NEAL SCOTT STONE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2004-SC-000690-MR
NEAL SCOTT STONE
V.
APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HON . LARRY RAIKES, JUDGE
NELSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 02-CR-00234
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM
REVERSING
Appellant, Neal Scott Stone, was convicted of trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree by a Nelson County jury. He was sentenced to twenty
years' imprisonment . He appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const . ยง
110(2)(b), raising five allegations of error. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse .
FACTS
In August 2001, Robert Delonjay was arrested for trafficking narcotics . Following
the arrest, Detective Thomas Roby of the Bardstown Police Department recruited
Delonjay to serve as a confidential informant for the Greater Hardin County Narcotics
Task Force, to which Detective Roby had been assigned . In exchange for dismissal of
the charge, Delonjay conducted nine transactions for the police.
On November 28, 2001, Delonjay contacted Detective Roby and informed him
that he could purchase crack cocaine from Appellant, who lived in the apartment
immediately next to his own in Bardstown . Detective Roby and a Task Force colleague,
Detective Doug Clark, met Delonjay at a liquor store near his apartment complex that
afternoon . The detectives showed a photograph of Appellant to Delonjay, who verified
his identity. The detectives also gave Delonjay instructions not to leave with anyone,
not to leave in a vehicle, and not to enter a residence . Delonjay departed the meeting
with three marked twenty-dollar bills and a concealed cassette recorder.
Delonjay proceeded to a convenience store where he paged Appellant from a
pay phone. Speaking in code, Delonjay and Appellant agreed to meet on Appellant's
front porch. Detective Clark overheard Delonjay's portion of the telephone conversation
from his surveillance car parked nearby. Delonjay then left for Appellant's apartment.
When he arrived, he learned from Appellant's girlfriend that he was not yet home but on
his way. Dean Stivers, another person with whom Delonjay had previously conducted a
controlled buy, was also waiting for Appellant on the porch . Stivers offered to sell
Delonjay a quantity of cocaine, but Delonjay declined . He waited for some time, then
eventually departed .
Delonjay returned to the liquor store, where the detectives were waiting, and was
instructed to return to Appellant's apartment. Appellant arrived shortly thereafter and
met Appellant on his front porch. Delonjay told Appellant that he had cut his hand and
needed some gauze . He then gave Appellant the marked sixty dollars, and went to the
back of the apartment where Appellant met him with a rock of crack cocaine wrapped in
paper towels . Delonjay then returned to the liquor store and gave the cocaine to the
detectives .
Appellant was later arrested . At trial, Appellant's primary theory of defense was
that Delonjay had gone into his own apartment to get the cocaine . This theory rested
on the fact that the apartment building was built at the bottom of a slight embankment,
preventing the detectives from having an uninterrupted view of Delonjay . The jury
ultimately convicted Appellant of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree .
He was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. He now appeals to this Court as a
matter of right.
WAIVER OF REPRESENTATION
Appellant represented himself at trial, with a public defender serving as standby
counsel . He now challenges his waiver of representation on two grounds .
A recitation of the procedural history of Appellant's case is necessary to
discussion of the alleged errors .
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At his first arraignment on November 7, 2002, Appellant requested to represent
himself until he could find an attorney . The request was granted, but the trial court did
appoint Nancy Denton, a public defender, to advise Appellant during the arraignment .
The trial court also scheduled a later hearing date to determine whether a public
defender would be involved in the case on a permanent basis . Ms. Denton appeared at
this later hearing and, upon questioning by the trial court, explained that it was not the
practice of the public defender to act as standby counsel ; she explained that Appellant
could either request a public defender to represent him or he could proceed pro se.
Presented with this choice, Appellant expressed his intention of proceeding pro se . The
hearing was very brief, and no inquiry was made concerning Appellant's waiver of
counsel as required by Faretta v. California , 422 U .S . 806, 95 S.Ct . 2525, 45 L.Ed .2d
562(1975).
Thereafter, Appellant represented himself at various hearings, including a
hearing on a discovery motion, a hearing on a motion to dismiss a persistent felony
offender count, and a suppression hearing . During this period, Appellant also filed
several written motions on his behalf, including a motion to disclose the identity of the
confidential informant, a motion to disclose exculpatory evidence, a motion to dismiss
the indictment, and a motion for bond modification . Most importantly, he represented
himself at a plea bargaining conference .
Later, on May 23, 2003, Appellant again inquired into the possibility of having
standby counsel appointed. The trial court explained that if he wished to have an
attorney appointed, his June 9, 2003 trial date would be postponed . Appellant elected
to remain pro se. However, prior to the June trial date, Appellant was taken into federal
custody and his case was abated for approximately six months. Following suppression
of items seized from Appellant's home, the federal court dismissed the charges.
On January 27, 2004, Appellant filed a written "Motion for Court to Appoint
Standby Counsel for Defendant ." At the hearing on the matter, Appellant explained that
he needed an attorney to advise him about criminal procedure and evidentiary rules .
The trial judge agreed to appoint the public defender as standby counsel subject to
further inquiry as to whether it would be permitted by the public defender agency.
Again, no inquiry was made as to whether Appellant's decision was knowing, intelligent
and voluntary .
At some point thereafter, the trial court apparently determined that a Faretta
hearing relating to Appellant's now partial waiver of counsel was required . Finally, on
May 21, 2004, just 20 days before trial and for the first time in the proceedings, a
complete Faretta hearing was held . The trial court then concluded that Appellant's
partial waiver of counsel was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily . Appellant
was tried on June 10 -11, 2004, with an appointed public defender assisting him as
standby counsel.
Appellant now asserts two errors with respect to his waiver of representation .
First, Appellant argues that reversible error occurred when the trial court denied him
hybrid representation for thirteen months.' Additionally, Appellant argues that he was
denied his right to counsel when the trial court failed to timely conduct a Faretta hearing
to establish whether his waiver of representation was made knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily . It should be noted that Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the
Faretta hearing that was ultimately held on May 21, 2004, nor does he argue that his
waiver at the time was invalid .
Turning to the first portion of Appellant's argument, the trial court clearly erred by
failing to inform the Appellant that hybrid representation was his right under Section
Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution, a point which the Commonwealth concedes. See
Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W .2d 692 (Ky. 1974) . Appellant's Sixth Amendment rights were
not implicated in this error, however, as the federal Constitution does not similarly afford
criminal defendants the right to act as co-counsel . McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U .S. 168,
183, 104 S.Ct . 944, 953-54, 79 L .Ed .2d 122 (1984); see also Baucom v.
Commonwealth , 134 S .W .3d 591, 592 (2004). However, Appellant's Sixth Amendment
rights were violated by the trial court's failure to hold a timely Faretta hearing . Faretta v.
California , 422 U .S . 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Again, the
Commonwealth agrees that the trial court should have conducted the Faretta hearing at
the time Appellant originally waived his right to counsel, an omission that resulted in
Appellant proceeding pro se without any determination as to the validity of his waiver of
When a criminal defendant desires hybrid representation, he is making a limited waiver of counsel
whereby he acts as co-counsel with a licensed attorney. The defendant specifies the extent of legal
services he desires, but undertakes the remaining portion of his defense pro se. Counsel's duty to the
defendant is thereafter limited to the extent of representation specified . See Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d
692, 696 (Ky. 1974).
counsel . 2 When a trial court permits a criminal defendant to represent himself without
the warnings required by Faretta, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated . See
Hill v. Commonwealth , 125 S.W.3d 221, 228-29 (Ky. 2004) .
The present case, however, is unique from other cases in which we have,
considered a criminal defendant's rights to representation and self-representation .
Unlike previous cases, here, Appellant was afforded the representation he requested
prior to trial . See, id . In fact, both Appellant and the Commonwealth also agree that his
waiver at the May 21 St Faretta hearing was valid, and that co-counsel was appointed
prior to trial . Accordingly, the correct inquiry in this case is whether Appellant's rights
under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution and Section Eleven of the
Kentucky Constitution were violated by the thirteen-month period during which Appellant
represented himself absent a valid waiver and notwithstanding his expressed desire for
hybrid representation .
It is well-settled that a criminal defendant has a right to be represented by
counsel that extends beyond the actual trial to every critical stage of the proceedings.
Henderson v. Commonwealth, 396 S .W .2d 313 (Ky. 1965) ; see also United States v.
Wade, 388 U .S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). Conversely, the right
2 We acknowledge that the federal courts are split as to the extent of Faretta's applicability in situations of
a limited waiver of counsel, as a conflict of authority exists as to whether standby counsel satisfies the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 680 (6th Cir . 2004)
("There is conflicting authority on the issue of when Faretta warnings are required ."); Cf. U .S. v. Davis,
269 F .3d 514, 520 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Standby assistance of counsel, however, does not satisfy the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel."). However, we find those cases readily distinguishable based on the
nature of Appellant's waiver of counsel . Here, though Appellant initially expressed his desire to receive
hybrid representation, the trial court would permit only a total waiver of counsel or full representation . At
that point, Appellant determined he would continue pro se, and made the requisite clear and unequivocal
assertion of his right to represent himself, thus triggering the trial court's duties under Faretta . Appellant's
prior expressed desire for hybrid representation then became irrelevant. Cf. Cromer, 389 F.3d at 683 ("A
defendant who seeks merely to supplement his counsel's representation, as Cromer did here, has failed
to avail himself of his right to self-representation and thus failed to waive his right to the assistance of
counsel ."); see also King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir . 2006) ("We need not weigh in on whether
standby counsel's substantial assistance can satisfy a defendant's right to counsel because here,
[standby counsel] did not participate in the case at all after he was designated as standby counsel .") .
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to represent oneself is also embedded in the Sixth Amendment of the federal
Constitution : "[T]he right to self-representation - to make one's defense personally - is
thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment ." Faretta v. California, 422
U .S . at 819, 95 S .Ct. at 2533 . Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution, extending
further than the Sixth Amendment, recognizes the right of a criminal defendant not only
to proceed pro se, but also to receive hybrid representation . Wake , 514 S .W.2d at 696.
Because Appellant was granted his desired representation prior to trial, the
inquiry before this Court is whether Appellant was denied counsel at a critical stage of
his prosecution . Courts have long struggled with a precise definition of what constitutes
a "critical stage ." See Van v . Jones, 475 F.3d 292 (6th Cir. 2007). The U .S . Supreme
Court has defined a `critical stage' in various terms : "any stage of the prosecution,
formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the
accused's right to a fair trial," Wade , 388 U.S. at 226, 87 S.Ct. at 1932 ; a "moment
when available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted,"
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U .S . 52, 54, 82 S.Ct. 157, 159, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961) ; a
period when counsel's attendance is necessary to "mount a meaningful defense,"
Wade, 388 U.S . at 225, 87 S .Ct. at 1931 ; a stage when "potential substantial prejudice
to defendant's rights inheres in the . . . confrontation and the ability of counsel to help
avoid that prejudice," Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 2003, 26
L .Ed .2d 387 (1970) . Thus, an analysis of a critical stage necessarily involves a
retrospective inquiry as to the nature and consequences of each step in the
proceedings. Particular attention must be given to how counsel would have benefited
the defendant at these moments. In other words, was there the likelihood that
representation by counsel would have benefited Appellant?
The denial of counsel at a critical stage is not subject to harmless error analysis
once a lawyer-less stage has been deemed as critical . "It is settled that a complete
absence of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding is a per se Sixth
Amendment violation warranting reversal of a conviction, a sentence, or both, as
applicable, without analysis for prejudice or harmless error." Van, 475 F.3d at 311-312 .
However, in determining whether a particular stage was critical, this Court must
undertake an analysis that is similar to an inquiry for actual prejudice . The Sixth Circuit
has explained :
In order to assess if a given portion of a criminal proceeding is a critical
stage, we must ask how likely it is that significant consequences might
have resulted from the absence of counsel at the stage of the criminal
proceeding . . . There must be a reasonable likelihood that such prejudice
will arise from a complete absence of counsel .
Van, 475 F.3d at 313 .
In light of the type of analysis upon review, trial courts should be governed by the
caveat that any stage of a criminal prosecution, even the seemingly most perfunctory,
can become a "critical stage ." For this reason, criminal proceedings advance with great
risk at every step if a defendant has not validly waived his or her right to counsel
following a Faretta hearing .
Accordingly, we have reviewed the record in this case to determine whether a
"reasonable likelihood" existed that Appellant was prejudiced by the complete lack of
counsel for the thirteen-month period prior to the appointment of co-counsel . Appellant
represented himself at the following pretrial proceedings: arraignment on an amended
indictment, a hearing on a discovery motion and bill of particulars, a hearing on a motion
to dismiss a persistent felony offender count, a hearing on a motion to suppress, two
hearings on the Commonwealth's failure to comply with discovery orders, a pretrial
conference involving two settlement offers, a hearing concerning potential KRE 404(b)
evidence, and a hearing on bond reduction . This Court has undertaken a very thorough
and comprehensive review of the record in this case, giving particular attention to what
occurred following the appointment of co-counsel and whether Appellant had the
opportunity to revisit prior decisions of the trial court . See Van , 475 F .3d at 313
("Perhaps the best way of reaching an answer to that query is to ask whether [the
defendant] had any opportunity . . . to recover or exercise whatever privilege he lost.").
Upon careful review, we conclude that Appellant was denied counsel at several
critical stages of the prosecution, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.
In the instant case, the absence of counsel during a meeting with the
Commonwealth's attorney to discuss two different plea agreements looms monumental .
Prior to the appointment of standby counsel, the Commonwealth offered at least two
plea agreements to Appellant . The Commonwealth first offered to amend the trafficking
charge to a lesser offense with a sentence of "time served." The Commonwealth also
offered to run Appellant's sentence concurrently with the .then pending federal charges
in exchange for a plea of guilty to trafficking in the first degree . Appellant stated on the
record that he rejected both offers and wished to proceed to trial. More important to the
present analysis, there is no affirmative indication on the record that these plea offers
were revisited following appointment of standby counsel .
It is axiomatic that the advice of counsel is vitally important to a criminal
defendant's understanding of a guilty plea agreement . The decision to accept or reject
a plea offer necessarily involves an analysis of the charges, the nature and admissibility
of the Commonwealth's evidence, and an accurate assessment of the defendant's
3 As stated earlier, Appellant's federal charges were later dismissed following the federal court's
suppression of several items seized at his apartment .
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actual guilt. "[A]n intelligent assessment of the relative advantages of pleading guilty is
frequently impossible without the assistance of an attorney ." Brady v. United States ,
397 U .S . 742, 748 n .6, 90 S .Ct 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Recognizing the
gravity of the decision to plead guilty, "[t]here is no doubt that a criminal defendant is
entitled to representation by counsel in plea negotiations ." United States v. Sammons,
918 F.2d 592, 602 (6th Cir. 1990). Stated more specifically for our analysis, "plea
negotiations, guilty plea hearings, and sentencing hearings are all `critical stages' at
which the right to counsel attaches ." King v. Bobby, 433 F .3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2006);
see also United States v. Akins , 276 F .3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Nowhere is
counsel more important than at a plea proceeding .").
It is indeed rare for any criminal prosecution not to involve some sort of pleabargaining along the way. Arguably, when this happens it can be the most critical stage
of the proceeding . As stated previously, it is in the negotiation of a criminal case where
the learning and experience of legal counsel can prove most vital. The overwhelming
majority of criminal cases are pled out. Our criminal justice system has arrived at a
place where often the negotiating skills of a lawyer are more critical than his or her
prowess in a courtroom .
When analyzed through the lens of Appellant's overall prosecution, we conclude
that these plea negotiations were critical stages for purposes of the Sixth Amendment .
Appellant rejected two favorable plea offers absent counsel's professional opinion as to
the likelihood of a conviction before a jury. He was charged and convicted of trafficking
in a controlled substance in the first degree (second offense), a class B felony which
requires a penalty ranging from ten to twenty years' imprisonment . KRS 218A.1412 ;
KRS 532 .060(2)(b) . Though the Commonwealth's attorney does indicate on the record
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that the charge would have been amended down to a lesser offense, it is unclear
exactly what charges the Commonwealth contemplated. Furthermore, the
Commonwealth offered to sentence Appellant to "time served" for this lesser offense .
Appellant also rejected a plea offer that would have tied the charges to pending federal
charges, which were later dismissed following suppression of vital evidence. It appears
that following that critical plea agreement, the prosecution took the very attractive offer
"off the table" and the record does not reflect that it ever resurfaced for a more knowing
consideration by Appellant with counsel . Clearly, the consequences of this meeting
were grave, as indicated by the fact that Appellant ultimately received a sentence of
twenty years' imprisonment, the maximum sentence for a class B felony. Without any
indication that these offers were revisited subsequent to appointment of standby
counsel, we can only conclude that Appellant had no opportunity to "recover or
exercise" the privilege he lost. Van, 475 F .3d at 313 .
We are mindful of the Commonwealth's repeated assertions that Appellant,
notwithstanding the wrongful denial of counsel for a lengthy period of time, was
nonetheless afforded a fair trial. Coupled with Appellant's admission that standby
counsel was effective at trial, there is a compelling argument that any error herein
should be deemed harmless . However, for better or worse, we are bound by the U .S .
Supreme Court's very clear dictates that the complete denial of counsel at a critical
stage is reversible error per se, not subject to harmless error review. United States v.
Cronic, 466 U .S . 648, 659, 104 S .Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L .Ed.2d 657 (1984).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Appellant was denied counsel at a critical
stage of his prosecution, namely, the plea bargaining conference, in violation of his
Sixth Amendment rights. Since our ruling turns on one particular event, we need not
address whether any of the other hearings during the thirteen-month absence of
counsel rise to the level of a critical stage .
Lastly, because they are unlikely to recur upon retrial, it is unnecessary to
address Appellant's additional allegations of error. Terry v. Commonwealth , 153
S .W .3d 794, 797 (Ky. 2005) . Accordingly, the judgment of the Nelson Circuit Court is
hereby reversed for further proceedings consistent with this opinion .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
James Havey
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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