WILLIAM CARR V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED O~"INIOI
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CI T1IL PROCED URE PR O.IVIUL GA TED, BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (e), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
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CASE INANY CO UR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 22, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-000680-MR
WILLIAM CARR
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINE, JUDGE
NO . 04-CR-001178
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, William Carr, was convicted of two counts of sodomy in the first
degree and one count of attempted sodomy in the first degree . He was sentenced to
twenty years for each count of sodomy, and ten years for the attempt, to run
concurrently for a total sentence of twenty years . He appeals from his conviction as a
matter of right.'
On September 29, 2003, Appellant was arrested and charged with three counts
of oral sodomy in the first degree based on allegations made by his girlfriend's
daughters. Because Appellant was seventeen years old when these charges were
brought, a petition was filed in the Juvenile Session of Jefferson District Court . On
March 11, 2004, a hearing was conducted pursuant to KRS 640.010, and the juvenile
1 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
court ordered that Appellant be transferred to the circuit court as a youthful offender and
tried as an adult.
On April 15, 2004, a Jefferson County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Appellant with several offenses, including three counts of sodomy in the first
degree . Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion in limine to prevent introduction of certain
evidence including "[t]he portion of Gloria Dobbins' statement where she states that . . .
[Appellant] had stuck a stick into the private area of another girl at the 4-H Club." The
Commonwealth did not object and the trial court sustained the motion. A jury was
impaneled and sworn on December 14, 2004, but a mistrial was declared after a police
officer testified about the aforementioned excluded third-party incident. The prosecutor
asked the investigating officer, "[h]ow did you come across this case?" The officer
stated that he received a call from Child Protective Services that a Ms . Dobbins from the
4-H Club had called to report that three girls reported their babysitter masturbated in
front of them and that the same man had apparently poked another girl between the
legs with a stick on the day of the report. Appellant objected and moved for a mistrial
because the statement about the stick involved sexual conduct with someone other than
the three victims listed in the first three counts of the indictment and based on the
court's pretrial order. Regarding the prosecutor's instructions to the officer, the
prosecutor explained that he had told the officer, "[t]he only thing we're going to talk
2 Counts four through nine of the indictment also charged Appellant with two counts of
rape in the first degree, two counts of incest, and two counts of sexual abuse in the first
degree . The alleged victims of those charges were his sisters . The trial court granted
Appellant's motion to sever those counts for a separate trial, and the Commonwealth
elected to try sodomy counts one, two, and three of the indictment first . This appeal
only concerns the trial and retrial of counts one, two, and three .
about today is what went on in the house." The trial court reviewed the tape to confirm
the officer's testimony and eventually declared a mistrial.
On December 16, 2004, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on
grounds that the Commonwealth's actions caused the mistrial . Specifically, Appellant
alleged that the Commonwealth failed to advise the lead officer of certain pretrial
motions prohibiting testimony. The trial court, in denying this motion, found that there
was no bad faith or overreaching on the part of the prosecutor as intentional misconduct
on the part of the lead officer . Therefore, the court conducted a retrial of counts one,
two, and three of the indictment on May 2 through May 5, 2005 .
At the retrial the Commonwealth presented testimony from four daughters of
Appellant's former girlfriend, Theresa . J.W., who was ten years old at the time of trial
and seven years old at the time of the abuse, testified that she lived with her four
sisters 4 and her mother at 1700 Hale Avenue in Louisville when Appellant moved in
during the summer of 2002. Appellant would baby-sit her and her sisters while their
mother was at work. J .W. testified that Appellant would play games with them, including
a game called "hide and go lick" where the girls would hide, and Appellant would get to
lick them anywhere he wanted if he found them . J.W . testified to one specific instance
where Appellant licked her "private parts" which she further identified by marking the
vaginal area in a diagram . DaW was present when this happened and she testified
she saw Appellant do this to J .W . Appellant threatened to beat J.W. if she told
3 The mother's first name and the initials of the children will be used to protect the
anonymity of the parties involved .
4 One sister, A .W., moved out of state to live with her father .
anybody. Gloria Dobbins of United Clubs, Inc . was the first person to whom J .W .
confided the details of what happened .
DaW was one year younger than J.W. DaW testified that Appellant licked her
private parts and further identified what she meant by marking the vaginal area on a
diagram . J .W. testified she saw Appellant do this.
De-W . also verified that Appellant liked to play the "hide and go lick it"game .
DeW stated that Appellant would walk around naked in the house while the mother
was away. DeW saw Appellant play with his "private parts." One time, Appellant
came into De .W.'s bedroom while she was asleep and tried to lick her private parts.
Appellant's tongue did not actually touch De.W .'s private parts, however DeW further
testified that she saw Appellant lick J.W. and DaW when she walked into the room
where Appellant was doing this.
Another sister, M.W., testified that she went into the bedroom J.W. and DaW
shared and saw Appellant licking on the two girls . Although Appellant never touched
her sexually, she testified that Appellant talked about "busting a cherry" and that he was
going to do it with them . She did not really know what this meant. M .W. also saw
Appellant naked in the house. Appellant would routinely show his penis to the girls
whenever the mother was at work and would fondle himself . One time, Appellant
choked J.W. and would not stop even though J .W. cried and coughed . M .W. tried to
help by pulling his fingers off J .W.'s throat . M.W. once told her mother that Appellant
was mistreating them, but did not tell her about the "nasty stuff" because she was
scared . She did not tell everything until after she confided in Ms. Dobbins.
The Commonwealth called Gloria Dobbins as a witness since she was the first
person in whom the children confided . Ms. Dobbins founded and ran United Clubs, Inc.,
which combined a Bible club and a 4-H Club. Ms. Dobbins and others sought to
enhance the parent-child relationship, teach good morals, and teach positive social
behavior . De.W., J.W., and Da .W. were members in the club. In questioning Ms.
Dobbins, the prosecutor asked if the three victims told her about being abused by
Appellant .
Q.
A.
Did the girls tell you something about, that happened at the
hands of Mr. Carr? Did they at some time tell you that Mr.
Carr had done something to them?
Right We had a girl that we - the children were practicing .
The Step Teens were practicing in the basement. Mr. Carr
was on the piano where he usually practiced the piano, but
he got off the piano and rushed down into the basement
where the girls were . After a while, one of the girls came
running upstairs and said "Mamaw" - they all called me
Mamaw. And she said, "Mamaw, get William ." And I said,
"What's he doing? What did he do?" And he ran out the
door, he rushed out the door and I said 'What did he do?"
And she said he had taken a mop handle, stuck it in her
private -.
At this point, Appellant interrupted and asked to approach the bench. Appellant
stated there was an order (on the motion in limine) from the day before which prohibited
this testimony . Appellant did not ask for specific relief, but the trial court treated the
matter as if it were a motion for a mistrial . The trial court denied the motion for mistrial
and made specific findings that (1) the Commonwealth could not introduce evidence of
a mop handle being inserted into the girl's private areas, (2) that the Commonwealth did
not intentionally violate any order because it was not clear what was being precluded by
the pre-trial order, (3) there was testimony about a mop handle but there was no
testimony it was being used in a sexual context, and (4) the reference to the mop
handle was not so prejudicial as to require a mistrial .
At the end of the trial, Appellant again moved for a mistrial based on Ms.
Dobbins' statement. The trial court overruled the motion and again stated that it had not
made its pre-trial ruling prohibiting this testimony explicit. The trial court noted Ms.
Dobbins was stopped during her testimony and the court found her statement "did not
create an issue of prejudicial information coming before the ladies and gentlemen of the
jury. . .
In this appeal, Appellant asserts three instances of error. Appellant first argues
that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss counts one, two, and three of the indictment
after a mistrial was declared, and that jeopardy had attached . We note that this issue
was properly preserved for review by Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment after
the trial court granted a mistrial .
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person
shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ...
Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution likewise provides that "[n]o person shall, for the
same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of his life or limb. . . ." Both of these provisions
"are identical in the import of their prohibition against double jeopardy ." 5 Furthermore,
"feopardy attaches only when the jury is impaneled and sworn. ,,6 "Once jeopardy
attaches, prosecution of a defendant before a jury other than the original jury or
contemporaneously-impaneled alternates is barred unless 1) there is a `manifest
5 Jordan v. Commonwealth , 703 S .W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1985) .
6 Lear v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Ky. 1994) (citin Crist v. Bretz, 437
U.S . 28, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.E.2d 24 (1978)) .
necessity' for a mistrial or 2) the defendant either requests of consents to a mistrial ."'
As a general rule, a mistrial granted on the Defendant's motion removes any double
jeopardy bar to retrial . However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a
defendant in a criminal trial who successfully moves for a mistrial may still invoke the
bar of double jeopardy against a second trial where "the conduct giving rise to the
successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a
mistrial ."9 This Court has held that the defendant must show "that the conduct giving
rise to the order of mistrial was precipitated by bad faith, overreaching or some other
fundamentally unfair action of the prosecutor or the court."' ° It is not enough that the
prosecutor erred or even acted intentionally for there to be bad faith . The prosecutor
must act with intent to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial in order to have
a better chance at convicting the defendant in a subsequent trial ."
As previously noted, the prosecutor instructed the lead police officer to talk only
about the incidents in the girls' home. However, the prosecutor did not specifically
inform the officer of the trial court's order prohibiting certain testimony . When the
prosecutor questioned the officer about how he had come across this case, the officer
responded "that the three young ladies had reported to Miss Dobbs" at the 4-H Club
"that their babysitter had been masturbating in front of them" and that "he had touched
See KRS 505.030(4); Leibson v. Taylor, 721 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1986) ( overruled
on other grounds by Shaffer v. Morgan , 815 S .W.2d 402 (Ky. 1991)); United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U .S. 600, 606-07, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079, 47 L.E.2d 267 (1976) .
8 Stomps v. Commonwealth, 648 S .W .2d 868 (Ky. 1983) ; Silverburg v. Commonwealth ,
587 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1979) .
' Oregon v . Kennedy , 456 U.S . 667, 679, 102 S .Ct . 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982).
'° Tinsley v. Jackson , 771 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky. 1989) .
" Terry v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 794, 803-04 (Ky. 2005) (citin United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U .S. 600, 96 S .Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) ; Oregon v. Kennedy , 456
U.S. 667,102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed .2d 416 (1982)) .
some kids in the basement [of the 4-H Club] with a stick or something between their
legs." The prosecutor contended that he had only expected the officer to say he had
received a call from CPS . Noting that allegations of sexual abuse were involved and
that a trained officer had given the prejudicial testimony, the trial court found that an
admonition would not be sufficient to cure the prejudice, thus granting a mistrial. In
denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, the trial court did
not find that the prosecutor's actions were in bad faith or overreaching on the part of the
prosecutor as intentional misconduct on the part of the lead officer.
We discover no abuse of discretion or clear error in the trial court's findings. 12
Appellant has offered no reason or evidence why the prosecutor would have wanted to
entice Appellant into a mistrial. An unethical prosecutor might try to provoke a
defendant into a mistrial where evidence is missing or witnesses may not be found.
However, in the case at bar the prosecutor asked a seemingly innocent question, and
received an answer that was hardly responsive . Moreover, the Commonwealth argued
against the mistrial, and did not acquiesce in the motion for a mistrial by Appellant.
Perhaps the Commonwealth should have more thoroughly explained the motion in
limine to the officer, but we agree with the trial court's assessment that by failing to do
so the prosecutor did not act in bad faith. We will not disturb such trial court findings on
appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence and the trial court is not clearly
erroneous in its findings . 13
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial during
the retrial when the Commonwealth introduced inadmissible evidence of a subsequent,
12
Commonwealth v. Delonev , 20 S.W.3d 471 (Ky. 2000).
13 Id . at 474 .
uncharged sexual act involving a separate alleged victim . This issue was properly
preserved for review by Appellant's motion in limine and motion for mistrial.
The issue of what evidence would be limited was taken up anew by the trial court
before Appellant's second trial . Appellant sought a laundry list of items to be excluded
by his written motion in limine . The evidence sought to be limited included :
4 . The portion of Gloria Dobbins' statement wherein she
states that the girls had told her that William had
masturbated in front of the girls and had also stuck a stick
into the private area of another girl at the 4-H Club.
The trial court ruled that "[f]or the reasons stated on the record, except for the statement
of-Diana Carr (paragraph 3) & the statement of Gloria Dobbins (paragraph 4) unless for
impeachment, the balance of the motion is denied."
The question that precipitated Appellant's motion for mistrial did not specifically
elicit the testimony of which Appellant now complains . The prosecutor asked Ms .
Dobbins, "[d]id the girls tell you something about, that happened at the hands of Mr.
Carr? Did they at some time tell you that Mr. Carr had done something to them?" Ms.
Dobbins then began a response which was, in part, non-responsive to the question
because it referred to something Appellant did to another person . Her answer ended,
"[a]nd he ran out the door, he rushed out the door and I said what did he do? And she
said he had taken a mop handle, stuck it in her private -." Defense counsel
immediately objected, arguing that the Commonwealth had violated the court's pretrial
order prohibiting this testimony. The prosecution claimed that defense counsel was
confused and that the trial court had denied the motion in limine in its entirety. After
reviewing defense counsel's motion and its order, the trial court agreed that it meant to
exclude this uncharged act involving a third person . However, the court found that the
Commonwealth had not intentionally violated any order because the court had not made
it clear that this testimony would be precluded . Treating defense counsel's objection as
a motion for mistrial, the court found that a mistrial was not warranted under these
circumstances . The court stated that the jury had no idea that the mop handle involved
a sexual assault or sexual misconduct and found that merely referencing a mop handle
was not so prejudicial as to require a mistrial.
The next day, Appellant renewed his motion for a mistrial based on Gloria
Dobbins' testimony . Defense counsel argued that this testimony was irrelevant to the
charges being tried, was unduly prejudicial, and could not be erased from the jurors'
minds . The trial court agreed that the episode involving touching a third party with a
stick or mop handle had little or no probative value, and that the prejudice from
introducing that evidence would outweigh any probative value . However, the trial court
felt that its ruling had not been explicit and further believed that Ms. Dobbins had been
stopped before she could actually testify about the prejudicial evidence. Therefore, the
court once again denied the motion for a mistrial.
"Whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
`such a ruling will not be disturbed absent . . . an abuse of discretion
m14
"A mistrial is an
extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when there appears in the record a
manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or real necessity ." 15 "[F]or a mistrial
to be proper, the harmful event must be of such magnitude that a litigant would be
'4
Bray v. Commonwealth , 177 S.W.3d 741, 752 (Ky. 2005) uotin Woodard v.
Commonwealth , 147 S .W.3d 63, 68 (Ky. 2004)) .
15
Id. (citin Ska_ggs v. Commonwealth , 694 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Ky . 1985)) .
10
denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect could be removed in no other
way ."' 6
There was no manifest necessity requiring a mistrial due to the mop handle
testimony. The trial court specifically found there was no intentional misconduct by the
prosecutor and that its ruling on the pre-trial motion was unclear. Ms. Dobbins was cut
off by Appellant's objection before explaining that Appellant stuck the mop handle in the
girl's private "parts." Appellant sought no other form of relief.
Regardless of whether the jury may have inferred that Appellant used the mop
handle in a sexual manner, there was no requirement of a mistrial. The evidence
against Appellant was overwhelming, including two children who testified that Appellant
licked their private parts and a third who testified Appellant attempted to lick her private
parts . A fourth child witnessed two of the events for which Appellant was charged . In
addition, the sisters testified to a number of other inappropriate acts where Appellant
was apparently grooming them for sexual contact . Appellant walked around the house
naked, he played with his penis in front of the girls, he told the girls he was going to
"bust their cherries," and he used physical force and intimidation to scare the girls into
keeping quiet . Measured against this evidence the mop handle testimony was not of
such force and not so prejudicial as to create a manifest necessity for a mistrial, and we
so hold.
Appellant's final argument is that the trial court committed reversible error by
refusing to strike Juror No. 104625, Juror No. 116723, and Juror No. 116601 for cause .
16
Maxie v. Commonwealth , 82 S .W.3d 860, 863 (Ky. 2002) (citin Gould v. Chariton
Co. , 929 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Ky. 1996)) .
We note that this issue is preserved by Appellant's motion to excuse these jurors for
cause .
The right to an impartial jury is a fundamental constitutional right, a violation of
which may never be harmless." However, the law recognizes that a trial court is
endowed with broad discretion in determining whether to excuse a prospective juror for
cause . 18 A juror should only be dismissed for cause if the juror cannot conform his or
her views to the requirements of the law, and render a fair and impartial verdict-' 9 "It is
the probability of bias or prejudice that is determinative in ruling on a challenge for
cause ."2° "A determination as to whether to exclude a juror for cause lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court, and unless the action of the trial court is an abuse of
discretion or is clearly erroneous, an appellate court will not reverse the trial court's
determination ."2'
To determine whether Appellant's basis for claiming that the three prospective
jurors should have been excused, we will examine each juror in turn. We note that
none of the following jurors actually served on the jury, as Appellant used his
preemptory strikes to remove them.
Juror No. 104625
During voir dire, the trial court asked the following questions:
Q. How many of you have been called as witnesses before? You saw
something happen or [in] your line of work, you're called to testify as an
" Paenitz v. Commonwealth, 820 S .W .2d 480, 481-82 (Ky . 1991) .
1s
See McQueen v. Commonwealth , 669 S.W .2d 519 (Ky. 1984); Pennington v.
Commonwealth , 455 S .W .2d 530 (Ky. 1970) .
'9
Mabe v. Commonwealth , 884 S .W.2d 668 (Ky. 1994) .
2°
Pennington v. Commonwealth , 316 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Ky. 1958) (citing Sizemore v.
Commonwealth, 276 S.W. 524 (Ky. 1925)) .
21
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 9 03 S .W .2d 524, 527 (Ky. 1995).
12
expert, but you've had some exposure as a witness before? Okay, two .
Anything about that experience of having appeared as a witness that you
think would have an effect on you listening to the evidence of this case?
Juror No. 104625 responded as follows: "Probably . As a retired social worker, I testified
in family court and (inaudible) advocate for victims (inaudible) ." At the end of voir dire,
the trial court disagreed with Appellant's characterization of this juror's answers and
generally summed up the answers of the jurors as follows:
Numerous jurors expressed some strong feelings about what
they would do if they believe someone committed a crime
against a child .
None of them expressed the feelings
though, that that would cause them to prejudge this case
simply because the allegations were made and I think the
same thing applies to juror in seat number one (Juror No.
104625). So, I'm going to deny the motion for cause as to
that juror.
This juror's situation is quite similar to a juror in Alexander v. Commonwealth .22
In that case, a prospective juror advised the court that she was not certain she could sit
impartially in a trial . The juror was an investigative social worker with Child Protective
Services, and she stated unequivocally that her position would affect her ability to be
fair and impartial in the case . It has long been held that "[i]t is the probability of bias or
prejudice that is determinative in ruling on a challenge for cause." 23 However, in the
case at bar the prospective juror gave no such unequivocal answer. The juror stated
only that her experience would "probably" have an effect on her ability to listen to the
evidence of the case. Unlike the juror in Alexander, this juror did not express that she
22
862 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1993) (overruled on other grounds by Stringer v.
Commonwealth, 956 S .W.2d 883 (1997)) .
23
Pennington , 316 S.W.2d at 224.
13
had feelings that would cause her to prejudge the case. We hold that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion with respect to this juror.
Juror No. 116723
Juror No . 116723 stated that he had worked for five years in a juvenile residential
setting with offenders and victims of sexual abuse, and that based on his experience
there, he stated he was biased in "this type of case." He further stated that he was very
opinionated about how sexual offenders should be punished and that his opinions would
not be acceptable in today's society . Nevertheless, when asked by Appellant, this juror
stated that he would be able to sit and weigh the evidence fairly. The trial court noted
this answer when determining the juror would not be dismissed for cause.
If we dismissed all jurors for cause who have pre-conceived ideas about child
sex crimes, the result would likely be an inability to seat a jury. Indeed, most of the
population undoubtedly harbors some sort of "bias" against sexual offenders and
against sexual based crimes. In Young v. Commonwealth 24 this Court held that there
was insufficient reason to dismiss a prospective juror for cause in a murder case
involving drug trafficking where the prospective juror had a "zero tolerance" against drug
offenses and had testified for the prosecution in drug cases. Additionally, in Turner v.
Commonwealth 25 we held that jurors' pre-conceived beliefs regarding homosexuality did
not render them unfit to sit on the panel, so long as they were able to set aside those
beliefs and considered the case impartially. RCr 9.36(1) states in part: 'When there is
reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial
verdict on the evidence, that juror shall be excused as not qualified." However, in this
24
25
50 S .W.3d 148 (Ky. 2001).
153 S.W.3d 823 (Ky. 2005) .
14
case the prospective juror gave adequate assurances to the trial court that he could
render a fair and impartial verdict, despite his preconceived notions about this type of
crime. This comports with RCr 9.36(1) and gave the trial court a reasonable basis for
declining to remove the juror for cause .
Juror No. 116601
Appellant next argues that Juror No. 116601 should have been dismissed for
cause because she had been the victim of rape and had taken a class on sexual
offenders . The juror apparently even knew statistics about sexual offenders . The trial
court considered this and noted that he had watched this prospective juror during voir
dire and concluded she did not express any grounds to dismiss her for cause .
Being a victim of a similar crime does not create grounds to dismiss a juror for
cause . 26 This is true even in a prosecution for rape and sodomy where the prospective
juror had been raped by her stepfather. Thus the fact that the juror was a rape victim
did not disqualify her. Likewise, the fact that a prospective juror has some specialized
knowledge or experience in an area does not disqualify that person from sitting on a
jury . This Court has determined that a prospective juror did not have to be dismissed
for cause when the juror had worked with the state's marijuana eradication taskforce
and had been shot by a drug dealer in a murder case where there would be evidence
the defendant was a drug trafficker . Even law enforcement officers, with specialized
26
Bowling v. Commonwealth , 942 S.W.2d 293,299 (Ky. 1997) (citin Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1990)).
27
Whalen v. Commonwealth, 891 S.W.2d 86, 88-89 (Ky.App. 1995) (overruled on other
grounds by Moore v. Commonwealth, 990 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1999)) .
8 Young, v. Commonwealth , 50 S.W.3d 148,163-64 (Ky. 2001).
15
knowledge about crime, are not disqualified as jurors for that reason .29 The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the juror for cause .
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's convictions are affirmed .
Lambert, C.J ., and Graves, McAnulty, Minton, Scott, and Wintersheimer, JJ.,
concur . Roach, J., concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Elizabeth C . McMahon
Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Room 118, Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
29
See Sanders v. Commonwealth , 801 S.W .2d 665 (Ky. 1990) .
16
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