COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. PATRICK MCKENZIE
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AS CORRECTED: FEBRUARY 26, 2007
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 22, 2007
TO BE PUBLISHED
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APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2002-CA-001098-MR
CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CR-00191
PATRICK MCKENZIE
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE SCOTT
Reversinq
Appellant, Commonwealth of Kentucky, appeals from an opinion and order
of the Court of Appeals which reversed and remanded a judgment and sentence
entered against Appellee, Patrick McKenzie, by the Campbell Circuit Court. The
Court of Appeals reversed Appellee's conviction and sentence because it
believed that Appellee's substantial rights were violated when the
Commonwealth was permitted to amend the indictment against Appellee at the
close of the Commonwealth's case in chief. On discretionary review to this
Court, we reverse the Court of Appeals; and reinstate the judgment and sentence
entered against Appellee by the circuit court.
In the early morning hours of September 3, 2000, the basement of the
Cold Spring Roadhouse Restaurant was burglarized . Over $10,000 in cash, gift
certificates, sales receipts, and credit card slips were stolen . On May 31, 2001,
Appellee was indicted for the above crime . The indictment stated in relevant
part:
The Campbell County Grand Jury charges that on or about the 3rd
day of September, 2000, in Campbell County, Commonwealth of
Kentucky, the above named defendant, Patrick McKenzie,
committed the offense of Burglary in the third degree by knowingly
and unlawfully entering the building housing the Cold Spring
Roadhouse Restaurant in Cold Spring, Kentucky with the intent to
commit a theft[.]
After the Commonwealth's evidence was presented at Appellee's trial, the
Commonwealth moved to amend the above referenced indictment to include a
charge that Appellee committed the offense of third degree burglary by
complicity. The Commonwealth argued that a complicity charge was appropriate
since the evidence presented at trial supported such a theory . Appellee objected
to the amendment, arguing unfair surprise and insufficient time to prepare an
adequate defense . The Commonwealth responded that Appellee had been
aware long before trial of the substance of its evidence. The circuit court agreed
that Appellee was not unfairly surprised and granted the Commonwealth's
motion. The jury was subsequently instructed on both third degree burglary as a
principal and third degree burglary by complicity .
On March 12, 2002, the jury convicted Appellee of third degree burglary
by complicity and of being a first degree persistent felony offender. For these
crimes, Appellant was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment . On direct
appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated Appellee's convictions and remanded for a
new trial . We granted the Commonwealth's petition for discretionary review. For
the reasons set forth herein, we now reverse the Court of Appeals ; and reinstate
the judgment and sentence entered against Appellee by the Campbell Circuit
Court.
In a revised opinion rendered March 4, 2005,' the Court of Appeals
correctly held that RCr2 6.16 permits the circuit court to amend an indictment,
information, complaint, or citation "any time before verdict or finding if no
additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant
are not prejudiced." See McPherson v. Commonwealth , 171 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Ky.
2005); Schambon v. Commonwealth, 821 S .W .2d 804, 810 (Ky. 1991) . It further
held, correctly, that amending the indictment to include an allegation that the
defendant is guilty of the underlying charge by complicity does not constitute
charging an additional or different offense . See Commonwealth v. Caswell , 614
S.W.2d 253, 254 (Ky. App. 1981) ("KRS 502.020 does not create a new offense
known as complicity . It simply provides that one who aids, counsels or attempts
to aid another in committing an offense with the intention of facilitating or
promoting the commission of the offense is himself guilty of that offense ."); see
also, Parks v. Commonwealth, 192 S .W. 3d 318, 326-27 (Ky. 2006)("[O]ne who is
found guilty of complicity to a crime occupies the same status as one being guilty
of the principal offense .")(internal quotation omitted) .
However, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that that the substantial
rights of Appellee were nonetheless prejudiced by the late amendment . Citing
our holdings in Brown v. Commonwealth, 498 S .W.2d 119,120 (Ky. 1973) and
The Court of Appeals initially rendered an opinion and order in this matter on
September 17, 2004. In response to a petition for rehearing filed by the
Commonwealth, the September 17, 2004 opinion and order was withdrawn and
replaced with the March 4, 2005 opinion and order.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
3
Wolbrecht v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 533 (Ky. 1997), the Court of Appeals
found that Appellee was not given proper notice that he would have to rebut
evidence of his alleged complicity to the crime averred in the original indictment .
We disagree .
We first note that the reasoning in Brown , supra, and its predecessors has
been largely superseded with the passage of KRS 502.020 (a person is guilty of
an offense committed by another if he intentionally promotes or facilitates the
offense) and KRS 502 .030 (disposition of a charge against the principal offender
is immaterial to the liability of an "accomplice") . See also, Johnson v.
Commonwealth , 864 S. .W.2d 266, 272 (Ky. 1993) ("under modern rules the
essential question when examining variance between the indictment and the
proof is whether the defendant in fact had fair notice and a fair trial"). Therefore,
to the extent that Brown , supra , and its predecessors hold that it is per se
prejudicial to the substantial rights of a defendant to amend an indictment during
trial to add a charge that the underlying crime was committed by complicity, they
are overruled .
Second, while we affirm the principle set forth in Wolbrecht, supra , that "a
defendant has the right to rely on the fact that he would only have to rebut the
evidence of which he was given notice," we find the circumstances in Wolbrecht
to be vastly different from the circumstances in this case.
In Wolbrecht, the
original indictment alleged that the three defendants were guilty of murdering the
victim either as principals or by engaging in a conspiracy with each other as a
result of which one (1) of the defendants shot the victim. Id. at 536. Half way
through trial, the Commonwealth made "a dramatic, 180 degree turn in the case"
by amending the indictment to include a charge that an unknown trigger man
may have actually shot the victim. Id. at 537. This Court found that such a
dramatic change in the Commonwealth's theory of the case constituted "unfair
surprise" and a "cavalier disregard of a person's right to be free from
unsubstantiated criminal charges" since "Appellants were given no notice
whatsoever, not a hint of a suggestion, that they would be ambushed at trial with
a new theory of the case ." Id . 537-38 .
In this instance, there was no such "dramatic, 180 degree turn" in the
Commonwealth's theory of the case . Id. at 537. In fact, Appellee was on notice
prior to trial that the Commonwealth intended to present testimony alleging that
Appellee was, at the very least, an accomplice in the burglary . The
Commonwealth did not change its theory of the case mid-trial, like it did in
Wolbrecht , and it did not allege any charges that were not substantiated by the
evidence . Rather, as instructed by Wolbrecht, su ra, the Commonwealth "fairly
informed [Appellee] of its intentions" and Appellee was free to "have developed
its strategy accordingly ." Id . ; Cf., Epperson v. Commonwealth , 197 S.W.3d 46,
52 (Ky. 2006) (no unfair surprise where defendant was given adequate notice of
the evidence against him, but was not given notice by the Commonwealth of the
role it believed the defendant played in the crimes) . Thus, the outcome in
Wolbrecht , supra , is not controlling in this case.
Moreover, unlike in Wolbrecht , supra, Appellee never requested the
remedy prescribed in RCr 6.16, which was a continuance . The amendment in
this case was requested after the Commonwealth's case in chief, but prior to the
evidence which might have been offered by the defense. Thus, "if the defendant
felt such an amendment was prejudicial . . . the defense could have moved to
continue the trial in an effort to revamp [its] defense." Anderson v.
Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 135,141 (Ky. 2001) . However, no such motion was
made, and thus, any claim that Appellee was prejudiced by the lack thereof was
waived . See Bell v. Commonwealth , 473 S .W.2d 820, 821 (Ky . 1971) (objection
waived where defendant failed to ask for appropriate remedy); Baker's Adm'r v.
Frederick , 243 S .W.2d 921, 925 (Ky. 1951) (where unfair surprise was alleged at
trial, no relief was granted in part because litigant failed to protect himself by
requesting a continuance) . In fact, the defendant closed his case without offering
any evidence .
When these circumstances are considered in their totality, we find that
Appellee suffered no unfair surprise and was not misled as a result of the original
indictment being amended at the close of the Commonwealth's case in chief to
include a charge that the underlying offense was committed by complicity .
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' opinion must be reversed because the
substantial rights of Appellee were not prejudiced in this case. See Gilbert v.
Commonwealth , 838 S .W .2d 376, 378 (Ky. 1992) (no prejudice where defendant
was not surprised or misled by amendment of indictment) . In light of this holding,
we need not address whether Appellee was impliedly acquitted of burglary in the
third degree as a principal when he was convicted of burglary in the third degree
by complicity.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed ; and the judgment and
sentence entered by the Campbell Circuit Court are reinstated .
All concur . Minton, J ., not sitting .
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Kathleen K. Schmidt
Schmidt Law Office
P.O . Box 218
Shepherdsville, KY 40165
"Suyrnut (~vurf of fi:eUfUrhv
2005-SC-000257-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2002-CA-001098-MR
CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CR-00191
PATRICK MCKENZIE
APPELLEE
ORDER OF CORRECTION
The Opinion of the Court by Justice Scott entered February 22, 2007, is
hereby corrected on its face by substitution of the attached pages 1 and 4 in lieu
of the original pages 1 and 4 of the opinion . The purpose of this Order of
Correction is to correct a typographical error and does not affect the holding of
the original Opinion of the Court .
ENTERED : February mar, 2007.
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