant and rises to the level. of reversible error:
(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to
prejudice the accused ;
(2) whether they were isolated or extensive ;
(3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed
before the jury; and
(4) the strength of the evidence against the accused .
Certainly any statement that a defendant took PCP tends to portray the
defendant as a drug addict and is highly prejudicial . See Schaefer v. Commonwealth,
622 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Ky. 1981) (concluding that irrelevant testimony about an
individual's cocaine use was considered prejudicial error warranting reversal) . As to
whether the remarks were isolated or extensive, as noted above, the misstatement of
Williams' testimony regarding the PCP was made once during cross-examination of
Williams and once during closing argument. Although the misconduct may not have
been extensive, especially in the context of this being a five-day trial with abundant
evidence, neither was the misstatement an isolated comment. As for whether the
misstatement was deliberate or accidental, it was deliberately made, although, given the
difficulty in hearing Williams' testimony, it does not appear that the Commonwealth
acted in bad faith.
Relative to the strength of the evidence against Williams, as noted above, the
Commonwealth's evidence was overwhelming . Williams first denied having any
involvement in the shooting, until she learned from police that there were witnesses.
Williams then confessed to the shooting (which was offered into evidence), but claimed
she was acting in self-defense . The testimony of the three witnesses who saw the
confrontation between Caudill and Williams just prior to th e shooting refuted her claim of
self-defense, none of them recalling that they saw Caudill with a knife or saw him lunge
at Williams . The only knife found at the scene was a kitchen knife found under a pile of
trash in Caudill's truck. The knife did not fit the description of the knife given by
Williams and had no blood on it. Finally, during the Commonwealth's cross-examination
of Williams, it brought out several inconsistent statements made by Williams regarding
the crime, which severely impeached her credibility.
Considering the overwhelming evidence against Williams, the lengthy trial, and
the fact that the references to Williams being on PCP were not extensive or pervasive,
we cannot say that there is a reasonable possibility that the misstatements might have
contributed to Williams' conviction . Holt v. Commonwealth , 219 S.W.3d 731, 738 (Ky.
2007). Hence, the prosecutorial misconduct did not mandate reversal .
Williams also complains that the Commonwealth misrepresented her testimony
when the prosecutor, in the course of pointing out her inconsistent statements regarding
how she got the gun used to shoot Caudill, stated : "So there again, you've not told the
truth apparently. You didn't tell it when Mr. Reynolds [defense counsel] asked you, but
you tell yet another version of it didn't you?" Defense counsel objected to the
misstatement of Williams' testimony, and the trial court overruled the objection .
Williams claims that this improper questioning by the Commonwealth falsely accused
her of lying to her attorney on direct examination, when her testimony on direct was
actually consistent with what she testified to on cross-examination - that she got the
gun from Begie Breeding. It appears from the record that in the course of pointing out
Williams' inconsistent statement - that she got the gun at a flea market - the
Commonwealth mistakenly attributed the statement to testimony on direct examination
by her counsel, when the statement was actually made to police. The question did not
appear to be calculated to mislead the jury. See Berge~,
v. United States, 295 U .S. 78,
85, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed . 1314 (1935). And there was evidence that Williams had, in
fact, told the police that she had bought the gun at a flea market . While the question
was improper, we cannot say that it constituted reversible error. See Bowler v.
10
Commonwealth , 558 S .W .2d 169 (Ky. 1977) (concluding that the prosecution's asking
of an isolated improper question is not ordinarily grounds for reversal) .
Williams' remaining argument is that the jury was misled about Williams' parole
eligibility when the trial court answered a question posed by the jury when they were
deliberating Williams' sentencing . The jury first sent out the following question : "Will
Kathy be eligible for parole and is [sic] time already spent in jail count toward
sentence?" The court answered: "The Defendant will receive credit for any time
already served on this case. She will at some point be eligible for parole, though when
is dependent on the sentence received ." Minutes later, the jury sent out another
question : "Can we impose a sentence without parole, or X amount of years and a day?"
The court then answered : "Parole eligibility is controlled by statute and you cannot
change it. You can impose a day above any term of years up to the maximum , but it
only adds one day to the sentence and will not prevent or delay parole eligibility more
than one day."
At no time did . Williams' counsel express any objection to the court's responses
to the jury's questions . Thus, the argument will be reviewed for palpable error only.
RCr 10.26. From our review of the record, no palpable error resulted from the court's
answers to the jury's sentencing questions .
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Letcher Circuit Court is
affirmed .
Lambert, C .J. ; Cunningham, Minton, Noble, Schroder and Scott, J .J ., concur.
Abramson, J ., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Irvin Halbleib Jr.
P .O. Box 16175
Louisville, KY 40256
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Jeffrey A. Cross
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.