AMY DAWN STODGELL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT 7'D BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PRO CEDURE PROMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME CO URT, CR 76.2 8 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYINANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
AS MODIFIED : MARCH 30, 2006
RENDERED : MARCH 23, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-000601-MR
AMY DAWN STODGELL
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HON . THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 02-CR-00512
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Daviess Circuit Court on
July 1, 2005, sentencing the Appellant, Amy Dawn Stodgell, to a term of twenty
(20) years upon conviction of manslaughter in the second degree, burglary in the
first degree, receiving stolen firearms, and receiving stolen property valued at
$300.00 or more. The Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the above charges
and, as a part of the judgment and sentence, the trial court determined that the
Appellant was a violent offender pursuant to KRS 439.3401 . The Appellant
appeals to this Court as a matter of right pursuant to Ky. Const. §110(2)(b).
The Appellant argues that the elements of the Class B crime for which she
was convicted, burglary in the first degree, did not meet the requirements set out
in the violent offender statute, KRS 439.3401 . Also, the Appellant argues that
the trial court's determination of her as a violent offender is contrary to the rule of
lenity and, additionally, is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment and Ky. Const.
§17 as cruel and unusual punishment . She moves this Court to reverse the trial
court's designation of her as a violent offender .
Final sentencing occurred on July 1, 2005 and notice of appeal was filed
on July 29, 2005. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court's ruling .
FACTS
On or about October 23, 2002, in Daviess County, Kentucky, the
Appellant, acting in concert with her boyfriend, Lonnie Edward Puckett (Puckett),
burglarized the home of James Ronald Gant. The Appellant provided
transportation for Puckett and herself to the Gant residence . Puckett entered the
residence through a back window and beat Mr. Gant to death . The Appellant
followed through the back window entry and helped Puckett remove items and
weapons from the residence . The Appellant then sold some of the weapons in
other counties while retaining other items from another burglary committed by
Puckett .
The Grand Jury charged the Appellant with murder in the first degree,
burglary in the first degree, receiving stolen firearms, and receiving stolen
property valued at $300 .00 or more. Thereafter, the Commonwealth made an
offer in which the Appellant would enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
manslaughter in the second degree, in lieu of the murder charge, along with the
other charges.
At the sentencing hearing on June 22, 2005, the Commonwealth moved to
have the Appellant designated as a violent offender pursuant to KRS 439.3401 .
The Appellant argued that characterizing her as a violent offender was not
appropriate because death or serious physical injury are not elements of any of
the crimes to what she pled guilty . The trial court asked the Appellant if the
designation of her as a violent offender would bring a motion to withdraw her
guilty plea . The Appellant's counsel responded he would have to talk with
Appellant. The trial court reset sentencing for July 1, 2005 .
On July 1, 2005, the trial court heard arguments on the violent offender
issue . The Appellant argued that the KRS 439.3401 required that death or
serious physical injury must be an element of the Class B felony, and therefore,
since they are not elements of burglary in the first degree, it was inappropriate for
her to be designated as a violent offender . Moreover, she argued that because
the statute is ambiguous the rule of lenity requires the benefit of the interpretation
to go to her. Finally, she argued that to impose the violent offender statute would
be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Ky.
Const. §17 .
The Commonwealth argued that the statute clearly applied . The trial court
ruled that the statute as drafted in 1986 and all its subsequent amendments
cover this case because it states that a violent offender is a person who commits
a Class B felony involving death or serious injury .'
' Although there have been several amendments to KRS 439.3401, none were
made to change any of the language in section one, which applies to this case .
Most of the amendments were to include other offenses and also, an exemption
for domestic violence cases . In fact, the amendments show that the legislature,
-3-
The trial court then asked her if she wished to wit"uraYv her guilty plea.
After consultation with her attorney, she indicated she did not wish to withdraw
her plea . Judgment was entered and the Appellant was sentenced as agreed in
the plea agreement, with a designation of violent offender being made in the final
judgment. Appeal was filed on July 29, 2005 .
ISSUES
The trial court did not err in designating
the Appellant a violent offender
pursuant to KRS 439.3401(1) .
The Appellant argues the trial court erred in characterizing her as a
violent offender. She argues KRS 439.3401(1) requires that before a defendant
can be characterized as a violent offender for a conviction of a class B felony,
death or serious physical injury must be an element of the Class B felony .
Pursuant to KRS 439.3401(1) a person is considered a "violent offender" if
that person has been convicted of, or has pled guilty to, the commission of a
Class B felony involving the death of the victim or serious physical injuryto a
victim . Under the statute, if a defendant is designated as a violent offender, he or
she must complete no less than 85% of his or her sentence. KRS 439.3401(4) .
"Parole is a matter of legislative grace or executive clemency," and it is not
a judicial function but an executive function. Land v. Commonwealth , 986
S.W.2d 440, 442 (Ky. 1999) ; Gober v. Commonwealth , 79 S .W .3d 887, 890 (Ky.
App. 2002) (citing Morris v. Commonwealth , 268 S.W .2d 427 (Ky. 1954)) . "[T]he
circuit court's only role is to make the factual determination set forth in the violent
offender sentencing statute," KRS 439 .3401 . Hoskins v. Commonwealth , 158
by not changing the language through five amendments since it was enacted in
1986, thinks the statute is sound and unambiguous .
-4-
S.W.3d 214, 217 (Ky. App. 2005). After the court has made that determination,
the Parole Board is free to "review the case of any inmate for parole
consideration prior to his eligibility date if it appears advisable to do so" and
"[n]othing in the [parole] statute or regulations mandates the granting of parole in
the first instance and nothing therein or diminishes the discretionary nature of the
[Parole] Board's authority." Huff, supra at 110 (Leibson, J. dissenting) ; Belcher v.
Kentucky Parole Board, 917 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Ky . App. 1996) (citing Adams v.
Ferguson, 386 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1965) ; Willard v. Ferguson, 358 S.W.2d 516
(Ky. 1962)) .
The requirements for violent offender status set out in KRS 439 .3401
"[are] not arbitrary, capricious or unconstitutionally vague ." Huff v
Commonwealth , 763 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Ky. 1988) (Leibson, J., dissenting) (citing
Kentucky Parole Board Reg . DC-RG6(8)) . "The phrase 'with regard to the
offenses involving the death of the victim or serious physical injury to the victim'
dictates that there be some connection or relationship between the [injury]
suffered by the [victim] and the underlying offense committed by the defendant."
Commonwealth v. Vincent, 70 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Ky. 2002).
In this case, the Appellant pled guilty to a Class B felony of burglary in
the first degree . The appellant, using her own vehicle, transported herself and
Puckett to the Gant home to burglarize it. Puckett entered the home to clear the
way for them to enter . Then, she entered the home the same way. The
appellant and Puckett walked around inside the home, lifting valuable items, all
the while, stepping over the body of Mr. Gant . She did not at any time call for
help for Mr. Gant or care for his welfare .
In Jackson v. Taylor , 153 S .W.3d 842 (Ky. App. 2004), the defendant
argued the trial court did not state in its judgment that he was convicted of a
Class B felony which involved the death or serious physical injury of the victim,
and therefore, it was not proper for the court to characterize him as a violent
offender. However, the Court held that even though the trial court had not stated
that language specifically in its judgment, the defendant effectively admitted the
victims of those offenses suffered serious physical injuries when he pled guilty to
three assault charges, charges which included the element(s) of serious physical
injury or death . Therefore, it "necessarily" meant that the defendant fell within the
violent offender statute . Id . at 844. The Court did not hold, as the appellant here
argues, that the defendant was a violent offender because the Class B crime had
the elements of physical injury or death .
Also, in Care y, 104 S.W.3d 783 (Ky. App. 2002), the Court held that the
designation of the defendant as a violent offender was proper. There, the
defendant pled guilty to two Class B felonies, assault in the first degree and
burglary in the first degree . The Court did not distinguish the elements of the
offenses, just noted that both offenses were Class B felonies, and serious
physical injury had occurred . Id. a t 784.
Even though death or serious physical injury is not an element of KRS
511 .020, Burglary in the first degree, the trial court's judgment is sound in two
ways. First, under KRS 511 .020, an element of burglary in the first degree is
physical injury. The statute states that a person is guilty of burglary in the first
degree if during the commission of the crime she or another participant causes
physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime . Puckett, the
other participant, caused physical injury to Mr. Gant during 'their commission of
the burglary and thus, the appellant is also responsible for that physical injury,
which resulted in Mr. Gant's death . The physical injury inflicted upon Mr. Gant
not only placed the appellant within the bounds of burglary in the first degree, a
Class B felony, it also placed the appellant within KRS 439.3401(1) because the
offense involved a serious physical injury that caused the death of a nonparticipant .
Secondly, and more simply put, the appellant was convicted of a Class B
felony which involved the death of the victim of the offense . Moreover, she pled
guilty to manslaughter, and even though it is not one of the enumerated offenses
of KRS 439 .3401, this was an acknowledgement of her responsibility for the
death that occurred during the burglary .
Therefore, the appellant's conviction of a Class B felony, burglary in the
first degree, which involved the death of Mr. Gant, satisfied the requirement of
serious physical injury, or death, as required by KRS 439.3401 .
Based on the record, her designation as a violent offender was not
"extremely harsh or incongruous ." Darden v. Commonwealth , 52 S.W .3d 574,
577 (Ky. 2001) . The application of the statute in this case was proper and the
statute is not unclear. "Parole is simply a privilege and the denial of such has no
constitutional implications," thus, the appellant lost that privilege when she was
designated a violent offender pursuant to KRS 439 .3401(1) by committing
2 KRS 502 .020 sets out the liabilities of persons for the conduct of another. The
statute states that a person is guilty of an offense committed by another person
when, with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense, he either engages or aids in the conspiracy, or fails to make a proper
effort to prevent the offense .
burglary in the first degree which involved the murder of the resident of the home
she burglarized . Land v. Commonwealth , 986 S .W.2d 440, 442 (Ky. 1999).
Thus, the trial court was correct in its designation .
The trial court did not violate
the rule of lenity.
"[D]oubts in the construction of a penal statute will be resolved in favor of
lenity and against a construction that would produce extremely harsh or
incongruous results," or "impose punishments totally disproportionate to the
gravity of the offense ." Woods v. Commonwealth , 793 S .W.2d 809, 814
(Ky.1990) (citing Commonwealth v. Colonial Stores, Inc. , 350 S.W.2d 465 (Ky.
1961); Boulder v. Commonwealth , 610 S .W.2d 615, 618 (Ky. 1980)) ;
Commonwealth v. Colonial Stores, Inc . , 350 S .W.2d 465, 467 (Ky.1961) . The
rule of lenity applies when courts are uncertain about the statute's meaning and it
is not to be used in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature . Hearn
v. Commonwealth , 80 S.W.3d 432, 434 (Ky.2002)
In this case, the application of the statute in question is simple. The
Appellant pled guilty to burglary in the first degree, a burglary which involved the
death of the victim of the crime . The purpose of the legislature is clear in KRS
439.3401 ; offenders who commit such crimes as the Appellant are stricken of
their privilege to a parole hearing until they have served 85% of their sentence.
The rule of lenity cannot be used to completely disregard that purpose. As a
result, the designation of the appellant as a violent offender, here, did not
produce an extremely harsh or incongruous result. Furthermore, the designation
does not impose a punishment on the appellant that is totally disproportionate to
the gravity of the offense . The Appellant's argument that the rule of lenity applies
here because the statute is ambiguous is without merit .
The designation of the Appellant as a violent offender
was not cruel and unusual punishment contrary
to the Eighth Amendment or Ky. Const. -4 17.
The Appellant argues that the designation of her as a violent offender
violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment . She argues she is
being characterized as a violent offender through her plea of guilty to
manslaughter in the second degree, which is not a crime specified by KRS
439.3401 . However, this is simply not the case . "[W]here punishment is within
the limits prescribed by the statute it could not be properly classified as cruel
punishment ." Workman v. Commonwealth , 429 S .W.2d 374, 377 (Ky . 1968)
(citing Golden v. Commonwealth , 275 Ky. 208,121 S.W.2d 21 (1938) ; Fry v.
Commonwealth , 259 Ky. 337, 82 S.W.2d 431 (1935)) ; See Rummel v. Estelle,
445 US 263, 100S .Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed .2d 382 (1980)(where the range of a
sentence is a matter of legislative prerogative and life sentence for three thefts
totaling $200 was permissible under statute) .
The Appellant, as stated in the previous two sections, pled guilty to an
offense that is specifically set out in KRS 439.3401(1) designating her as a
violent offender. The trial court stated in its judgment that her classification stems
from her pleading guilty to burglary in the first degree, an offense that involved
the death of the resident of the home she burglarized .
We have said in Land v. Commonwealth , 986 S.W .2d 440 (Ky. 1999), that
"there is no constitutional right to parole, but rather parole is a matter of
legislative grace or executive clemency." Id . at 442. "Parole is simply a privilege
and the denial of such has no constitutional implications." Id . at 442. "Mhe
length of punishments are prerogatives of the legislature," and the statute is not
unconstitutional as written . Hughes v. Commonwealth , 87 S.W .3d 850, 856 (Ky.
2002). Therefore, this argument is also without merit.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the judgment of the Daviess County Circuit Court
designating the Appellant, Amy Dawn Stodgell as a violent offender pursuant to
KRS 439 .3401(1) is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Michael Trent Lee
Neal, Mitchell & Lee, PLLC
115 East Second Street, Suite 400
Owensboro, KY 42303
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Room 118, Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8240
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2005-SC-000601 -MR
AMY DAWN STODGELL
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HON. THOMAS O . CASTLEN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 02-CR-00512
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER OF CORRECTION
The Memorandum Opinion of the Court entered March 23, 2006, is
modified on its face by substitution of the attached opinion in lieu of the original
opinion . Modifications on pages 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 of the original opinion affected
the pagination so as to necessitate substitution of the entire opinion and does not
affect the holding of the original Memorandum Opinion of the Court .
ENTERED : March 3 0 , 2006.
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