JACK CALDWELL, SR. V. DARREN PECKLER, JUDGE, BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NC~TT'O BE PUBLISHED
OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMUL GATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS AUTHORITYINANY OTHER
CASE INAIVY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2006-SC-000171-M R
JACK CALDWELL, SR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
ACTION NO. 05-CA-002356
DARREN PECKLER, JUDGE
BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLEE
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
REAL PARTY IN INTERST
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The Appellant, Jack Caldwell, Sr ., appeals as a matter of right pursuant to
CR 76.36(7) (a) from an order of the Court of Appeals denying his petition for writ
of prohibition to prevent his retrial on charges of murder of his neighbor Jim
Rachsel, a former principal of the local school district . The Appellant argues that
the trial court erroneously declared a mistrial without the "manifest necessity"
necessary to do so, thus, violating his constitutional right not to be tried twice for
the same offense under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States and Section Thirteen of the Kentucky Constitution . Based upon the
record, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
Facts and procedural background
The Appellant was indicted on October 1, 2004 by the Boyle County
Grand Jury for murder. On August 15, 2005, the trial began . During voir dire,
the appellant moved to strike twelve prospective jurors for cause. He argued the
jurors made statements regarding the publicity of the trial in the Boyle County
area. Based upon this motion, the trial court struck nine of the twelve jurors, but
refused to strike the other three after those individuals assured the court they
would be fair and impartial . The appellant was then forced to use his peremptory
challenges to strike those jurors. After swearing in the jury, the trial court
recessed until the next morning .
When court reconvened, the trial court stated that the appellant's motion
to strike all twelve jurors should have been granted . Therefore, he restored the
peremptory challenges to the Appellant . However, there were no replacement
jurors to be utilized in the event the appellant wished to use his peremptory
challenges because the jury had been dismissed the previous day. Therefore,
the trial court declared a mistrial.
The trial court stated he had already discussed with both counsel he was
going to sua sponte declare a mistrial . He also noted on record that the error,
not striking the three jurors for cause, was preserved on the record. He gave
both counsel time to read the relevant law, and then asked if there were any
objections to the mistrial for the record . The appellant answered, "No, Your
Honor."
On September 13, 2005, the Appellant moved the court to dismiss the
charges against him based upon double jeopardy . On November 8, 2005, the
court issued an order denying the motion. Then, the appellant filed a petition for
writ of prohibition with the Court of Appeals requesting an order to deny the court
the right to retry him. The Court of Appeals denied the writ stating that "after
careful review of the record, we believe that [the Appellant] will not be subjected
to double jeopardy because he did, in fact, explicitly consent to the court's
decision to declare a mistrial." We agree .
Applicable law
"We must review this matter under an appellate standard because it has
come before us as a matter of right appeal and not an original action ." Grange
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trude, 151 S .W.3d 803, 809 (Ky. 2005)). 'Where `the
lower court is acting within its jurisdiction but in error, the court with which the
petition for a writ is filed only reaches the decision as to issuance of the writ once
it finds the `conditions precedent,' i .e. no adequate remedy and irreparable
harm ."' Id . (citing Grange, 151 S.W.3d at 810) . Obviously, if the mistrial was in
error, the appellant has no adequate remedy, by appeal or otherwise, upon
denial of a writ. Therefore, the first test is successfully met. The second test,
irreparable injury, is also met if the writ is denied, because there would be a great
injustice if the new trial places him in double jeopardy.
However, once jeopardy attaches, prosecution of the defendant before a
subsequent jury is only barred absent manifest necessity for a mistrial or the
defendant either requested or consented to the mistrial. Commonwealth v. Ray ,
982 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Ky. 1998) (citing KRS 505.030(4) ; Leibson v. Taylor , 721
S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1986); United States v.. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-7, 96
S.Ctr. 1075, 1079, 47 L.Ed .2d 267(1976)) . A defendant impliedly consents if he
does not object . 'Where defendant failed to object . . . defendant impliedly
consented . . . and was bound by the result." Blakeman v. Joyce, 511 S.W .2d
112, 114 (Ky. 1974) (citing Marlow Construction Company v. Jacobs 302 S.W.2d
612 (Ky.1957) ; CR 15.02) . This reasoning is consistent with other jurisdictions'
holdings as well. See United States v. Avnaim , 211 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir.
2000)(where the defendant implicitly consented to the mistrial when he failed to
object) ; United States v. Smith , 621 F .2d 350 (9th Cir . 1980)(where defendant
impliedly consented when he did not object to sua sponte declaration of a
mistrial) ; Keating v. Sherlock , 278 Mont. 218, 924 P.2d 1297 (Mont. 1996) ; State
v. Mounce, 859 S .W.2d 319 (Tenn . 1993) .
Here, the Appellant consented to the mistrial . When the trial court
declared a mistrial, explaining his error in denying the appellant's motion to strike
certain jurors for cause, the appellant made no objection . When the trial court
asked if the appellant had any objections to the declaration of the mistrial, he
specifically stated, "No, your honor." The appellant had time to make an
objection ; but did not. Therefore, because he consented to the mistrial, his retrial
does not subject him to double jeopardy.
Conclusion
Therefore, the Court of Appeal's decision is affirmed .
All concur, except McAnulty, J ., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
William R . Erwin
Helton, Erwin, & Associates
432 West Main Street
P .O. Box 137
Danville, KY 40423-0137
Ephraim Woods Helton
Helton, Erwin, & Associates
432 West Main Street
P .O . Box 137
Danville, KY 40423-0137
Matthew Robb Walter
Helton, Erwin, & Associates
432 West Main Street
P.O. Box 137
Danville, KY 40423-0137
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Room 118, Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Ky. 40601-8204
Richard L. Bottoms
Commonwealth Attorney
119 South Main Street
Harrodsburg, Ky. 40330
Hon. Darren Peckler
Circuit Judge
321 Main Street
Danville, Ky. 40422
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