ANNIE WYATT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : APRIL 19, 2007
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2005-SC-000184-MR
ANNIE WYATT
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS FOUST, JUDGE
NO . 04-CR-00123
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Upon a jury verdict, Appellant, Annie Wyatt, was convicted of two counts of
criminal solicitation to commit murder,' and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on
each count to run consecutively for a total of thirty years . She appeals to this Court as a
matter of right, claiming that she was erroneously denied an instruction on the defense
of entrapment ; that she was prejudiced by a key witness being allowed to testify to the
legal elements of criminal solicitation; that her convictions violate principles of double
jeopardy; and that the admission of certain hearsay testimony violated her Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation .
The investigation leading to Appellant's convictions began when her drug
customer, Buddy Ferguson, approached Detective Chris Garland of the Murray Police
Department. Ferguson told Detective Garland that Appellant had mentioned something
' KRS 506.030; KRS 507.020 .
to him about "taking out" Detective Donald Bowman, a member of the Tri-County Drug
Task Force . Upon Ferguson's agreement to act as a confidential informant, he was
given money to purchase Lortabs from Appellant and instructed to follow up on her
comment about Detective Bowman . He was wired before this transaction in an effort to
obtain an audio recording. After meeting with Appellant, Ferguson returned with the
Lortabs and told Detective Garland that Appellant had mentioned, again, wanting to kill
Detective Bowman and his partner. Due to equipment failure, there was no audio
recording.
Nearly one month after Ferguson's undercover drug purchase, the investigation
proceeded with a plan for Ferguson to introduce an undercover officer to Appellant as
an assassin . Ferguson called Appellant and told her that he had a friend from Chicago
who was willing to handle the matter the two of them had discussed previously . During
the conversation, Ferguson and Appellant set up a meeting for Ferguson to purchase
some more Lortabs and to introduce Appellant to his Chicago friend .
Special Agent Curt Thielhorn of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
went undercover as Ferguson's "friend from Chicago" and the two met with Appellant in
a commercial parking lot. Appellant got in the back seat of Ferguson's car where both
audio and video recordings were attempted . However, much of the audio recording
proved to be inaudible, particularly with respect to what Appellant said.
Agent Thielhorn began the conversation by telling Appellant he had heard that
she was willing to pay with drugs for two police officers to be killed . He told Appellant
that he had come in from Illinois and he did not have a gun or anything so he asked her
how she wanted them killed . Appellant told him that she didn't care, "dead is dead ."
Appellant then said, "the easiest way," but she immediately stated that she had no
money. Agent Thielhorn said that the easiest way to do it was to shoot the two officers
with a gun, but he did not have one . At Ferguson's urging, Appellant admitted that she
had a sawed-off shotgun and Ferguson asked if it could be used for the crime . Agent
Thielhorn told Appellant that she would not get the gun back because he would have to
dispose of it. Appellant again stated that she had no money, but Agent Thielhorn
suggested that pills (Lortabs) would be acceptable payment . A discussion of payment
amounts and methods began between Agent Thielhorn and Ferguson . Appellant
responded, "I don't know, I'll have to think about it." Eventually, Agent Thielhorn arrived
at a down payment amount of one-hundred pills . When specifically asked by Agent
Thielhorn, Appellant agreed that it was a fair down payment .
The two men then asked Appellant about he physical characteristics of the
intended victims as well as a description of their vehicles and Appellant gave them the
requested information . Ferguson and Agent Thielhorn talked further about payment
amounts and how Ferguson would deliver the payments to him . However, a final
purchase price was never agreed upon or even suggested . Agent Thielhorn provided
Appellant with his cellular phone number and advised her to call him three days later, on
Monday. He took Appellant's number as well. Then, Appellant got out of the car .
Appellant did not call Agent Thielhorn as he had suggested, so he attempted to
call her twice but did not reach her. Appellant was arrested and charged with murder
for hire on Friday, one week after the parking lot meeting, despite Appellant's failure to
initiate any further contact or otherwise perform the purported agreement.
To establish motive, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of one of the
intended victims, Detective Donald Bowman . Detective Bowman testified that he had
been assigned to the Tri-County Drug Task Force from 2000 through 2004 and had
investigated Appellant for doctor shopping to obtain drugs. He testified that while
Appellant would not have been aware of his investigation of her, she was aware that he
had investigated her son and his wife, and her daughter, for drug trafficking . During
Detective Garland's testimony, the Commonwealth played portions of a videotaped
interrogation of Appellant's daughter, Debra Wyatt. In an attempt to elicit incriminating
statements from Debra, the interrogating officers had falsely told her that her mother
had confessed to soliciting someone to murder Detectives Bowman and Vaden. In
response, Debra told the investigators that her mother had said that it was Ferguson
who wanted the two detectives murdered. Debra said that she responded to her mother
that she didn't want to hear anything more about it because Detective Bowman and his
previous partner, Detective Mile, had saved her life by getting her off of drugs .
Neither Appellant nor confidential informant Ferguson testified at trial. The facts
as stated hereinabove were established through the testimony of Detective Garland and
Special Agent Thielhorn . The audio recording of the conversation between Thielhorn,
Ferguson and Appellant was of poor quality and largely inaudible . While Thielhorn
testified that Appellant said, "dead is dead," Thielhorn was unable to identify this
statement on the audiotape recording of the meeting . The recording does reveal that
Thielhorn asked Appellant how she wanted the victims killed, but the only audible
response was from Ferguson, who stated "dead under the ground ."
We first examine Appellant's contention that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct on the defense of entrapment . Initially, we address a procedural point arising
from the fact that Appellant simply rested her case after the Commonwealth presented
its case-in-chief . As entrapment is a defense, the question arises whether a defendant
must testify or present evidence in his case-in-chief to show an entitlement to the
defense . Other jurisdictions are not in agreement on this issue . While Kentucky has
never explicitly confronted the issue, our jurisprudence implicitly recognizes that a
defendant need not testify to avail himself of the defense. Rather, the evidence
presented by the Commonwealth, including cross-examination of the Commonwealth's
witnesses, may suffice to warrant an instruction on entrapment .
For example, in Johnson v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals reviewed the
merits of the claim even though Appellant Johnson had not testified at trial. The Court
of Appeals held that the trial court properly denied Johnson's requested instruction on
entrapment, but in so deciding, the court analyzed the testimony given by the
confidential informant who testified for the Commonwealth . Likewise, in Green v.
Commonwealth , the Court addressed the merits of Green's claim despite his failure to
testify at trial . The Court upheld the trial court's denial of an entrapment instruction, but
its decision was based on an examination of the behavior of the government agents. In
other opinions, it is impossible to discern whether the defendant testified at trial, but in
2 See, e.g . , U .S. v. Demma , 532 F .2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) . Compare U .S. v. Jones, 575
F.2d 81 (6th Cir . 1978) .
3 554 S .W .2d 401 (Ky. App. 1977) .
4 488 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1972) .
any event, our analysis has focused on the behavior of the government agents as
developed though testimony of Commonwealth witnesses.5
We now hold, expressly, that a defendant need not testify in order to avail himself
of the defense of entrapment . If the evidence presented is sufficient to support an
entrapment instruction, it is of no consequence that such evidence is introduced during
the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, through direct or cross-examination. As stated by
the Court of Appeals in Farris v. Commonwealth , 6 "[I]n order for the defense to be
raised, so as to call for an instruction placing the burden on the Commonwealth, there
must be something in the evidence reasonably sufficient to support a doubt based on
the defense in question . . . . Once there is evidence sufficient to create a doubt, yes-then
the state has the burden of proof and there must be an instruction so casting it."
Entrapment is an available defense when a defendant "was induced or
encouraged to engage in [the criminal] conduct by a public servant or by a person
acting in cooperation with a public servant seeking to obtain evidence against him for
the purpose of criminal prosecution ; and [a]t the time of the inducement or
encouragement, he was not otherwise disposed to engage in such conduct. ,7 If the
public servant first conceived the criminal design and lured the defendant into its
commission, the state is effectively estopped from convicting the defendant . $ In
Sanders v. Commonwealth,9 an entrapment defense was required because the public
5 See, e.g. , Dumon v. Commonwealth , 488 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1972) .
6
836 S .W.2d 451 (Ky. App . 1992), overruled on other grounds bar Houston v. Com . , 975
S .W.2d 925 (Ky .1998) (_quoting Brown v. Commonwealth , 555 S .W .2d 252, 257 (Ky.
1977)) .
KRS 505.010.
8 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U .S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932).
9 736 S .W .2d 338 (Ky. 1987).
servant had suggested the time for the crime (robbery), a specific escape route, and
supplied the defendant with a disabled gun and a mask and because there was
conflicting evidence of who initially developed the idea for the crime .
Turning to the instant case, Appellant must first show inducement or
encouragement by either Agent Thielhorn, confidential informant Ferguson, or both. The
phone conversations and meetings between Appellant and Ferguson were always
initiated by Ferguson . Agent Thielhorn's testimony, the only participant in the threeperson conversation who testified at trial, was not unambiguous with respect to who led
the conversation . Thielhorn suggested the means, the payment method and quantity,
and Ferguson urged Appellant to provide a weapon . While Appellant appears to have
acquiesced in suggestions made by Thielhorn and Ferguson, she does not appear to
have been the prime mover. Thus, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to
constitute inducement or encouragement on the part of Agent Thielhorn and confidential
informant Ferguson .
Upon the foregoing determination of evidentiary sufficiency of official inducement
or encouragement, "where the government has induced an individual to break the law
and the defense of entrapment is raised, the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to
first being approached by government agents."' ° Of course, evidence that a defendant
was predisposed to commit the criminal act may be shown where the accused has
engaged in a course of similar crimes, where the defendant was merely afforded an
'° Commonwealth v. Day , 983 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1999) (citin Jacobson v. United States ,
503 U.S . 540,112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992)) .
opportunity to commit a preconceived plan, or where willingness to commit the crime is
apparent by ready compliance."
Appellant had no history of engaging in crimes similar to those charged . In a
portion of the videotaped interrogation of Debra Wyatt, Debra repeatedly stated that her
mother had told her that Ferguson was the one who was planning the murder of the two
officers. The principal evidence that the murder for hire plan originated with Appellant
was through the hearsay testimony of police witnesses who relayed statements made
by the non-testifying, confidential informant, Ferguson. Finally, Appellant did not
demonstrate a ready compliance when confronted with Agent Thielhorn's offer to
murder the two officers. On the contrary, Appellant's response was, at best, ambivalent
or equivocal . It was only upon her acquiescence in Agent Thielhorn's and Ferguson's
continuous suggestions that an inference arose that she intended to solicit Agent
Thielhorn to commit the murders.
In light of the conflicting evidence and inferences arising therefrom, it appears
that an issue of fact was presented and that the trial court erred by denying Appellant's
request for an instruction on the defense of entrapment . 12
The Commonwealth argues that even if there was conflicting evidence
concerning Appellant's predisposition to commit the crime, the denial of an instruction
on entrapment was nevertheless appropriate pursuant to subsection two of the statute.
KRS 505.010(2)(b) provides that "The relief afforded by subsection (1) is unavailable
when [t]he offense charged has physical injury or the threat of physical injury as one (1)
" Shanks v. Commonwealth , 463 SW2d 312 (1971).
12
See Sanders , 736 S .W.2d 338 .
of its elements and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such
injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment."
Though this provision was enacted as a part of the original penal code in 1975,
we have discovered no Kentucky case which references it. Upon extensive review, we
have discovered only two jurisdictions that have examined this provision, due, no doubt,
in part to the fact that not all jurisdictions 13 have adopted the provision which is based
on the Model Penal Code § 2.18(3) . Kentucky, along with Utah and New Jersey, has
adopted the "unavailable" provision verbatim from the Model Penal Code. 14
In State v. Coloring, 15 the Supreme Court of Utah rejected a literal construction of
the physical injury or threat thereof requirement and held that implicit injury or threat of
injury was sufficient. However, Colonna sought an entrapment defense, not for an
inchoate crime, but for the crime of aggravated robbery. A required element under
Utah's robbery statute is the use of force or fear. As a result, the Colonna court held
that physical injury or threat of injury was implicit in the crime of aggravated robbery.
Conversely, the Superior Court of New Jersey confronted the provision's
application to an inchoate crime, conspiracy to commit second-degree aggravated
assault . 16 Threat of serious physical injury is an element of New Jersey's second
degree assault statute . In State v. Soltvs ,17 relying on basic rules of statutory
construction, the court concluded that Soltys was entitled to an entrapment defense .
It recognized that the essence of conspiracy is the agreement to commit the crime
13
See , e_g,., State v. Latham, 910 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn .Cr.App. 1995) .
KRS 505.010(2)(b) ; Utah Code Ann . § 76-2-303(2) ; N.J.S.A. 2C:2-12c .
15 766 P.2d 1062 (Md. 1988) .
16 State v. Soltys, 636 A .2d 1061 (N.J . Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
17
Id .
and "here the conspiracy had to include an agreement to cause, or attempt to cause,
serious bodily injury, but such an agreement itself constitutes neither a "bodily injury"
nor a "threat" thereof. "8
As with conspiracy, the essence of criminal solicitation is the demand or
encouragement of another to engage in criminal conduct.19 Criminal solicitation is an
inchoate crime that is a separate and distinct offense from the underlying substantive
offense that is its object .2° Neither physical injury nor threat of physical injury is an
element of this separate offense .21 As such, KRS 505.010(2)(b) does not disqualify
Appellant form the defense of entrapment.
Appellant also claims error with regard to Special Agent Thielhorn's testimony on
the law of solicitation . Over objection, Special Agent Thielhorn was permitted to answer
the question, "But, solicitation to commit murder does not require completion of the
payment, does it?" to which he responded, "When I read the code, no, I did not see that
the completion needed to be done, and I compared the state code to the federal code ."
The Commonwealth attorney continued, "And I believe you had legal advice on that,
didn't you?" to which Agent Thielhorn replied that he had "legal advice on that and
printed out many legal citations to read how it is done in various districts around the
United States."
8 _Id . at 1065 .
KRS 506 .030.
See Braverman v. U.S ., 317 U .S . 49, 53, 63 S .Ct. 99, 102, 87 L.Ed . 23, 27 (1942) .
1
S506.030 .
19
2°
10
Admission of the foregoing testimony was in error, as "[A] witness generally
cannot testify to conclusions of law." 22 Furthermore, the error was compounded by
colloquy in the hearing of the jury. Specifically, when defense counsel asked Special
Agent Thielhorn if a hit would have taken place if no drugs had changed hands, the
Commonwealth attorney objected and stated, "there is a misstatement of law on
solicitation and the question propounds that misrepresentation of the law and solicits an
answer from the witness that is not based on the law." Defense counsel responded,
"the law has not been presented to the jury. We're asking about facts and what he
would have done under the circumstances ." Nevertheless, the trial court sustained the
objection and stated, "the law does not require payment."
While it is true that payment or consideration is not an element of the offense of
criminal solicitation, the question of payment is not irrelevant . The offense requires
that a defendant "commands" or "encourages" another to engage in criminal conduct.
Facts supporting or disputing "encouragement" are proper for the jury to hear . In the
instant case, questions and arguments regarding payment or consideration, while not
dispositive, were probative of whether Appellant "encouraged" Special Agent Thielhorn
to commit the murders and also relevant to Appellant's defense that she lacked the
requisite intent. However, the trial court effectively disposed of available inferences by
informing the jury that payment was not required .
We have no doubt that if payment had been made, the Commonwealth would
have properly used that fact as evidence of "encouragement ." As there was no
Tamme v. Commonwealth , 973 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1998) (uotin
259 Ky. 708, 83 S.W.2d 1(1935)) .
23
KRS 506.030 .
22
Gibson v. Crawford,
payment, Appellant should not have been prohibited from arguing that failure of
payment supported her defense that there was no "encouragement ."
Turning to Appellant's double jeopardy claim of error, the Constitution of
Kentucky provides that "No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy
of his life or limb.
,24
Appellant contends that her convictions for two counts of criminal
solicitation based on only one alleged act of "encouragement" violates double jeopardy
principles that prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense .
Our Constitutional provision prohibiting double jeopardy parallels that of the Fifth
Amendment of the U .S. Constitution . Even the most cursory review of double jeopardy
jurisprudence reveals that attempts to develop a clear and coherent body of law
construing the term "same offense" have been less than successful at both the state
and federal levels .25 However, we must discern whether two convictions are
permissible under the criminal solicitation statute in view of the facts presented here .
KRS 506 .110 prohibits convictions, based on the same course of conduct, for
both the underlying crime and certain inchoate offenses involving the commission of the
same crime . KRS 506.110 (3) provides that if any of the inchoate offenses of attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or facilitation occur in a single course of conduct designed to
Ky . Const. § 13.
See, ec . , Ingram v Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1990), overruled by
Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S .W.2d 805 (1996) ; Commonwealth v. Day, 983 S.W.2d
505 (Ky. 1999), overruling Fuston v. Commonwealth , 721 S .W.2d 734 (Ky .App. 1986)
and Farris v. Commonwealth , 836 S.W.2d 351 (Ky.App. 1992) (all dealing with different
aspects of double jeopardy) . For federal cases demonstrating the difficult application of
double jeopardy principles, see e .g_, Blockburaer v. U .S. , 284 U .S. 299, 52 S .Ct . 180,
76 L. Ed . 306 (1932) ; Ohio v. Johnson , 467 U .S. 493, 500, 104 S .Ct. 2536, 2541, 81
L.Ed .2d 425 (1984); Grady v. Corbin , 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548
(1990), overruled by U .S. v. Dixon, 509 U .S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed .2d 556
(1993).
24
25
12
consummate the commission of the substantive crime, a person may be convicted of
only one of the enumerated inchoate offenses . Yet, neither of these prohibitions
applicable to inchoate offenses addresses the permissibility of multiple convictions for
one inchoate crime where the commission of more than one underlying substantive
offense is contemplated . KRS 506 .020(2) does address this issue, but only with respect
to the inchoate crime of conspiracy. The provisions states, "A person who conspires to
commit more than one (1) crime, all of which are the object of the same agreement or
continuous conspiratorial relationship, is guilty of only one (1) conspiracy." This
provision is not applicable where one or more, but not all, of the object crimes are
committed . In such a case, a conviction may be had for the commission of the crimes
that were completed along with a conviction for the agreement to commit the remaining,
but uncommitted crime(s) .
Appellant contends that the rationale of KRS 506 .020(2) should apply to the
offense of criminal solicitation . However, the Commonwealth counters that there is no
statutory provision analogous to KRS 506 .050(2) which applies to criminal solicitation .
Whether one act of solicitation to murder multiple victims permits multiple solicitation
convictions based on the number of victims appears to be an issue of first impression in
this Court. We are not unmindful of this Court's decision in Putty v. Commonwealth, 27
wherein the facts were the exact conversed those in the instant case . Putty was
convicted of multiple counts of criminal solicitation for multiple, separate acts of
soliciting the murder of the same victim, but the issue presented here does not appear
to have been raised .
26
27
KRS 506.110(2).
30 S.W.3d 156 (Ky. 2000) .
13
A review of other jurisdictions provides little guidance. With the exception of
Mever v. State, 28 a decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, and People v.
Vandelinder ,29 which adopted Meyer's approach, we have discovered no reported cases
helpful to our analysis of this issue .3° The. Meyer court declined to adopt a bright line
rule that encouraging another to kill more than one person constitutes distinct
incitements, permitting multiple convictions for criminal solicitation . Rather, the Meyer
court held that the determination should focus on the number of incitements, not the
number of victims . Meyer's multiple convictions were upheld on the basis that:
The executions were to occur at different times and places, and
possibly by different means and executioners ; different (and cumulative)
fees were to be paid for these acts. Different motives were involved . Even
as between the two officers, the evidence permitted a fair inference that
most of these distinguishing attributes were present. In short, the evidence
sufficed to permit a finding that it was not a "lump sum" singular deal, but
separate and independent incitements to commit four separate and
distinct acts of murder against specific named individuals ; and thus,
neither the separate convictions nor the separate and consecutive
sentences were inappropriate .
Our decision in Putty is not inconsistent with this approach as Putty clearly
solicited two different people in four different conversations to murder the same victim.
Each time Putty's solicitation was made, the offense was completed . The next
solicitation constituted a new incitement and thus a new offense . The reasoning in
28 425 A .2d 664 (Md. App. 1981) .
29 481 N.W.2d 787 (Mich .App.1992) .
30
Various appellate districts in California have rendered conflicting decisions on the
issue, even within the same district . See People v. Cook, 199 Cal .Rptr. 269 (Cal.App. 1
Dist. 1984) (agreeing with the Meyer approach), People v. Miley , 204 Cal.Rptr. 347, 351
n .4 (Cal .App. 2 Dist. 1984) (approving a pre-trial consolidation based on the fact that the
"solicited crimes were all part of one package") and People v. Morocco , 237 Cal.Rptr.
113 (Cal .App. 4 Dist. 1987) (striking second count of solicitation based on Cook and
Miler) ; Compare People v. Davis, 259 Cal .Rptr. 348, 352 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1989)
(holding that convictions may be had on "as many counts of solicitation to murder as
there are identifiable victims") .
14
Meyer seems to be sound, and applying it in the instant case, a different conclusion
seems to be compelled . Here, there was only one solicitation conversation . The
intended victims were partners and traveled together, and the place, means, and
executioner were to be the same ; one fee was to be paid ; the alleged motive was the
same; and with the exception of their physical descriptions, the victims were referred to
collectively .
Upon our conclusion that Appellant's alleged solicitation constituted a single
course of conduct, we must determine whether that single course of conduct
established one or more solicitation offenses .
Under the federal conspiracy statute, the Supreme Court of the United States
has explained :
Whether the object of a single agreement is to commit one or many
crimes, it is in either case that a reement which constitutes the conspiracy
which the statute punishes. . . .3
A conspiracy is not the commission of the crime which it contemplates,
and neither violates nor `arises under' the statute whose violation is its
object . 32
Likewise, whether the object of a single act of encouragement is to commit one or many
crimes, it is the act of encouragement which the solicitation statute punishes . We
reiterate that solicitation is a separate and distinct offense from the underlying
substantive offense that is its object . 33 While our authority for these propositions is
drawn from the analogous offense of conspiracy, it is not inappropriate as the offense of
Braverman , 317 U .S. at 53.
Braverman , 317 U .S. at 54 ( citing United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U .S . 87-89, 35
S.Ct. 682, 684, 685, 59 L.Ed. 1211 (1915) ; United States v. McElvain, 272 U .S. 633,
638, 47 S .Ct. 219, 220, 71 L.Ed. 451(1926)) .
33
See Braverman , 317 U .S. 49 .(holding that conspiracy punishes the agreement to
engage in criminal conduct, not the criminal conduct that is the object of the
agreement).
31
32
15
criminal solicitation may be logically viewed as an imperfect conspiracy or as an attempt
to conspire .34 The offense of criminal solicitation emerged from the offense of criminal
conspiracy , 35 and was designed to address situations where one party offered to
conspire with another, but the other rejected the offer.36 Criminal solicitation simply
recognizes that a refusal of the other to participate does not reduce the mental
culpability of the solicitor .37 By the same token, however, a refusal by the person
solicited to participate should not result in greater punishment than if there had been a
completed agreement .
As applied to this case, had Special Agent Thielhorn been an actual assassin
and accepted Appellant's alleged solicitation, thereby creating an agreement between
the two, Appellant would have been subject to prosecution for one count of conspiracy,
not two counts of solicitation . KRS 506.050(2) would allow only one charge of
conspiracy to be brought . It would be illogical to obtain a different result where the
conspiracy fails and the only crime committed is solicitation . As we have determined
that there was only one act of encouragement, Appellant may be convicted of only one
act of solicitation .
For her final claim of error, Appellant contends that the hearsay testimony of
Detective Garland whereby he repeated statements made by the confidential
informant, one who did not testify at trial, violates her confrontation clause rights .
This claim is unpreserved . As we are reversing for a new trial on other grounds, we
34
35
36
37
Ira P . Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes , 26
KRS 506.030, curt. (1974).
_Id .
Id . .
16
HARV . J . ON LEGis.
1 (1989).
will forego a review for palpable error and rely on counsel to properly present the
issue when and if it arises on retrial.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's convictions are reversed and the case is
remanded for further consistent proceedings .
Cunningham, McAnulty, Minton, Noble, Schroder, and Scott, JJ., concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Donna L. Boyce
Appellate Branch Manager
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane'
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Room 118, Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Gregory C . Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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