SANDRA HARTLAGE V. KROGER #394, ET AL.
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THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
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CASE _IN ANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 22, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Courf of ~i
2006-SC-0139-WC
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SANDRA HARTLAGE
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2005-CA-1445-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 04-01282
KROGER #394; HON . JOHN W . THACKER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Vacating an order that dismissed the claimant's application for benefits without
prejudice, the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) stated that the motion and the
order granting it provided no basis for review and remanded the claim to the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for further proceedings . The Court of Appeals
determined that an ALJ has discretion to grant a voluntary dismissal without prejudice
but affirmed because neither the regulations nor CR 41 .01 permitted one under the
present circumstances. It is unnecessary in this case to determine whether CR 41 .01
applies to workers' compensation proceedings . Otherwise, we affirm .
On July 21, 2004, the claimant filed an application for benefits . It alleged that
she injured her left arm, shoulder, and neck in April, 2003, in the course and scope of
her work for the defendant-employer . Submitted with the claim were medical records
from Louisville Bone & Joint Specialists, PSC, that addressed her ability to work.
On August 20, 2004, the employer filed a Form 111 in which it accepted the
claim as being compensable but asserted that there was no injury of appreciable
proportion . It also filed medical records from Dr. DeGruccio regarding visits on May 13,
2003; May 27, 2003; and June 16, 2003; and an MRI performed on May 23, 2003.
The claimant submitted a September 17, 2004, report from Dr. Browne, who had
examined her in July, 2003, and February, 2004. He diagnosed rotator cuff tendonitis
and assigned restrictions but stated that he was "not able to grant any permanent
physical impairment and loss of function at this time ." He indicated that an arthroscopic
procedure might be necessary.
Finally, the employer filed a September 27, 2004, report from Dr. Gladstein, who
diagnosed a left shoulder contusion or strain. Noting that none of the other physicians'
examinations had been remarkable, he stated that he would not impose any permanent
restrictions because he did not think that there had been a significant injury. In his
opinion, any degenerative changes were unrelated to the alleged work injury .
Proof time expired shortly thereafter. The employer filed its witness list,
proposed stipulations, and notice of contested issues, and the Benefits Review
Conference was held on December 2, 2004. At that time, the claimant had submitted
no evidence that the injury resulted in a permanent impairment rating. Nor had she
filed a motion under 803 KAR 25:010, § 15 requesting an extension of proof time or a
motion under 803 KAR 25:010, § 13(12) requesting that the BRC be postponed for
good cause . On December 6, 2004, she filed a motion to dismiss the matter without
prejudice and requested the ALJ to enter a proposed order. Objecting, the employer
asserted that to dismiss the claim without prejudice at that point would be unfair and
prejudicial . It requested that the final hearing be scheduled. On December 9, 2004, the
ALJ entered a summary order dismissing the claim without prejudice .
The employer's petition for reconsideration argued that the regulations did not
permit a dismissal without prejudice under the circumstances . They required a final
hearing and a decision on the merits . Furthermore, it argued, to permit the claimant to
dismiss without prejudice at that point unfairly prejudiced the employer. After the
petition was summarily denied, the employer appealed . The record indicates that the
claimant filed a new application for benefits that was identical to the dismissed
application and accompanied by identical medical evidence. The employer both
objected to the filing and responded . No scheduling order had been issued as of June
10, 2005, when the Board entered its opinion .
The claimant asserts that Board and the Court of Appeals erred in determining
that neither a voluntary nor discretionary dismissal without prejudice was permitted in
this case . She maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in considering CR 41 .01 as a
possible basis for dismissal because it is not among the civil rules that have been
adopted by the regulations ; therefore, it is inapplicable to workers' compensation
proceedings. Relying on authority for the principle that dismissals with prejudice should
be avoided, she argues that a workers' compensation claimant may dismiss the claim
as a matter of right at any time before the merits are adjudicated . In the alternative, she
argues that an ALJ has the authority to grant a voluntary dismissal without prejudice .
She maintains that the Board substituted its judgment when vacating the order of
dismissal because it was not present at the BRC when the matter was discussed .
The claimant is correct that the regulations have adopted certain civil rules of
procedure and that CR 41 .01 is not among those that have been adopted . In any
event, it is unnecessary in the present circumstances for us to determine whether CR
41 .01 applies to workers' compensation claims. The claimant did not file her motion to
dismiss until after the employer filed a Form 111 in response to his claim, at which point
CR 41 .01(1) would no longer have permitted a voluntary dismissal as a matter of right .
Even if we were to assume for the purposes of discussion that CR 41 .01(2) applied,
Sublett v. Hall, 589 S.W.2d 888, 893 (Ky. 1979), and Louisville Label, Inc. y.
Hildesheim , 843 S .W .2d 321, 324-26 (Ky. 1992), make clear that a dismissal under CR
41 .01(2) is a form of equitable relief and that the discretion to grant it is not unlimited .
The fact-finder must analyze a number of factors, including prejudice to the parties . In
the present case, the claimant's motion failed to show any cause. Therefore, a decision
to grant it would have been an abuse of the ALJ's discretion under CR 41 .01(2).
The Board noted in its opinion that on at least one occasion it has found an order
granting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice not to be an abuse of the ALJ's
discretion. In the present case, however, the lack of any grounds to support the motion
for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice and the absence of any stated rationale for
granting it prevented the Board from determining whether the order conformed to
Chapter 342 . Convinced that a remand for additional findings would be a waste of
judicial resources in view of the re-filed claim, the Board vacated the order to dismiss
without prejudice and remanded the claim "for further proceedings consistent with [the
ALJ's] sound discretion and the mandates of the Workers' Compensation Act and
regulations ." The Board was divided, however, regarding what the Act and the
regulations permit .
KRS 342.275(2) gives an AU the authority to grant continuances or grant or
deny any benefits afforded by Chapter 342, including interlocutory relief, "according to
criteria established in administrative regulations ." The claimant knew that for whatever
reason she had not received a permanent impairment rating. If she thought the reason
was that she was not at maximum medical improvement, 803 KAR 25:010, § 15
permitted her to receive an extension of proof time under specified conditions; 803 KAR
25 :010, § 13(12) permitted the BRC to be postponed for good cause; and 803 KAR
25:010, § 13(15) permitted additional proof to be taken between the benefit review
conference and the hearing for good cause.
The regulations do not provide for summary judgments or for involuntary
dismissals with prejudice before an adjudication of the merits . Nor do they provide for
voluntary dismissals without prejudice . An AU has the explicit authority to grant
continuances under KRS 342 .275(2) and explicit authority under the regulations to
extend proof time and grant various forms of interlocutory relief. Absent anything in
Chapter 342 or the regulations to imply that an AU may dismiss a claim without
prejudice, we are not convinced that an AU must do so at any time the claimant
requests .
Cornett v. Corbin Materials . Inc. , 807 S .W.2d 56 (Ky. 1991), does not support the
proposition that a claimant has the right to dismiss the claim without prejudice at any
time before the hearing . The dismissal at issue in Cornett was involuntary, based on
the worker's failure to introduce any evidence within the initial 60-day period for prooftaking . The worker offered no excuse and asserted that nothing prevented a party from
submitting the entire case at the hearing . At issue was whether the Board and the
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the dismissal was not an abuse of the ALJ's
discretion . The court affirmed . It did not consider whether the dismissal should have
been with or without prejudice because the statute of limitations would have barred a
re-filing . The court explained subsequently in New Directions Housing Authority v.
Walker, 149 S.W .3d 354 (Ky. 2003), that the regulations and Cornett did not require an
AU to grant an employer's motion to dismiss a claim if extraordinary circumstances
prevented the claimant from making a prima facie case within the initial 60-day period
for taking proof.
The Board determined in the present case that even if Chapter 342 and the
regulations give an AU authority broad enough to grant a motion to dismiss without
prejudice, the motion and the order granting it must state grounds sufficient to establish
on appeal that the order is not an abuse of discretion. Considering whether an ALJ's
decision conforms to Chapter 342 or whether it was an abuse of discretion is within the
Board's scope of review under KRS 342.285(2). Therefore, the Board did not err by
concluding that the motion and order in the present case were inadequate to permit
review.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
Lambert, CJ., and Graves, Minton, Roach, Scott, and Wintersheimer, JJ.,
concur. McAnulty, J ., not sitting
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Ched Jennings
239 South Fifth Street, Suite 412
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, KROGER # 394:
Brian T. Gannon
Fulton & Devlin
2000 Warrington Way, Suite 165
Louisville, KY 40222
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