GLEN DALE COLEMAN V. ROAD FORK DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., ET AL
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RENDERED : May 18, 2006
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2005-SC-0651-WC
GLEN DALE COLEMAN
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2005-CA-0207-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 02-79826
ROAD FORK DEVELOPMENT CO., INC./
RAWL SALES AND PROCESSING, INC. ;
HON. SHEILA C. LOWTHER, CHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the claimant retained the
post-injury physical capacity to return to work as a roof bolter. Based on evidence that
he was laid off upon his return to work and presently earned a lower average weekly
wage, the ALJ awarded him a double benefit under KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 . In a decision
that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed
the denial of a triple benefit under KRS 342 .730(1)(c)1 and vacated the order awarding
benefits under KRS 342 .730(1)(c)2 . We affirm .
The claimant was born in 1962 and quit school during the tenth grade. He
received some on-the-job training in welding but did not have a certificate . On July 11,
2002, he injured his eye while working for the defendant-employer. He underwent
surgery and received TTD benefits from July 12, 2002, through November 17, 2002.
He last worked for the employer on July 11, 2002, at which time he earned $862 .50 per
week working as a roof bolter. He testified that when he attempted to return to work, he
was informed that he had been laid off. He explained that the mining business was
slow at that time and that it was difficult to find a job anywhere . On February 1, 2003,
he found work with a different employer, also as a roof bolter. He worked about the
same number of hours but earned $812.50 per week because the hourly wage was 77
cents lower. He received the same hourly wage as the other roof bolters .
The claimant testified that he continued to experience symptoms from his injury,
including drainage from the eye, decreased peripheral vision, and headaches that
appeared to be triggered by exposure to bright light. On his doctor's advice, he wore
sunglasses when driving ; however, miner's lamps and the headlights on machinery
bothered him and slowed his performance . He testified that his work at the time of
injury required him to do occasional welding, but he could no longer do so because the
light from the welding torch triggered headaches . Asked at the hearing how often he
performed welding, he responded, "On average maybe twice a month."
Although acknowledging that a residual sensitivity to light prevented the claimant
from welding, the ALJ determined that welding was only an incidental part of his job for
the defendant-employer. Moreover, he passed a pre-employment physical when
applying for his present job, which was also as a roof bolter, and he continued to
perform that job . On that basis, the ALJ concluded that he was not entitled to a triple
benefit under KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 and rendered an initial award of $35.11 per week
under KRS 342 .730(1)(b) . After granting the claimant's petition for reconsideration, the
ALJ amended the award to provide a double benefit under KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 "during
any cessation of employment with earnings equal to or greater than the plaintiffs
average weekly wage at the time of the injury ." The Board and the Court of Appeals
determined, however, that the plain language of KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 required a return
to work at the same or greater wage and that the amended award must be vacated.
Appealing, the claimant raises arguments under KRS 342 .730(1)(c)1 and 2 . He
asserts that he is entitled to a triple benefit because his sensitivity to bright light and
inability to weld prevent him from performing all of his previous duties, rendering him
physically incapable of the type of work he performed at the time of the injury. In the
alternative, he asserts that he is entitled to a double benefit based on his testimony that
he returned to work with the defendant-employer but was laid off. He argues that he
should not be penalized because the employer laid him off rather than permitting him to
return to his former job . He also argues that it would be absurd to construe KRS
342 .730(1)(c)2 to permit a worker to obtain a double benefit simply by working for one
day at the same or greater wage but to deny him a double benefit .
As amended effective Ju.l y 14, 2000, KRS 342.730(1)(b) and (c) refined the
system for awarding partial disability benefits that was enacted in 1996. The 2000
version of KRS 342 .730(1)(b) provides a basic partial disability benefit without regard to
whether the individual has returned to work. The formula for determining the amount of
the benefit considers the average weekly wage at the time of the injury as well as the
resulting impairment, and it gives more severe impairments greater weight. KRS
342.730(1)(c) provides, in pertinent part, as follows :
1 . If, due to an injury, an employee does not retain the physical
capacity to return to the type of work that the employee performed
at the time of injury, the benefit for permanent partial disability shall
be multiplied by three (3) times the amount otherwise determined
under paragraph (b) of this subsection, but this provision shall not
be construed so as to extend the duration of payments; or
2 . If an employee returns to work at a weekly wage equal to or
greater than the average weekly wage at the time of injury , the
weekly benefit for permanent partial disability shall be determined
under paragraph (b) of this subsection for each week during which
that employment is sustained . Durinq any period of cessation of
that employment , temporary or permanent, for any reason, with or
without cause, payment of weekly benefits for permanent partial
disability during the period of cessation shall be two (2) times the
amount otherwise payable under paragraph (b) of this subsection .
(emphasis added) .
Subsection (1)(c)3 permits enhancement of the triple benefit awarded under subsection
(1)(c)1 for workers of specified ages and educational levels. KRS 342 .730(4) and KRS
125(3) permit a reopening at any time to conform an award to KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 .
The burden was on the claimant to prove every element of his claim, including
that he lacked the physical capacity to return to the type of work he performed at the
time of injury. Roark v. Alva Coal Corporation , 371 S .W.2d 856 (Ky. 1963) . KRS
342 .285 designates the AU as the finder of fact with the sole authority to weigh the
evidence . A finding against the party with the burden of proof may not be reversed on
appeal unless the favorable evidence was so overwhelming that it compelled a finding
in the party's favor. Special Fund v. Francis , 708 S.W .2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986).
KRS 342 .730(1)(c)1 bases a triple benefit on a loss of "the physical capacity to
return to the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury ." After
reviewing the evidence, the AU determined that the claimant worked as a roof bolter,
both at the time of his injury and when his claim was heard . Moreover, although he
performed occasional welding for the defendant-employer, it was only an incidental part
of his duties as a roof bolter. In reaching that conclusion, the AU noted the claimant's
statement that he did welding "maybe twice a month" as well as the fact that he passed
a pre-employment physical and was hired by a subsequent employer for whom he
performed roof bolting presently. Under the circumstances, the favorable evidence was
not so overwhelming as to compel the award of a triple benefit .
Eligibility for a double benefit under KRS 342 .730(1)(c)2 requires both a postinjury return to work "at a weekly wage equal to or greater than the average weekly
wage at the time of injury" and a "cessation of that employment." A post-injury
employment cannot cease if it has not begun. The evidence in the present case
indicates that at no time after his injury was the claimant employed to work at the same
or a greater wage. Therefore, such employment did not cease, and he was not entitled
to an award under KRS 342 .730(1)(c)2 .
The claimant is correct that KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 does not prevent an employer
from laying a worker off in order to avoid the potential of liability for a double benefit .
Nonetheless, the evidence in this case does not support such an assertion . The
claimant testified that he was one of many workers who were laid off because business
was slow. Moreover, KRS 342 .730(1)(c)2 does not base eligibility on a return to the
employment, a return to the same type of work, or simply on a return to work; therefore,
its purpose appears to be something other than to compensate individuals, such as the
claimant, who return to work at a wage lower than what they earned at the time of
injury .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
Lambert, C.J ., and Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Roach, and Wintersheimer, JJ.,
concur. Scott, J ., dissents without opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
R. Roland Case
149 Main St
PO Drawer 1410
Pikeville, KY 41502-4410
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
ROAD FORK DEVELOPMENT CO., INC./
RAWL SALES AND PROCESSING, INC. :
A. Stuart Bennett
Jackson Kelly PLLC
PO Box 2150
Lexington, KY 40588-9945
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