PATTI WEBB, ET AL. V. BRIAN SHARP, ET AL.
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RENDERED : MAY 24, 2007
TO BE PUBLISHED
upremP (90urf of
NO. 2005-SC-000271-DG
PATTI WEBB, ET AL
V
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
NOS. 2004-CA-000308-MR, 2004-CA-000329-MR
AND 2004-CA-000817-MR
MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
NOS. 03-CI-00451 AND 04-CI-00016
BRIAN SHARP, ET AL
APPELANTS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
1. INTRODUCTION
This case presents the issue of sufficient evidence in a prison disciplinary
hearing before the Department of Corrections (hereinafter the Department) . In
particular, the parties have raised a question as to the evidentiary value of two field
tests : the Duquenois-Levine Reagent test, used to detect the presence of components
of marijuana ; and the Marquis Reagent test, used to screen for numerous substances,
including amphetamines, heroin, and opium alkaloids . The Appellees, on two separate
occasions each, were involved in incidents at Green River Correctional Complex
(GRCC) that led to disciplinary actions . In addition to other counts, each inmate was
charged with two counts of possession of dangerous contraband . At the conclusion of
evidentiary hearings, which included submission of the results of the field tests in
question, both inmates were found guilty and were penalized with the loss of good time
credit, placed in disciplinary segregation, and suffered the loss of privileges .
Sharp and Thomas challenged the findings by filing separate declaratory
judgment actions in the Muhlenberg Circuit Court . In Sharp's case, the circuit court
noted the inmate had not challenged the findings as they related to one count of
tampering with physical evidence . The court then rejected Sharp's claims as they
related to one count of physical action against an employee of the institution . On the
two counts dealing with possession of dangerous contraband, the court found the
Appellants had failed to establish the reliability of either of the field tests. Thus, the
court concluded the Appellants had not met the "some evidence" standard required in
disciplinary proceedings. The Appellants in Sharp's action filed a timely appeal
challenging the court's conclusions as they related to the two counts of possession of
dangerous contraband . Sharp filed a timely cross appeal challenging, among other
things, the court's decision as to one count of physical action against an employee of
the institution .
As with Sharp, the court granted Thomas a declaratory judgment on the two
counts of possession of dangerous contraband. Likewise, the court denied Thomas's
challenge to the one count of physical action against an employee of the institution.
Again the court's reasoning rested on the fact that the Appellants had failed to present
any evidence that the Duquenois-Levine Reagent test was reliable . The court
concluded that even with the additional facts surrounding the incidents involving
Thomas, the Appellants failed to demonstrate by "some evidence" that Thomas had
possessed dangerous contraband . The Appellants in Thomas's action filed a timely
appeal .
The Court of Appeals, hearing the cases together, returned a two-to-one decision
affirming the trial court. The majority rejected the arguments raised by Sharp in his
cross appeal, and that portion of the decision has not been appealed . The majority then
agreed with the circuit court's conclusion that the "some evidence" standard was not
met as to the possession of dangerous contraband counts. In particular, the majority
emphasized that it was the officers' burden to present evidence as to the reliability of
the field tests . Having failed to do so, the majority found the scientific evidence was not
reliable.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Knopf disagreed
with the majority on the possession counts . Judge Knopf noted that other evidence had
been presented to the hearing officer concerning the nature of the substance and the
facts surrounding its discovery . Further, he noted that other jurisdictions have accepted
the field tests, in particular under the reduced burden of the "some evidence" standard .
Finally, Judge Knopf noted that the inmates had failed to raise the reliability of the field
tests before the adjustment committee or the warden and thus were precluded from
raising it for the first time in the declaratory judgment action .
This Court accepted discretionary review on the issue of sufficiency of evidence
and the value of the field tests in prison disciplinary proceedings . Having concluded the
"some evidence" standard was met in three of the four incidents, without consideration
of the field tests, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
11. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Sharp's first incident occurred on May 30, 2003 . During a routine search of the
cell Sharp shared with inmate Whitlow, Officer Watson conducted a strip search of
Sharp. During the strip search Watson observed a white object protruding from Sharp's
anus. When Watson radioed for a supervisor, Sharp attempted to reach the toilet.
Having refused an order to stop, Officers Watson and Romans attempted to restrain
him. While Sharp managed to drop the object in the toilet, the officers were able to
prevent him from flushing the packet. Additional officers entered the cell, restrained
Sharp, and recovered a clear bag from the toilet. The bag contained a green leafy
substance . Lieutenant W. Thomas performed the Duquenois-Levine Reagent test on
the substance with the result being positive for marijuana.
Lieutenant L. Morris, acting as hearing officer in this matter, considered among
other things the evidence presented by Officer Romans in his report, the follow-up
investigation conducted by a supervisor, and the results of the Duquenois-Levine
Reagent test performed by Lieutenant W. Thomas. Sharp, in addition to waiving the
right to call any witnesses, chose not to testify . Thus, Sharp neither denied ownership
nor challenged the nature of the substance. The hearing officer found Sharp guilty of
one count of possession of dangerous contraband, and one count of tampering with
physical evidence . Sharp appealed the findings to Warden Webb . In his appeal he
challenged the chain of custody of the marijuana and aspects of the color changes that
occurred in the Duquenois-Levine Reagent test. Warden Webb denied his appeal .
Sharp's second incident occurred on June 8, 2003. During a routine cell search,
Officer Hope discovered a white substance wrapped in toilet paper lying on the floor.
Sergeant Rich, standing at the door with Sharp, took pictures of the substance and
where it was found. Officer Hope secured the substance . Lieutenants J. Elliott and M .
Morris brought over a Marquis Reagent test kit. When the substance was tested by
Sergeant Rich, the result was positive for amphetamines .
In a follow-up investigation, Lieutenant B . Cooney interviewed the officers
involved and confirmed the information in their reports. When Lieutenant Cooney
interviewed Sharp, he stated that the officers had kicked the paper, which had been
laying outside his cell, into his cell when they came in to search.
Lieutenant L. Morris again served as the hearing officer reviewing Sharp's case.
Lieutenant L. Morris considered the report of the officer involved, the results of the
investigation conducted by Lieutenant Cooney, the results of the Marquis Reagent test,
and the statements by Sharp. Sharp, who had made statements during the
investigation, once again chose not to testify nor did he call any witnesses at the
hearing . The hearing officer found Sharp guilty of one count of possession of
dangerous contraband, and one count of tampering with physical evidence. Once
again, Sharp appealed the findings to Warden Webb. In his appeal he challenged the
chain of custody for the substance and asserted that the substance was not a drug .
Warden Webb denied his appeal.
The first incident involving Thomas occurred July 19, 2003. During visitation,
officers observed what appeared to be a transfer of some sort of contraband . Officer
Hope escorted Thomas from the visitation room. The officer, observing an object in
Thomas' right hand, instructed him to surrender the item . Thomas pulled away from
Officer Hope and placed the object, a dark colored substance wrapped in a paper towel,
in his mouth . When Officer Hope reached for his right hand, Thomas pushed the officer
into a wall causing her to strike her right shoulder and upper arm . In the ensuing
struggle, Officer Hope, with the assistance of three additional officers, managed to place
Thomas in handcuffs. Thomas was placed in the special management unit.
Lieutenants M . Morris and Jenkins, upon observing Thomas chewing the object in his
mouth, ordered him to spit it out. Thomas refused . Officers then ordered him to open
his mouth. When Thomas complied with the order, Lieutenant Jenkins observed a
green leafy substance . The officers stated the substance smelled like marijuana.
Thomas, upon receiving another order to spit the substance out, complied . Lieutenant
M. Morris performed a Duquenois-Levine Reagent test on the substance with the result
positive for marijuana.
Lieutenant L. Morris, acting as hearing officer for this incident, considered the
reports submitted by Lieutenant M. Norris, Lieutenant Jenkins, Sergeant Gibson, Officer
Hope, and Registered Nurse M. Croley . Lieutenant L. Morris took note of the officers'
observations concerning the color, texture, and smell of the substance, as well as the
results of the Duquenois-Levine Reagent field test. Thomas, in addition to waiving his
right to call witnesses, chose to remain silent . Thus, Thomas neither denied ownership
nor challenged the nature of the substance recovered from him during the incident. The
hearing officer found Thomas guilty of one count of physical action against an
employee, and one count of possession of dangerous contraband . In his appeal to
Warden Webb, Thomas claimed (1) he had not been given the opportunity to consult
with his legal aide 24 hours prior to the hearing ;' (2) Lieutenant L. Morris should not
have been allowed to serve as the hearing officer due to a prior history of conflicts with
Thomas; (3) he had not received 24 hours notice of the hearing or charges; and (4)
there was no chain of custody concerning the substance. He did not challenge the
integrity of the evidence itself. Warden Webb denied his appeal .
Thomas's second incident occurred six days later, on July 25, 2003 . Thomas
had been taken to the office of the Special Management Unit at the request of
Brett Lile was assigned to serve as Thomas's legal aide in both incidents .
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Lieutenant W . Thomas, Internal Affairs, for the purpose of having his mouth checked for
contraband . Unit Administrator (UA) S. Mason asked Thomas to raise his tongue .
Thomas claimed his tongue was raised as far as it would go. UA Mason then had
Thomas move his tongue from side to side. When Thomas complied, UA Mason and
Nurse S . Collins observed what appeared to be two balloons under his tongue . When
Thomas refused an order to surrender the objects in his mouth, UA Mason called for a
move team to assist in its removal . Thomas then bit down on the object in his mouth
and attempted to swallow it. UA Mason immobilized Thomas's head to keep him from
swallowing .
When the movement team arrived, they placed Thomas on his back on the floor.
Thomas struggled to resist the move and continued to refuse to open his mouth. Two
officers were required to force his mouth open while a padded set of tongue depressors
was inserted to prevent Thomas from closing his mouth. UA Mason then performed a
finger sweep that resulted in the recovery of two balloons . Lieutenant W. Thomas
performed a Duquenois-Levine Reagent test on the substance with the result positive
for marijuana .
Lieutenant R. Williams served as the hearing officer for this incident. Lieutenant
R. Williams considered reports from nine of the responding staff, including reports by
UA Mason and Nurse S . Collins . In addition, Lieutenant R. Williams considered the
results of the investigation conducted into the incident by Lieutenant P . Walter.
Lieutenant Walter indicated that during his investigation Thomas had chosen to remain
silent and thus gave no explanation as to the ownership or nature of the substance
recovered. The hearing officer found Thomas guilty of one count of possession of a
dangerous substance . Thomas, in his appeal to Warden Webb, challenged the findings
claiming (1) insufficient findings of fact; (2) a failure to list reasons for the penalty
imposed ; and (3) the improper imposition of additional punishment in that he was
required to pay the "cost of all drug tests." He did not challenge the integrity of the
evidence nor claim it was not contraband. Warden Webb denied the appeal .
111. ANALYSIS
A. Framework For Review
Our society expects our prisons to be both humane and secure. The former
consideration encompasses not only the requirement that the residents not be treated
cruelly or physically abused, but also that they be treated with respect . This later
requirement has evolved over the years to establish certain due process requirements
in the imposition of prison discipline .
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[p]rison disciplinary
proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in such proceedings does not apply ." Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 556,
94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L .Ed .2d 935 (1974). See also Superintendent, Mass .
Correctional Inst., Walpole v. Hill , 472 U .S. 445, 456, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2774, 86 L.Ed.2d
356 (1985) . In balancing the divergent interests between the institution's need for
security and the inmates' constitutional rights, the U.S . Supreme Court has concluded
that due process requirements in prison disciplinary hearings, where the loss of good
time credit is at stake, include :
(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges ; (2) an opportunity, when
consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the
factfinder (sic) of the evidence relied omand the reasons for the disciplinary
action .
Hill, 472 U .S. at 454, citing Wolff, 418 U .S . at 563-67 . The due process requirements
set out in Hill have been recognized and applied in Kentucky. See Smith v. O'Dea , 939
S .W .2d 353, 357 (Ky.App. 1997). Significantly, the right against self-incrimination
contained in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the progeny of
cases interpreting this right have not been imposed upon prison disciplinary
proceedings . Thus, silence, or the failure to assert a claim of innocence, can be
considered for purposes of prison disciplinary hearings .
At the same time, the implementation of procedural safeguards in the
punishment for rule infractions must be tempered by the serious concern for prison
security and the safety of both inmates and staff. The United States Supreme Court
recognized this principle when it noted, "Prison disciplinary proceedings take place in a
highly charged atmosphere, and prison administrators must often act swiftly on the
basis of evidence that might be insufficient in less exigent circumstances ." Hill, 472
U .S . at 456, citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 562-63, 567-69. Thus, the Court concluded that
minimum due process requirements are met if "the findings of the disciplinary board are
supported by some evidence of record ." Hill , 472 U.S . at 454. Again, this standard was
applied in Kentucky in Smith v. O'Dea . 939 S .W.2d at 356 .
In applying the "some evidence" standard, the Court in Hill noted that the
analysis "does not require examination of the entire record,, independent assessment of
the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of evidence ." 472 U .S. at 455. Nor does the
"some evidence" standard require that the evidence logically preclude any conclusion
but the one reached by the disciplinary board. Id. at 457. Rather, the "relevant question
is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached
by the disciplinary board ." Id . at 455-56 .
Clearly, courts are called upon to use a common sense approach to balancing
the divergent interests at stake in this analysis . The U .S . Supreme Court in Hill
concluded that this balance is met by "[r]equiring a modicum of evidence to support a
decision to revoke good time credits[.]" Id . at 455. This would "help to prevent arbitrary
deprivations without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue administrative
burdens ." Id.
This framework, established to balance the divergent interests involved in prison
disciplinary hearings, satisfies the principle that "[w]hen all is said and done, common
sense must not be a stranger in the house of the law." Cantrell v. _Kentucky
Unemployment Ins . Comm'n , 450 S .W.2d 235, 236-37 (Ky. 1970). There is perhaps no
other area of the law where this principle is more relevant than in prison discipline
litigation .
B. The Failure of the Department to Establish Evidence of Reliability and Lay a
Foundation Precludes Reliance on the Field Tests in this Case
In challenging the Appellants' findings of guilt as to the counts dealing with
possession of a dangerous substance, both Appellees directed their arguments at the
field tests used to screen the substance for contraband . The Appellees argue the tests
should not be considered because the Appellants failed to present any evidence as to
reliability. Further, the Appellees point out that the Appellants failed to establish any
foundation for the results . In particular, they note (1) there was no evidence as to the
training and experience of the officers performing the field tests ; and (2) there was no
evidence as to the procedures followed while conducting the tests.
The Appellants respond by arguing the Appellees have cited to no authority that
would indicate the tests have been rejected as unreliable . To the contrary, the
Appellants cite to several cases from other jurisdictions that have considered the tests
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and accepted them as reliable. In addition, the Appellants make the argument that the
Department has used the field tests for many years without objection .
Before we can consider the question of whether the field tests used in this case
would satisfy the "some evidence" standard, a threshold question as to reliability must
be answered. For "[a]Ithough a prison inmate facing administrative disciplinary
proceedings does not have the same procedural safeguards as does a person facing
criminal prosecution or even parole revocation, fundamental fairness dictates that the
evidence relied upon to punish him at least be reliable." (Internal citation omitted .)
Byerly v. Ashley , 825 S .W.2d 286, 288 (Ky.App. 1991). See also Hensley v. Wilson ,
850 F.2d 269, 276 (6 th Cir. 1988) ; O'Dea v. Clark, 883 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Ky.App. 1994);
Stanford v. Parker, 949 S .W.2d 616, 617 (Ky.App. 1996). In this case the Appellants
point to no evidence of record that supports their claim that the field tests used are
reliable.2
Further, the Appellees correctly note that the Appellants can point to no evidence
of record that would establish a foundation for admitting the test results even if they had
been accepted as reliable . In Byerly v. Ashley, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
recognized that test results from urine samples would be admissible only if a sufficient
chain of custody was established as part of the evidentiary foundation . 825 S.W .2d at
288. Likewise, in Henslev v. Wilson the court required the fact finder to consider
whether the statement had in fact come from the confidential informant, the reliability of
the informant, and the basis for the investigator's opinion as to the informant's
2 One of the cases cited by the Appellants, People v. Escalera, 541 N .Y.S .2d 707 (N .Y. Crim . Ct. 1989),
offers an example of how the Department could establish a record on the question of reliability . In that
case the State used a combination of statements from personnel in other agencies that rely on the test,
the results of a test conducted by the New York City Police Department as to the accuracy of the field
test, and the results of a study conducted by the Drug Enforcement Agency concerning the accuracy of
the test.
credibility. 850 F.2d at 276. The requirement that foundation evidence be presented
was applied specifically to the results of the type of field test at question sub 'uL dice in
one of the cases cited by the Appellants, Davis v. McClellan , 608 N .Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994). In Davis the court noted, "Before such test results may be utilized,
however, a proper foundation must be laid, i .e., it must be demonstrated that, inter alia,
proper testing procedures were followed ." Id. a t 742.
Given the fact that the Appellants have failed to point to any evidence as to either
reliability or foundation, we are left to conclude the field tests utilized in each of the four
incidents cannot serve to meet the "some evidence" standard required to support the
punishment imposed . This decision does not foreclose the admission of such tests in
future cases where the proper evidentiary requirements are met.
Our analysis of this issue impacts the four separate incidents in different ways.
As to the second incident involving Sharp, occurring June 8, 2003, we note that the field
test served as the principal evidence concerning the possession count. For this reason
we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court in its decision
granting declaratory judgment in favor of Sharp. As to the remaining three incidents,
all involving possession of a substance believed to be marijuana, our analysis does not
resolve the issue . In each of those three incidents, there were additional facts
considered by the hearing officer . We must now consider whether those facts, without
consideration of the field tests, are sufficient to meet the some evidence standard .
C. The Facts Surrounding the Discovery of the Marijuana in Three
of the Incidents Satisfy the Some Evidence Standard
3 During oral argument, the attorney for Appellants suggested this incident was moot. The attorney noted
that in accordance with the Warden's ruling on Sharp's appeal, the incident would be removed from his
file if the white powder did not come back positive as a drug. Follow-up tests were not done in the three
incidents involving marijuana .
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In reaching its decision, the circuit court focused on the field tests. Once it
determined the field tests did not satisfy reliability requirements, the circuit court
concluded the "some evidence" standard simply had not been met. The Appellants
argue this ignores the additional facts surrounding the recovery of the other substances .
It is Appellants' position that even without the field tests, the facts surrounding the three
incidents involving marijuana satisfy the "some evidence" standard . The Appellees
respond by arguing the remaining evidence is not sufficient to satisfy th.e "some
evidence" standard .
Rather than review the facts underlying the three incidents involving marijuana,
we will set out a general summary of circumstances common to each incident. In each
case, officers observed and reported their first hand impressions of the substance
recovered; including odor, texture, and color. As noted in Cooper v. Commonwealth , "it
is a fundamental principle that a policeman may "observe" with any of his five senses[ .}"
577 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Ky.App. 1979).4 See also Commonwealth v. Hagen , 464 S .W .2d
261, 264 (Ky. 1971), wherein this Court recognized that an officer could base his
opinion on what he see or hears. In addition to the officers' impressions as to the
nature of the substance recovered, the hearing officer heard evidence as to the way the
inmate reacted when the substance was discovered. In each case the inmate
attempted to conceal the substance . In all three of the incidents, the inmates went to
great lengths to destroy the substance either by flushing it down the toilet or by
swallowing it. In fact, in two of the incidents the inmates openly scuffled with the officers
in an attempt to prevent the officers from recovering the substance . Finally, in each of
the three incidents involving marijuana, the inmates elected not to testify or assert that
4 The Cooper case was reversed in part on other grounds by Mash v . Commonwealth , 769 S.W.2d 42
(Ky. 1989) which in turn has since been overruled by Commonwealth v. Mobley , 160 S.W .3d 783 (Ky.
2005).
13
the substance was not what the officers believed it to be . As a result, the inmates
neither denied ownership nor challenged the nature of the substance recovered.
We are mindful of the principle that "common sense must not be a stranger in the
house of the law." Cantrell , supra . Common sense supports the hearing officers'
conclusions that in each of the incidents involving marijuana, the inmates possessed
dangerous contraband . In reviewing prison disciplinary actions, we recognize that the
standard of proof is the "some evidence" standard . Further, the "some evidence"
standard does not require that the evidence logically preclude any conclusion but the
one reached by the hearing officer . Such is the case sub iudice. The facts surrounding
the three incidents involving marijuana, even with the field test results excluded, are
sufficient to conclude there is "some evidence" of record to support the decision
reached by the hearing officers in Sharp's May 30, 2003 incident, and in the incidents
involving Thomas occurring on July 19, 2003, and July 25, 2003 . For this reason we
reverse the Court of Appeals, and find the circuit court erred in granting declaratory
judgment in favor of the Appellees as to these three incidents .
IV. CONCLUSION
.
Having concluded the Appellants failed to present evidence as to either reliability
or foundation, we are unable to reach the issue of whether either of the field tests
involved, standing alone, would satisfy the "some evidence" standard . Our decision
does not foreclose the admission of such tests in future cases where the proper
evidentiary foundation is met.
Having determined the field tests cannot serve to satisfy the "some evidence"
standard under these circumstances, we conclude the Court of Appeals and the circuit
court did not err as it relates to the white powder discovered in Sharp's cell and thus
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affirm . However, our review of the record and the applicable law leads us to reverse as
to the three incidents involving marijuana.
Lambert, C.J. ; McAnulty and Schroder, JJ ., concur.
Minton, Noble and Scott, JJ ., concur in the result reached by the majority but
believe that the majority errs by considering the merits of the reliability of the field tests .
Neither Thomas nor Sharp questioned the reliability of the field tests during the
administrative disciplinary process . As Judge Knopf noted in his separate opinion, the
failure to raise an issue before an administrative body precludes a litigant from raising
that issue in an action for judicial review of the agency's action . O'Dea v. Clark, 883
S.W .2d 888, 892 (Ky.App. 1994) .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
PATTI WEBB, LIGGETT MORRIS,
RICK WILLIAMS, AND BRIAN LILE :
Rebecca Baylous
Emily Dennis
Justice and Public Safety Cabinet
Office of Legal Services
125 Holmes Street, Second Floor
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES
BRIAN SHARP AND DONTRAE THOMAS :
Brian Thomas Ruff
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Post-Conviction Branch
207 Parker Drive - Suite 1
LaGrange, Kentucky 40031
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